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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I examine the rival conceptions of modernity, crisis and critique developed 
in the work of JOrgen Habermas and Charles Taylor. Since the publication of Habermas's 
highly influential 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity in the mid-1980s, scholarship 
on the conceptions of modernity and critique contained therein has gained its keenest focus 
in the context of the 'modernity vs. postmodemity' controversy. Meanwhile, in Sources 
of the Self; the Making of the Modern Identity -a book of comparable range and 
philosophical ambition to Habermas's study - Taylor has made his own distinctive 
contribution to what Habermas calls the philosophical discourse of modernity. But as yet, 
there has been no sustained investigation into the internal consistency and mutual challenge 
of the conceptions of modernity, crisis and critique defended by Habermas and Taylor. 
Taylor himself has recently proposed that a debate begin between what he terms cultural 
theory of modernity (to which his own work contributes), and acultural theory (to which 
Habermas owes allegiance). My thesis takes this invitation for debate as its point of 
departure for examining the competing claims of these two important philosophers. 
The problem which organizes my contribution to a debate of the Idnd called for by Taylor 
is how, within the constraints of a philosophical conception of modernity, the claim to 
normativity can be brought to clarification. In chapter two, the sense in which the category 
of normativity is rendered problematic under conditions of modernity is explored. If the 
success of modem science shows that a moral order is no fit ob ect of cognition, it can 
seem that the only rational action-orientation is instrumental in kind. I then introduce the 
strategies adopted by Taylor and Habermas for challenging this representation of the 
ii 
modem tension between cognition and human identity. Chapters three and six are guided 
by the conviction that both Habermas and Taylor call upon a conception of crisis for the 
philosophical purpose of securing coherence to the idea of a moral order, and thereby the 
non-instrumentally rational redeemability of the claim to normativity. In chapters four and 
se , ven, the reflections upon language from which Habermai and Taylor derive con ceptions 
of rational critique are examined. It is proposed that the distinctive significance each 
attributes to language can be understood in terms of the extent to which language features 
as a phenomenon to be grasped by cultural or acultural. theoretical means. In chapter five 
it is maintained that Habermas's, commitment to the latter informs a distinction between 
procedural practical rationality and therapeutic reason which is both difficult to sustain on 
its own terms and in tension with the work done by his conception of crisis. Chapter eight - 
brings Habermas's and Taylor's alternative paradigms to subject-centred or instrumental 
reason into direct contact, and offers - albeit with a promissory proviso -a new way of 
comprehending the distinction between objective and subjective critical reflection. A 
hypothetical application of this distinction to the Idnd of critique appropriate to modernity's 
pressing ecological concerns concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: DiTRODUCTION 
(1.0) Foreword 
Marx once proposed that the task of critical philosophy is "the self-clarification of the 
struggles and the wishes of the age". ' The proposal is at once challenging and 
disconcerting. For if philosophical critique is to bring to self-clarification the struggles and 
wishes of the age, it would need to have a concept of the age -a concept of modernity. 
But what would be philosophical about such a concept? And on what grounds could - 
philosophers claim. competence to participate in a 'discourse' of modernity? These are 
troublesome questions, yet the idea that philosophical reflection can issue in some degree 
of self-clarification concerning the characteristic struggles and the wishes of the modern age 
informs contemporary philosop4ical debate of the very highest degree of rigour and 
sophistication. Much of the credit for this lies with the German -philosopher, Nrgeý 
Habermas. Habermas is the leading contemporary exponent of a tradition of thought called 
the 'Frankfurt School' of 'Critical Theory'. According to this tradition, pioneered in the 
1930s by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, modernity is, characterized by a 
domination of 'instrumental reason'. , The instrumental society - the organization of the 
gamut of human affairs according to principles of technological, control, anonymous 
administrative dictat, and profit-maximization - is, according to this school of thought, the 
paradigmatic location of struggle and discontent in the modem age. Indeed, the dominance 
of instrumental reason is so pervasive, the pioneers of Critical Theory maintained, that its 
critique requires, an epistemologically distinctive, non-instrumentalizing form of 
philosophical reflection. Only if this requirement is taken seriously,, they believed, could 
that which is dominated by instrumental reason by brought to self-clarificationý in recent 
I 
years, historians of ideas have written extensively and illuminatingly on the continuity 
between Habermas's work and the founding ideas of the Frankfurt School. ' While I will 
occasionally draw from the results of these studies, I shall not directly be contributing to 
them. 
However, recent research has also I established that the Frankfurt School tradition by no 
means exhausts the . possibilities for thinking about how philosophical critique of the kind 
called for by Marx might proceed. This literature can be broken down into two kinds of 
philosophical investigation. First, there are studies which offer readings of past 
philosophers - particularly Hegel and Heidegger - as responding to problems thrown up by 
a philosophical concept of the 'modem age'. 4 Second, there is work which both establishes 
continuities between the motivating problems of Frankfurt School Critical Theory and rival 
contemporary frameworks for critique, and which assesses the relative merits of their 
5 proposed solutions. The main focus of attention here has been French post-structuralism. 
Habermas himself has defended his position against these rivals (especially the 
post-structuralists), which in turn has sparkeý off further research into the , defensibility of 
his position. ' Although I will draw on some of this literature quite extensively, 'my 
contribution to the debate between Habermas and defenders of post-structuralism(s) will be 
- at best - tangential. 
But this German-trenýh axis of enquiry is currently undergoing a shift, due to the 
challenging proposals for a philosophically informed diagnosis of the 'spiritual situation of 
the age' offered by two English-speaking thinkers; Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. 
Although both have engaged in controversy with post-structuralism, neither has yet 
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undertaken a sustained debate with Habermas's work. ' While a small amount of research 
has now been done by way of compaiing the opposing positions of MacIntyre and 
Habermas concerning a philosophically informed normative critique of modernity, as yet 
there exists no sustained assessment of the apparently rival positions defended by Habermas 
and Taylor. " The two rival conceptions developed by Habermas and Taylor of how best 
to undertake critical enquiry which aims at the "self-clarification of the struggles and wishes 
of the age" is the sub ect of this, thesis. j 
My central focus of attention will be the sense in which "struggles and wishes" can stake 
or express a claim to norinativity. The issue of how the category of normativity becomes 
problematic in modernity, and of how the category can be secured by appeal to reason, 
deeply structures the work of both Habermas and Taylor., It generates what Habermas calls 
'the problem of modernity's self-reassurance', and contributes to what Taylor terms the 
'crisis in confidence' in the 'modem identity'. Taylor agrees with Habermas that of the 
struggles of the age which call for self-clarification - the sources of moral/spiritual 
discontent which the concept of modernity covers - the dominance of instrumental reason 
is paradigmatic., Of the wishes of the age, both identify normative aspirations on the basis 
of which the dominance of instrumental reason can be overcome. They both offer a 
philosophically informed diagnosis of the struggle and wish for normativity which 
characterizes the modem age, but how their diagnoses are philosophically informed differs. 
My primary objectives are to clarify and to assess the conceptual resources upon which 
Habermas and Taylor draw in their respective efforts at formulating and resolving, to use 
Habermas's expression, the problem of modernity's self-reassurance. In this -opening 
chapter, J will introduce the philosophical conceptions of modernity, crisis, and critique 
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which will guide my reconstruction of the rival claims of these two thinkers. I begin (I - 1) 
by drawing attention to Taylor's recent call for a debate between what, he terms . 'cultural' 
and 'acultural' theories of modernity. After explicating this distinction, and anticipating 
a problem which will later emerge in Taylor's defence of the 'cultural' position, I offer a 
schematic outline of Habermas's theory, of modernity as a version of the 'acultural' kind. 
There are two obvious disadvantages to proceeding in this way: first, I must simplify 
Habermas's theory to an excessive degree; second, the introduction of technical terms 
which go insufficiently explained is unavoidable. On the first count, however, I think that 
the general strategy of Habermas's theory can fruitfully be reconstructed around certain 
dacultural' claims, which I identify. On the second, the precise meaning of the 
Habermasian concepts which most interest us, such as 'communicative action' and the 
'lifeworld', will be investigated in later chapters where .1 
offer an interpretation of the role 
they play in Habermas's proposed resolution of the problem of modernity's 
self-reassurance. 
My reading of both Habermas and Taylor centres around what I argue is the decisive role 
played by a concept of crisis in the normative foundations of their critical theories of 
modernity. In (1.2) 1 first introduce the formal characteristics of Habermas's crisis 
concept, and then outline how, according to Habermas, this concept enters into 
philosophical discourse as a problem of 'self-reassurance'. At this stage, I say little on how 
the concept of crisis structures the normative basis of Taylor's theory, except to anticipate 
my thesis - to be developed later - that there are tensions in the use Habermas puts to his 
conception of crisis which may be resolved by appeal to Taylor's conception. The latter, 
it will become clear, draws on figures of thought similar to those incorporated into the 
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'hermeneuti c' philosoph Iy of Hans-Geo I rg Gadamer. Now the question'of what kind of 
theory can best articulate the conception of crisis to which Habermas himselfappeals is 
internally related to the issue of what it is in virtue of which a theory of modernity has 
critical powers. The latter issue has already been addressed in the well-known controversy 
between Habermas and Gadamer. In (1.3) 1 briefly outline the main contours of that 
debate, in order to lay the ground for an understanding of the divergent paths taken by 
Habermas and Taylor in pursuit of the goal of self-clarification concerning the aspiration 
and struggle for normativity characteristic of modernity. 
(1.1) Two Conceptions of Modernity 
In a recent article, Charles Taylor makes a distinction - and proposes that a debate begin 
- between "cultural" and "acultural" theories of modernity. 9 By a "culture", Taylor means 
a practice expressing specific understandings of "personhood, social relations, states of 
mind/soul, goods and bads, virtues and vices, and the like". 10 "To share a culture", to use 
Alasdair MacIntyre's rather more precise formulation of the same idea, "is to share 
schemata which are at one and the same time constitutive of and normative for intelligible 
action by myself and are also means for my interpretation of others". " The participants of 
a culture, accordingly, understand (are intelligible to) themselves through the schemata of 
conceptions of personhood, social relations, desirability-characterizations, and the like, 
which constitute the culture. The so-called "cultural" theories of modernity focus on the 
specifically modem schemata by way of contrasting them with equally specific others. The 
central issue for the cultural theorist, then, lies in identifying and explaining the transition 
from one schemata to another. Nietzsche, insofar as he portrayed modem scientific culture 
as one schemata of (ascetic) values in contrast and antagonistic to (life-affirming) others, 
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is cited as an exponent of this kind of approach. But Taylor suggests that cultural theorists 
have had little impact on the dominant canon of theory on modernity. 12 Taylor's purpose I 
in initiating the debate is to give voice to what he perceives to be the unjustifiably silenced 
claims of a cultural conception and theory of modemity. 
But Taylor acknowledges that this marginalization has, not been completely without warrant. 
On the one hand, he suggests that practitioners of the cultural approach have typically been 
too one-sided in their identification of the schemata constitutive of modem culture (or as 
Taylor prefers to call it, for reasons I will explain later, the 'modem identity'). The 
content of the cultural conceptions of modernity have failed to do justice to the rich variety 
of, and inner tensions between, the modem schemata of self-interpretation. They have been 
too narrow, he claims, in their description of the aspirations characteristic of the modem 
age. 13 Another reason for the lack of success of cultural theory, he implies, is the 
seemingly relativistic consequences of it; no appeal is made to a non-culturally specific and 
thus seemingly non-culturally relative ground for the critical assessment of practices 
informed by different shemata. The problem has been, Taylor suggests, that cultural 
theorists have been unable to dispel this appearance - they have failed to articulate 
convincingly why this relativistic conclusion does not follow. In other words, they have 
been unable to account for the idea that the transitions to the modem schemata may 
represent a gain or a loss in rationality. The very idea of a gain or loss in rationality 
appears to be problematic within the framework of a cultural theory, since what counts as 
rational is not independent of what a 'gain' or 'loss' means within the interpretive schemata 
of the theory itself. These gains or losses, if the cultural conception of modernity is to be 
preserved, cannot be theorized by appeal to a standard of rationality external 
I 
to the 
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transitions themselves. 7hat move, Taylor states, is distinctive of the "acultural" conception 
of modernity. 
According to the so-called '"acultural" theories, - modernity is defined in terms of some 
"rational or social operation which is culture-neutral". "' By this is meant that modernity 
is thýorized in terms of either'the development of some geneial ýqpacity for thought and 
action, or the performance of some social operation which is an independent variable of 
culture. In both'c'ases, all cultures could, under suitable conditions, undergo the general 
transformation in terms of which modernity is conceptualized in the acultural theory. Any 
par . ticular culture could serve as "input" to the general operation, and the ope'ration'"is 
definable independently of any specific culture. General capacities for thought and action 
typically invoked by theories of this kind, Taylor observes, include the "SCientization of 
world-view", the capacity for discrimination'between "fact and value", and the ability to 
perform actions which bring about- an end by the most efficient 'Means. " Of, the 
culture-neutral social operations taken to characterize modernity, Taylor mentions in&easý 
mobility, urban demographic concentration, and industrialization. ' Theorists who adopt this 
kind of acultural approach may either affirm "or deny that modem societies are successful 
in their performance of the selected function. For instance, there are those who affirm that 
modeffiity has'successfully fostered an objective cognitive grasp of nature, that the growth 
of scientific consciousness in modem societies actualizes'the capacity for separating fact 
from value, I and that with modem technology, theý ability I- to bring about'an end by the most 
efficient means reaches unprecedented fruition. On the other hand, there are those who 
deny that modernity does satisfy the aculturally defined requireffient. Thus, in the Case of 
the social changes characteristic of modernity, they deny that the chosen culture-neutial 
7 
operation is successfully, performed. The secure social integration of individuals, for 
instance, might be cited as a general operation which pre-modem, tightly-knit, relatively 
immobile, traditional communities do best. 15 The point is that any culture could in principle 
serve as input for the capacity to view the world scientifically, or to live in organic 
solidarity with others. Another way of putting Taylor's point, Would be to. say that the 
standards against which modernity is judged are not taken from any particular culture, but 
that all cultures are in principle accountable to these general, culturally non-specific 
I- 
standards or capacities. " 
In the article in which Taylor expresses the wish to initiate a debate between cultural and 
acultural theories of modernity, his official view is to deny that "one can make an exclusive 
choice between them". 17 Cultural theories of the kind he wants -to defend, he 
acknowledges,, neglect certain cruci4 facets of the transformation to, modernity - for 
instance, that "modem science has a validity, and the accompanying technology an efficacy, 
that we have 'come to see'". From this statement, it seems that while not wanting to 
dismiss the claims of acultural theories, Taylor simply seeks to redress the balance between 
them and cultural theories. Unless the cultural approach is given its due, Taylor asserts, 
we are in danger of either the ethnocentrism of misclassifying what is specific to modem 
western cultures as a universal given (because it is construed by the acultural theory as 
culture-neutral),, or of misunderstanding the various dimensions of just what it is which is 
specific to modem western cultures (because the concepts of an acultural theory, are pot 
geared towards showing the contrast between modem and other cultures). But as we will 
see, the position Taylor defends elsewhere is actually stronger than this. For the sense in 
which science has a validity, he will argue, can be brought to clarification by appeal to the 
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resources which only a theory of the cultural kind makes available. The means by which 
we "come to see" the validity of science, he claims elsewhere, is no different to the means 
by which we come to see the validity of schemata of self-interpretation. ý In chapter seven, 
I will argue that there is an unresolved tension in Taylor's defence of a cultural theory of 
modernity which corresponds to this oscillation between the weak claim of redressing the 
balance between cultural and acultural theories,,, and the strong claim'that only a cultural 
theory can articulate the transformations to be explained. 
Having expressed the desire to initiate a debate between cultural and acultural theories in 
general, Taylor makes only one explicit reference to the sense in which Habermas's theory 
of modernity in particular is acultural in type. " in the remainder of this section, I want'to 
The introduce Habermas's -conception of modernity as part of an acultural. theory. 
justification for so classifying Habermas's theory of modernity is apparent from the basic 
insight around which it is fashioned; that since the seventeenth century, distinctive 
structures of thought and action have evolved within'western societies, and that 'this 
evolution can (and must) be conceived as a process of rationalization. " The essence of 
Habermas's conception is that modernity stands in an "internal relationship" to rationality, " 
and the central task of his theory is to establish the precise nature of this relationship. The 
strategy he adopts in undertaking this task can be informatively reconstructed, I believe, 
around the following guiding claims: (1) that, there are certain- 'resources' which all 
societies must make available if they are to be capable of ± reproducing themselves 
'non-pathologically'; (2) that it is possible to reconstruct ideal conditions the satisfaction of 
which would render the availability of such resources 'rational'; (3) that modem societies 
can accurately be described as approaching this ideal type; (4) that allegiance to the 'project 
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of modernity' involves a normative commitment to the closing *of the gap between actually 
existing modem societies and the ideally projected rational type; and (5), that such 
normative commitment is itself rationally justifiable. At this ' int, my sole aim is to PO 
indicate how a certain conception of modernity emerges from this kind of strategy -'one 
which, according to Taylor's nomenclature, is acultural in orientation. Only later -will I 
analyse how Habermas attempts to justify the decisive claims on which, this strategy rests. 
(1) Habermas makes a distinction between the 'symbolic' and the 'material' resources which 
societies must make available if they are to sustain their identities as collectivities. Of the 
symbolic resources, he distinguishes what he calls 'meaning', 'solidarity', and 'personal 
identity'. 'Meaning' is a term of art which designates the resource which is provided by 
the stock of largely implicit, historically generated knowledge upon which participants in 
everyday communication draw; it is that in virtue of which social actors are capable of 
engaging in intelligible action. 'Solidarity' refers to that in'virtue of which individual 
actors are bound together as a community - it covers obligations, normative prescriptions 
for action, and nourishes a sense of communal belonging. , Concerning meaning'and 
solidarity, there must be some degree of consensus if the 'symbolic' identity of the society 
is to be maintained. 'Personal identity' is what enables autonomous action on the part of 
individuals - it provides that sense of individuated selfhood in virtue of which individuals 
can direct, and be responsible for, their own actions. 'Habemas insists that each of these 
resources, if they are to be capable of maintaining the collective identity of the society; 
must feed off the power of conviction. To provide them is the job of three different social 
mechanisms; what Habermas calls 'cultural -reproduction'; 'social integration', and 
6 socialization', respectively. Through cultural reproduction, inherited Stocks of knowledge 
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and interpretive schema are passed from one generation to another; through social 
integration, actions are coordinated on the basis of intersubjectively recognized noms; and 
through socialization, individuals learn to differentiate themselves from others and to 
become accountable for own actions. The integrity of the society depends on each of these 
mechanisms being performed satisfactorily, -ý on malcing these core symbolic resources 
available. But besides these symbolic resources, of course, any society must also make 
certain 'material' resources available -ý such as food, shelter, energy, and the like. To make 
these resources available, is for the society to generate its material means of subsistence. 
(2) Habermas, contends that it is possible to reconstruct how these socially necessary 
mechanisms can operate 'rationally'. Again, 'Habermas distinguishes two different forms 
of rationality appropriate to the reproduction of the two different kinds of resource. ' The 
symbolic resources are reproduced rationally if they are'subject to agreements between 
participants in dialogue reached solely on the basis of the better argument. The mechanism 
here is a formally definable procedure of linguistic interaction which issues in a consensus 
reached with minimal appeal to some, pre-given, time-honoured, authority. A 'culture9 
reproduced in this way would take on an increasingly reflexive character, as inherited 
stocks of knowledge are subjected to a continuous process of revision on the basis of their 
ability to resist criticisms of their validity. 'Solidarity' would be generated according to 
principles which were capable of passing the legitimating test of consensus reached through 
argument. The capacity of action-coordinating norms to carry conviction would be Q, 
displaced from the concrete content of particular normative claims to the formal procedure 
of justifying them. Such principles would thereby take on -a 'generalized, 'universal 
character. And without the security of guaranteed stocks of knowledge and fixed patterns 
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of solidarity to rely on, the pressure increases towards highly individuated, personal- 
identities; abstract and fragile 'ego-identities' which must direct their own life-projects. 
Habermas calls the vehicle through which the symbolic resources are made available 
rationally 'communicative action'. The mechanism through which material ý resources are 
provided for rationally, on the other hand, is the efficient control over, - and adaptation to, -, 
an environment. And this requires, Habermas maintains, that the mechanism through which, 
actions are co-ordinated for the purpose of renewing the material resources of society 
becomes separated from the mechanism for rationally coordinating actions serving to 
reproduce the symbolic resources. -I 
(3) This separation is decisive for Habermas's conceptualization of the specific linds of 
crisis to which modem societies are disposed.,, They are consequences of what Habermas 
f. "Al calIs 'societal rationalization', the main contours of which I have so far been summarizing. 
But supplementing his conception of modernity as rationalized along these lines, is a 
characterization of modernity as a rationalized 'culture'. " I shall refer to this dimension 
of rationalization to indicate how the actual transformation -to modernity'can. be seen to'fit 
Habermas's rational projection. 
The defining characteristic of the products of cultural modernity, in Habermas's conception, 
is that they can each be compartmentalized as contributing to one of three distinct spheres 
of 'value'; science, moral understanding, and -art. ' The value of any cultural artefact, 
under conditions of cultural modernity, depends on its contribution to any one of these 
spheres. Accordingly, cultural modernity dictates that any of its products be assessed either 
qua scientific theory, or qua theory of morality, or qua work of art (or ail criticism). In 
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the institutionalized embodiment of each sphere, the specific kind of claim immanent to the 
artefact is rendered autonomous, and thematized in a manner which allows for a 
specialized, expert competence in matters scientific, moral, and aesthetic. The 'culture' of 
cultural modernity is, in Habermas's specific sense of, a 'rationalized culture', one of 
experts in different Idnds of discourse and judgement. Thus -. scientific discourse is 
institutionalized in such a way as to thernatize the kind of validity claim immanent to 
scientific theories, independent of the contribution such theories might make to the 
understanding of morality, or in yirtue of their merit as works of art. Similarly, questions 
of justice and morality require their own independent and specialized treatment, while the 
production and criticism of works of art takes on a validity which is independent of their 
merit as scientific or moral claims, and for which a quite separate Idnd of specialized 
competence is required. For, Habermas, the value of a scientific claim, qua item of cultural 
modernity, lies in its truth; truth is the aspect of validity which is thematized in scientific 
discourse. The value of moral discourse, on the other hand, resides in how well it 
thematizes problems under the validity aspect of justice or normative rightness. The value 
of modem art and art criticism lies neither in its truth nor in its normative rightness, but 
in its exploration of subjective authenticity, and beauty. 23 According to Habemas, then, 
'cultural modernity' refers to the separation within culture of science, morality, and art; to 
the thematization within science, morality and art of claims to truth, normative rightness, 
and sub ective authenticity respectively; and to the separation between the institutions j 
thrqugh which this thematization issues in 'expert cultures', from everyday life. 
(4) Habermas traces the embryonic normative commitment to a form of life rationalized 
along these lines back to the Enlightenment. 'The 'project of modernity' begins with the 
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Enlightenment insistence upon the failure of religion to furnish the resources outlined 
above. At the level of culture, religion abrogates the differentiation between science, 
morality, and art, which to the thinkers of the Enlightenment, had proved itself as the 
unassailable condition of reflective, self-conscious knowledge. Feeding off the 
self-sanctioned knowledge of authority and tradition, it seemed, religion hindered that shift 
towards reflexivity which conditions the aspiration towards genuinely valid knowledge 
claims. At the level of solidarity, it imposed exemplary hierarchical models of the ordering 
of society from a past bereft of legitimating weight, hindering that shift towards genuinely 
universal norms which reflection demands. And at the level of personal identity, religion 
had defined a place for each individual in this social order, hindering the shift towards 
self-directed autonomous action. The Enlightenment critique'of religion (and more 
generally, of authority and tradition), then, was informed by the ideal of a rational practice 
in which the conditions for "self-consciousness" (reflexively valid knowledge), 
"self-determination" (reflexively valid norms), and "self-realization" (of a reflexive, highly 
abstract personal identity) are established. Without an exemplary rational order drawn from 
the past or the cosmos on which to model itself, the project of modernity must generate 
conviction concerning its norms, as Habermas puts it, "Out Of itself". 24 Since'Habermas 
assumes that the means of rationally coordinating actions which reproduce material 
resources are in themselves norm-free, it follows that the modem project cannot but insist 
that its norms be generated out of the mechanism for rationally wproducing, its'symbolic 
resources. 
(5) It is by following the strategy just outlined that Habermas theorizes the transition to 
modernity as a process of rationalization. The theory explains this process according to 
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"internally reconstructible sequences of stages of competence" " in the reproduction of both 
symbolic and material resources. Its 'acultural' orientation should now be evident. The first 
stage proposed that all societies, irrespective of their particular culture, must reproduce 
symbolic and material resources according to an "internally reconstructible" mechanism. 
This is taken to hold independently of the content of -the resources, themselves. In 
Habermas's terminology, "the lifeworld" (considered as a- resource for self-interpretation) 
displays a structural invariation which underlies the diversity of particular cultural contents; 
"particular forms of life, which emerge only in the plural .... exhibit structures common to 
lifeworlds in general" . 
26 The second stage outlined two culture-neutral operations which 
would process any 'input' rationally; consensus reached through argument and efficient 
adaptation to an environment. Habermas also maintains, as I mentioned, that it is possible 
to internally reconstruct competence in each in terms of their differentiation. As is clear 
from the third stage, differentiation within 'culture' conditions competence in reaching 
rational agreements about truths and norms. 
But these differentiations make the rational justification of allegiance to the project outlined 
in the fourth stage problematic. We saw that, for Habermas, only that Idnd of competence 
which is required for rationally reproducing symbolic resources'has normative relevance. 
But is a society which reproduces its symbolic and material resources by these rational 
mechanisms capable of sustaining (and stabilizing) itself? Are rationally justifiable principles 
available which can integrate the actions of abstract, highly individuated self-directing 
actors? Most generally, can the struggles and aspirations of modernity: be brought to 
u-If-clarification from within the project of modernity so understood? In the light of these 
questions, a need for self-reassurance emerges on the part of the project of modernity. 
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(1.2) Two Conceptions of Crisis 
Internally related to the two conceptions of modernity developed by Taylor and Habermas, 
are conceptualiiations of 'crisis' to which modem individual and collective identities are 
disposed. Being so disposed, modernity stands in need of 'self-reassurance. In this 
section, I will first introduce the formal attributes of Habermas's concept of crisis, before 
indicating how a problem of self-reassurance can be articulated in their terms. Central to 
my thesis will be the claim that in addressing the problem of self-reassurance, Habermas 
appeals to a model of crisis which is inc6mpatible with his conception of modernity insofar 
as it is part of an acultural theory. I will also claim that this incongruity can be rectified 
by a modified appeal to the conceptual resources Taylor's 'Preferred cultural approach 
makes available - resources which are implicitly tapped by Habermas himself. 
On his way towards specifying a 'social-scientific' concept of crisis -, one which is suitable 
for an acultural theory of modernity - Habermas mentions two other'contexts in which the 
concept of crisis has application; the medical and the tragic. ' In the medical context, crisis 
refers to "the phase of an illness in which it is decided whether or not the'organism's 
self-healing powers are sufficient for recovery". 28 The person's critical illness, his or her 
body's externally caused deviation from its normal healthy state, is an objective reality upon 
which the life or death of the person turns. ' From the point of view of the physician, there 
will be empirical criteria for determining this malfunction as an objective process. ' But the 
peculiarity of a crisis, Habermas notes, is that it "cannot be separated from the'viewpoint 
of those undergoing it". The illness takes the form of a crisis insofar as the person is "a 
subject condemned to passivity". " In the medical context, therefore, the concept'of crisis 
is associated with ''the idea of an objective force that deprives a subject of some part of his 
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normal sovereignty. To conceive of a process as a crisis, Habermas continues, "is tacitly 
to give it a normative meaning - the resolution of a crisis effects a liberation of the subject 
caught up in it". " ý 
According to this characterization, crises are (1) inseparable from the point of view of those 
suffering them, (2) caused by influences external to a subject which appear as something 
objective, (3) normatively ascribed by (often implicit) appeal to a criterion of emancipation, 
and (4) resolved with the effect of emancipation. The distinctive twist which Habermas will 
give to these attributes is anticipated by the second context he chooses to consider for the 
sake of clarifying the crisis concept. Following Hegel's understanding of crises as they 
feature in classical tragedy, Habermas remarks that; 
crisis signifies the turning point of a fateful process that, despite all 
objectivity, does not simply impose itself from the outside and does not 
remain external to the identity of the persons caught up in it. The 
contradiction, expressed in the catastrophic culmination of conflict, is 
inherent in the structure of the action system and in the personality systems 
of the principle characters. Fate is fulfilled in the revelation of conflicting 
norms againstwhich the identities of the participants shatter, unless they are 
able to summon up the strength to win back their freedom by shattering the 
mythical power of fate through the formation of new identities. " 
Although Habermas immediately distances himself from the millenarian overtones of the 
philosophy of history implicit in this conception - one which he aims to replace with a 
scientific reconstruction of the logic of learning processes (an "internal reconstruction of 
stages of competence") marking the transition to modernity -. he will continue to rely on key 
aspects of this tragic conception of crisis when articulating what he takes to be the driving 
philosophical problematic of modernity's self-reassurance. 32 Before turning to that problem, 
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let me briefly clarify what these features are by comparing them with the medical usage of 
the crisis concept. As in the medical context, where the objectivity of the critical condition 
from the outside point of view is suffered as a crisis only from the inside perspective of the 
subject of it, so here the effect on the internal identity of subjects of the objective unfolding 
of the dramatic events makes for the crisis., The crisis occurs due to circumstances which 
are external to and out the control of the particular characters, yet they come to inflect the 
identities of the characters themselves. And again like the medical model, the effect of a 
successful resolution of the crisis is liberation - the characters "win back their freedom". 
But despite these similarities, there are differences which are not simply due to the greater 
sophistication of the tragic model. The unfolding of the plot is not 'objective' in the same 
sense as the unfolding of an illness is, and the outside point of view of the gods, the 
story-teller, or the audience, is not the same outside point of view as of the physician. But 
more to the point, whereas in the medical model the objective process which plunges a 
person into crisis is a physical event of nature (a'disease), in the tragic model it is human 
actions and personalities which are ultimately responsible for the crisis. To be sure, these 
actions and personalities have an 'inherent' structure, but it is one which remains behind 
the backs of the participants until it is revealed in the conflict, bound to catch up with them, 
which plunges their identity and existence into crisis. In the tragic model, the crisis has 
a causality of 'fate' rather than nature. 
I now want to indicate how Habermas draws on this conception of crisis to articulate how 
the problem of modernity's self-reassurance enters into philosophical discourse. As we saw 
in the previous section, the project of modemity, as initiated by the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, commits, itself to the norms of a &rational practice'. Such norms are 
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'unconditioned' (rational) by virtue of holding independently of historically contingent 
traditions. Modernity must generate its norms "out of itself", which means - if my 
reconstruction of the acultural strategy of Habermas's theory is correct - out of the 
mechanism for reproducing its symbolic resources. The project of Enlightenment, 
Habermas informs us, emerged as a reaction to a degenerate form of religion as the 
provider of symbolic resources, insofar as it subordinated the individual's reason to 
time-honoured authority, and proved scarce in resource for nourishing solidarity between 
individuals. Religion, as it appeared to the philosophers of the Enlightenment, failed to 
provide crucial symbolic resources which - in the last resort - can sustain an identity only 
by virtue of their power to' carry conviction. Habermas then describes how the 
Enlightenment philosophers turned instead to self-consciousness, self-determination, and 
self-realization, as the orienting norms of the project of modernity. These norms, it was 
thought, could be conceived as manifestations of the "principle of subjectivity", which - 
according to Hegel - is "the principle of the modem world" itself. " 
But Hegel also perceived, Habermas reminds us, that the Enlightenment critique of religion, 
performed in the name of reflective reason and the sovereignty of the rational -subject, is 
itself incapable of furnishing the symbolic resources necessary for sustaining the identities 
of individuals and collectives. "Subject-centred" reason, or reason as it is articulated in the 
principle of subjectivity, leaves itself without a motivating power for the individual who 
must act, and without a unifying power for the collective which must mediate individuals. 
Incapable of "interesting the heart and of having an influence upon feelings and needs", 34 
the principle of subjectivity merely perpetuates the failures of the principles of degenerate 
religion it was to replace. For Hegel, categorial oppositions central to the principle of 
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subjectivity - such as between "nature and spirit", "theoretical and practical reason", "I and 
non-I", "knowledge and faith" - reflect the historically rooted instabilities of the modem 
world. This -instability Hegel attributed to a "sundered harmony of life", to real 
"diremptions" emerging in modem society. " 
Hegel also refers to the abstract oppositions of the principle of subjectivity as expressed in 
enlightenment thought as reflections of a concrete "estrangement of spirit" in modem 
conditions of life - an estrangement which he captures in the notion of "positivity". For 
Hegel, Habermas tells us, positivity represents both the "signature" and the "need" of an 
age embodying subject-centred reason. The positivity of reason, like the positivity of 
religion, refers to a withdrawal of motivational and unifying power only now from the very 
norms which apparently give the project of modernity its orientation. It refers, in other 
words, to the failure of both religion and Enlightenment to provide sustainable - because 
capable of carrying conviction - symbolic resources. Hence a philosophical problem of 
self-reassurance faces the project of modernity. Self-reassurance is required because, as 
Hegel conceived it, a form of life oriented by the norms contained in the principle of 
subjectivity leads to experiential (personal) and public (institutional) consequences which 
simultaneously undermine the stability of that life form. Hegel's critical intuition, then, 
concerns the modem identity's intrinsic tendency,, or fateful disposition, towards crisis. 
Habermas identifies this theme of diremption as the underlying problematic of the 
philosophical discourse of modernity; he designates it as the source of the need for 
36 modernity's self-reassurance. How, then, is the positivism of reason to be theorized given 
the conception of modernity introduced in the previous section? And how is the crisis 
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which it represents to be conceptualized in a social scientific discourse? 
I noted in the previous section that, according to Habermas's theory, modemity is 
characterized by a separation of the mechanisms for reproducing its symbolic and material 
resources. This separation, he argues (on the basis of an internally reconstructible sequence 
of stages of competence), allows both to become rationalized - but the meaning of 
rationalization differs in the two cases. This difference, he maintains, must be taken into 
account in the methodological orientation of the theorist. Society as a rationally organized 
'system', according to Habermas's usage, is theoretically comprehensible from the external 
point of view of an observer as a self-managing functional organism. The rationality of a 
system is measured in terms of its functional efficiency in self-preservation. This it achieves 
by way of a growth in complexity and material production. System-maintenance depends 
upon maximally efficient integration of action consequences, and this is achieved by what 
Habermas, following Talcott Parsons, calls 'steering media'. A society's symbolic 
resources, on the other hand, being the reservoir of meanings, can only be grasped from 
the theoretical perspective of a participant in communication. Considered as this resource, 
what Habermas calls the lifeworld becomes rationalized to the extent that it is reproduced 
by communicative participants in rational dialogue with each other. Habermas's thesis is 
that modernity unfolds initially as an uncoupling of lifeworld from system, and then 
degenerates, under the pressures of an expanding system, into a state of colonization of the 
lifeworld by the system. Within the functional subsystems of the capitalist economy and 
the modem bureaucratic state, action integration is mediated not communicatively, but by 
the 'delinguistified' steering media of money and power. These react back and mediatize 
or instrumentalize the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld, and hence put the 
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identity-forming process of individuals and groups in jeopardy. There comes a point when 
the integrity of the lifeworld is threatened by systemic mediatization. At this crisis point, 
the economic/bureaucratic system colonizes the lifeworld. The result is a pathological 
systemically induced 'reification' of the lifeworld. This manifests itself to the participants 
as a 'one-sided rationalization'. of everyday life around the 'instrumental' dimension of 
rationality which is. exploited in system expansion. This, according to Habermas, is how 
the positivism of reason which has motivated the philosophical discourse of modernity since 
Hegel, can be conceptualized without resort to the principle of subjectivity and 
subject-centred reason. 
The two theoretical attitudes which. Habermas holds to be required for understanding the 
paradox of rationalization - namely the undermining effects of a rationalized system on. a 
lifeworld whose rationalization it presupposes - imply two different conceptions of crisis. 
'System-crises' operate behind the backs of the participants and can be theorized only from 
the vantage point of the first of the two methodological orientations mentioned above; 'lived 
crises' manifest themselves in the lifeworld and are caused by deformations of it? ' While 
it would be a considerable virtue of Habermas's theory if it were able to establish the 
interconnection of these two conceptions, his strategy runs the risk of displacing the, 
theoretical perspective on the lifeworld from the internalized, action-orienting perspective 
of the agent: can Habermas convince us that the lived or existential crises which he wants 
to explain - those which react to the modem dominance of instrumental reason - are best 
articulated in a theory with conceptual resources designed to account for the above paradox 
of rationalization? Is the paradox of rationalization - put as it must be in acultural terms - 
an adequate basis for bringing the modem struggle for 'normativity' to self-clarification? 
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In the next section, I turn to a debate which prefigures Habermas's and Taylor's opposing 
positions on these questions, in that it addressed itself to the philosophical basis of the claim 
to normativity. 
(1.3) Two Conceptions of Critique 
Central to any debate between acultural and cultural theories of modernity, must be the 
question of how adequately each is able to articulate that in virtue of which it possesses 
critical powers. As theories, both contain commitments to the view that this adequacy can 
be defended through rational reflection. Given this shared commitment, the failure of either 
kind of theory to avail itself of conceptual resources required for making intelligible its, own 
possibilities and potentialities for critique must count as a prima facie case against that Idnd 
of theory. Since Taylor's understanding of the status of cultural theories, is avowedly 
indebted to Gadamer's conception of hermeneutics, " the much-discussed controversy 
between Habermas and Gadamer offers itself as a useful point of departure for grasping the 
differences between the foundations for a normative critique of modernity proposed by 
Habermas and Taylor. After outlining the main contours of the earlier controversy, I will 
indicate how a debate between cultural and acultural. cfitical theories of modernity of the 
kind called for by Taylor follows naturally from and marks an advance upon the former 
debate. 
The controversy between Gadamer and Habermas centres around a constellation of claims 
concerning the scope and function of 'hermeneutic reflection' . 
39 Hermeneutic reflection is, 
in the first instance, reflection upon what it is in virtue of which an interpreter is capable 
of reaching an understanding of an initially unfamiliar (because historically or culturally 
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distant) text. The first principle which hermeneutic reflection reveals, according to 
Gadamer, is that the interpreter cannot help but bring to the text anticipations of its 
meaning; anticipations which are not the interpreter's own invention. The interpreter does 
not suddenly appear before the text as a tabula rasa - the text is always approached from 
somewhere. Gadamer chooses to call this 'somewhere' "tradition", and he designates these 
anticipations "prejudices". " These pre-reflective prejudices, and the tradition which carries 
the interpreter to the text, are the interpreter's access to it. It is mistaken, therefore, to 
think that prejudice and tradition are something which merely cannot be avoided; rather 
they are a positive condition of the interpreter's possibility of reaching an understanding. 
Further, the text itself is also both the bearer of and carried by tradition. Consequently, 
the point of departure for hermeneutic reflection is the concrete historical positioning of 
interpreter and interpreted; what Gadamer calls the "hermeneutic situation". The interpreter 
is always situated in his or her attempt to reach an understanding, a task which is only 
intelligible by virtue of the prejudices which are shaped by a tradition within which both 
interpreter and interpreted always find themselves. 
A second principle which hermeneutic reflection reveals is that the understanding which is 
sought on the part of the interpreter is reached through a procedure of dialogue with the 
text which is interpreted. The kind of understanding which the interpreter seeks is 
"dialogical" in that it involves the reaching of an agreement, with the person who speaks 
through the text, concerning the subject-matter of the text. But in order to avoid 
misconstruing the nature of this agreement as the coincidence of self-transparent 
psychological contents, and to give due weight to the traditions and prejudices along which 
subjectivity is always carried, Gadamer coins the phrase "fusion of horizons" to describe 
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the phenomenon of reaching a common accord. "' In this fusion of horizons, the truth of 
the subject matter about which understanding is Sought discloses itself. Further, it is the 
function of the language of interpretation to disclose such truth. Interpretation, then, aims 
at truth which is disclosed through a fusion of the horizons between interpreter and 
interpreted, and this results from a genuinely dialogical interaction between the carriers of 
tradition. Consequently, the goal of interpretation is properly conceived as the broadening 
of the horizon of the interpreter, and there6y an enriched self-understanding. I An .d this is 
a third and crucial principle brought , to herme'neutic reflection; that the understanding which 
is sought has a productive, " practical'character. As well I as being pushed ftom somewhere 
the anticipations and -prejudices which inform and guide a'tradition'- the inteipreter is also 
pulled towards an expanded horizon which cannot be anticipated prior to a dialogical 
interaction with the text. And through this process of interpretation, as it is revealed to 
hermeneutic reflection, both interpreter and interpreted are mutualiy'iransformed in a 
non-arbitrary, practically efficacious, truth-disclosive manner. 
Now Gadamer holds that the position of the interpreter - the hermeneutic situation - is 
paradigmatic for the understanding of human interaction as such. Consequently, in its 
scope fiermeneutic reflection has a claim 'to "universality". All human understanding, 
Gadamer insists, contains a substratum of prejudice which resists reflective rationalization. 
Gadamer proposes a general "rehabilitation" of the concepts of prejudice, tradition, and 
authority, which he thinks have been negatively polarized against an abstract, ahistorical 
"Enlightenment" conception of reason. According to the . Enl ightenment model, as badamer 
interprets it, rational thought and action is defined in opposition to the recognition of 
authority and tradition. But this ideal of rationality, Gadamer claims, breaks with the 
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principle revealed by hemeneutic reflection that understanding only issues from within or 
between tradition(s) - and that without prejudices, the human enquirer would be without any 
"windows" to, the world. A consequence of the contextual, historical character of 
understanding, is that there can be no "Archimedian point" - to use Descartes' notorious 
metaphor" - independent of the content of tradition, from which to assess the rationality of 
prejudices. Likewise, if understanding . 4uman thought and action proceeds in the way 
Gadamer describes, then a method which orients itself to neutralizing prejudices - such as 
the one employed in, the natural sciences - is fundamentally inappropriate for grasping the 
significance of human affairs. Conversely, if it is accepted that the goal of understanding 
is a truth of some sort, then truth itself needs to be divorced from a method which, if 
followed, would guarantee it "monologically". There can be no such guarantee if the 
means by which understanding is reached is dialogical, for there can be no telling in 
advance what the outcome of the dialogue, conducted through language, will be. Indeed, 
the scope of hermeneutic reflection is none other than the scope of language itself, and the 
scope of language is universal; it covers all meaningful human activity in its 
"world-disclosive" aspect. 
It is this last claim which provokes Habermas's challenge. While he finds much that is 
acceptable in Gadamer's hermeneutic insights - particularly his emphasis on the linguistic, 
participatory, dialogical character of reaching an understanding, and the limits of grasping 
the meaning of social action from the point of view of a scientific observer - he is unable 
to accept the contention that hermeneutic reflection is universal in its scope. Habermas's 
worry is that by ascribing universality to hermeneutic reflection, Gadamer forfeits the 
critical potentialities of reflection. For. so long as reflection is bound by the traditions and 
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prejudices of the hermeneutic situation, it remains hostage to the structures of domination 
and relations of power which are legitimated through these traditions, and which are not 
transparent to, hermeneutic reflection from within them. Critical reflection upon these 
traditions, for Habermas, cannot appeal to the prejudices of the traditions themselves for 
the normative basis of its critique. Rather, he insists that it is possible to break out of the 
linguistic tradition which defines the hermeneutic situation. As evidence, he points to the 
phenomenon of "systematically distorted communication", from which emancipation can 
be gained through a process of non-hermeneutic reflection. In the debate with Gadamer, 
Habermas appeals to the "scenic understanding" achieved in psychoanalysis as a paradigm 
case of such reflection. In his early work, he calls, this kind of reflection "depth 
hermeneutics". 
The scenic understanding which is achieved in the dialogue between the analyst and the 
patient, it is claimed, retrieves the meaning of an initially incomprehensible "text"; the 
symptoms of the patient., It does this by appeal to theoretical assumptions about 
psycho-sexual childhood development. By resort to the theory, the analyst can reconstruct 
an "original" traumatic scene in the patient's early life history, which explains the distorted 
evolution of the patient's ego-identity. A correct understanding the patient's behaviour is 
thus conditioned by a knowledge of the causal genesis of the systematic discrepancy 
between "latent" meaning and "manifest" intention. The crucial point for Habemas is his 
claim that such knowledge is discontinuous with the language of everyday, traditional 
horizons of understanding. For in the former case, understanding is guided by theoretical, 
methodologically non-naive assumptions with explanatory power. The phenomenon of 
systematically distorted communication is only intelligible if the dialogue situation is not 
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assumed as always already built into traditions, but is postulated as a normative standard 
in a theory of communicative competence. For Habermas,, then, a theory of communicative 
competence takes over the role of hermeneutic reflection as the modus operandi of 
crifique. 
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I will examine the conception of crisis which features in this argument in more detail in 
chapter three. But the significance of its conclusion should be clear; that for Habermas,, a 
theory of communicative competence must be able to identify and to explain the sense in 
which modernity stands in need of self-reassurance. In (1.1), 1 sketched the acultural, 
strategy Habermas adopts in reconstructing the logic of learning processes which he takes 
to characterize modernity. In (1.2), 1 indicated how crises can be explained in that evolution 
within the framework of a theory of rationalization. But can the decisive transition out of 
the lived crises of the psychoanalytical patient be explained as a learning process within 
such a framework? In his debate with Habermas, Gadamer doesn't. directly address this 
question. I hope to establish that it is at this point that Taylor's hermeneutic conception of 
critique advances the debate. From Taylor's perspective, Gadamer can be seen as one of 
those cultural theorists who inadequately explains rational transitions in the process of 
self-interpretation. But this will only become evident when the debate on the scope of 
hemeneutic reflection is recontextualized. around the problem of modernity's 
self-reassurance; or better, when the problem of self-reassurance is reformulated around the 
principles of hermeneutic reflection. 
My aim in this introductory chapter has been to set the stakes for the interpretation and 
assessment which will follow of the attempts made by Habermas, and Taylor to bring the 
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modem aspiration and struggle for normativity to self-clarification. I now want to explain 
more precisely how modernity renders any claim to normativity problematic. Earlier in this 
section, I noted Gadamer's objections to the "Enlightenment" view that the methods of the 
natural sciences hold an exclusive claim to truth. In the previous sections, I emphasized 
Habermas's point that the resources of human identity, if they are not to degenerate into 
a 11positive" form, must be capable of carrying conviction. If the Enlightenment view is 
broadly correct, and genuine cognition (of truth) is incapable of carrying sources of human 
identity with conviction, isn't the project of modernity advanced by the proponents of 
Enlightenment doomed, to positivity? In the next chapter, I try to make sense of the 
proposition that cognition and human identity stand in irresoluble tension under conditions 
of modemity. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE MODERN TENSION BETWEEN COGNITION AND 
EDENTITY 
(2.0) Introduction 
Of contemporary thinkers who insist on the philosophical and normative unassailability of 
an unqualified project of modernity, perhaps the most uncompromising (and for that reason 
representative) is Ernest Gellner. The first part of this chapter (2.1) unpacks a remark 
which is the recurring motif of Gellner's philosophical writings; that modernity represents 
a "wholly new balance between being and knowing". ' Here, as elsewhere, my focus will 
be on the coherence of the conceptual resources which are tapped in the articulation of 
diagnostic claims, rather than on empirical hypotheses concerning the historical or 
socio-anthropological specificity of what is diagnosed. In my exposition of Gellner, I 
outline a sketch of the predicaments he takes to follow from a certain way of legitimating 
beliefs. By adopting what Gellner calls an "ethic of cognition" - within which the 
believability of beliefs is conditioned by the rationality of the procedure legitimating them 
- modems ý bring upon themselves, Gellner proposes, an irreconcilable tension between 
cognition and identity. ' 
Gellner's understanding of this tension can be provisionally reconstructed around the 
following conjectures. Human beings have beliefs about themselves and about the world, 
and the beliefs they have of their place in the world, if true, gives them reason for action. 
Cognition can be defined as the grasp of truths, and the capacity for cognition reaches 
fruition when beliefs held in reason are true. If we take it that the capacity for cognition 
reaches fruition with modem science, what counts as a reason can then be understood in 
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terms of the procedure which conditions its cognitive success. But when this procedure is 
applied to beliefs held by human beings about themselves and their place in the world - and 
hence to what could count as a reason for acting - then, they no longer seem to admit of 
truth. The kind of beliefs which are capable of carrying the conviction which cognition 
affords can only give reason to instrumental action in bringing about by the most efficient 
means a non truth-evaluable end. So in the process of gaining a cognitive status for their 
beliefs,, modems forfeit conviction-carrying reasons for their own non-instrumental actions. 
And insofar as beliefs resist assimilation to cognition, they become relativized to the 
individual (or -communal) disposition of the holder(s) of the belief. If, following the 
terminlogy of (1.1), we call the resource and context of application of action-guiding beliefs 
the 'lifeworld', then modems must confront the predicament of their lifeworld being eroded 
by cognition. It is a predicament because the beliefs which can be scientifically legitimated 
are incapable of supporting individual or collective human identities. 
After offering a more refined exposition of Gellner's claims, I address the weaknesses in 
his position by way of reconstructing objections which also serve to introduce the 
alternatives developed by Habermas and Taylor. In (2.2), 1 take up what would be 
Habermas's objections to Gellner's employment of the lifeworld concept, and , to his 
narrowly construed conception of rationality as exclusively instrumental. The fragility of 
the 'if' which conditions Gellner's identification of rational credibility with scientific 
legitimacy or instrumental efficacy would be stressed by Taylor as well as by Habemaso 
though on different grounds. After questioning the significance Gellner attaches to rules 
in his account of the intellectual tension between knowledge and value (2.3), 1 draw directly 
on the criticisms which Taylor (amongst others) has put to the anti-realist prejudices to 
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which Gellner implicitly appeals. My argument at this point is only to draw attention to the 
ground which would have to be covered for his claims to have adequate support, though I 
hope, in the course of this, to have put the onus of argument on Gellner's side. The 
arguments put forward to support the counter-positions of Habemas and Taylor will be 
rehearsed in later chapters. 
What these counter-positions would need to establish by way of reconciling cognition and 
identity is introduced in (2.4). Gellner acknowledges that the ethic of cognition issues in 
predicament since it is unable to account for why anyone should abide by it. As has often 
been noted, in prescinding from value-attribution to the world, the scientific perspective is 
incapable of attributing value to itself. What I call - the Nietzschean strategy for 
reconciliation embraces this sceptical conclusion, and affirms an ethic of and-cognition. 
Habermas's and Taylor's strategies can be understood in contrast to this move. Both turn 
to language in developing a conception of moral order, but whereas Habermas attempts to 
reconstruct it on the basis of the pragmatics of linguistically mediated interaction, Taylor 
seeks to clarify the ontological commitments to which the disclosive or expressive 
dimension of language lends itself. Further, while for, Habermas the moral order is 
essentially open to public recognition, Taylor proposes that under modem conditions, - no 
public realizability of the moral order in which humans are set; in a certain sense, is 
conceivable. But they share common ground in seeking to counter scepticism by appeal to 
transcendental arguments concerning a certain Idnd of unavoidability of both cognition and 
identity. Returning to Gellner's initial insight, both aim to elucidate the problematic balance 
between being and knowing which characterizes modernity. 
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(2.1) GeUner on Cognition vs. Identity 
Modems are "doomed", writes Gellner, "to suffer a tension between cognition and 
identity"'. This tension is an inescapable consequence, he, thinks, of the consistent and 
rigorous application of a deeply embedded norm of modem culture; what I shall call 'the 
validational imperative'. The demand for validation represents the regulative principle of 
what Gellner calls the "ethic" and the "norm" of cognition? According to Gellner, there 
are two fundamental components to this norm. First, it commands that "anything must be 
true before it can'significantly claim other merits". 4 The second component requires of 
truth that it be merited in virtue of satisfying maximally risky criteria of epistemic 
legitimacy. Both components, Gellner claims, issue in a certain "disenchantment" - one 
which is correctly perceived - as threatening to human identity. Faced with this threat, 
Gellner suggests that philosophers invent a concept of the lifeworld to protect us from the 
dehumanizing forces of cognition. But this move is self-defeating, he argues, because its 
motivation is intelligible only under the presupposition of conditions of rationalization 
incompatible with the applicability of the lifeworld concept. For these "are', -conditions 
shaped by and fit for instrumental rationality, the very idiom of disenchanting cognition. 
In this section I will offer an exposition of the grounds for Gellner's thesis that'cognition 
both represents and simultaneously undermines itself as an ethic. In the following two 
sections I will indicate how the alternative conceptual possibilities for diagnosing the 
modem tension between cognition and identity offered by Habermas and Taylor can be 
approached on the basis of weaknesses which can be exposed in Gellner's position. 
The first component of Gellner's version of the validational imperative contains, the 
proposition that different Idnds of value can be ascribed to beliefs, that one of these is truth, 
33 
and that the ethic of cognition prioritizes the truth-value ('truth') of beliefs over other 
evaluable properties they may have. Besides being evaluable in terms of their truth, beliefs 
may be held on account of allegiance to a tradition, to a moral or political authority, or to 
one9s inner 'feelings'. Gellner's contrast is between belief systems for which the overriding 
criterion of acceptability or evaluability of beliefs is their truth, and those for which truth 
is compromised or overridden by 'idiosyncratic' loyalties to particular traditions, authorities, 
and faiths. The ethic of cognition requires that, as an ideal, beliefs be held on account of 
a truth which is independent of the function they serve in perpetuating any tradition other 
than the growth of objective knowledge. To the degree to which it is possible, the ethic 
demands that authority and faith ought not "fill out the world", that they should "stand 
ready to be judged by evidence which is not, under their control". ' By isolating the 
truth-evaluability of beliefs, the ethic of cognition impels us to differentiate that function 
of language which enables us to describe the world felicitously - and hence to issue truths 
- from functions which, from the point of view of the ethic of cognition, are adventitious 
to the world-descriptive function of language. It is this differentiation, Gellner thinks, 
which traditions and the 'common sense' of traditional societies fail to carry through. And 
it is In virtue of the "systematic conflation of descriptive, evaluative, identificatory, 
status-conferring and other roles - of language", that traditional world-views are 
"enchanted". ' Enchantment, according to Gellner, is a consequence of a yocabulary 
sufficiently 'thick' to perform each of the different linguistic functions simultaneously; thus 
giving the appearance of both describing the world and expressing a particular cultural or 
moral code. The autonomy and primacy of truth appraised by, the ethic of. cognition, 
Gellner suggests, - serves to alienate "Man the knower" from the "citizen and the moral 
being". ' 
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In order to maximize the extent to which beliefs are held in virtue of their truth, and to 
minimize the degree to which non-assertoric functions of language serve to influence the 
content of belief, the ethic of cognition requires of truth-claims that they pass a maximally 
rigorous selection procedure. It may be the case that traditions and common sense are the 
vehicles of truth-content, but the ethic of cognition biases theburden of proof by involdng 
criteria of legitimacy which are minimally dependent on particular cultural contents. The 
second aspect of Gellner's validational imperative does not reduce truth to legitimacy, rather 
it insists that since it is better to hold beliefs which are true rather than false - and this 
independently of the consequences of holding them - we are obliged to maximize our 
chances of arriving at the truth, and this means following a procedure for reaching them 
which minimizes the risk of error. We are obliged, that is, to be able to legitimate beliefs 
in as stringent a manner as possible. The task of epistemology is to clarify how this 
obligation is best met. 
Gellner proposes that once the task of epistemology is seen in this way, the preoccupation 
with the 'foundations of knowledge' in the Descartes-Kant canon of modem philosophy 
appears not so much as an attempted explanation of cognitive success and its possibility, but 
more as a concern for outlining a programme of "recommendations for the proper conduct 
of our intellectual life". ' The significance of epistemology, then, lies in the series of 
"cultural injunctions" it elaborates, the most important being the validational imperative to 
place all beliefs and practices subjudice. For instance, Locke's description of the role of 
philosophy as the "handmaiden to science" can be read as motivated not just by the 
perceived need for science to be given foundations, but by the understanding that the 
emerging science of his time faithfully satisfied the requirements of proper intellectual 
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conduct; conduct which its philosophical handmaiden could assist. 9 But modem 
epistemology,, at least insofar as it is set on its way by Descartes and Locke, could not 
explain the cognitive advance of modem science, Gellner suggests, because by focussing 
on the individual's acquisition and justification of beliefs, it failed to grasp the broader 
cultural injunctions which came to inform the emerging scientific system of belief. So 
Gellner holds that the terms of acceptability of beliefs can systematically differ, that with 
modernity a cultural injunction emerged that beliefs be acceptable - that is, worth having 
- if one can generally expect them to have satisfied certain criteria of legitimacy, and that 
these broader cultural criteria can serve both to demarcate scientific thought, and to account 
for its cognitive advance. 
What, then, are these criteria? Gellner's claim is that modem cognitive practices are 
peculiarly constrained in the provision of explanations which are open to public and 
repeatable testing. This formal norm of genuine cognition, according to Gellner, serves to 
neutralize the cultural "cocoon" within which, in cognitively "low-powered", societies, 
knowledge claims are protected. " It is formal in, virtue of. being maximally, if not 
absolutely, culture-unspecific. 
- 
Gellner can call this culture-neutral baseline of explanation 
"mechanism" because "a machine is an artifact which can be reproduced at any time, in any 
place, in any society, provided that the same specified materials are used and put together 
in a publicly specifiable way". " The ethic of cognition requires the same of legitimate 
explanations. But in order to satisfy this requirement, it must avail itself of certain 
conceptual resources. Most significantly, these resources must be strictly rule-bound. 
The concept of a rule, Gellner suggests, captures the deep significance of the norms of 
public specifiability and repeatability. Rules command consistency and symmetry, "like 
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cases are treated alike" in accordance with them - they do not admit of idiosyncratic 
variation. The disposition towards mechanism which defines the scientific mode of 
cognition can thus be interpreted as a rigorously sustained bias toward rule-boundedness. 
Procedures of explanatio4 must follow an orderly, -rule-governed method, and the concepts 
by which they are articulated must be of such a Idnd as to be applicable in a strictly 
ordered, non-idiosyncratic way. 
But a presupposition of treating like cases alike in accordance with rules is that different 
kinds or classes of cases be distinguished and differentiated from each other. In the case 
of cognition, - the effect of such differenflad; n is to purify the. language of possible 
explanation from all ý other compromising linguistic . 
functions. , The subsequent 
disenchantment is reinforced by what Gellner calls an "ethic of rules", constraining the 
knower to a vocabulary of a kind which is expunged of human idiosyncrasy. The order, 
regularity, and symmetry imposed by rules on the behaviour of objects and concepts by 
mechanism, disenchants them by ruling out the spontaneity and idiosyncrasy characteristic 
of agency. The world loses the meaning discharged by the Idnd of concepts through which 
human agents must understand themselves, as agents. Gellner observes that the loss of 
spontaneity and freedom -which Weber, captured in his, image of modem, bureaucratically 
organized society as an "iron cage", can thus be extended to the modem scientific 
conceptual organization of the world. " A language of genuine cognitionlis gained at the 
expense of a vocabulary in which the identity of free and meaningful human agency can be 
recognized and expressed: the concepts "in terms of which identities are forged and life is 
lived" are submitted to an irreversible form of "intellectual erosion". " - To adopt a 
formulation from John McDowell, modem science develops conceptual capacities which are 
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directed to the - Idnd of intelligibility that is proper to the realm of law, precisely by 
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separating that intelligibility from the kind that is proper to meaning. But since human 
beings do fall. within the realm of law, Gellner sees no alternative to the view that 
"whatever is worth saving in our conception of ourselves needs to be reconstructed in tems 
of conceptual apparatus suitable for characterizing the realm of law as such". 15 This is just 
the constraint required by the mechanistic baseline of legitimate explanation, ý which thus 
issues, Gellner believes, in the modem "certainty of reductionism"; "that everything is an 
unedifying something else. " 
16 
So the modem tension between cognition and identity, as Gellner presents it, results from 
a conflict between the validational imperative and the human need for enchantment., One 
way of dealing with this conflict, ' which Gellner believes to have been taken by many 
contemporary philosophers, is to re-establish identity and self-reassurance by separating off 
or bracketing the world in which humans live and endorsing it, as it were, from within. 
It is in the service of re-enchantment that Gellner sees the significance of the notion of the 
lifeworld. The lifeworld (Lebenswelt) - "the ordinary world in which we conduct our daily 
life" 17 _ provides both the resources for identity-formation, and the field of expression of 
human identities. It becomes problematic, he contends, with the differentiation of the 
languages of cognition and life, with the discontinuity between the vocabularies of science 
and the everyday. This is partly because competence in the use of the former generally 
requires a specialized and technical training, but the point Gellner emphasizes about the 
modern lifeworld is that it is partly constituted by this discrepancy between the language 
of genuine cognition and 'ordinary' language. That is, the modem recognizes the "interim 
status" of the claims of common sense as objects of possible "re-validation" by science, and 
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thus of possible - reconceptualization, according to apparatus suitable for rendering them 
intelligible within the realm of law. This lack'of congruence is evidenced, he suggests, by 
the modem preference for the "idiom for which we have greater cognitive respect" - 
namely, science - when dealing with problems of grave practical consequence. " 
The paradox of the preference for scientific problem-solving, assuming for the moment that 
it is one which generally obtains, is this; that although the idiom of lifeworld thought lacks 
competence for dealing with issues of real gravity, it is also responsible for detennining 
what these issues are to be. The implication of Gellner's position is that within the modem 
lifeworld, what is to count as of real importance is a matter of something external to it - 
namely, the sphere of expert scientific/technological knowledge and practice. it is part of 
the identity of the modem lifeworld that issues of greatest importance be specified in a way 
amenable to scientific or technological resolution. But science and technology deal with a 
world devoid of meaning, or at least must presuppose such a world. in order to reap the 
goods demanded -by the modem lifeworld. Consequently, - Gellner argues,, under the 
pressure of the validational imperative, the boundary -around any putative lifeworld 
collapses, such that the very invocation of a lifeworld testifies to its non-availability as a 
real option. " The separability of the lifeworld from the world of cognition, and of the 
radically different idioms in which they are articulated, Gellner asserts, is enough to 
undermine the ultimate legitimacy of the claims of the lifeworld. Yet it only makes sense 
to impute a lifeworld under modem conditions, as a measure to preserve human identity 
from the anonymity of the world-machine. Speaking on behalf of the modem, Gellner 
claims that the lifeworld can only properly be imputed with irony, since "we have become 
aware of it when we no longer live in it, at any rate not exclusively or predominantly". 20 
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The lifeworld becomes 'eroded' by an idiom of cognition 'detached' and 'autonomous' from 
it; the latter destabilizes the former irreversibly. 
Gellner is not referring here simply to an 'intellectual' erosion, but to one which he thinks 
has its roots in the increasing rationalization of action in the modem world. Gellner's 
account of how it occurs can be summarized more clearly if we keep distinct what Gellner 
himself conflates - the two senses of lifeworld distinguished above. The lifeworld is both 
the source of identity-formations, and therefore of categories and judgements about what 
is most worthwhile and important. It is also the means of application and reproduction of 
these values in everyday life. Keeping these two senses separate, Gellner's account of how 
the lifeworld becomes eroded goes as follows. The practical application of cognition 
(technology) has a disintegrative effect on the lifeworld (in the second sense) because of the 
idiom of its operation. Technology aims at the most efficient means of solving a 
pre-ýdetermined, closed problem. Likewise, the science which is applied operates by means 
of hypotheses which seek to explain a given problematic state of affairs. The idiom of 
cognition, then, is applied in everyday life in order to solve problems by way of discovering 
the -most efficient means of achieving a given, pre-determined end. It requires the 
maximum degree, for Gellner, of instrumental rationality. 
The implications of this for the lifeworld (in the first sense) become apparent when Gellner 
discusses the possibility of judging the rationality of the conduct of a life as a whole. 
Against the background of the modem worldview, nature is an empty resource for 
judgements, concerning the ends of human action - the world is a morally neutral 
mechanism. But it does behave in an orderly, rule-governed way, which affords a basis for 
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judging the rationality of actions in terms of their efficiency in being instrumental to the 
realization of given desired ends. Particular ends of action can also be judged rational to 
the degree that they are mutually consistent, so that the efficient realization of one specific 
end might be judged irrational if it is incompatible with the realization of another, more 
desired end. Even here, of course, the rationality of the end is being judged as a means to 
a further prioritized end; that is, in terms of a relative instrumentality. But what about the 
rationality of the end for the conduct of a life as a whole, where the question of relative 
instrumentality does not arise (we only live one life as a whole)? The problem here, 
Gellner observes, is that the presuppositions of instrumental rationality break down, for two 
related reasons. First, the specificity required for an end of action to be the basis of a 
calculation of efficient means, renders any such end unfit for the purpose of a whole life. 
By way of illustration, Gellner remarks that where the desired end is a holiday partner, the 
qualities sought in that person are readily specifiable, and a decision can be reached which 
will realize the desired end with instrumental reason. But in the case of life-long 
commitments, such as the choice of a spouse, no such qualities can be readily specified. 
Second, and more crucially, the diversity and plurality of plausible fundamental ends is 
inconsistent with the unitary identity which conditions instrumentally rational choices. In 
the following way, Gellner proposes that this problem assumes a much broader significance 
under conditions of modernity. 
Gellner coins the phrases "Fixed and Variable Cognitive Capital" to illustrate the changing 
significance of instrumental rationality in the modernization process. " ,ý The expression 
'Cognitive Capital' serves as a reminder that bodies of knowledge are available to us which 
I, 
are a useful resource for dealing with particular life problems. It is 'Fixed' if the system 
41 
of beliefs, which make it up is relatively rigid and stable, and so immune from the 
challenges of recalcitrant experience. Accordingly, it is important that these beliefs be sul 
genefis, if they are to be understood as hypotheses at all. Further, it is "the concepts and 
ideas of this Fixed Cognitive Capital" which serve to articulate and legitimate "identities" 
and, "personal relationships", as well as power and hierarchy structures. It is thus the 
resource for the legitimation of personal and social identities, and also a conservative 
counter-weight to change. - Where there is a greater degree of evidence sensitivity, problems 
are rationally resolvable in terms of the "Variable Cognitive Capital". This is the domain 
of instrumental rationality, where hypotheses are constructed to discover the most efficient 
means to a particular end. In bringing everything under the hypothesis, scientific thought 
destabilizes the "Fixed Cognitive Capital" out of which the value of instrumental rationality 
arose: 
The modem scientific/industrial world is simultaneously driving us in'two 
incompatible directions. By eroding the old frameworks and requiring 
neutral, - homogeneous legitimation of beliefs, it pushes the world into 
becoming a Bundle of Hypotheses, and thus a home fit for instrumental 
rationality-, At the same time, this extension of the Bundle of Hypotheses 
and the corresponding reduction of the rigid framework also eventually make 
rational calculation harder in many areas where it is now expected and which 
were previously exempt from it. The more general or fundamental features 
of the world, though ý now demoted to the status of mere hypotheses, often 
elude rational assessment because they are unique or sul genefis or very 
fundamental. They become relativised, optional, and - deprived , of their 
privileged, entrenched status - but without becoming, for all that, eligible for 
rational,, instrumental evaluation ." 
This, I think, is the closest Gellner comes to diagnosing the real source of the modem 
tension between cognition and identity. I shall now consider reasons for thinking that, it 
stands on -an inadequate conceptual foundation, by way of reconstructing the kind of 
response which Habermas and Taylor would make to it. 
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(2.2) Morality and Cognition - Habermas's Response 
One way of responding to Gellner's position would be to retain the validational imperative, 
while challenging Gellner's formulation of-it. One might want to accept that the cognitive 
achievements of modernity presuppose a systematic differentiation of descriptive, 
prescriptive, and evaluativ6 linguistic functions; that the terms of acceptability of belief take 
on an increasingly formal-and reflexive character as legitimation is secured with minimal 
appeal to pre-reflective, -, tradition-specific dogma; and that there is a sense in which this 
process renders the claims of the lifeworld problematic. But if the validation imperative is 
dissociated from ý its positivistic construal as mechanism - if it is radicalized to cover the 
claims of the lifeworld themselves - then the imputation of the lifeworld can in turn be 
divorced from -the motivation for re-enchantment. If the first component of Gellner's 
version of ý the validational imperative is dropped, and cognitive worth is attributed to 
redeemable validity claims other than truth-claims, then a corresponding shift in our 
conception of the idiom of validation (the second component) is required. Then the effect 
on the lifeworld of different kinds of rationality would also need to be distinguished, and 
the tension between cognition and identity diagnosed by Gellner retheorized. It is by such 
a radicalization of the validational imperative that Habermas can be seen to respond to 
Gellner's position. The motivation for this move can be reconstructed from the need to 
overcome weaknesses primarily in (1) Gellner's employment of the lifeworld concept, and 
(2) in his understanding of instrumental rationality. 
(1) There are several reasons for thinking that Gellner's polemic against the concept of the 
lifeworld is unsatisfactory. First, Gellner equivocates in his employment of the notion; he 
oscillates between the mutually incompatible views that the claims of the lifeworld have no 
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cognitive'statusýat all, and that this status is cognitive but precariously so. The first view 
amounts to an a priori rejection of the cognitive capacity of most of natural language, and 
would be'in need of much further metaphysical support. Not only is such support not 
forthcoming-, but it is difficult to see how it could be given the radical epistemological 
constraint on metaphysical thought built into the validational imperative. But if, for 
epistemological reasons, the claims of the lifeworld are ascribed a precarious cognitive 
status, "one will want to know more about why the validational imperative itself is excluded 
from them. - To appreciate this point, it is enough to take a brief look at how the concept 
of the lifeworld gets its philosophical significance. 
As Husserl presents it, the lifeworld is the background or "horizon" of unthematized 
cultural certainties which is presupposed by, and always pre-given to, the human enquirer. 
The lifeworld is "always already there, existing in advance of us", presenting objects to 
"always somehow practically interested subjects". 23 Because of this entwinement of theory 
and practice within a lifeworld, even the "knowledge of the objective-scientific world is 
'grounded" in the' self-evidence of the life-world"'. This self-evidence is irreducibly 
intersubjective, its taken-for-grantedness is constitutively shared by members of the living 
community of which the theoretician or scientist is always a part. " The'lifeworld is a 
4world"which "is always prior to the subject that relates itself to objects in knowing and 
acting "26 9 it provides that background context against which a subject can confront'an 
objectiVe world in an appropriate epistemic attitude. Gadamer's hermeneutics, Habermas 
observes, transformed the lifeworld concept into one of "a culturally 'transmitted and 
linguistically'organized repository Of meaning patterns"27 which is pre-given as a linguistic 
and cultural horizon for theoretically and practically engaged subjects., 
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The lifeworld considered as an epistemic totality corresponds closely to what Wittgenstein 
. -,, A 1s" "29 .1 the sub-stratum, of all my inquiry and asserting and "the inherited background 
against which I distinguish between true and false". " It is therefore not something which 
as a whole I can stand outside of and judge as true or false, and thus not something which 
is an apt object of doubt. Certainty is properly conceived as a function not of 'intrinsically 
credible' beliefs which can be construed as the foundations of knowledge, but of a mutually 
reinforcing, holistically structured web of thought and action. It is against this certain - but 
tacitly-known - background that particular doubts and knowledge claims are tested and 
validated. And it follows from this that not all propositions can be hypotheses since the very 
possibility of judgement presupposes commonly accepted standards or nomu of judgement. 
Such considerations play an important part in the use Habermas, makes of the category of 
the lifeworld. The lifeworld is a horizon of "more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, 
background convictions". " Beliefs, assumptions, definitions and expectations present 
themselves in an ý unthematized, intuitive, pre-given way in the lifeworld horizon. 
Problematic beliefs and situations are "encompassed within the horizons of a lifeworld"", 
but the lifeworld as such "cannot become problematic, it can at most fall apart". -The 
lifeworld as a whole is therefore immune from total revision. It is encountered by subjects 
as a pre-given, pre-interpreted reality the limits of which "cannot ýe transcended";, for the 
lifeworld is that -"transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet". " In employing the 
lifeworld concept in this way, Habermas is exploiting a function which the notion -has 
always served; to signal the exhaustion of foundationalist epistemology. - From Husserl to 
Habermas, the idea of the lifeworld is a philosophical tool constructed for the purpose of 
saving cognition from the reductio which issues from sceptical demands for foundational 
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justification. Iq other words, it serves to redeem the validational imperative from the 
incoherence into which it collapses when pushed beyond its proper scope of application. 
Gellner himself acknowledges that the unbounded application of the principle of validation 
threatens to' undermine all cognitive claims by infinite regress, but recommends that, we 
resign ourselves to this predicament. 33 But by rejecting the lifeworld concept tout court, 
he allows himself no resource for making a case for such an acknowledgement. And this 
refusal is a consequence of. a misunderstanding of the philosophical motivation behind the 
concept. 
Contrary to Gellner's presumption, the lifeworld need not be a safe haven for philosophers 
on the run from the world-machine. This is particularly clear in the use Habermas makes 
of the concept. Habermas is careful to distinguish world concepts which are the referential 
presuppositions of redeemable validity claims from the lifeworld concept which represents 
the context which conditions the meaning of those claims. According. to Habermas's theory, 
I can raise claims with presuppositional reference to an objective world ("the totality of 
ob ects and states of affairs"), what he calls a social world ("the totality of legitimately j 
regulated interpersonal relations"), and a subjective world ("the totality of experience to 
which a speaker has privileged access and which he can express before a public"). ' These 
'worlds' are the ontological correlates of claims which can be validated by appeal to the 
irreducible criteria of truth, rightness, and sincerity or truthfulness respectively. The 
lifeworld, on the other hand, plays no such ontological role; speakers and hearers'cannot 
refer to it in ý the way they can to the objective, socialg and subjective worlds. Hence 
knowledge of the objective world does not compete with the lifeworld as it does in the 
scenario depicted by Gellner. 
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A third objection can be directed towards inadequacies in Gellner's diagnosis of the tension 
between cognition and identity arising from his abandonment of the lifeworld concept. In 
order to distance himself from projects of re-enchantment, Gellner chooses to articulate the 
threat posed by the idiom of cognition to the linguistic resources required for making sense 
of and expressing human identity as disintegrative of the lifeworld. The concept 
relinquished, he is forced'into coining terms like "Fixed and Variable Cognitive Capital" 
for the purpose of explaining this effect. But Habermas's lifeworld concept can do the same 
job, only much more elegantly and with greater explanatory power. Besides being a 
resource of cultural or epistemic certainties - the pre-given stocks of knowledge upon which 
speakers and hearers draw - there are also institutional orders which regulate group 
memberships, as well as individual pre-theoretical skills and competences constituting the 
horizon of the lifeworld. So for Habermas, the lifeworld is the source not only for the 
production and reproduction of knowledge, but also of social solidarifies and individual 
personal identities. -Under the pressure imposed by the validational imperative, the 
lifeworld itself can and does become rationalized. With the concept of a rationalized 
lifeworld, Habermas can capture both the thought that traditionally sanctioned stocks of 
knowledge are put, at-risk under the requirement for validation, and that any particular 
validation is encompassed by a background totality of taken- for-grantedness which cannot 
be bracketed at will. Not only does this move put Gellner's charge of 'bracketing' on the 
other foot, but it makes room for a conception of rationalization which covers each of the 
three dimensions of the lifeworld. 11 And as we shall now see, this sheds a different 
explanatory and diagnostic light on the significance of instrumental rationality. 
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(2) Habermas would argue that from the point of view adopted by Gellner, the notion of 
a rationalized lifeworld falls on a blindspot for which a narrowly constricted conception of 
rationality is responsible. The notion of a rationalized lifeworld, then, must be 
complementary to a conception of action which is non-instrumentally rationalizable. If 
Gellner were to have recourse to a model of action the rationality of which is not 
determined. by instrumental success - by the criterion of efficiency of means to a 
non-rationally decidable end - he could avoid what would then appear as a metonymic 
fallacy of construing, one particular moment of rationality as the whole. With what 
Habermas calls communicative action, he claims to have just such recourse. 
A lifeworld becomes rationalized, in Habermas's sense, "to the extent that it permits 
interactions which are not guided by normatively ascribed agreement but - directly or 
36 indirectly - by communicatively achieved understanding". A communicatively achieved 
understanding is one which is reached purely on the basis of the better argument, whereas 
an agreement is normatively ascribed if it is accepted habitually or uncritically - say, on the 
basis of some unchallenged convention, authority, or tradition. Communicative action is 
furnished by and also reproduces the background horizon of the lifeworld, while putting at 
risk the particular, claim which is either implicitly or explicitly raised in the action. The 
understanding to which communicative actors are oriented is one which is mefitotious of 
rationally motivated intersubjective recognition. To say that a lifeworld can possess degrees 
of rationalization, is to propose a thesis concerning the scope made available. for 
communicative action. 
I will offer a more detailed discussion of Habermas's concept of communicative action in 
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chapter four. ' For the moment, what matters is the sense in which the conception of 
rationalization 'for which communicative action is the vehicle differs from and marks an 
imp, rovement upon Gellner's thesis concerning the erosion of the lifeworld by instrumental 
rationality. While Habermas's claim converges with Gellner's view that the validational 
imperative puts the claims of the lifeworld at risk, it diverges in expanding the scope for 
validation beyond the constraints imposed by 'mechanism'. The privilege which Gellner 
ascribes to scientific method (the ethic of cognition) corresponds to a foreshortening of the 
rational potential of communicative action. Communicative reason finds its criteria "in the 
argumentative procedures" for redeeming "validity claims geared to intersubjective 
recognitionot. 37 But Gellner's exposition of these procedures is too narrow. Not only does 
fthil'to accountifor the possibility of criticizable - but non-truth-evaluable - validity claims, 
but it does so by undercutting the role of everyday, uncoerced dialogue as the idiom of 
validation. Once the latter is taken as paradigmatic, then the human capacity for "making 
true statements and implementing plans loses its privilege, and the space emerges for 
replacingan ethic of cognition with a more fundamental communicative ethic, oriented by 
the norm of mutual recognition. Further, it enables Habermas to distinguish two different 
senses of rationalization which Gellner assimilates, leading to a misleading account of the 
source of tension between cognition and identity. 
The lifeworld concept gets its distinctive meaning in Habermas's theory not only from its 
c6mp leme - ntary relationship to communicative action, but also in its distinction from social 
reality considered as a tsystem'. As we saw in (1.2), society qua system is rational to the 
degree that it integrates action consequences according to criteria of efficiency in 
performing functions necessary for its self-preservation. We saw that in the I subsystems of 
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the economy and the bureaucratic state, action integration is mediated not communicatively, 
but by the delinguistified steering media of money and power, which react back and 
mediatize, instrumentalize, and colonize the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. 
Accordingly, the main cause of lifeworld erosion is not so much disenchanting cognition, 
but the pseudo-communicative or delinguistified media, of system integration. Habermas 
acknowledges that cognitive claims become increasingly rarefied and split off from everyday 
discourse in the domain of scientific expert spheres, but the specialized training which is 
required to understand these claims also conditions competence for_ participation at., the 
highest level of discourse in which other validity claims are thematized; moral and aesthetic 
discourse also get separated from the horizon in which everyday life is led. But this 
impoverishment of identity As of secondary significance to the colonization of identity 
wrought when the horizon within which identities are forged become mediated by money 
and power. It is the latter which "deworlds" the lifeworld, not cognition. But a symptom 
of colonization is a one-sided rationalization of the lifeworld in its cognitive/technological 
dimension, and herein lies the imbalance between being and knowing characteristic of the,,, 
times. 
In short, Habermas would argue that Gellner's fundamental error can be traced back to the 
central flaw in Weber's "disenchantment thesis"; a false opposition between the 
identity-consolidating Reason built into religion and metaphysical world views, and an - 
identity-resourceless instrumental rationality built into modem forms of action and scientific 
knowledge. " He replies by way of reconstructing the validational imperative in a manne'r, 
which drops the priority it cedes to truth, and which substitutes procedures of argumentation 
operative in everyday communication for the mechanistic idiom of validation. It follows 
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that Habemas's idea of a rationalized lifeworld stands or falls with the availability of a 
correspondingly expanded conception of rationality, the criterion of which is not identified 
with the kind of instrumental success which betokens the increasing rationalization of 
system-integrated action. Further, if what is "de-worlding" about money and power is that 
they are "delinguistified", Habermas will have to extract from language a model of 
normativity which explains the vulnerability of human identity to this Icind of corrosion. 
He needs - to establish not only that the claims of morality have as good a- place in 
argumentative procedures as scientific/cognitive claims, but also that there is good reason CP 
for abiding by these procedures - that doing so satisfies the requirements of human identity. 
(2.3) Morality and Identity - Taylor's Response 
A'different way of challenging Gellner's position would be to retain the truth-requirement 
of -beliefs relevant for sustaining human identity, but to divorce -it from subjudice 
procedures of validation. Rather than radicalizing the validational imperative to cover 
obligatory, norms of action, this move incorporates cognition into identity and thereby 
ontologizes it. The validation imperative is taken as one form of human self-interpretation 
amongst others; its status as a cultural injunction is affirmed, but it is also allowed to admit 
of truth, conceived as the felicitous disclosure of a moral world. One might want to reject 
the view that the systematic differentiation of descriptive and evaluative linguistic functions 
necessarily does constitute cognitive advance, as well as the view that beliefs merit rational 
acceptability to the degree to which they transcend their culture-specific content. -The 
objection here would not be - pace Habermas - that the privilege Gellner accords to the 
assertoric mode of language is arbitrary from the perspective of the validational imperative 
(properly conceived), but that the domain of assertion is arbitrarily restricted from the 
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perspective of what might be called the 'interpretative imperative'. The restriction on 
interpretation imposed by mechanism can appear as arbitrary in the light of further 
o ections which can be put to (1) the significance of rules, (2) the mechanistic constraint 
on - the language of explanation, and (3) the concept of rationality, as they feature - in 
Gellner's account. 
(1) Gellner correctly relates rule-boundedness to consistency, publicity and repeatability. 
He then takes these as criteria for demarcating scientific cognition from magic, on the 
grounds that the latter allows of explanations which are inconsistent with each other, and 
which are protected from public and repeatable testing procedures. Gellner takes this 
consideration to justify the claim that our trust in scientific knowledge is of a fundamentally 
different kind to that which not only magic, but also the knowledge claims implicit in, the 
discourse through which sense is made of the living of lives, enjoins. But is this latter 
claim justified? Can the concept of a rule do the work Gellner requires of it? What first 
needs to be observed is that all discourse qua discourse is rule-bound, and not just in virtue 
of syntactic structure (which has no bearing on Gellner's claim). Discourse is also 
rule-bound insofar as the concepts which articulate the propositional content of a sentence 
are capable of being applied correctly or incorrectly. Now if this is a property which all 
concepts which can feature in meaningful sentences have, then it is absurd to say that the 
conceptual resources available for employment in legitimate discourse can be 'eroded' by . 
rule-governed constraint. This is the case even if by 'legitimate discourse' we mean 
'fact-stating' discourse, since any grammatically well-formed indicative sentence has prima 
facie propositional status - having truth conditions which when satisfied would make it true., 
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Does Gellner give us any reason for overturning the prima facie propositional 
(truth-evaluable) status of grammatically well-formed indicative sentences, whatever their 
conceptual content? It is not enough, as Gellner suggests, to say that the rule-governed 
peculiarity of natural scientific discourse lies in the fact that 'like cases are treated alike', 
since what counts as a 'like' case is itself what a rule needs to determine. His position must 
be either that what counts as the 'same' instance of the correct application of a concept is 
fixed in advance of and independently of our practices of explanation, or that rule- 
boundedness is itself a function or expression of those practices. The former position would 
commit him to the claim that there are instances of the 'same' facts which are graspable in 
a linguistically unmediated fashion but this view is inconsistent with his insistence that "it 
is our practices of explanation which disenchants us". 40 However, it is a view which the 
analogy he draws between a culture-neutral baseline of explanation and the operation of a 
machine might tempt him to make. As Gellner described it, a machine is something which 
is reproducible "at any time, in any place, in any society, provided that the same specified 
materials are put together in a publicly specifiable way". Not only does drawing this 
analogy with legitimate explanations beg the question of what counts as "the same", but one 
might further object to the decontextualization proposed in the analogy. Gellner's picture 
of a machine, the Wittgensteinian would reply, misleads us "into conceiving justification 
as the unfolding of the pre-determined properties of a chain", 41 and this because the 
supposed working of the machine "is only the picture of the working of a machine". 42, 
Continuing the analogy, if all we have is a picture of a machine, we are left. with the 
crippling sceptical paradox of how a rule can befollowed determinately, since any, way of 
4going on' from a rule - i. e. in the 'same' way - specified independently of its applications,, 
can be made to fit the rule. 43 But what we actually have are not pictures, but practices Of 
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rule-following, and these practices are always context-bound. Gellner's machine-imagery 
thus le6ds a false impression by imputing a baseline of explanation which is divorced from 
contextualized practices of explanation. 
If, on the other hand, Gellner holds that rule-boundedness is an expression of our practices 
of natural science, then one will want to know why other discourses do not make the grade 
for fact-stating. His argument now seems to be that this is so in virtue of the degree of 
rigour in rule-following required by legitimate participation in the scientific language game. 
But this argument only establishes that discourses exhibit differences along a continuum of 
rule-boundedness, a continuum which covers various degrees of consensus regarding what 
counts as rule-bounded, and what counts as a fact. The relative flexibility of the criteria 
which govern the correct application of evaluative concepts - and to that extent their 
idiosyncrasy -ý also serves to confirm their resistance to arbitrary usage. But if we take this 
resistance to be the tell-tale sign of fact-stating in scientific discourse, then we have been 
given no reason for thinIdng that the same does not hold for evaluative discourse. 
But perhaps these objections miss Gellner's point. He might reply that the symmetry and 
lack of idiosyncrasy which is required of the behaviour of concepts which feature in genuine 
cognition is elucidated not so much by their rule-boundedness, nor by the public and 
repeatable verification procedures of the theories containing them, but rather by something 
aldn to the idea of ptimary qualities. Primary qualities are those properties or powers the 
existence of which is not wholly contingent upon the existence of beings (like humans) who 
are disposed to be affected by them in the form of experience. They are distinguished from 
secondary properties which exist solely in virtue of such dispositions. If - the world 
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contained no beings with the idiosyncratic sensory (or linguistic) constitution of humans, 
it would contain no secondary qualities; whereas the existence of primary qualities is quite 
independent of such human idiosyncrasy. The crux of the distinction, however, comes from 
the further supposition that human nature is prone to the error of projecting what is relative 
to the idiosyncrasy, of the human enquirer onto the world as it exists - so to speak - 
9-ME-Isolutely. --Hence, there issues an epistemologic. -ad and indeed ethical requirement to 
disengage from -these human idiosyncrasies; to gain a perspective on the world from a 
vantage point which is neutral with respect to the peculiar significance it has for humans; 
to give an absolute account of reality on which there would be (in principle) universal 
agreement between all enquirers who had successfully managed to. overcome their naive, 
partial, idiosyncratic standpoints. Such an account would be written in a language of 
primary quality concepts, and only explanations couched in them would qualify as genuinely 
cognitive. " Gellner's ethic of cognition, and his version of the validational imperative, 
could then be translated, as: "Don't project! ". But this move raises its own difficulties. 
(2) One might start by challenging the coherence of the primary/secondary quality 
distinction, and -of the very idea of an absolute account of reality. But this is not the path 
which Taylor takes. "' Rather, he argues that while the absolute conception does have a 
proper scope of applicability, insuperable difficulties face it when overextended. Taylor 
would argue that the shortcomings in Gellner's diagnosis of the tension between cognition 
and identity result from just such overextension. 
One difficulty arises as soon as we put the question; are there forms of explanation which 
are not adequately articulated or conceptualized in absolute terms? One obvious case would 
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be the explanations we give of human behaviour in terms of the moral significance 
attachable to what motivates the behaviour. Human ýeings apparently lead their lives in a 
world which has moral significance for them, and we commonly understand -and explain 
how these lives are lived by appeal to such notions as "honestly", "courageously", 
"sensitively", "magnanimously", "spitefully", "inauthentically", and the like; what Taylor 
calls "desirability-characterizations" (or in the latter , two cases, "undesirability- 
characterizations"). Such notions have no place in the absolute conception of reality, which 
accounts for the way the world is independently of the meaning it has for humans. , 
Now if Gellner's thesis is correct that the terms invoked in the explanations through which 
humans lead their lives require revalidation by science, then one will want to know how the 
absolute conception can cover and improve upon this prima facie explanatory language. 
What seems to be required is a translation of these terms into a vocabulary which separates 
the (neutral, human independent) reality of the situation described, from the experience of 
that reality, (say, in, terms of an intrinsically neutral - since applicable to a neutrally 
describable fact - 'pro-' or -'con-' attitude), and which when combined covers in 
scientifically valid terms the naively ascribed. quality. But objections of various strength can 
be put to this requirement. First; as a matter of fact, no such vocabulary is available, and 
it is difficult to imagine what it would sound like. Second, it fails to give adequate account 
of the phenomenology of moral experience, which seems to inform us that there can be fit 
or apt objects of this experience, and hence that the 'fact' which it is construed as projecting 
upon is non-contingently related to it (and hence that the fact is not neutrally or 'absolutely' 
describable); to describe the situation which is the object of the experience (or concept) in 
absolute terms is to change the meaning of that experience (or concept), since there seems 
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to be an essential link between the facts which'make up the situation and the atfitudinal 
response to it which is captured* in the original term. " The meaning of the term does not 
tolerate breaking the link, since the putatively "revalidating" de4e'scription is not co- 
extensional'with it. One might conclude from this that we neeý not accept Gellner's thesis 3 
that modem science or genuine cognition' submits the concepts in terms of which identifies 
are forged and life is lived . to an intellectual erosion, but rather that the impu ted I erosion is 
a iseudo-intellectual'6ne. If we take it upon ourselves that our intellectual life is bes t 
conducted under the recommendation "don't project! ", we can be made to think we are 
projecting reactions onto neutrally describable facts, even when no such description is 
available, convincing, or even conceivable. In other words, the injunction gives'a distorted', 
or at least inadequate; model of proper intellectual conduct. ' 
This second objection can be put another way. Modem scientific explanations, guided by 
the claim to an absolute account of reality, ' seek to improve upon naive everyday 
explanations by identifying facts independently of idiosyncraticly human reactions to them. 
BI ut by taking this neutral stance, by di . senjaging from the'reactions 'which typically 
'accompany' the understanding of a phenomenon, ' it is possible that we can lose our grasp 
of the phenomenon which needs ex I plainin I g. 49 In the case of "'moral phenomena, the 
assumption of the neutral stance can disable us from arguing competently about them. This 
suggests that the method of prescinding from moral 4prejudices' - or the horizon of meaning 
within which we are engaged in the leading of our lives - does not necessarily give better 
insight into the domain of reality under consideration. 'So the absolute description, rather 
than giving us the really true story (Gellner's "certainty of reductionism"), , actually loses 
from view some aspect of reality requiring explanation. If this is the case, it seems that'it 
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is irrational to predicate descriptions of this domain couched in absolute terms as cognitive. 
(3) But in order to be able to say this, we need a richer concept of rationality than Gellner 
provides. Taylor suggests that the concept of rationality is best captured by the idea of 
perspicuous articulation. A perspicuous articulation will be well-ordered and consistent; 'it 
will give an account which clearly distinguishes one Idnd of case or phenomenon from 
another, in formulations which are consistent internally and with each other. I have a 
rational grasp of something if I can articulate it in a perspicuously ordered, and a fortiori 
consistent account., Likewise, an action merits the ascription rational if it is consistent with 
achieving some more or less clearly defined objective which gives it its point, and, it is 
irrational if it frustrates the achievement of that goal. But the criterion of consistency does 
not exhaust the concept of -rationality; consistency is a necessary, but, not a sufficient 
condition of a rational account, or a rational action. For the canons within which an 
account is consistent, and the objectives which are consistently met by means of action - it 
at least makes prima facie sense to say - can also be more or less rational. "" For canons 
and objectives often appear as rivals, and in virtue of this, assessable against each other by 
appeal to some standard other than the formal one of consistency. Taylor allows that where 
the subject-matter admits of it, the demand of rationality is to adopt a disengaged,. neutral 
perspective. But where the disengaged perspective issues in inarticulacy, as is proposed in 
the previous objection, it is to that extent irrational. The rationally superior account would 
be the one which renders articulate what was otherwise confused or occluded from-view. 
Such an approach to the concept of rationality has two crucial implications., - First, it leads 
us to think of standards of rationality in terms of contrasting, degrees -of perspicuity 
possessed by available vocabularies, rather than in terms of some neutrally describable ideal 
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standard. Second, it encourages a conception of truth as what is disclosed by a perspicuous 
articulation,, rather than in terms of correspondence or consent. 
From Taylor's standpoint, the most glaring inarticulacy in Gellner's account as its failure 
to render perspicuous the nature of the ethic of cognition as an ethic. It espouses the 
desirability-characterization of adopting a disengaged, neutral stance towards the world - 
that it is better to hold beliefs from that perspective and in that attitude - while neglecting 
to account both for what is involved in attributing such characterizations, and for the 
possibility of attributing them correctly. In the terminology developed by Taylor, it is just 
such characterizations which constitute a human identity. Gellner's ethic of cognition is 
thus best understood as an expression of identity, one deeply embedded in modem culture, 
but which undercuts itself when applied to itself as an identity - since the concept of an 
identity is not available from the disengaged perspective. Accordingly, the tension between 
cognition and identity diagnosed by Gellner should rather be attributed to something internal 
to the modem identity itself. 
(2.4) Strategies for Reconcitiation 
In Legitimation Ctisis, Habermas takes up the predicament generated by the modem tension 
between cognition and identity with the following question; "If world-views', he asks, 
"have foundered on the separation of cognitive from socially integrative components", if 
such world-views "today belong irretrievably to the past", then what else can fulfil "the 
moral-practical task of constituting ego- and group-idenfity? ". " Is there scope, he asks, for 
a morality without roots in "cognitive interpretations of nature" which could "adequately 
stabilize itself' and "secure the identities of individuals and collectives"? If we assume that 
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the cognitive/scientific task of finding truths about the world is not expected to deliver 
anything Of ýmoral significance, and that moral significance is something which is 
presupposed in the identity of human beings, do human beings under such conditions really 
have a sustainable, identity at all? 'If the socially integrative fabric of a moral order no 
longer belongs'to the natural order, does it'make sense to talk of any 'Order by legitimate 
appeal to which' human'beings can satisfy their'moral-practical'needs and tasks? The 
objections put to Gellner's position embryonically express two different 'strategies for 
tackling this question, 'and, hence'for'reconciling modem scientific cognition with human 
identity. I will now offer an outline of the strategies adopted by Habermas and Taylor, but 
I shall begin by introducing a third against which both can be contrasted; that proposed by 
Nietzsche. " 
(1) The Nietzschean strategy'proceeds by rejecting the nomatiWty of oider. Consequently, 
the ethic of cognition is abandoned tout court. This abandonment manifests itself in the 
outright denial of human cognitive powers, 'renderini any proposed 'ethic' celebrating these 
powers superfluous. The idea of a cognitive grasp of an'objectiVe order achieved by 
science is replaced by the notion of science as one- amongst the many perspectives conjured 
by humans in their ultimately lawless struggle for power. There is no" truth' beyond these 
perspectives, no order to which they might correspond as 'true'. But the distinctiveness of 
the Nietzschean strategy lies not so much in its questioning the possibility of cognition - this 
it shares with all forms of scepticism - rather it'lies in the ýchallenge it'makes to'the 
aspiration towards truth. So when, for instance, Nietzsche famously describes truth - the 
norm of cognition - as "worn out metaphors which' have become powerless to affect the 
senses "52 , he is primarily contrasting and subordinating one'norm to another. The challenge 
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to the norm of cognition has force in virtue of this contrast; the problem lies in specifying 
just what this other norm, is supposed to be. 
Nietzsche variously refers to it as "life" and "will to power". His suggestion is that our 
so-called truths are antagonistic to life, where "life", connotes a vital force of creative 
energy,, a flux of sensuous particularity which resists the conceptual categorization which 
conditions claims to truth. " On Nietzsche's view, life expresses itself in metaphor- and 
more generally, in art., Nietzsche thus - seems to be proposing a norm of -'expression', 
though not the expression of a subject about which there can be a truth, but rather of a 
deeper impersonal -reality which manifests itself through the artistic creation of humans. ' 
Although Nietzsche sometimes conflates truth with self-creation or "a will to overcome that 
has in itself no end", " his bizarre will to power metaphysics is adventitious to the challenge 
which opponents of his strategy must address; is it necessary to reject the norm of truth and 
the ethic of cognition for another norm that, is external and antagonistic to it, and which 
must be thought of as having "in itself no end"? The force of this question turns on the 
relationship between rationality and the ethic of cognition. For if the two are equated, then 
a critique of the latter must invoke an "other of reason", not only because it ý is defined in 
terms of its antagonism to truth, but also because it has no other end - no other standard 
against which rational critique can begin. 
The Nietzschean strategy, then, is to 'reconcile' cognition and identity by denying what is 
supposed Ao separate them; the very category of an order by appeal to which either 
cognition or -identity can be secured. -Not only is such -an order-, unavailable, but the 
aspiration to -pursue it is detrimental to, proper intellectual conduct; self-creation and 
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self-transformation which has itself 'no other end'. - In havingý 'no other end', the 
Nietzschean dispenses with the idea of a human identity guided by an order toward which 
the powers for self-creation may be properly or improperly directed. 
(2) Habennas's strategy departs from Nietzsche's in attempting to preserve the 
differentiation of the claims of cognition and identity, -while reconciling them on a formal 
rationalist ground. Habermas objects to the Nietzschean strategy on three counts. First, 
in hypostatizing the aesthetic moment of modernity, it is guilty of the same kind of 
one-sidedness which bedevilled Gellner's hypostatization of scientific cognition., Second, 
the appeal of this hypostatization presupposes the differentiation of cognitive from aesthetic 
claims which are simultaneously de-differentiated in the Nietzschean strategy. A similar 
kind of self-contradiction which Habermas thinks counts against it is that it cannot 
coherently be claimed, since - in order to put'it forward as a claim, its defender must 
presuppose norms built into the medium of raising and redeeming claims; what Habermas 
calls the communicative use -of language. Indeed, it is just the rationality built into the 
procedure of communicative action which, Ior Habermas, makes available the moral order 
required for securing the identities of individuals and collectives. The Habermasian strategy 
is to argue for an order which is prior to and presupposed by the separation of cognition 
from identity: its point of departure is the shared medium of understanding between subjects 
capable of speech and action, or "linguistically generated intersubjectivity". 
The normative structure of the medium ý which conditions cognitive claims is to -, be 
investigated by way of "rational reconstructions" of the implicitly known competences and 
rules presupposed in the achievement of mutual understanding. Accordingly, the 
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objectifying methodological attitude endorsed by the ethic of cognition loses its paradigma c 
status, and is - replaced by 'the "performative attitude of . participants in interaction"56 . 
Self-understanding as rational reconstruction need not involve the objectification of self in 
the reflective gaze of a neutral observer - the Idnd of objectification which the Nietzschean 
strategy reacts against - for it proceeds by a "recapitulation" by the 'ego' of what comes 
into view from the second. person perspective of the 'alter' in dialogue. And it is by 
reconstructing the non-coercive, unifying'rational potential of agreements reached -in the 
dialogue situation that Habermas aims to show that a conception of moral order without 
foundations in cognitive interpretations of nature but capable of sustaining the identities of 
individuals and collectives is available. 
But the method of reconstruction cannot establish why, at the level of motivation, the moral 
order should be followed. - To show this, Habermas tums to what he calls "therapeutic 
reason". He argues that there is a universal moral basis to modernity which when distorted 
generates instabilities and pathologies. He thus proposes a model of the distinctive 
pathologies of modernity under the presupposition that a standard is available for their 
critique. , More specifically, Habermas argues -that (a) the integrity of modem conditions 
of life is threatened by crises, manifesting themselves as pathologies, caused by the distorted 
reproduction of what he calls an "intact intersubjectivity"; and (b) that the norm of an intact 
intersubjectivity can be traced -transcendentally to the procedural conditions of - the 
communicative use of propositionally differentiated language which -is, peculiar to the 
modem reproduction of life. Chapters three, four, and five elucidate and contend these 
claims. 
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(3) Taylor's strategy also departs from Nietzsche's in its commitment to establishing the 
reason for adopting it. For Taylor, the Nietzschean abandonment of order is irrational not 
so much because of the performative inconsistency involved in claiming it, since the 
Nietzschean can reply by disavowing any commitment to the canons of argumentation. 
Rather, the irrationality lies in its inarticulacy with respect to its alternative canon of 
57 normativity. Additionally, it espouses a relativism which is incapable of making sense of 
the indubitable cognitive advances of modem natural science. Taylor's strategy seeks to 
avoid this Nietzschean anti-cognitivism, by way of maldng a conception of a moral order 
available which is cognizable but not by natural science. Whereas Habermas's strategy is 
to dissociate validity from'its privilege in truth, Taylor's is to dissociate truth from its 
pnvilege in natuml science. 
Taylor's strategy for establishing this thesis is to argue for the ontological irreducibility of 
what is disclosed by human self-interpretations. The argument follows two steps; first, it 
aims to show that the concept of a human agent who prescinds from horizons of morally 
significant self-interpretation is incoherent. This step is examined in chapter six. Second, 
it must establish that existential self-interpretations of this kind are equal candidates for 
cognitive value with interpretations of nature disclosed from the disengaged perspective of 
natural science; a claim which, is considered in chapter seven. - In the course -of this 
argument, it becomes clear that as soon as the validational imperative is applied to humans, 
it too becomes one form of self-interpretation which must prove its superiority over others. 
The strategy is to take the status of the ethic of cognition seriously as an ethic - not in order 
to reject it a priori - but as the first step in -showing its inferiority to other norms which 
confront it as rivals. And it is precisely because there are - such rivals that the ethic of 
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cognition requires the Idnd of defence which Gellner offers for it. 
But just because, as Gellner asserts, the cultural injunction called the ethic of cognition is 
so deeply ingrained in modem life, Taylor's strategy stands at a disadvantage. For it needs 
to be able to recover a sense of human identity which is occluded in a culture deeply shaped 
by disengaged cognition and technologically mediated practice. This means that the 
language through which the strategy is employed needs to have a special degree of 
resonance to be convincing. But there is an even greater handicap. For in such a culture, 
Taylor suggests, the moral order which is supposedly disclosed by language loses its 
foundation in the public order of references in the medium of which identities are initially 
forged, and in which knowledge claims are tested. But this conclusion threatens to 
undermine the'coherence of Taylor's strategy for reconciling cognition and identity, since 
it, " dissolves the' gro'Und for thinIdng that linguistically disclosed moral and scientific 
understanding are ontologically symmetrical. This thought is pursued in 'chapter eight. 
(2.5) Conclusion ý-", 
To 'Summarize: Gellner argues that the mechanistic mode of legitimating beliefs has a 
corroding effect upon the linguistic' resources available for forging believable human 
identities. Science legitimates beliefs about the' world according to formal explanatory 
criteria of'public reproducibility in a minimal language of primary qualitY"concepts. But 
this language is not enough to'fill out'a human identity, which means that modem human 
beings cannot legitimate beliefs about themselves in a cognitively satisfactory way. The 
imputation of a lifeworld, according to Gellner, expresses a failure of nerve in face of this 
predicament between cognition and identity. For it suggests a bracketing off of the world 
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as it is lived, a world which forms a background of belonging and source for the 
self-reassurance and legitimation of human identities, from the objective world which is the 
backdrop and -reference point of genuinely cognitive claims. Now not only is this 
'bracketing off said to be a betrayal of cultural modernity's ethic of cognition which 
prioritizes truth above all other values, but it is also to misunderstand the relationship 
between science and modem everyday life. The bracketing does not work because it 
already presupposes an everyday world in which instrumental rationality, the formation of 
hypotheses to solve problems by discovering the maximally efficient means of bringing 
about a particular end, has a constitutive role. Insofar as the resource of the lifeworld is 
allowed cognitive status at all (Gellner's Fixed Cognitive Capital), it becomes destabilized 
by. the continual growth of hypotheses concerning that status and of the instrumental 
rationality which can assess hypotheses (the so-called Variable Cognitive Capital). The 
outcome is a predicament because the ends by appeal to which instrumental rationality can 
assess value - the claims of the lifeworld - have in this rationalization process lost their 
immunized status, without thereby acquiring a rational one. They appear to be relativized, 
arbitrary, optional, whilst identities and ends of action as such can be none of these things. 
I have argued, however, that by dismissing the lifeworld conceptq and by prejudicing the 
case against forms of rationality other than instrumental efficiency and mechanistic 
scientific validation, Gellner fails to give good grounds for accepting the diagnostic thesis 
which concludes his argument. He unwittingly disposes of the very conceptual resources 
he needs to give it a convincing formulation. The onus is now back on Habermas and 
Taylor to show how identities and ends of action - or the claim to normativity - can be 
secured from the fate of having a merely optional, hypothetical status. 
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CHAPTER THREE: HABERMAS'S CONCEPTION OF CRISIS 
(3.0) Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced two different strategies for responding to a tension 
between identity and cognition wrought by modem scientific practices of legitimating belief. 
Habermas shares Gellner's commitment to the view that in the course of its evolution, the 
human species comes to learn that the nomological, order of nature is empty of moral 
signification. It can then seem impelling for Habermas to take on the guiding problematic 
of Kantian philosophy: how is the source of moral significance to be grounded if not in the 
natural order of things? Aware of the threat which the objectivity of modem natural 
science posed to the identity of the reflective human subject -a reflexivity which is imposed 
upon modems with the collapse of the social fabric of religious tradition - Kant sought to 
bring the ground of moral order to self-clarification in the rationality of free and responsible 
action. There may not be any ethical substance in the world which can be the object of 
cognition, but there is a- moral law which can be tracked by a free sub ect acting on 
universalizable self-willed maxims. And in the moral law, the human agent- can be 
reassured that there are reasons for acting which have more than a merely optional, 
hypothetical status, since there is a class of actions which, qua rational beings, humans have 
an unconditional obligation to perform. The moral law, for Kant, puts constraints on 
matter-of-fact, empirically motivated action by opposing to the particularity of sensuous 
inclination the universality of the rational, dutiful will. For Kant, the, struggle for 
normativity can only mean the attempt to institutionalize the moral law as it is revealed to 
the conscience of each rational reflective subject. 
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But by abstracting the rational agent from the historically concrete intersubjective conditions 
of agency-formation, and similarly by idealizing the source of the legitimacy of the moral 
law as prior to any institutionalized embodiment - Hegel famously countered - the Kantian 
view fails to give a plausible account of just what is threatened by the objectivating sciences 
and the fragmented social fabric of religion; the lived sustainability of a moral identity. 
Such an account can only be given, in the view proposed by Hegel in his early writings, 
if instead of understanding the moral order as what is categorically determined by the moral 
law, it is conceived as an 'ethical totality' which exercises its compulsion upon acts which 
transgress it as a 'fate'. 
Now it is just as a 'causality of fate' that Habermas conceives the systematic dynamics of 
moral crisis and social pathology formation in modernity. "The pathological characteristics 
of ý modern, societies now fit into patterns", Habermas writes, "only to the extent that a 
predominance of economic and bureaucratic rationality - of cognitive/instrumental forms 
of rationality generally - makes itself felt". ' But this predominance does not make itself felt 
directly; it requires theoretical self-clarification. The avowed achievement of Habermas's 
Critical Theory is to do this by way of reconstructing "Hegel's concept of the ethical 
context of life" in such a way that it "disenchants the unfathomable causality of fate". 2 The 
characteristic crises of modernity are explicable, Habermas puts it otherwise, as a struggle 
for normativity which can be brought to philosophical clarification in terms of a "dirempted 
totality, which makes itself felt primarily in the avenging power of destroyed reciprocities 
and in the fateful causality of distorted communicative relationships"., It is through this 
"avenging power" that the force of normativity, now taken as the force of the rationality 
potential of undistorted communicative intersubjectivity, makes itself felt in conditions of 
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a predominant "norm-free" cognitive/instrumental rationality. According to the model 
Habermas claims to borrow from Hegel, a moral order discloses itself behind the backs of 
(individual or collective) human agents in the identity crises they suffer as a result of 
disturbed self-formative processes; processes which refer back to an immanent ethical 
totality. In this chapter, I want to consider the kind of theory Habermas takes to be best 
equipped to articulate this model of crisis and its reflective overcoming. For it is from such 
a model that Habermas extracts the conception of a moral order which can fill the 
identity-gap left by religion and hence provide modernity with self-reassurance. 
In (3.1), Loutline how the notions of an ethical totality and causality of fate feature in the 
young Hegel's critique of the Kantian construal of a moral order as the moral law. Against 
Xant,, Hegel proposes a tragic model of the self-formative process of the moral subject by 
appeal to the idea ý of a fatefully avenging ethical totality. At this point, for the sake of 
clarifying Hegel's insights, I compare them with views recently espoused by Bernard 
Williams. Following this, I introduce Habermas's incorporation of the young Hegel's 
critique of Kant into his general diagnostic thesis of crisis-formation in modernity as a 
struggle -for normativity. This general pattern of disturbed and reconstituted moral 
identity-formation, Habermas once claimed, " forms the implicit basis of what is 
metatheoretically interesting and correct in the diagnostic and therapeutic claims of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. The issue of what kind of theory is capable of articulating Hegel's insights 
is taken up in (3.2). Here I discuss the metatheoretical. implications Habermas draws from 
understanding the End of psychopathologies investigated by Freud according to the 
Hegelian Model. 
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I then consider two Unds, of objection which have'been launched against Habemas's 
synthesis of Hegel and Freud; first (3.3), that in its neglect of the scientifically discoverable 
laws of human development, it is insufficiently naturalistic; and second (3.4), that in 
pandering too much to the requirements of an empirical science and to the injunction of 
cognitive/instrumental rationality, it is too naturalistic to serve its putative 'critical' purpose. 
I distinguish two different meanings of the 'disenchantment' of the causality of fate which 
Habermas claims to be the achievement of his preferred Idnd of critical theory, anticipating 
objections I will put in chapter five concerning Habermas's equivocal use of the concept 
of 'ethical totality'. , Since the normative foundations of Habermas's critical theory are 
tailored to his conception of crisis - and hence the problem of self-reassurance - Habermas 
will also need to clarify how the normative presupposition of an ethical totality can be 
articulated'in a theory which meets the two kinds of objections considered in (3.3) and 
(3,4). That move will be be considered in the next chapter. 
(3.1) Ethical Totality and the Causality of Fate 
As is clear from the remarks cited in (3.0), Habemas's appropriation of Hegel's model of 
an ethical totality which avenges itself as a fate is decisive for his proposed resolution of 
the problem of self-reassurance. -It is important, then, that some consideration be given to 
the, purpose to which Hegel originally employed these concepts. 'In -71e, Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate,, the young Hegel can be read as offering a phenomenology of 
morals by way of describing two contrasting appearances of the binding force of the moral 
relation. ' Moral authority, 'it is assumed, has the character of universality, inasmuch as 
particular agents stand to it in a relation of some kind of compulsion or guidedness. - Hegel 
attempts to make sense of this phenomenon of the binding, universal, authoritative (as we 
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would now say, 'objective') nature of morals, from the point of view of a particular 
subject's lived experience of its compelling force. From this point of view, the issue 
emerges of, the possibility of reconciliation between the compelled particular, and the 
compelling moral source. This is an issue which Hegel can focus on by considering the 
structure of the -lived experience of moral transgression; of crime and punishment. The 
criminal experiences the compelling character of moral authority, which he has usurped in 
his act, as punishment. But the meaning of the punishment will differ depending upon 
whether it appears as the revenge of law, or as the avenging force of what Hegel calls 
'fate'. - Although in Hegel's text the same term 'punishment' is used to refer to both 
'law-like' and Iate-like' kinds of avenging force, I shall hereafter demarcate them by 
capitalizing the 'P' of the former ýind. So where the binding force of morality appears as 
the force of the law, a criminal act brings into play the avenging force of Punishment. ý 
The Punishment suffered by the criminal would appear under the following characteristics. 
First, Hegel describes it as the necessary and inescapable consequence of the criminal act: 
Punishment is entailed by the act. If Punishment represents the avenging force of the moral 
source (the source of normativity), and if the moral source is represented by the moral law, 
then the 'must' of the Punishment will be as the imperative of the moral law - namely, 
categorical. ý The necessity of the Punishment reflects the imperative of the law. As the 
imperative of the moral law is necessarily and unconditionally (i. e. categorically) applicable 
to the human being qua agent, so Punishment is applicable unconditionally and necessarily 
to the agent qua criminal. This, as Hegel sees it, is the unbending demand of justice; "so 
long as laws are supreme, so long as there is no escape from them, so long - must the 
individual be sacrificed to the universal" - i. e. the law, in Punishment. 6 But -it is only 
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possi e or the individual to be sacrificed to the universal in this manner, thinks Hegel, if 
te indiv dual is identified with his standing with, respect to the law. That is, with respect 
to the law, the criminal's identity is nothing but that of the perpetrator of crime. From the 
moral point of view - the point of view of the judge - he is a criminal; "a sin existent, a 
7 trespass possessed of personality". Now the criminal would be only that, from the moral 
point of view, if the law felicitously represented the whole of the moral source. Yet it is 
an identity which 'an individual can acquire only by being 'abstracted from the concrete ' 
conditions of his'life context. Thus Punishment also appears to the criminal as exercising 
its avenging force upon an abstraction. In Punishment, the agent who trespasses against 
the law is considered only in the abstract. Third, and crucially, the moral source which 
exercises its avenging force as Punishment appears as extemal to the criminal. The law is 
external to the trespass, it stands outside and is unchanged by the transgressive act. The 
fear which the criminal has of the universal is a fear of something which stands above and 
beyond him - as something alien. This is the case, Hegel suggests, even if the criminal 
would have"willed that law himself as a universal maxim of action. For although qua 
maxim the law may be self-willed, its reactive force (suffered as Punishment or guilt) 
stands independent and external to that will. The transgression of his duty appears not only 
as an unworthiness, but as the misfortune of a concrete being with particular inclinations 
living in circumstances not wholly under his control. ' 
I indicated that in maldng a distinction between the avenging force of law and the avenging 
force of fate; Hegel is especially interested in the possibility of reconciliation between the 
particular person who, acts, ' and the reactive universal moral force which appears to the 
agent as following ineluctably from the act. The three characteristics of Punishment just 
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ou ined do not readily accommodate this possibility. First, the criminal faces the necessity 
of Punishment, so far as the law will have its way. As a matter of fact, of course, the law 
may not have its way; any actual judge is a concrete individual with particular feelings and 
inclinations which - though contingent to his station - may affect his judgement (the 
criminal, always has the chance of getting away with it). But as Hegel puts it, this 
"contradiction between consciousness of oneself and the hoped-for difference in another's 
idea, of one's self", or the "contradiction between desert in the eyes of the law and the 
actualisation of the same", ' is no basis for a reconciliation with the law. Second, given the 
abstraction -of the criminal qua criminal from the point of view of the law, any putative 
reconciliation with the law could only be what Hegel calls a mere "conceptual reunion", 
involving "man as a concept" rather than "man as reality". And finally, as long as crime 
appears as the "destruction, or subjugation of something alien", external to and unchanged GP- - 
by the act, again. the thought of reconciliation is absurd. 
Hegel's conclusion - is that within a framework structured by unmediated oppositions 
between 'universal' and 'particular', 'concept' and 'reality'; "Punishment and law cannot 
be reconciled". 10 However, he wants to, show that reconciliation is possible if these 
oppositions can be transcended. In what is all but an echo of the young Hegel's fragment, 
]Bernard Williams has expressed the need for such a transcendence with impressive 
economy. " The Punishment through which the law avenges itself corresponds to-what 
Williams calls "the institution of blame" which bears upon the transgressor of the peculiar 
12 "system of, morality". Within the system of morality, the fundament of ethical life is 
construed as. an, unconditional, obligation to - act in accord with the moral law. The 
phenomenal appearance of an objective constraint on a subject's particular inclinations is 
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then taken to represent an implicit recognition of the universality of the moral demand - as 
an intuited sense of one's overriding obligation to a moral law which is universal in virtue 
of being uncompromised by such inclinations. " This is taken as the achievement of the 
rational will. But as Williams describes it, the experience of the moral demand is like 
being confronted with something which is "part of the world in which one lives". The 
force of the moral law is explicable as'external to the individual rational will only if it is 
regarded as the law of a ". notional republic", in which the law is rationally self-imposed by 
each citizen. " The morally construed law-like funadament of ethical life, in Hegel's terms, 
impinges on 'man as concept', and it does so by abstracting the demands of law from the 
concrete world in which 'man as reality' lives. 
Moreover, the stability of the morality system, according to Williams, requires a means of 
binding individuals which it is itself incapable of providing. The system of morality is 
inherently unstable, Williams suggests, because it does violence to the reality of the 
individual's life context. In order to be grounded as law, the system of morality needs its 
own peculiar sanction, and this it finds in a particular kind of punishment - in blame. 
Allocations of blame tend to focus narrowly on an action or omission perpetrated by an' 
isolated, ideally autonomous subject. It can then seem as if the agent who transgresses the 
system of morality always has a reason for acting otherwise - namely, to fulfil his moral 
obligation. But this reason is then viewed as overridden by another reason upon which the 
transgressor chose to act, and for which he merits blame. The practice of blame thus 
presupposes that there is a common (or 'basic') reason for acting which all agents implicitly 
or explicitly recognize, and to which the agent can voluntarily confom or dissent. Not 
only is such a basic reason fictional, Williams argues, but so is the idea of the ideally' 
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autonomous subject which chooses to act upon it. The practice of blame abstracts moral 
consciousness from the background context of self-formation, and so from the surroundings 
in which the shape of the particular character blamed is forged. At this point, Williams 
suggests that the fictional foundation of the system of morality and its misrepresentation of 
the pull of the ethical as blame can be overlooked if one is convinced by the ideal that 
"human existence can be ultimately just""; that luck in the process of character-formation 
and the leading of life are adventitious to what is of fundamental value in life. Williams 
notes that this aspiration towards 'purity' may have been of some beneficial practical 
consequence. More sceptically, however - and here the echo of Hegel is at its clearest - 
Williams writes that the fiction underlying the practice of blame can encourage people "to 
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misunderstand their own fear and resentment... as the voice of the Law". Williams 
concludes that although the fiction of the moral law may have augmented the amount of 
actual justice in the world, it does so by misrepresenting the nature of the limited value it 
fosters.; This misrepresentation can only be overcome - and the end of justice more 
felicitously served -- if the illusion of value without luck is dropped, and with it the 
irreconcilable OPPositions between duty and inclination, voluntariness and force, and with 
them the idea that unless social practices embody justice purely, they must be failing to 
institutionalize justice at all. " 
But where does the acknowledgement of luck leave us, and how might these oppositions be 
reconciled? " Let us now consider the reconciling or redeeming potential of what Hegel 
"n1 . Is the avenging force of punishment as fate. We saw that for Hegel, the avenging force 
of the law as Punishment takes the form of a sacrifice of the individual agent as an abstract 
category to the universal demands of morality, the necessarily hostile force of which is 
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fearfully - experienced, as alien to the - particular individual. Taking these features as 
considered above in reverse order, the appearance to the criminal of his punishment as a 
fate. contrasts with them, according to Hegel, in the following ways. 
First, what avenges itself in the power of fate is not something external to the agent, but 
the 'defective life' of the agent hinueyInsofar as this life is shared with the other members 
of his ethical community: -- 
I 
When the trespasser feels the disruption of his own life (suffers punishment) 
or knows himself (in bad conscience), then the working of his fate 
commences, and this feeling of a life disrupted must become a longing for 
what has been lost. The deficiency is recognized as part of himself, as what 
was to have been in him and is not. " 
What has been lost is not the satisfaction of his own particular self-interest as sacrificed or 
opposed to a universal moral law. Hegel speaks of what is destroyed by the trespass as the 
"friendliness of life". The longing for what has been lost is the longing for the friendly 
context of life which through his own act, the criminal has disrupted, or distorted,, into an 
enemy. , Hence, the fear of the criminal is directed not towards something which pre-existed 
his act and which is external to it. The criminal's fear of punishment as fate is a "fear of 
a separation, an awe of one's self"'; he makes himself into his own enemy by separating 
himself from, and thereby malcing an enemy of, what was to have been but is not a: friendly 
context or totality of life. Tor this reason, the moral significance of his'act is not primarily 
the aninulment of an extemal moral law, but the diremption of a shared ethical, totality. - 
Now if in his crime the criminal becomes split-off' from the presupposed (in the longing) 
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friendly context of life considered as a totality, it follows that all other parties to the totality 
suffer the consequence. Not only the criminal, but all other members of the ethical 
community are implicated. The avenging force of punishment is thus fateful in the 
following sense; it draws in 0 parties to the moral relation, even those who are innocent 
of any crime. Hegel's point is that the criminal's act is not in itself sufficient to bring the 
causality of fate into play (as in the force of law). Hegel distinguishes between the act as 
the- occasion of this force, and the reaction to it on the part of the other members of the 
moral, relation which produces it. The injured party can either struggle for the recovery 
of his right, or renounce it in "submissive grief". " In either case, though neither doing 
wrong nor deserving punishment, the other finds himself in a position of responsibility "as 
an inescapable, fate". ' 
The necessity of this fate, therefore, is not to be considered in terms of what is entailed by 
the abstract identity of an agent qua criminal from the point of view of the law. For not 
only is the fate of the criminal not just his, but the reason for this being so is unthinkable 
outside the concrete conditions of his life context. And it is the avenging force of this 
distorted concrete life context which the criminal experiences in his punishment as fate. 
This is not to say, to return to the first of Hegel's contrasts, that justice is compromised by 
fate, since "even in the hostility of fate a man has a sense of just punishment". 23 The point 
is that this hostility is not grounded in the moral law, but in the ethical totality - the 
friendly context of life - presupposed in the. appearance of a dirempted life which avenges 
itself as a fate. The principle of justice which is the unbending demand of the moral law 
is but a fragment, albeit an important one of the ethical life. Since fate "knows no precinct 
of virtue"", we can say that for Hegel, Punishment presupposes punishment; "The law is 
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later than life and outflanked by it", "the law is only the lack of life, defective life 
appearing as a power". 
25 
This power is what appears to the criminal as the compelling force of moral authority. But 
the universal it represents, Hegel insists, "is not severed from the particular in the way in 
which the law, as universal, is opposed to man or his inclinations as a particular". " For 
in the source of the compulsion, the criminal recognizes his own life as a particular 
individual as it might have been before his separation from it in his punishment. Referring 
to this opposition between universal and particular, Hegel makes the point that; 
Before he acts there is no cleavage, no opposition, much less a mastery. 
Only through a departure from that united life which is neither regulated by 
law nor at variance with law, only through the Icilling of life, is something 
alien produced. Destruction of life is notAhe nullification of life but its 
diremption, and the destruction consists in its transformation into an 
enemy. 17 
If the universal of moral authority is considered in terms of the ethical totality - or friendly 
context of life - reconciliation becomes possible between'it and the particular agent who 
through his crime, becomes split-off from it. For Hegel, reconciliation between split-off 
or divided fragments of life, and the return to the friendly life which has been lost, - is the, 
achievement of love. In love, as he puts it, "fate is reconciled". " ý. ýI 
Now Habermas, has always acknowledged the force of the young Hegel's exposition of the 
weaknesses in the Kantian conception of the basis of morality. " Particularly, Habermas 
identifies those inadequacies which result from Kant's abstraction of moral action from the 
particular inclinations which motivate it; of the form of duty from the specific, 
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context-dependent content of its application; but most importantly, of the autonomous will 
from the complex intersubjective nexus of its self-formation. And it is precisely the 
emergence of moral identity out of a destroyed intersubjective nexus of mutual recognition 
which Habermas takes to be the central insight of Hegel's position. "In the causality of 
destiny", Habermas writes, 
the power of suppressed life is at work, which can only be reconciled, when, 
out of the experience of the negativity of a sundered life, the longing for that 
which has been lost arises and necessitates identifying one's own denied 
identity in the alien existence one fights against. Then both parties recognize 
the hardened positions taken against each other to be the result of a 
separation, the abstraction from the common interconnection of their lives 
and within this, in the dialogic relationship of recognizing oneself in the 
other, they experience the common basis of their existence. 30 
It is this common basis of existence which Habermas takes to be the source of morality. 
It is the goal of that struggle for normativity the self-clarification of which is the task of his 
critical theory. He describes it as "the complementary interchange of non-compulsory 
communication and the mutual satisfaction of interests" . 31 Habermas's claim is that this 
structure of intersubjectivity is a necessary condition of undamaged self-formative 
processes. It. thus provides a standard which can be appealed to in the critique of the 
systematic injury to human identity which makes itself felt in the predominance of 
cognitive/instrumental, reason.. But Habermas also wants to claim that it is within this 
undamaged process of self-formation - or 'intact intersubjectivity' - that communicative 
rationality is deposited. As -Habermas puts 
it in a more, recent formulation; 
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Any violation of the structures of rational life together, to 
which all lay claim, affects everyone equally. This is what 
the young Hegel meant by the ethical totality which is 
disrupted by the deed of the criminal and that can only be 
restored by insight into the indivisibility of suffering due to 
alienation. 32 
The problem Habermas, now faces is that of malcing Hegel's insight intelligible within a 
general account of the emergence of structures of rational life. But given the theoretical 
commitments already introduced, this can only mean within an account of the evolution of 
communicative competence as organized within a theory of rationalization. So Habermas 
must find a way of combining the conception of crisis and the revelation of a moral order 
which he derives from Hegel with the Enlightenment derived conception of modernity as 
guided by the norms of procedual rationality. It is not initially clear how such a synthesis 
can be forged, since procedural reason departs from its substantive, pre-modem precursor 
just in its differentiation of truth-evaluable action-motivating moral insight from the self- 
clarification of the claim to normativity; where the achievement of this separation is a 
measure of communicative competence. By seelcing to integrate Hegel's insight with a 
theory of rationalization, Habermas thus faces the danger re-introducing the Kantian 
abstractions against which Hegel's critique was originally directed. In the general guiding 
terms of our discussion; are the_acultural conceptual tools needed to theorize modernity as 
a process of rationalization suitable for articulating the injuries inflicted upon an ethical 
totality as a fate? I now want to turn to how Habermas takes the causality of fate to be 
evidenced in actual self-formative processes, and to the kind of theory which Habermas 
claims can best articulate its operation. This is most clear in Habermas's interpretation of, 
the achievements of Freudian psychoanalysis. " 
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(3.2) The Fateful Causality of Psychopathologies 
Habermas takes as his basic model for the conflicts of modernity which generate its need 
for self-reassurance "the pseudo-natural dynamics of impaired communicative 
life-contexts". ' The notion of an unimpaired communicative life-context is the standard 
against which these conflicts are to be understood as symptoms of pathologies. At this 
point I want to consider the pattern of dynwnics Habermas attributes to pathologies arising 
from the impairment of this standard. For these dynamics are pseudo-natural precisely to 
the extent that a causality of fate appears as a causality of nature. The distinction between 
these two dynamics is most fully elaborated in Habermas's discussion of Freud in 
Knowledge and Human Interests, " where he presents an argument to the following effect. 
If Freud was theoretically correct in inferring a dynamic of inner conflict from phenomena 
of resistance within a subject's psyche to part of its own content, and if Freud was 
therapeutically successful in undoing this resistance through an act of communicated 
recollection which was the subject's own doing, then the dynamic of the pathological inner 
conflict must be articulable by the critical concepts of self-recognition and responsibility. 
But since self-recognition is possible only within a public context of linguistically shared 
rules of interpretation, the private dynamic of inner conflict, resistance, pathological 
self-misrecognition and emancipation through self-responsible reflection, will refer to a 
public dynamic of a distorted, and reconstituted grammar. For Freud, the patient's 
pathology is essentially determined by the law-like causality of the instincts, such that his 
suffering before his symptoms can be compared to what Hegel described as the suffering 
of the criminal before an alien,, unbending penal law. But for Habermas, the patient stands 
to his symptoms as the criminal described by Hegel stands not to a law but to his- fate. The 
common fate of the patient and the criminal is the suffering of an excommunication, which 
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for Habermas means an alienation not from an external moral or libidinal law, but from just 
that communicative life-context in which processes of self-formation occur. Distorted 
self7formation thus reflects on what Habermas is calling an impaired communicative 
life-context, or damaged intersubjectivity. 
I shall now investigate this argument in more detail. The distortion of communicative 
life-contexts is Habermas's model for the social pathologies characteristic of modernity. 
According to Habermas, this is just the sense in which pathologies were identified and 
treated by Freud, though Freud's bewitchment by the model of the natural sciences led him 
to misunderstand this. The issue I want to focus on is not the validity of Habermas's 
epistemological critique of Freud's science, neither is it the fidelity of Habermas's 
interpretation of Freud's system as whole. Rather, ' my main objective is to elucidate the 
sense in which psychoanalytical theory is concerned with articulating the operation of a 
causality of fate in processes of pathological self-formation. For this is the same dynamic 
which, according to Habermas, generates the crises in identity he elsewhere attributes to 
the distorted reproduction of modernity's symbolic resources. 
"The starting point of psychoanalytical theory", for Habermas's purposeso "is the blocking 
force that'stands in the way of free and public communication" of a class of psychic 
contents. " in everyday life, ' we often refrain from freely and publicly communicating 
episodes in our mental life; one may feel conscious reservation about communicating 
something which is compromising, tactless, or unedifying either to onegs partner in 
communication, or more commonly, to oneself. Words can hurt, and aware of the social 
and moral pressures to avoid hurt, we can choose not to communicate such words. 31 But 
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in the situation of dialogue between analyst and patient, these normal everyday restraints 
to communication are bracketed. We have an 'experimental' situation in which the 'initial 
conditions' are such as to maximize the extent of freedom on the part of the patient to 
publicly communicate his or her mental history to the analyst. Psychoanalytical theory 
begins with experiences of resistance here. In the situation of dialogue between analyst and 
patient, empirical data in the form of amnesias in the recounted mental history of the patient 
are interpreted as evidence of resistance within the patient to key episodes in that history. 
The two-fold task of psychoanalytical. technique is to overcome this resistance and to 
interpret what is latent to the manifestations of it. Overcoming resistance involves 
neutralizing the blocIdng force to the communication of contents of the patient's psyche ý 
which have become 'lost' to him. The nature of the amnesias, encountered by the analyst 
suggests that it is not simply the passive loss of memory which is at work here -a 
temporary excursion into the resting place of the pre-conscious - but a loss which is due to 
an active force of resistance which works 'behind the back' of the patient. The resistance 
experienced by the analyst in his or her effort to get the patient to recall an episode in the 
patient's mental history - under such conditions - reflects on the unconscious resistance 
experienced by the patient him/herself to the very same phenomenon. 
Freudian psychoanalysis attempts to capture the logic of this blocking force in the concept 
of repression, where the class of psychic contents which resists open and public 
communication is that content of the mind which is systematically resistant, to. ý- 
consciousness. This psychic content is both affective and symbolic. It includes needs, - 
desires, and motivations, which at their most thoroughgoingly-and elementally affective' 
level, are referred to by Freud as instincts. They are, so to speak, the bare substance of '' 
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the psyche considered dispositionally. However, insofar as we can talk about an affective 
content of the mind, this content must be given form by being 'attached' to the specific 
means of operation of the mind. -As the mind operates by way of symbols articulated in 
a language, so the- affective content of the mind must be symbolically or linguistically 
mediated. To have an intelligible mental content is to have acquired a language. But to 
have acquired a language, Habermas learns from Wittgenstein, is to have been introduced 
into, and to participate in, a linguistic practice or 'language game'. " This latter notion 
contains the idea of language as a rule-governed activity of communication, a necessary 
condition of which is that the rules which make the communication of meanings possible 
are public. This is not because meanings are initially private to the mind of a subject, and 
are then contingently made public in order to communicate them to an other mind. Rather, 
meanings are constitutively public, and are only understandable to oneself for the very same 
reason that they are understandable to others, publicly,, in the act of communication. 
But if psychic contents are linguistic in constitution, and language is constitutively public, 
what bearing does this have on a 'repressed' content of the mind? As Habermas, interprets' 
it, the repressed content of the mind refers to just those linguistic interpretations of, "need 
dispositions" which are excluded from public communication. - Since social pressures may 
prohibit the communication of certain motivations or need dispositions, the symbols through 
which they are interpreted can become 'split-off from the ý public rules which are the 
grammar of "the ongoing text of'our everyday language --games". " , But- since one 
understands one's own motives, -actions, and patterns of, expression -according to these 
public rules, then those motives, actions and patterns, of expression the interpretations of 
which are removed from public circulation appear incomprehensible to the subject or author 
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of them. And this, -according to Habermas, is precisely the incomprehensibility of the 
unconscious. The unconscious thus corresponds to the repressed content of the mind, 
where what is repressed is a public language for the interpretation and communication of 
need dispositions which are sanctioned against socially. Hence the resistance which is the 
starting point' of psychoanalytical. theory - namely, the resistance to free and public 
communication ý of repressed, psychic contents - can now be seen to correspond to the 
resistance of the unconscious content of the mind to consciousness. 
The problem of comprehending the unconscious is the second of the two-fold task of 
psychoanalytical technique; to interpret the manifestations of resistance. For although an 
event in the subject's life-history may be displaced inaccessibly from her consciousness, the 
suppressed need-disposition it represents nevertheless continues to leave its trace., "Because 
the symbols that interpret, suppressed needs are excluded from -public communication", 
Habermas ' writes, , "the speaking and acting subject's communication with himself is 
interrupted. "" This interruption in the communicatively mediated identity-formation of the 
subject has considerable repercussions upon the apparent expression of that identity. And 
it is through the interpretation of these repercussions that the 'lost' content may be 
retrieved. -In extreme cases - such as neuroses - they manifest themselves publicly as I 
pathologies in the form of 'symptoms'. Following Freud, Habermas theorizes neurotic 
symptoms as a defence, mechanism of substitute gratification for early experiences'of 
traumatically suppressed needs. But more distinctively - Habermasian is the view that 
symptoms, such as compulsive repetitions,, phobias, and obsessional fixations, are distorted 
expressions of dispositions the interpretation of which has been excommunicated from the 
public realm. The subject does not understand why he or she repetitively and compulsively 
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acts in ways which defy his or her conscious preferences and beliefs, and awareness of this, 
discrepancy is of no effect -in changing the actions to conform with these preferences. 
Symptoms are actions which belie the subject's motivations, the latter appearing to have a 
compulsive force which is external to the agent. So the interpretive problem can now be 
specified as that of maldng sense of-, (1) the belied motivation, in terms of-, (2) an 
excommunication from the public realm of meanings, which; (3) exercises an externally 
compelling* force. -.. It is this third aspect of the problem which most interests us,, so I shall 
just very briefly deal with the first two aspects of the so-called 'depth-interpretation'. 
(1) The ý symptoms and conscious intentions of the subject belie the dispositions which 
motivate them in the sense that the latter are expressed in a distorted, manifestly disguise& 
form. - They appear, as irrational. " But since both the (verbal and non-verbal) conscious 
actions and the unconscious dispositions are parts of the same 'self', then Habermas 
considers the belying of one by the other to be a form of self-deception. - Because of this, 
psychoanalytical, interpretation takes on a peculiar character. Its interpretive dimension 
invites comparison with hermeneutics, the goal of which, as we saw in (1.3), is to interpret 
the problematic meaning of historically and culturally distant texts. Likewise, symptoms 
(and in normal cases, parapraxes, dreams, etc. ) can be considered as texts the elusive 
meaning of which requires artful interpretation. But in contrast to hermeneutics, 
psychoanalytical. interpretation is directed towards non-accidental textual distortion; "The 
omissions and distortions that it rectifies have a systematic role and function; For the' 
symbolic structures that psychoanalysis seeks to comprehend are corrupted by the impact 
of intemal conditions. "" That is, they are the product of 'systematically distorted ý 
communication" the comprehension of which requires tools drawn from a general theory. 
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of communicative competence which transcends the domain of everyday, theoretically 
unmediated hermeneutic consciousness. 41 
I 
Psychoanalysis seeks to uncover intentions which have in the sense. described become 
dunconscious'. The meaning of the symbolic structures (texts) are not transparent to the 
subject (author), and the'goal of interpretation is to make these meanings accessible to the 
subject. The interpretation can meet this goal, Habermas believes, by simultaneously 
explaining how the inaccessibility, or distorted meaning, has come about. The flaws in the 
text of, the actions and recounted mental history of the patient, the symptoms and the 
amnesias, are not arbitrary distortions of the intentions or dispositions of the author. They 
have meaning as such as resistances. The self-understanding generated in the analysis 
"makes accessible the meaning of specifically incomprehensible forms of expression only 
to the extent to which it is possible to clarify the conditions for the emergence of non-sense 
in conjunction with the original scene". ' But if the distortions are not accidental, what is 
the nature of the causality or necessity operating here, and how can it be reversed?, - Before 
attempting to answer this, we must briefly attend to the second aspect of the interpretive 
problem. 
rr 
(2) The analyst notices a lack of 'fit' between what is linguistically stated and what is 
non-verbally (bodily) expressed by the patient. They, apparently -make no sense together. 
But if symptoms, as Habermas has claimed, are distortions arising from a splitting-off of 
the need disposition from a publicly meaningful language, then the peculiar task of 
psychoanalytical interpretation is that of a translation ý from the privatized or 
'degrammatized' text of the symptom (or in normal cases, the dream) to the public language 
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of linguistically statable intentions. The interpretive task involves "translating symbols from 
a mode of expression deformed as a private language into the mode of expression of public 
communication", thus bringing "to consciousness the person's own self-formative 
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process". Translation is possible precisely because the distortions of the subject's text are 
not arbitrary. The distortions are "meaningful as such", in that they both resist conscious 
(public) articulation, while at the same time revealing this resistance in disguise; "subjects 
deceive themselves about themselves through language and simultaneously give themselves 
away in it". ' To unmask this disguise, the making manifest of the latent content of 
patient's psyche, is to articulate this content in a language which is accessible and 
meaningful to the patent, which is the public language in which each person's self-formation 
is comprehensible. That is, in the grammar of the ongoing text of everyday 
language-games. 
The position reached so far is this. Starting from Freud's insight into. the role of resistance 
in freely and publicly communicating aspects of one's psychic history, Habermas has 
reformulated the concept of repression in terms of an excommunication, "carried out in and 
through language "47 , of aspects of one's self-formation. He can now say that the causality 
at play in repression and symptom formation is the kind of causality which is appropriate 
to the process of self-formation. But it is a distorted or pathological process because, as 
a result of repression, one comes by patterns of behaviour and bodily expression which are 
alien to that self, thus frustrating the satisfaction of desires which the subject would 
otherwise choose. Habermas uses Freud's phrase of "internal foreign territory" to describe, 
the phenomenon of symptoms. They are foreign because they are not recognizable as the 
subject's own, they need translation into a language the subject understands. - Yet they are 
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internal býecause they are also an integral, though fragmented, expression of the subject. 
Habermas mu st now'indicat6 what the kind of causality appropriate to this process is, and 
thereby to show'how 'ieconcillation is possible bet, ý; een the alienated aspects of the-self 
generated through it. 
(3) Thephen-omenon which'needs to lie accounted f6r is the extemalbi compelling character 
of the unconscious. The fo , r66 of the compulsion of the unconscious is"experienced as 
external to the' subject because it manifests itself in actions and dispositions which are 
incomprehensible to the subject, yet these actions and 'dispositions are nevertheless'part of 
that subject's identitY. - This externalitý -6f the compulsion tempted Freud to- attribute the 
causality of the unconscious to natuial laws. ' The physical forces'which govern the 
behaviour of the unconscious'accoiding to laws Of nature Freud called instincts. Habermas 
in effect makes three objections to this mo I ve. First, he claims that the concept of instinct 
is inapplicable to mental contents. ' The very concept of instinct'is only applicable afill, 
so'he claims, because animal behaviour can be understood in terms of 'a reduced, but 
irreducibly linguistically interpreted human experience, of hunger, love, and aggression. 
It is inapplicable to the mental content of humans because it is divorced from the 
specifically linguistic charactei 'Of 'this content. In this connection, Habermas opposes'a 
pseudo-natural causality of instincts to a causality of fate which "prevails through'the 
symbolic means of the mind". " 
Put this way, Habermas's idea of a causality of fate'seims to be close to the'view that 
symbolic representations which are'reasons can be causes of actions without nomologically 
determining them. The causality 'which prevails through the symbolic means of the mind 
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is, according to this, interpretation, the causality of reasons, which don't appear to be 
connected with particular actions in a law-like way., In particular, the connection between 
a symptomatic action and the. initial desire and defensive reaction cannot be satisfactorily 
explained in terms of the invariance of. natural laws. , But there is invariance of some Icind; 
what Habermas calls "the spontaneously generated invariance of life-history" 49 , which is 
captured in Hegel's notion of a causality of fate. Habermas's second o0jection, then, is that 
it is not necessary to invoke the concept of instinct to account for the causal conditions of 
the unconscious, since an alternative kind of causality to the law-like causality of "natural" 
conditions is available to us. This is the causality of reasons for action which have become 
'split-off from the communicative life-context of self-formation. According to Habermas's 
4 excommunication' model of the unconscious I have been oudining, the repressed content 
of the mind (the unconscious) appears only with the banishment or exile of unconstrained 
and publicly communicable need interpretations and expressions. The reactive force of the 
excommunicated reasons for acting then appears as something law-like and external - as a 
second, nature'. The subject's actions then appear to be, pulled - by týis "objectified 
unconscious" as, say, the tides are by the gravitational pull of the moon. 
This brings us to the third, and crucial objection which Habermas makes against the natural 
law-like compulsion of instincts - that it is not compatible with the power that sdf-reflection 
has to overcome the pathologies caused by repression and the causality of the unconscious. 
Habermas's transcendental argument is that the capacity for dissolution of the pathology by 
the self-repection of the subject presupposes that a causality of fate rather than nature is at 
play in the original formation of the pathology. " If the latter were the case, Habamas 
argues, then it would make sense to consider the therapy as an essentially-. mechanical 
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procedure, ', however difficult, which could in principle be repeated in, all like cases ý to 
similar'effect. But the therapeutic achievement of an analysis is not analogous to the 
technical achievement of a biochemist in removing a pathological formation from a diseased 
or maldeveloped organism. For the achievement in the former case requires an act of 
self-reflection by the-patient, and for this,, Habermas insists, there can-be no technical 
substitute. On the contrary, it is just in the emancipation of the sub ect from the i 
'objectification' which appears as a law-binding external second nature that the goal of the 
therapy lies. The ý act of reflection brings a practically momentous 'enlightenment' by 
freeing the subject from the occupying forces of the internal foreign territory. Reflection 
brings about a reconciliation between the conscious self and those symbols and motives 
which have "gone underground" and which appear as alien to the subject, while belonging 
to him. Self-reflection "transforms the pathological state of compulsion and self-deception 
into the state of superseded conflict and reconciliation with excommunicated language". 51, 
So for Habermas, the 'cure' of analytical reflective insight is intelligible only if the 'cause' 
is attributable not to instincts exercising their force externally to the self, but to a division 
or diremption within the self which is reconciled by it. It works by 'undoing' the original 
process of splitting-off, and thereby reconstituting a "grammatical connection between 
symbols"". But what allows this reversal to come about? What is special about the 
recollective insight?, As Habermas reads Freud, the answer lies in the peculiarity given 
by its contextualization in the 'transference' situation. During the course of an analysis, 
the patient can come to transfer his or her reaction to the symptom-forming occasion from 
the original scene of the symptom, to the artificially controlled analysis situation. 
Analytical self-reflection renders the latent meaning behind the apparently irrational and 
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misery-inducing symptom comprehensible'"by reference to the unmutilated, meaning of the 
original scene in infancy". " This ". scenic understanding" is rendered possible under the 
presupposition that an equivalence is established between the everyday symptomatic scene,, 
the'transference scene, and'the original scene., With the pressures and social obligations 
of life suspended by the analyst, 'the patient's symptoms are allowed unconstrained 
expression, thus weakening the resistance of the patient to recollecting the original scene. ' 
With the help of the reconstructions of the original scene suggested by the analyst, and 
"confronted with the results of his action in transference", the patient can come to recall 
the lost portion of his or her mental history seen "through the eyes of another", 54 
It is important to the logic of this situation that the act of self-reflection by virtue of which 
the patient can emancipate himself. from his illness, requires an encounter with an other 
through whom the patient can recognize the split off part of himself as his own. The 
patient's achievement of self-consciousness - which is to say the undoing of the unconscious 
which has become lost to the self - is constitutively an achievement of mutual recognition 
made possible by communication in a shared (public) language. Habermas gives this point 
its most convincing formulation in the following passage which appears as a footnote to the 
main text of Knowledge and Human Interests; 
When the physician lets the patient free himself as an autonomous ego, the 
subjects must define themselves in relation to one another in such a way that 
the former patient knows that the identity of his ego is only possible through 
the identity of another who recognizes him and whose identity in turn, is 
dependent on his recognition. " 
For successful therapy to be possible - for self-reflection to have its emancipating effect - 
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it must have a real affective-motivational base in the analysand. At one level, there must 
be a passion for self-knowledge which is strong enough to overcome resistance. But more 
fundamentally, Habermas remarks that there must be a "passion for critique", " in the sense 
that in order to emancipate himself from his illness through self-reflection, the patient must 
take responsibility for that which, like Hegel's criminal, "was to be in him but which is 
not". And it is this adoption of ý"moral ýresponsibility for the content of the'illness" 
demanded of the patient which results, by way of that'form of self-reflection- called scenic 
understanding, in the shattering or disenchantment of the experienced causality of fate; 
For the insight to which analysis is to lead is indeed only this: that the ego 
of the patient recognize itself in its other, represented by its illness, as in its 
own alienated self and identify with it. As in Hegel's dialectic of the moral 
life, the criminal recognizes in his victim his own annihilated essence; in this 
self-reflection the abstractly divorced parties recognize the destroyed moral 
totality as their common basis and thereby return to it. 57 
I now want to take up two sets of objections against Habermas's position. As we have 
seen, Habermas takes the metatheoretical. province of psychoanalysis to lie beyond that of 
the cognitivelinstrumental sciences. This is because psychoanalyitical explanations are 
applied to the domain of human, symbolically mediated self-formative processes. The first 
set of objections takes issue with this move by challenging the appropriateness of 
Habemas's Hegelianizing of Freud on naturalistic grounds. The second type of objection, 
on the other hand, questions the compatibility of Hegel's insights with Habermas's analysis 
I 
of systematically distorted communication as transcending the province of merely 
hemeneutic reflection. 
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(3.3) Naturalistic Objections 
In his book Vie Politics of Social 7heory, Russell Keat criticizes Habermas's 
conceptualization. of the presuppositions of psychoanalysis for being insufficiently 
naturalistic in its construal of-, (1) the domain of therapeutic understanding, and (2) the aim 
or goal of therapy. " By talcing the domain of therapeutic understanding as the realm of a 
causality of fate, Keat claims, Habermas posits an incoherent alternative to the world of 
natural, causally determinate laws to which the human being, as a part of nature, is subject. 
This in turn blinds Habermas, Keat suggests, to therapeutic practices which rely for their 
success on technologically exploitable knowledge of nature. Keat then imputes this 
blindness to a misleading conception of emancipation which Habermas takes to be the goal 
of analytical therapy and, by implication, of Habermas's model of Critical Theory 
generally. I will now briefly consider each of these objections in turn, focussing as 
narrowly as possible on the weaknesses in Habermas's theory attributable to it, according 
to Keat, on account of its employment of the idea of a non-naturalistic causality of fate. 
(1) Keat interprets the object domain of Habermas's critique as "the apparent objectivity 
of alienated, reified human subjectivity". " In his reading of Freud, Habermas identifies this 
split-off, alienated subjectivity with the unconscious as such. Habermas maintains, as Keat 
puts it, that "in overcoming the power of the unconscious, the patient is thereby removed 
from the deterministic realm of causality". ' The imputation of this view to Habermas is 
supported by the following passage: 
I 
In technical control over nature we get nature to work for us through our 
knowledge of causal connections. Analytic insight, however, affects the 
causality of the unconscious as such. Psychoanalytical. therapy is not based, 
like somatic medicine, which is 'causal' in the narrower sense, on making 
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use of known causal connections. Rather it owes its efficacy to overcoming 
causal connections themselves. " 
As Keat interprets it, this commits Habermas to the view that a critical science (for which 
psychoanalysis is the model) is directed towards the "abolition of what only appear to be 
genuinely causal determinants". " Against this view, Keat objects first that there are many 
manifestations of the unconscious which cannot in any plausible way be construed as 
'pathological' - something to be 'abolished' - and hence as part of the domain of therapeutic 
reason. Dreams, jokes, and parapraxes, for instance, hardly seem apt targets for abolition. 
Second, he objects to Habermas's identification of alienated, unfree subjectivity with 
causally determined action. The causal determinations of human behaviour are, in 
principle, as susceptible to scientific investigation as any other part of nature. But this 
position does not entail, pace Habermas, the abolition of human freedom, since knowledge 
of such causes can remove the hindrances to purposive action. The domain of therapeutic 
reason is not pseudo-causality, but the competing causalities of different natural desires, 
instincts, and motivations. 
Apropos of the first objection, Habemas explicitly accepts that the dream is "the 'normal 
63 model' of pathological conditions". His position is that dreams follow a pattern which has 
the same structure of "pathologically distorted meaning" as symptoms - namely, the 
disguised manifestation of motives which have been excluded from public communication 
(i. e. 'repressed'). So although dreams are the 'normal' case, they are nevertheless only 
possible given an infantile history of conflictual and traumatic will-formation. " If the 
pathological state of affairs is taken as the odginal splitting off of need-disposition from 
communication, then it makes sense to say that dreams are pathological in origin. But this 
95 
is not to say that the dream itself is a pathology;, on the contrary it fulfils the necessary 
compensatory function of repressed wish-fulfilment. Although, of course, something of the 
same is true of symptoms, in their case the compensatory mechanism issues in a crisis of 
identity which impels a certain 'passion for critique'. The point of the therapy is not simply 
to remove the symptomatic behaviour. It is rather to enable a reconciliation of the 
conscious ý agent with his unconscious or 'split-off' past. If Habermas's account is to 
survive the objection, then, it must distinguish between the pathological context or origin 
of the formation of the unconscious, and the pathological behavioural. consequences of its 
formation. Of course, this presupposes that the origin can be determined, a supposition 
which will be questioned in the next section. 
The'force of Keat's second objection turns partly on the interpretation he gives to the 
passage he cites from Habermas, and specifically the meaning of the operative 
"overcoming" of causal connections. This overcoming, it must be made clear, is not 
achieved through the Kantian supposition that the category of causality is only applicable 
to the realm of phenomena - as distinct from the noumenal realm of the transcendental will. 
But only if Habermas were claiming this, would Keat's objection have force. What 
Habermas does claim is that since the human self-formative process is mediated by 
language, peculiar constraints are imposed on the categories which can legitimately be used 
for comprehending its disturbance. The crucial point is that at the therapeutic level, 
'overcoming' the disturbance renders articulate what was otherwise unfathomable, and this 
in a process of dialogical interaction which both heightens self-consciousness and motivates 
altered behaviour through the affective content of what is brought to consciousness., -, The 
overcoming requires some responsibility on the part of the subject, who must act as if 
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things could be otherwise if the therapy is to be efficacious. This is different to a patient 
acting as if a cancer tumour is not going to develop, ýand it is a difference which needs to 
be reflected in the meta-theoretical self-understanding of the critical science. 
Undoubtedly, Habermas's equivocal use of "causal connections" in the passage cited above 
is unfortunate. But I don't see why Habermas's position taken as a whole is incompatible 
with Keat's insistence that the therapeutic achievement lies in the replacement of one cause 
of action for another. All that Habermas requires at this point in the argument is that there 
are some motivations for action which, once rendered perspicuous by self-reflection, would 
lose their motivational power upon the subject's action. 
(2) The second of Keat's objections I want to note concerns Habermas's specification of the 
goal of psychoanalytical therapy. Although this objection isn't particularly 'naturalistic', 
it does, I think, betray a fundamental miscomprehension of the role of 'the causality of fate', 
in Habermas's theory which is otherwise the target of his naturalistic criticisms. There is 
a normative, complexity to the therapeutic process, Keat claims, which is inadequately 
captured by Habermas's notion of emancipation. Keat illustrates this objection with two 
hypothetical cases: of a male patient who is 'emancipated' from his emotional distress in 
his discovery that he feels insufficiently nurtured in his relationships with women - and then 
proceeds to impose stereotypical, oppressive roles on his wife; and of a patient whose 
'successful' therapy reinforces a self-assertive attitude, which then motivates, and implicitly 
justifies, him in individualist and exploitative practices in his work-place. These examples 
show, states Keat, that "achieving therapeutic autonomy is consistent with the adoption and 
practice by an 'emancipated' patient of attitudes and values that are by no means [from an 
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anti-sexist, socialist viewpoint] unobjectionable". "And I do not see", Keat continues, "how 
their acceptability or unacceptability can be determined without going well beyond the 
normative concepts illustrated by the model of psychoanalysis". "' 
But emancipation as it is understood according to Habermas's Hegelian reading of Freud 
is precisely not normatively naive in the sense Keat alleges. For it involves recognition of 
the individual's immanence within a virtual ethical totality which is itself avenged in the 
individual's self-alienation prior to the therapy. Emancipation from unconscious 
dependencies represents only one moment of the normative structure which Habermas takes 
to be illustrated in the model of psychoanalysis. As Habermas puts it, "the virtual totality 
that is sundered by splitting-off is represented by the model of pure communicative 
action", ' but alienated subjectivity is only one consequence of this rupture. Thus the key 
normative concept which Habermas takes to be illustrated by the model of psychoanalysis 
is intact or undamaged inter-subjectivity, as represented by the concept of pure 
communicative action. The exploitative practices which Keat suggests are consistent with 
the achievement of therapeutic success theinselves transgress the normative model of an 
intact intersubjectivity to which Habermas appeals; as the analogy with the criminal who 
revokes the principle of ethical community makes clear. There are other crises in the 
symbolically mediated process of the identity-formation of humans, claims Habermas, 
which result from systematically distorted communication. But clearly there is also an 
asymmetry here. For what is apparently missing in the cases cited by Keat, is an account 
of the motivational basis for recognizing the claims of others in non-exploitative action. 
This leads us to different kind of objection to the understanding of human identity-crises 
Habermas draws from psychoanalysis. 
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(3.4) Anti-Naturalistic Objections 
In the previous section, I considered an argument to the effect that the weakness in 
Habermas's appropriation of psychoanalysis as a model of therapeutic reason lies in his 
failure to address the theoretical implications of the fact that psychopathologies have natural 
causes. But Habermas's depth hermeneutical reading of Freud can also be criticized for 
being too naturalistic. in its conception. This is because for Habermas, psychoanalytical 
self-reflection acquires its explanatory power by virtue of combining hermeneutical 
interpretation of apparently incomprehensible behaviour with empirical scientific insight into 
. 
the causal origin of that incomprehensibility. To be sure, the imputed explanatory scientific 
insight does not refer to an event covered by a law-like generalization, but to disturbances 
in the early stages of a linguistically mediated self-formative process. Since, these 
disturbances are themselves linguistic, they are curable by hermeneutic, self-reflective 
means, rather than by the technical manipulation of the efficient causes determining the 
behaviour of natural objects. 
Nevertheless, Habermas supposes that there is a determinable split-off symbol and repressed 
motive which avenges itself in the fate of the patient, and that this fate is 'disenchanted', 
to emancipatory effect, when it is 'recovered' in the analysis. Only on the supposition of 
a re-internalization of given excommunicated needs, Habermas believes, can the 
continuation of a disturbed self-formative process count as the criterion of validation for the 
theoretically constituted narrative of self-formation. Following arguments recently put 
forward by Jay Bernstein, I will now consider (1) the plausibility of the naturalistic 
assumption built into the former thesis, and (2) its compatibility with the hermeneutic claim 
expressed in the latter. 
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(1) Borrowing a formulation from Amelie Rorty, Bernstein describes the task of 
psychoanalysis, with which Habermas agrees, as that of identifying "the intentional 
component of the significant cause of the dispositional set that forms the intentional 
component of the [anomalous, intractable, misery-inducing] emotion". 7 The intentional 
component of the patient's neurotic feelings is not their apparent object, and this is 
something of which the patient is often aware. Rather, the object of the emotion refers 
back to a disturbance in the dispositional state of the patient, the particular nature of which 
the patient is not aware. This is because the disturbance itself is taken to have a remote 
cause. - But this is a significant cause in virtue of its intentional component; there are 
objects to the traumatic emotional conflict of the original childhood scene. As a result of 
this conflict, Habermas holds that the intentional object of the emotion becomes split-off 
from the emotion. The disturbance in the dispositional set which results from this renders 
the actual meaning of the neurotic symptoms intractable. In the transference scene, 
according to Habemas, equivalence is established between the everyday expression of the 
disturbed need disposition in symptoms, and the original significant cause of that 
disturbance. ý 
But as Bernstein notes, this claim to equivalence fits ill with the vague, underdetermined 
nature of the intentional components of the misery-inducing emotions in question. The 
specification of the intentional component always falls under some interpretative schema; 
what counts as a correct description of it is internal to the particular interpretative theory 
employed by the therapist. This interpretative theory-ladenness applies both to the correct 
description of the latent intentional object of the currently disturbed need disposition, and 
to that of the remote significant cause of the disturbance. But in neither case 'is the 
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identification simply a matter of neutral, empirical discovery. Although at first sight the 
former may appear more amenable to theory-neutral description, the criteria for what counts 
as a relevant description will in turn be drawn from the latter, highly theoretically loaded, 
I reservoir of interpretive'- terms. But this renders the claim to equivalence highly 
problematic, since in the case of the symbolic intentional components of intractable emotion 
and need disposition, what counts as equivalent is not determinable independently of the 
interpretative schema through which they are identified. Worse, they can hardly be said 
to exist independently of such a schema. Unlike empirically equivalent but incompatible 
theories, "what these'reflective theories are about", Bernstein suggests, "beconles different 
as the theories are accepted and so become true". " But if there is a truth of the matter 
here, if Psychoanalytical. self-interpretations do admit of cognitive validity, and'if the 
existence of the object-domain of psychoanalytic self-reflection "is cOntingent, upon the 
acceptance of the theory", in what can this validity consist, and in what sense -can that 
domain be said to exist at all? 
(2) The validity, as we have seen, cannot reside in the re-representation of a split-off 
symbol; 'the conditions of acceptability of an analytical interpretation do not lie, in an 
accurate description of a deteminable past. Instead, Bernstein insists that the truth of the 
self-reflection is essentially a truth of a practical, productive character, discernible 
retrospectively in the act of self-narration. it is fundamental to Habermas's own view that 
the analytical self-reflection is undertaken in the context of some practical need; there must 
be a passion for critique'- namely, to resolve the place in one's life of certain feelings, 
emotions, and, irrational behaviours. For this goal to be realizable, ' the conditions of 
acceptability for analytic insights must have some affective basis. What is required is not 
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just-correct beliefs about the past, but rather the significance of dispositions as they are 
revealed to play a role in one's life as a whole in the autobiography which the theory 
mediates. But this 'as a whole' projects into future life; it orients the agent to become the 
kind of person who, according to the interpretative schema of the theory, has reached moral 
maturity. What it is to reach moral maturity cannot be separated from the 
self-interpretative framework through which the self-formative process is grasped, through 
narrative form, with practical intent. 
This point will be elaborated in greater depth later, when its place in Taylor's hemeneutic 
approach to the moral predicaments of modernity will be explored.., As is clear from his 
reading of Freud, Habermas does himself affirm the validity of narratively carried-out 
self-critique, but by presenting it as attempting to dispel particular illusions within the 
totality of a course of life by way of a scientific explanation of their causal origin, he opens 
himself to the charge that the meaning of the totality of the analysand's life is itself changed 
by the autobiographical practice through which those practically significant illusions are 
identified. , This is because the practical task of dispelling those particular self-deceptions 
is, 'always already' oriented to the horizon of selfhood immanent to the interpretative 
framework of the theoretically mediated self-reflection: the very identification of the cause 
of the disturbance in the self-formative process is internal to the particular theory which 
mediates the autobiography. To return to the third and fourth features of the concept of 
crisis introduced in (1.2), the criterion of emancipation by appeal to which crises are 
normatively ascribed, and, the emancipatory effect of crisis-resolution, is not independent 
of the framework of interpretation within which the self regains its identify. "' 
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(3.5)'Conclusion 
What then is it for the causality of -fate to be disench4nted? We can now distinguish two 
apparently competing answers, offered by Habermas. Both appeal to the idea that the 
causality of fate appears 'behind the backs' of subjects, and requires theoretical insight in 
order to be disenchanted. 'To the extent to which Habermas draws from the young Hegel, 
he claims that this insight into the common interconnection of lives - the shared basis of 
existence - when supported by an effective 'longing' for what has been lost when this basis 
is revoked, thereby effects reconciliation with the ruptured ethical totality. This form of 
disenchantment through insight we might call 'love's knowledge'. On the other hand, 
however, Habermas appeals to a form of theoretical insight which disenchants by virtue of 
exposing pseudo-objectifications, - by dispelling the illusion of nature-like necessity from 
which emancipation can be gained through insight into the linguistic mediation of subjects. 
This kind of insight reconstructs- distortions in the linguistic mediation of subjects, and the 
crises which issue from them; within the framework of a theory of 'communicative 
competence. This is then constrýed by Habermas as a theory of the general capacity for 
communicatively rational action, from the perspective of which pseudo-objectifications can 
be theorized as . the prevention of the procedural realization of rational life together by the 
functionally rational steering media of money and power. But on the way to accounting for 
the disenchantment of the causality of fate within the problematic of the paradox of 
rationalization, Habermas has adopted a conceptual apparatus which in turn problematizes 
the intelligibility of the Icind of insight originally derived from Hegel. We seem to have 
competing conceptions of the self-clarification of the claim to normativity. 
My aim up to this point has been to clarify the form and dynamics of crisis formation 
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w ch the causality of fate model of critique is employed to illuminate. As we saw in 
chapter one, Habermas distinguishes three different contexts of application for the concept 
of crisis; the medical, the tragic, and the social scientific. In each case, Habermas claims 
that the ascription of a crisis has some normative force: the diagnosis of a critical state 
presupposes some appeal to a model of healthy or mature functioning, and the successful 
resolution of a crisis issues in a form of emancipation. Habermas's social scientific concept 
of crisis organizes a theory which attempts to reconstruct the self-formative process'of the 
human species, a process which, when disturbed, issues in socially induced crises of 
identity. A moral order, claims Habermas, is immanent to the process of human 
Val 
swIf-formation; and this is shown in the identity crises whi h befall humans when the moral 
order is transgressed. ThiS'ethical totality, we saw, is represented by the model of 'pure 
communicative action'. -In the next chapter, I will consider this concept in more detail. 
I will then argue that the key difficulties noted in this chapter arise from his attempt to 
render scientific'the tragic conception of crisis upon which he ultimately draws'in his 
attempt to'solve the problem of'self-reassurance. But before that, I must address'the 
conception of language'on the basis of which Habermas constructs a standardlor critique 
as the rational foundation of the claim to normativity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: HABERMAS, LANGUAGE AND CRMQUE 
(4.0) Introduction 
In (2.4), 1 noted that Habermas's strategy. for resolving the modem tension between 
cognition and identity turns on establishing two claims. The second was that the norm of 
'intact intersubjectivity', which Habermas proposes as the source of modernity's critical 
self-reassurance , can be traced back to the vehicle for reproducing modernity's symbolic 
resources; namely, in the procedural conditions of the communicative use of propositionally 
differentiated language. This is related to the first claim I identified, that modem conditions 
of social life are disposed to crisis tendencies and pathologies, in the following way. 
Human identities, can only be acquired and maintained within the context of a lifeworld. 
Following Habermas, the lifeworld is the source of those cultural traditions, group 
solidarities, and individuating communicative competences, which condition the possibility 
of human, identity. But ýIabermas asserts that the reproduction of these three basic 
structures of the lifeworld "can take place only through the medium of action oriented to 
reaching understanding". ' Were the. lifeworld to be reproduced non-communicatively - 
either by what Habermas calls the 'strategic action' of individuals who are oriented to 
ego-centric success according to criteria, of instrumental rationality, or via the systemic 
media of money and power, operating according to criteria of functional rationality - then 
those sources of identity which constitute the lifeworld would not be sustainable. And the 
I 
'inevitability' of such a disintegration of the lifeworld is precisely that of a 'fate'-which is 
a matter neither of objective law-like necessity. nor of subjective decision; . 
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That communicative rationality, precisely as suppressed, is already embodied 
in the existing forms of interaction and does not first have to be postulated 
as something that ought to be is shown by the causality of fate which Hegel 
and Marx, each in his own way, illustrated in connection with phenomena 
of ruptured morality - the reactions of those who are put to flight or roused 
to resistance by fateful conflicts, who are driven to sickness, to suicide, to 
'2 crime, or to rebellion and revolutionary struggle". 
In'the previ6us chapter, I considered how Habermas conce . ptualizes mental sickness and 
crime as social or intirsubjective pathologies following a'10gic of fateful'causality and 
conflict. But what are we to make of the -status of the'claim thaf communicative rationality 
"is -already embodied in existing' forms of interaction'" as an 'is' and'hot just asan 'ought'? 
Does Habermas have'a philosophical argument to, justify the claim that communicative 
rationality is- 'always already' embodied in modem forms of interaction, and that such 
interaction can'geherate out of itsiy"normative standards of rational critique? If so, and if 
the argument is a good one, Habermas . might be said to have solved the philosophical 
problem of the self-reassurance -, of modernity as he has defined it. 
Ther'e'is an argument, and the key to it lies in the distinction between, and the relative 
pno . rity of, two fundament , at types of linguistic interaction. ' AIs beings whose'identityis, 
mediated by language, in cultural traditions, group*-- solidaritie's, and communicative 
competences, linguistic interaction is'the sine qua non of any identity for that kind of being 
at all. I'Will begin then (4.1), by'driwing out' the distinction Habermas makes between 
these two different Idnds'*of linguistic interaction; what he calls "'comfilunicafive" and 
Ustrategic" action. Now not only do these two kinds of action have competingcrite'ria of 
rationality, but communicative rationality, we have just seen, " is'su'ppressed in'existing 
modem forms of interaction - forms that presumably accord with criteria of strategic 
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rationality. - How is this to be explained? Habermas replies by way of arguing that 
communicative interaction is in some sense "onginary" or intrinsic to language use; that the 
linguistic coordination and mediation of subjects and their actions would not be possible if 
communicativý rather than strategic language use were not the 'original' mode of linguistic 
interaction. I consider this part of the argument in (4.2). This is preceded by some 
remarks justifying the interpretation, of Habermas I offer, which, by highlighting the 
importance within Habermas's theory of establishing the 'originary' status of communicative 
action, diverges quite sharply from some current readings of Habermas's work. Its 
significance only comes to light, I propose, when it is grasped in relation to the theme of 
the 'causality of fate'- which guided the previous chapter. 
I then examine two sets of objections to this thesis which are particularly relevant to the 
broader problem of modernity's self-reassurance (4.3); what I call the 'deconstructivist 
objection', and the 'agonistic objection'. While I argue that Habermas's position is not 
significantly threatened by these objections, his thesis concerning the primacy - of 
communicative. action is seen to be in need of further support. . In 
(4-4) 1 offer a 
reconstruction of an alternative argument implicit in Habermas's text which might provide 
it. This alternative argument relies on insights drawn from Wittgenstein's famous remarks 
on rule-following. Identical ascriptions of meaning, it is supposed, are a condition of 
possible successful linguistic communication. But identical ascriptions of meaning are only 
intelligible, Habermas argues, if certain idealizations are built into the pragmatics of 
language use. In (4.5) 1 question the coherence, of Habermas's-use, of Wittgenstein's 
rule-following considerations, by introducing a set of 'Wittgensteinian objections'. .1 
conclude by suggesting that they pose a serious threat to the acceptability of Habemas's 
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thesis concerning the primacy of communicative action, and the role it plays in his 
contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernýty. 
(4.1) Communicative and Strategic Linguistic Interaction 
Habermas argues, that the norm of an intact intersubjectivity can be derived from the 
structural presuppositions of what he calls 'communicative action'. Despite the immense 
theoretical burden carried by the concept of communicative action, as no less than the 
organizing idea of Habermas's critical diagnosis of modemity and its ground for 
self-reassurance, the concept suffers from a widely noticed lack of clarity and consistent 
application. " This concept is not amenable to simple definition, but one can most readily 
grasp its point if one considers the basic need for human beings to coordinate their actions. 5 
If any but the, most rudimentary actions are to be coordinated, they must be so via the 
medium of language. And in the process of linguistic interaction"- in the medium of which 
I 
actions are coordinated in a society - human beings are socialized and take on individual and 
collective identities. So human identities are mediated intersubjectively by language. The 
point of the concept of communicative action is both to explain this process, and to diagnose 
systematically its tendencies to go wrong. By 'go wrong', I mean a failure of the mediating 
mechanism to integrate and sustain identities. Such tendencies thus constitute a disposition 
towards crisis. 
Insofar as competent linguistic interaction is a condition of having an identity at all, 'then 
the reconstruction of the norm of an intact intersubjectivity from the conditions of identity 
formation requires a distinction between those kinds of interaction which can, and those 
which in principle cannot, sustain the identities of human beings qua mediated. To -this 
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effect, Habermas contrasts communicative action with strategic action. The arguments 
offered in support of this demarcation are controversial, but, their force is missed, so I 
argue, if they are taken independently of the model of 'dirempted' intersubjectivity 
considered in the previous chapter. I shall proceed by briefly outlining the general 
distinction beiween communicative and strategic action, before turning to the more specific, 
and for our purposes more significant, distinction and relation between communicative and 
strategic linguistic interaction. 
Habermas proposes that communicative action can be contrasted to strategic action by virtue 
of its peculiar 'attitude' or 'orientation': 
social actions can be distinguished according - to'whether the participants 
adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one oriented to reaching 
understanding. And, under suitable conditions, these attitudes should be 
identifiable on the basis of intuitive knowledge of the participants 
6 themselves. 
(Strategic) action -oriented to "success' and (communicative) action oriented to 'reaching 
understanding' are distinct types of action, rather than merely different aspects of the same 
action. These distinct action orientations are in principle identifiable by the person who is 
acting, but as the 'under suitable conditions' proviso makes clear, this need not be so. For 
instance, the background or pre-theoretical knowledge of the participants must be 
sufficiently well developed and differentiated to enable them to distinguish between strategic 
'success' and communicative "reaching understanding'. 7 Now there -is a problem with 
resting this distinction upon an agent's intention which will only become clear by the end 
of the chapter. Let us begin by taking a closer look at what is being distinguished here. 
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When an actor engages in strategic action, he seeks to influence an opponent in pursuit of 
an end he himself has decided. Strategic action is therefore a species of instrumental action, 
where the means employed to realize a given end involves another person. The orientation 
of strategic action is success in bringing about a desired outcome by means of another actor. 
The only thing which is constitutive of the point of strategic action is its utility or 
consequence for the strategic actor. The rationality of this Icind of action is determined by 
the degree of success the actor achieves (or could be expected to achieve, given the relevant 
information available) in realizing his intended outcome. According to this 
conceptualization then, the telos of strategic action is to maximize the actor's own 
self-interest or "egocentric utility". ' Insofar as the action-orientation is towards the 
successful implementation of an individually decided plan, and another actor enters into the 
meaning of the action solely by virtue of being a means to that monologically (rather than 
through dialogue) decided end, the action is strategic in type. And to the extent that an 
actor achieves success by "causally exerting an influence upon others", by an influence 
which empirically forces them to act in accord with the strategic actor's goal, the action can 
be described as strategic. The coordination between strategic actions is typically mediated 
by threats and rewards. The interaction between the torturer and his victim, the pimp and 
the prostitute, and the prostitute and her client, are extreme but graphip examples of this 
Idnd of action coordination. " 
Habermas refers to communicative action, on the other hand, as action with the attitude or 
orientation of "reaching understanding" (verstandigung). By "reaching understanding", 
Habermas means agreement reached between at least two actors on the basis of its mutually 
acceptable validity. As an agreement, it must have the assent of both parties. The meaning 
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of a communicative action is thus constitutively dialogical, since such an action is 
specifiable only under the conditions of an agreement made with another. It is also 
dialogical in the sense that the agreement is reached solely by virtue of that force which is 
peculiar to dialogue - the force of the better argument or the 'pull to validity'. The 
acceptance of what is 'offered' in a communicative action is rationally based, precisely, 
because it is based upon the acceptability of what is offered. What is offered in 
communicative action is the content of an utterance. According to Habermas's model, when 
I engage in communicative action with another, J make a speech-act which raises a 
validity-claim. A- speech-act is something I do with a sentence or a proposition. In 
communicative action, I either implicitly or explicitly offer a proposition as something 
which has a claim to validity. My partner in communicative action can reject or accept the 
validity claim I raise - s/he can take a 'yes' or 'no' position on it. This Position is not a 
mere de facto acceptance (or rejection), but one based, Habermas insists, on the 
acceptability or validity of the claim. In either case, this position is based (again either 
implicitly, or explicitly) on grounds or reasons. Since "validity claims are internally 
connected with reasons and grounds"", they are cfiticizable with respect to whether the 
validity conditions of the claim are satisfied. And the claim is valid or invalid depending 
"upon whether the validity'conditions Of it can be shown to be fulfilled (or 'redeemed') 
through what Habermas calls "discourse" or "argumentation". 
Since the agreement or consensus toward which communicative action is oriented concerns 
the content of a validity claim, the claim must be 'propositionally differentiated'. That is', 
the content of the claim must be differentiated out from its attitude. Communicative action 
is thus motivated by the attitude of reaching an agreement over the content of a -validity 
Ill 
claim. A communicatively reached agreement, characterized by the internal relation 
between validity and reasons, must be distinguished from agreements 'causally induced by 
outside influence. Now it is just such outside influences (or inducements) which strategic 
actions exploit - in, for instance, monetary rewards or threats of violence. It is thus of 
some importance that Habermas establish that the 'propositional attitude' - or more 
precisely, speech act orientation - of communicative action is not a 'causally induced outside 
influence'. Or if one insists that some Idnd of causality must be in play here, then one 
could say that the agreement or consensus to which communicative action is oriented obeys 
a causality of reasons. 
Habermas is not arguing that, as a matter of fact, communication actually takes place 
according to this discursive procedure. The argument is rather counterfactual in form. 
"Without doubt", he recognizes, 
there are countless cases of indirect understanding, where one subject gives 
something to understand through signals, indirectly gets him to form a 
certain opinion or to adopt certain intentions ... or where, on the basis of an 
already habitual communicative practice of everyday life, one subject 
inconspicuously harnesses another for his purposes, that is, induces him to 
behave in a desired way by manipulatively employing linguistic means and 
thereby instrumentalizes him for his own success. " 
There are countless cases, then,, of the strategic use of language in everyday life. 
Manipulation by linguistic means is a commonplace, as are matter of fact agreements or 
accords which facilitate action-coordination. But these, agreements, Habermas insists$ will 
not be based on conWalons which stand the test of argument. They are not, that is to say, 
rationally motivated, and therefore not the Idnd of agreement by virtue of which actions are 
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coordinated communicatively. But Habermas wants to argue that these habitual practices 
of empirically motivated linguistic instrumentalization. are, in some sense derivative from the 
rationally motivated practice of communicative action, even though in any actual situation 
non-rational empirical motives and power relations are causally in play. Why should 
Habermas want to argue this? 
The question can only properly be answered if it is raised in the context of the problem of 
modernity's self-reassurance. For if human beings are mediated by language, and language 
can be shown to be intrinsically or essentially coordinative as represented in the model of 
pure communicative action, then the damage to intersubjectivity in modernity attributable 
to the mediating mechanism can be criticized by appeal to this model. Pure communicative 
action, as we have seen, is the virtual totality which is sundered and which avenges itself 
in the dynamic of fateful causality in the formation of Freudian psychopathologies. " It is 
therefore essential that Habermas should establish that pure communicative action is always 
already (or 'virtually') at play in all linguistic interaction. He must show, that is, that 
communicative action is the 'original' mode of language use, and that strategic actions are 
4parasitic' upon it. 
This must be the case if the causality of fate is to be conceptualized as coming into play 
with the violation of the structure of rational life together, and if the fundamental structure 
of rational life together is to be conceputalized within a theory of the rationalization of, 
action-coordinative mechanisms. For only then can the bare linguistic mediation of human 
beings assume its place in the self-reassurance of a rational (qua communicatively 
rationalized) form of life, the form of life which for Habermas is the goal of the project of 
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modemity. 
It is therefore not enough, as Stephen White has recently suggested, that "Habermas should 
just admit that both [communicative and strategic] forms of interaction coordination are 
necessary to social life". 14 If one fails to see that intact ýintersubjectivity requires 
communicative action, and that non-communicative but in some distorted sense 'rational' 
intersubjectivity generates the problem of self-reassurance, then like White one will "not 
see why this distinction [between 'original' and 'parasitic' language use] is so crucial". " 
I will maintain that the distinction remains crucial insofar as Habermas's contribution to the 
philosophical discourse of modernity, the insight into and disenchantment of the causality 
of fate, is presented as part of an acultural theory of rationalization. -Although, another 
leading Habermas commentator and critic, David Rasmussen, does see its importance, " he 
too fails to highlight where this importance really lies; precisely in spelling out the 
conceptual ptiority of language considered as a dialogically structured, mediating ethical 
totality. 
As a sympathetic critic of Habermas, White is prepared to play down the significance of 
the thesis that communicative action is the original use of language because he accepts that 
it has suffered fatal criticism. I will now argue that this criticism takes the bait of a 
misconstrual of Habermas's own position. This position is only at all plausible if seen in 
the context of the causality of fate model of intact and distorted intersubjectivity, a model 
which, taken together with a theory of rationalization, appeals to a causality of reasons 
distorted by 'external influence'. 
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(4.2) The Primacy of Communication; A Bogus Argument 
Habermas seeks to establish- that there is a norm, captured in the model of pure 
communicative action in a dialogue situation, which is immanent or virtual to-linguistic 
interaction and which can be appealed to as a source of critical self-reassurance for a form 
of life which has a well-grounded claim to rationality. To support this view, he argues that 
use of language which either presupposes or establishes an instrumental/ coercive 
relationship is 'parasitic' upon the procedure of pure communicative action. This he does 
by arguing that the strategic use of language, the use of language oriented to the successful 
manipulation and control of an opponent according to an individually decided plan, is 
derivative from the 'original' communicative use of language (oriented to reaching 
consensus). But at the point in which he expressly makes this claim, as several critics have 
noted, the argument offered is both confused and thoroughly unconvincing. "' I will use this 
section to indicate why. 
If it is acknowledged that language can be used with a strategic-instrumental orientation to 
control and manipulate an opponent, the thesis that an intact intersubjectivity is virtual to 
language requires "it can be shown that", as Habermas regrettably put it; 
the use of language with an orientation to reaching understanding is the 
original mode of language use, upon which indirect understanding, giving 
something to understand or letting something be understood, and the 
instrumental use of language in general, are parasitic. In my view, Austin's 
distinction between illocutions and perlocutions accomplishes just that. " 
As Habermas presents it, an illocutionary act refers to what is done in delivering an 
utterance. Under 'standard conditions', that is, where everyday life contexts and 
conventions are not bracketed (as, say, in a play), its meaning can be traced to a (literally 
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significant) performative. Such performatives include assertions, commands, promises, and 
avowals. In saying, "French philosophers are charlatans", "I will pay you back tomorrow", 
or "I love you very much", under standard conditions I make the illocutionary acts of 
performing a declaration of belief, a promise of action, and inter alia, an expression of 
feeling. The performative verb of the illocution, what is done in saying it, can be prefaced 
by "I hereby... ". In these cases, "I hereby... " declare, promise, avow. 
By contrast, the perlocutionary act refers to what is done through or by saying something, 
to the intended effect brought about in the hearer as a consequence of the utterance. By 
-saying those things, for instance, I might be trying to wind up a stylish 
literary critic, to get 
my bank manager to leave me alone, or to get my lover not to leave me alone. " But unlike 
the illocutions, only I will know if these are faithful descriptions of my respective 
perlocutions. The significance Habermas draws from this is as follows. 
Illocutions are said to differ from perlocutions in their respective aims and the expressibility 
of those aims. The aim of the illocution is manifest in the meaning of the performative 
verb. "I confess" makes manifest my confession. In going no, further than the'manifest 
meaning of what is said, insofar as this meaning is regulated by public linguistic 
conventions, the aim of the illocutionary act is 'self-identifying'. The addressee does not 
need to go 'behind' the speech-act in order to find the meaning of it as the communication 
of a greeting, a confession, etc. But if the illocutionary act is constituted by the meaning 
of what is said iffespective of the agent's subjective intentions, the aim of the perlocutionary 
act is not self-evident in what is said, since it depends on what consequences the speaker 
intends to bring about through the act. The illocutionary aim of "please get me a glass of 
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water" is self-identifying in the malýing of a request, though the perlocution . ary aim, what 
I want to get throUgh malýing the speech-act, ' is 'my own intention to which I have privileged 
access. I may be thirsty, I may be buying time, I may be wanting to get rid of the 
addressee, and so forth. 
Since the aim of the illocutionary act is self-identifying, the conditions of its success can 
be read off from a description of the act'Which makes the performative explicit. The case 
is different with a perlocutionary act, Habermas asserts, since the aim goes beyond 
linguistic conventions to the 'teleological context' of the agent's strategic intentions. This 
asymmetry, Habermas argues, is shown in the fact that the 'success' of the illocutionary act 
is not compromised by the illocution being openly declared (as a promise, a command, a 
confession etc. ), whereas an express declaration of what would count as perlocutionary 
success may result in'the failure of the perlocution. Habermas I redefines perlocutionary acts 
as a subspecies of teleological (means-ends) action where the means is aspeech act and the 
end is undeclared. 10 
But can one conclude from this that 'strategic linguistic di scourse is somehow derivative 
from communicative action? Habermas seems to be saying here that if perlocutions (speech 
acts with perlocutionary force) are derivative from illocutions (speech' acts with illocutio'nary 
force), then eo ipso strategic speech-action is shown' to be parasitic upon communicative 
action. But this move would only work if the distinction between communicative and 
strategic action were either synonymous with or strictly analogous to the distinction between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. And only if the distinction were of this kind would 
it be legitimate to make the inference Habermas seeks. So even if the conditions of 
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perlocutionary success can be shown to presuppose a successful illocution, this as yet tells 
us nothing about the relationship between communicative and strategic action, since the 
distinctions are not synonymous, and a relation ofstrict analogy has not been shown. And 
if the former distinction is transformed in such a way that it does become synonymous with 
the latter, then the question is begged, since the putative argument is tojustify the claim that 
communicative action is the original mode of language use by appeal to Austin's 
distinction. 21 
The actual role of the distinction behyeen illocutions and perlocutions must be interpreted - 
as an eWoration of the distinction between communicative and strategic action, rather than 
as a justification of the priority of the former over the latter. Consider. where we left off 
the previous section. I said there that the 'causality' of linguistically mediated interaction 
is one of reasons, and that this medium is distorted by influences 'external' to it. These 
rather opaque remarks should now be clearer, for their meaning is bound up with the 
distinction between the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of speech acts. , 
The 
illocutionary force of a speech act is internally related to the meaning of the linguistic 
utterance, and achieves its coordinating effect between actors by virtue of this connection. 
Since, for Habermas, a speech-actor understands the meaning of the claim raised in an 
utterance when s/he grasps the conditions of its validity, the causality of the illocutionary 
effect is validity- or reason-conditioned. The perlocutionary effect, however, owes its 
existence not to the intrinsic meaning of the speech act offer, and hence to its validity basis, 
but to causal powers independent of the (often implicit) warranty to justify the content of 
the utterance. 
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The virtual totality of the dialogue situation then, 'refers to linguistic interaction in pursuit 
of exclusively illocutionary effects. Whereas perlocutionary effects "are intended under the 
description of states of 'affairs' brought about through intervention in the world", 
illocutionary results appear "in the lifeworld to which the participants belong .... They 
cannot be intended under the description of causallY induced effects". ' Rather, the 
illocutionary force of the speech act lies in the bond resulting from the warranty to justify 
the validity claim offered. And this is conceptually independent of the empirically induced 
bonding of perlocutionary effects. The perlocutionary force of a speech act stands to the 
content of what is said as a communicatively 'iffational force' in that it is exerted 
independent of the redeernability of the validity of'that content. ' But if the distinction 
between illocutions and perlocutions has an elaborative rather than a grounding function in 
the argument for the primacy of communication, is even that function well served by the 
distinction as Habermas has drawn it? It is far from clear that a substantive demarcation 
between illocutions and perlocutions'can be established according to the criteria Habemas, 
suggests. It does not look very plausible, for a start, to argue that perlocutionary aims must 
be undeclared as a condition of their'success. There are certainly cases where admission 
of my plan may be self-defeating for its successful execution. If I were to say "I hereby 
promise to reduce base lending rates and by saying this I am trying to get you to vote for 
me", this may well jeopardize the success of my plan to get votes. But equally, the person 
I am trying to influence may easily recognize my strategic intent even if I don't make it 
explicit, so that it simply doesn't matter if my plan is declared or not. 23 Further, I might 
even enhance the chances of success in my perlocutionary goal by openly declaring it. For 
instance, if my goal is to remove someone from my company, I might say to that person 
"I hereby declare that the sight of you fills me with disgust", but my chance of success may 
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weU be enhanced if I were to add "and by saying this I am trying to get rid of you". 2" 
The general point to be made here is that it, depends. on the circumstances whether 
expression of the perlocutionary aim defeats that aim. But although I think Habermas could 
drop (or modify) the intention-concealment requirement of perlocutionary success without 
having to drop the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction altogether, the general objection 
that this distinction is context-specific brings me to a more serious charge concerning the 
kind of context Habermas appeals to when illustrating perlocutions. , 
Consider the following passage where Habermas argues that the difference between 
illocutionary aims, the success of which is conditioned by open ý expression, and 
perlocutionary aims can be seen in the fact that; 
the predicates with which perlocutionary, acts are described (to give a fright, 
to, to cause to be upset, to plunge into doubt, to annoy, mislead, offend, 
infuriate, humiliate and so forth) cannot appear among those predicates used 
to carry out the illocutionary acts by means of which the corresponding 
perlocutionary effects can be produced. ', 
If such predicates as these were genuinely representative of perlocutionary effects, then 
indeed they would be best kept hidden for strategic purposes. But a much different picture 
emerges if rather than these antagonistic, non-cooperative perlocutionary effects, others such 
I 
as 'to give relief to', 'to cause to be uplifted', 'to reassure', 'to boost confidence', 'to 
guide' were to be taken as exemplary. That they are not suggests that Habermas elides over 
such examples because he is already committed to the cooperative function of illocutions. 
And since he wants them distinct from perlocutions, he is blinded to the latter's cooperative 
potential, and hence fails to consider such instances of it. 
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My point here is not the one made by Culler that a -speaker can also seek (and achieve) 
strategic success with illocutions such as orders and commands. " According'to that 
objection, the speech-act "I hereby command you (Y) to'do x" will be successful if Y 
consequently does x', and thus there is no difference between the criteria of illocutionary and 
perlocutionary success. For Habermas can -reply here that in the case of imperatives, where 
an agent-openly declares his illocutionary aim to command someone, influence is exerted 
without reference to a'raised and criticizable validity'claim. ' The addressee is not'in'a 
position to rationally accept or reject the offer of the speech act. To be s'ure, th& criticism 
is telling if Habermas is taken at his word in justifying the priority of communicative over 
strategic speech acts by reference to the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction, since orders 
are, after all, illocutions. But it should be just as clear that orders which do not raise 
criticizable validity claims cannot count as communicative acts, 'ev en though theý have 
illocutionary force. As I have already suggested then, Habermas should not be taken at his 
word. He is in ý fact redefining perlocutionary acts as I concealed strategic acts governed by 
criteria of instrumental rationality, as opposed to genuine communicative acts oriented to 
reaching understanding. ' But perlocutions' need not be as' antagonistic 'to reaching 
understanding as Habermas's illustrations of strategic action suggest. To illustrate my 
preceding point, a teacher may use perlocutionary'actsý to' encourage 'self-confidence in 
students, with the (possibly concealed) - aim "Of enabling the' pupil * to reach an 
understanding. ' -. -IIýI ý- 
. 1.1 't I 
Habermas, might reply to this that I am not using the term 'reaching understanding" in its 
proper technical sense. For I am -neglecting the -condition that a communicativelý reached 
agreement is based on mutually acceptable reasons. And it might be said, that the 
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distinction between illocutions and perlocutions really boils down to this. Illocutions exploit 
the validity (rational) dimension of language which is irreducible to the causal (strategic) 
dimension of language exploited by perlocutions. This thesis is untouched by my objections 
so far. But an argument ý used by Habermas to support this thesis - has,,,, I think, been 
undermined. This is the argument that irreducibility is shown in the essential antagonism 
between validity- based and empirically motivated linguistic interaction. But of course the 
absence of this antagonism does not entail, that rationally motiVated interaction thereby 
collapses into causal influence. It does, however, threaten Habermas's fundamental idea 
that forces 'external' to pure communicative action are responsible for distortions in the 
linguistic mediation of the subject. - 
It will be recalled that an objection of just this kind was seen to be applicable to Habermas's 
interpretation of Freudian psychopathologies according to Hegel's model of a causality of 
fate. This connection helps us to grasp the point of the imputed primacy of communication. - 
For Habermas, communicative action is the original; mode of linguistic interaction tor the 
same reason that, for Hegel, the ethical totality precedes the criminal act which revokes it. 
The transcendental argument is that given the existence of crisis experiences, - of a rupture 
with an ethical totality or presupposed cooperative community - the coordinative operation 
of language is 'originary'. It is original in the sense that hidden conflict and manipulative 
strategy are 'external' to the 'binding force' of intersubjectivity which derives from the 
warranty to justify the content of speech-acts. The generation of modernity's norms out of 
itself thus means their generation exclusively from the domain of the lifeworld - from the 
force of illocutions made without reservation. But this is only possible given the uncoupling 
of the lifeworld from the causal inducements of the system, and is therefore only possible 
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in the condition of modernity. For the symbolic reproduction of modem societies depends 
upon identity-formation via communicative action, a thesis corroborated by the pathological 
consiequences of non-communicatively mediated action coordination in the contemporary 
world. But self-reassurance can be attained if it can be shown that immanent to this 
uncoupling are identity-securing norms built into týe possibility of social integration via 
communicative action. Habermas's theoretical strategy has been to show that this 
immanence resides in the intrinsically consensual nature of language. 
(4.3) Consensus and Strategy in language: Two Sets of Objections 
I now want to take up two different Idnds of criticism which have been launched against 
Habermas's approach to consensus and strategy in language. The first takes issue with the 
very idea of an 'original' mode of language use by way of highlighting the implicit bias 
involved in the distinction between 'normal' (consensus-oriented) and 'abnormal' 
(non-consensus oriented) language. We can call this the 'deconstructivist objection'. 29 The 
second kind of objection goes by way of offering an alternative model of langqage which 
emphasizes and prioritizes precisely its strategic aspect. This view, put forward by 
Lyotard, I shall call the 'agonistic objection'. 21 Although Lyotard draws, upon certain 
Wittgensteinian themes, his position is quite alien to yvhat can properly be called a 
Wittgensteinian one. But what can be so called is of no small importance to us. For as I 
shall go on to argue in the next section, an alternative support for the thesis of the primacy 
of communication can be teased out of Habermas's interpretation of what Wittgenstein 
establishes in his remarks on rule-following. I will then return to a third set of objections 
directed against the adequacy of this interpretation and its consequences for understanding 
the role of consensus in language. These Wittgensteinian objections can be extended to 
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Habemas's conception of critique, creating tensions within Habermas's proposal for a 
self-clarification of the modem tension between identity and cognition which will be 
examined in the next chapter. - 
(1) 7he Deconstructivist Objection: When Habermas, states that communicative action is 
'originary', he is claiming that it must be taken as the 'normal' case of linguistic interaction 
upon which other cases are parasitic or derivative. Habermas's analysis of communicative 
action appeals to a notion of a 'standard speech-act' which is uttered 'seriously' and used 
as 'simply' and 'literally' as possible- in 'normal' everyday practice. Speech-acts not 
specifiable in this way - such as jokes, playful fantasies, imaginative role-playing, puns and 
ironies - are thus derivative in that they necessarily presuppose the already established 
communicative competence of 'reaching understanding' under 'standard conditions'. The 
deconstructivist objection challenges the assumption of such 'standard conditions'. 'o For 
the deconstructivist, there is no innocent realm of 'ordinary' language upon which other 
forms of discourse can be parasitic. ' What counts as 'standard' or 'normal' is little more 
than a reflection of a pre-decided evaluative preference of the theorist; in Habermas's case 
a particular conception of truth, rightness, and sincerity. Indeed the very term 'parasitic' 
shows the devaluation of the non-serious, the abnormal, and the marginalized in language. 
Habermas's distinction between communicative and - strategic action , thus - betrays a 
metaphysical impulse "to separate intrinsic from extrinsic or pure from corrupt and deem 
the latter irrelevant" or "unworthy of separate consideration". " - Like all such impulses, it 
is best subject to a deconstruction, which shows up the ever-receding interplay of the centre 
and the margin, and the arbitrary privileging of the former. 
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To Counter this bbjectio'n, 'Habermas can'reply that what I counts as 'privileged' in his 
account of linguistic interaction is by no means arbitrary. "' For if language is to play its role 
as the mediator of the (even creative) subject, it must be able to co-ordinate the everyday 
interactions Of subjects. And'the co-ordination of a*Ctions'which'is''a necessary condition 
of social life - and therefore of an individual's - creative linguistic life - is itself conditioned 
by the presupposition of intersubjectively identical ascriptions of meaning in the -content of 
speech-acts. This shared consensus defines'' the literal meaning I of the speech-act; the 
meaning which is exploited by an, illocUtionary force *and which emerges under the 
constraints of rule-bounded action-coordination. 
It is thus the action-coordinative property of ordinary language which is at-'the root of the 
asymmetry between it and its poetic/fictive derivatives. These derivatives gain their power 
partly ffom the'bracketing or withdrawal of the illocutionary- force with which they are 
normally deployed for the sake of action co-ordination in everyday life. This force can be 
bracketed where speech-acts are relieved of the pressure of action-coordination. Even in 
contexts where the particular illocutionary force of an utterance is bracketed, as for instance 
with a quoted promise in a play, its meaning still depends on the existence of conventions 
which 'co-ordinate the actions of the actors qua actors -as speakers and hearers with a 
determinate Idnd of function which is mutually recognized. The effectiveness of the quoted 
or reported promise therefore presupposes "the constraints under which illocutionary acts 
develop a force for -co-ordinating action and have consequences relevant to action" in the 
realm of ordinary or 'normal' language. " It is just these "consequences relevant for action" 
which specify what Habermas means by "standard" conditions. 
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Habermas is surely, right to assert that the imaginative, creative linguistic inventions of 
irony, metaphor, and so forth, could not alone co-ordinate actions in the manner required 
for the social reproduction of life. In other words, they are incapable of performing that 
socially integrating operation which is the focus of Habermas's theory to the extent that it 
is acultural in Idnd. They are 'irrelevant' from the acultural perspective of Habermas's 
theory, but Habermas does not dismiss them as unworthy of separate consideration. 
Habermas repeatedly insists on the importance of tapping the critical potential of the 
imaginative, creative, linguistic activities informing modernist art. But rather than having 
the acultural significance accorded to 'problem-solving', action-coordinative mechanisms, 
this Idnd of linguistic activity serves what Habermas calls a "world-disclosive" function. 
Though introduced by Habermas only after the composition of 7he 77wory of 
Communicative Action, this distinction between the problem-solving and world-disclosive 
functions of language is crucial for understanding the role of communicative action in 
Habermas's proposal for the self-reassurance of the project of modernity. " Communicative 
actions gain their c-oordinative property by virtue of the bonding established by the 
warranty to justify the validity claim raised by the illocutionary speech act. To this extent, 
they meet problem-solving requirements which any society must satisfy. The 
world-disclosive function, on the other hand, releases the speech-act from illocutionary 
obligations and problem-solving contexts of everyday life. For Habermas, the 
deconstructivist focusses narrowly on this latter function, but it is only possible in a 
language which already proves its worth in the problem-solving contexts of everyday 
interaction. 
But what does it mean to say that a language must 'prove its worth'? The significance of 
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this point can be drawn out of an objection Habermas makes of deconstructive practice in 
general. - Any interpretative practice, Habermas rightly asserts, must make intelligible its 
own possibility of communication. An interpretative practice premissed on the idea that 
"every reading is also a misreading" fails this test, Habermas claims, in denying criteria for 
judging between interpretations and misinterpretations. While we can agree with this 
counter-objection to deconstruction, Habermas then goes on to claim that no matter how far 
removed interpretations are from the restraints of the everyday communicative situation, 
"they can never be wholly absolved of the idea that wrong interpretations must in principle 
be criticizable in terms of a consensus to be aimed for ideally. "' The 'proving of worth' 
of ordinary language, by implication, resides not in its defacto meaningfulness; it is not by 
appeal to linguistic conventions that standard conditions are established. "Rather", 
Habermas continues: 
language games only work because they presuppose idealizations that 
transcend any particular language game; as a neces&vy condition of possible 
understanding, these idealizations give rise to the perspective of an agreement 
that is open to criticism on the basis of validity claims. " 
Language games are therefore in continual need of justification - having to prove their 
worth' and 'subject to ongoing test' - in terms of such an ideal consensus. Hence, the 
satisfaction of these demands in everyday practice is what justifies the derivation of 
'parasitic' from 'normal' language use. 
The deconstructive criticism about the vagueness of normal or standard conditions has not 
been fully met, since the deconstructivist might rejoin that the selection of which worth is 
proved only pushes back Habermas's theoretical bias. But in the terms of the debate which 
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we are exploring, it is not - as the deconstructivist would claim - the theoretical bias qua 
theory which is challenging in this criticism, but its bias qua, acultural. 31 The dispute 
between'Habermas and deconstruction on the role of illocutionary force thus brings us to 
a central tenet of Habermas's acultural critical defence of modernity. The rationally 
motivated ideal consensus offers a 'culture-neutral' critical perspective on modernity, while 
being conditioned by the differentiation of validity claims which characterizes modem, 
problem-solving learning processes. It is therefore qualified as the basis of a critical 
self-reassurance of modernity out of itself. But the idealizations required for valid 
problem-solving do not enter into the 'world-disclosive' capacity of language, since it is not 
amenable to the kind of ideal consensus which Habermas takes to be presupposed in the 
ascription of identical meanings required for sustainable linguistic action-coordination. It 
follows that Habermas is unable to accommodate the evolution of world-disclosive powers 
within his theory of communicative rationalization, even though - as I will argue in the next 
chapter ý- he implicitly relies on it in his Hegel-derived plea for critical self-reassurance. 
(2) Yhe Agonistic Objection: The agonistic objection shares with the deconstructivist one a 
suspicion that the imaginative use of language is occluded or unduly marginalized in 
Habermas's emphasis on the consensus-building (or consensus-presupposing) function of 
language. But it proceeds not so much by stressing the interdependence of communicative 
and strategic linguistic interaction, as by prioritizing the strategic dimension of language as 
'the first principle' of understanding the linguistic social bond. 37 Accordinglyo for Lyotard, 
"speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics", which is to say within the 
domain of strategic interactions of adversaries. 39 This is of aesthetic significance not only 
because one of the chief adversaries is "the accepted language", but also because it is 
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strategically effective to create new 'moves' rather than relying on "reactional. 
countermoves", which Lyotard suggests are "no more than programmed effects in the 
opponent9s strategy". 39 According to Lyotard, speech acts are best accounted for as moves 
made between opponent players of language games in the medium of which social bonds 
are forged. 
The social bond is considered by Lyotard to be, at the very least, a function of language 
'effects'. These effects position the sender, addressee, and referent of speech-acts, as nodal 
points within the perpetually shiffing local networks of strategic relationships which 
constitute the social. The ammunition for the war which is ordinary language is provided 
by these effects, the diversity of which encourages the highest degree of flexibility of 
utterance in everyday discourse. But this flexibility becomes ossified by institutional 
constraints which privilege particular kinds of language game; "orders in the army, prayer 
in the church, denotation in the schools, narration in families, questions in philosophy, 
performativity in business. "'10 Yet this tendency towards the "bureaucratization" of the 
social bond, Lyotard suggests, is simultaneously threatened by the possibility that such 
institutionally imposed limits on potential language moves be themselves taken as "the 
stakes and provisional results of language strategies". 41 
i 
For Lyotard, then, the way to approach speech acts is as moves in language games made 
between adversaries according to strategies with the power to subvert established meanings. 
This approach, he thinks, shows greater sensitivity to the diversity of language games which 
people play - games which have no metalanguage to commensurate them. But to accept this 
incommensurability is to reject the consensus model of linguistic interaction, since it is to 
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deny the assumption that; 
it is possible' for all speakers- to come - to agreement on which rules or 
metaprescriptions 
' 
are universally valid for language games, when it is clear 
that language games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of 
rules. 42 
Consensus cannot be the goal of dialogue, Lyotard insists, since there is no possibility of 
a metalanguage into which the diversity of language games could be translated and in terms 
of which agrýement could be formulated. And worse, consensus reinforces that tendency 
towards bureaucratization - towards the ossification of language and hence of the social 
bond - by imposing the very conformity which is resisted by the strategic tapping of the 
heterogeneous potential of language games. 
One can say then that from Lyotard's agonistic perspective, the distinction between 
"manipulatory speech" and "free expression and dialogue" is to be rejected on three 
counts. '3 First, because all utterances have effects which are of significance in the forging 
of social bonds. Second, the distinction overlooks the diversity of -effects specific 
to 
utterances within different language games, of which Lyotard mentions "denotatives", 
"prescriptives", "evaluatives", and "performatives". And third, because "free expression" 
can. itself 
. 
be considered as creative manipulatory intervention oriented towards the 
dissoludon of consensus. 
Habermas might reply to these objections as follows. Regarding the first point, although 
it may be true that utterances are constantly placing and displacing sender, addressee, and 
referent in such a way as to make and break social bonds, we can nevertheless distinguish 
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between those bonds which are forged on the basis of the validity of the utterance, and those 
which are otherwise motivated. Habermas may exaggerate the degree to which the bonding 
between individuals in modem societies is ascribable to this kind of rationally motivated 
agreement, but the agonistic objection fails to account for the very possibility of it. This 
relates to the second point, since the co-ordinating effect of the rationally motivated 
agreement depends upon the recognition of the distinct validity-claims raised in the 
utterance. So the "effect" of a denotative , will differ from that of a prescriptive for no other 
reason than that for which the effects of a communicatively and strategically oriented 
denotative utteranc6 differ, except insofar as different resources of the lifeworld are at stake 
in the communication. As Peter Dews has observed, since these resources correspond to 
the different Idnds of validity-claim, Lyotard's objection appears from the Habermasian 
perspective as a confusion between language-games and validity-claim" Denotatives do 
indeed differ from prescriptions, but qua denotatives and prescriptions differ not in their 
"effects" (which depends on the context of the speech-act), but on the validity-claim (in 
these cases truth and normative legitimacy) that they thematize. 
It follows that the charge against the imputed assumption of a metalanguage by virtue of 
which all different language games are commensurable is misplaced. Validity claims are 
already either implicit or explicit in the diversity of language use, in such a way that no 
further commensurating metalanguage need be invoked to account for consensus about them. 
What is perhaps more worrying about Habermas's position, however, is that it does seem 
to require that all claims to validity are differentiable into truth, normative legitimacy or 
rightness, and sincerity. The worry is that there may be validity-claims the truth- 
evaluability of which is inseparable from their action - orienting legitimacy, and not just 
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- because these two aspects of validity are raised simultaneously. In the next chapter I will 
argue that this holds for a key class of critical concepts; those which feature, in what 
Habermas calls 'clinical intuitions'. 11 
Turning to the third aspect of the agonistic objection, is language oriented to consensus 
disposed to 'bureaucratization' in the manner Lyotard suggests?. The de facto agreements 
concerning obeisance to military orders, rote learning in school, and efficiency in business 
have no bearing on the issue, of course, because the kind of consensus proposed by 
Habermas is an ideal one, the conditions of which are not met where institutional constraints 
are normatively ascribed rather than communicatively established. Habermas can reply here 
that the objection rests upon an equivocation concerning the concept of 'strategy'. To be 
sure, the institutional ossification alluded to by Lyotard can be strategically subverted. by 
invention, but this is just to say that a condition of communicative action is the setting loose 
of all three validity claims. Indeed, the scenario depicted by Lyotard represents on the one 
hand systemic constraints upon communication, and on the other hand,,, a one-sided I- 
rationalization of lifeworld institutions. The' tendency towards bureaucratization, therefore, 
is just as well explained intemallyto Habermas's position. And it could further be argued 
that the strategy, of subversion is better explained within it, since it gives a point to the 
subversive critique beyond the sheer strategy of subversiveness- - namely, in the., 
establishment of communicative interaction in itsfill scope. ",, 
Habermas agrees with Lyotard that artistic creativity has the critical potential to let loose 
identities and social structures ossified by bureaucratic institutional constraints. I will return 
in chapters five and eight to the problems Habermas, has in grounding this claim, but now 
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I want to move onto an alternative argument to support his thesis that strategic linguistic 
interaction is in principle derivative from linguistic interaction oriented towards consensus. 
(4.4) The Primacy of Communication: An Alternative Argument 
I indicated when considering the deconstructivist objection to the primacy of 'reaching 
understanding' Habermas's view that communication is possible "only under the 
presupposition of intersubjectively identical ascriptions of meaning". , The possibility of 
perlocutionary or teleological success presupposes the prior ý possibility of reaching 
understanding in that the utterance employed strategically, to be effective at all,, must first 
be intelligible to the opponent. - In order for the manipulation of meanings to be possible, 
there must first be meanings to manipulate - there must be something to be used as a means 
to an end. But if meaning or intelligibility is itself not something which can be strategically 
decided upon, then the strategic use of language cannot be originary. --- 
Habermas recognizes this point, and interprets Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following, 
which are'pertinent for Habermas's purposes in explaining what makes for the 'sameness' 
of the various applications of a meaningful concept, in a way which indirectly supports his 
own thesis that the communicative use of language is the original mode. " But it is just at 
this point that the Wittgensteinian COunter-objection can be vedged. For although 
Wittgenstein gives reasons for thinking that some form of consensus is a necessary condition 
of meaningful utterance, it is questionable if the consensus which must be presupposed in 
acts of communication is of the kind proposed by Habermas, and at the level he takes it to 
be operative. And it is just the kind of consensus and the level at which communication 
presupposes it which are the crucial, features of the moral Habermas draws for his model 
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of pure'communicative action, intact intersubjectivity, and critique. In the rest of this 
II' sec on, I shall rehearse the argument Habermas draws from Wittgenstein's remarks on 
rule-following, and indicate how it serves to bolster the thesis that the communicative use 
of language is originary. In the next section, Iý shall consider hoiý the same remarks also 
serve to undermine'that thesis. 
For Habermas's purposes, the import of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following rests in 
establishing an' analytical connection between "identical meanings and intersubjective 
validity "48 . Rule-followinj is the sine qua non of propositionally differentiated language use 
since it determines what counts as the correct application of a concept. Of course, if there 
were'no such thing as the correct application'of a concept, there would also be no such 
thing as an incorrect application. And if this were the case there would be'no concept to 
be applied or misapplied at all. 'This is the objection Habermas puts to the deconstructivist. 
If the meaning of a concept is to be the same in the ongoing applications of it, it must be 
so by virtue of a rule which determines what is to count as the 'same' meaning. Habermas 
rightly points out that this 'sameness of meaning' is not something which can 66 inductively 
inferred from empirical reg, ularities in the application of the rule, since the, rule itself is 
needed to determine what counts as a particular instance of an empirical regularity. For 
this reason, what counts as 'going on in the same way' in the application of a'rule cannot 
I bIe determined by a0peal t6 something external to the rule and its application'. 
The ability to follow a rule is the ability to apply the rule in the same way to different 
particular cases. But what counts as the same way is not reducible to any empirical or 
non-no'rmative phenomenon. Habermas rightly takes this to imply that a condition Of 
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'sameness of meaning' is intersubjective validity in the application of concepts. Given that, 
identity of meaning is conceptually tied to intersubjective validity, it follows, according to 
Habermas, that the violation of a rule by a particular subject Must be criticizable by another 
subject who has grasped the rule. Further, this will be by way of a "critique which is in 
49 
principle open to consensus". "Without this possibility of reciprocal criticism and mutual 
instruction leading to -agreement", Habermas continues, "the identity of rules cannot be 
secured. A rule has to possess validity for at least two subjects if one subject is to be able 
to follow the rule". 10 This is a consequence of Wittgenstein's argument against the 
possibility of a subject following a rule 'privately'. The intersubjective validity of rules is 
a validity which must obtain between at least two subjects where both "must have a 
competence for rule governed behaviour as well as critically judging such behaviour". 51 A 
single isolated subject, who could either not act in accord with the rule or critically judge 
rule violations, "could no more form the concept of a rule than he could use symbols with 
identically the same meaning". 52 
For Habermas, then, sameness of meaning, being bound to the intersubjective validity. of 
rules, implies the ability to take a "critical yes/no position" on the coffectness of 4 
particular application of a rule. But such a concept of rule-competence refers, inter alia, 
"to the ability to produce symbolic expressions with communicative intent and to understand 
them". " So at the most fundamental level, 
_linguistic 
competence presupposes the grasping 
of rules the validity of which is in principle open to a consensus on the basis of "reciprocal 
critique" and "mutual instruction". The qualifiers "reciprocal" and, "mutual" are crucial 
here, since they circumscribe the critique and instruction presupposed in the very foundation 
of language use %yithin the exclusive realm of the illocutionary. And implicitly, the kind 
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of consensus to which the intersubjective validity of rules is accountable is one divorced 
from causally induced effects. Since any actual consensus is always conditioned by some 
empirical motivation, there is'an ideal consensus p resupposed in the original use of 
language. Although an idealization, it is nevertheless an assumption which the possibility 
of identical ascriptions'of meaning demands. Virtual to linguistic competence, then, is the 
consensus of an ideal communication community, which is to say the consensus of subjects 
in a dialogue situation pursuing solely illocutionary aims or in other words - pure 
communicative action. 
Of course, by this point Habermas recognizes his radical deviation from Wittgenstein's 
position. To return to Habermas's reply to the deconstructivist objection, and now also 
contra Wittgenstein-, Habermas insists that it "is not habitual practice that determines just 
what meaning is attributed to a text or an utterance", but rather that "language games only 
work because they presuppose idealizations that transcend any particular language game". ' 
Habermas's reading of Wittgenstein'gives a distinctive and novel twist to the recent and 
voluminous literature within analytical philosophy on Wittgenstein's -rule-following 
considerations. Outside this interpretative tradition, however, Habermis follows'Apel in 
conceiving communicative discourse -as presupposing an entwinement between - "a real 
communication community" into which the participant has become socialized, and "an ideal 
communication community" in which arguments would be properly understood and judged. ' 
As the previously quoted remark suggests, the idea of an ideal communication'community 
is invoked to save both rationality and critique from the conservatism of habit and custom. 
I will now consider whether this move is compatible with Wittgenstein's remarks on 
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rule-following from which Habermas draws. 
(4.5) Consensus and Strategy in Language; A Third Set of Objections - 
Can Wittgenstein be "turned'on his feet"" so-as to show the primacy Of communicative 
action and the immanence of the ideal communication community? Is linguistic interaction 
oriented to reaching an intersubjectively valid consensus shown to be presupposed by (or 
analytically connected to) the possibility of identical ascriptions of meaning? As I indicated, 
e- 
the problem lies in the Idnd of agreement which is presupposed in communication, and the 
level at which this agreement is operative. On the first point, Wittgenstein is emphatic that 
the kind of'agreement which valid argumentation presupposes is not one of opinions, but 
of practices or 'forms of life'. The consensus here is not one of the 'yes' or 'no' of the 
interpreter of the rule. 'It is not an interpretation which is in principle open to a consensus, 
but the background against which interpretations are made. Following a rule is 'founded 
on agreement', but agreement over the background framework of action "within which the 
concept of following a rule has intelligible employment, not to the explanation of what 
'following a rule', means". " So not only is the kind of agreement at issue here -one of 
practices rather'than opinions, but the level at which it operates is at the level of the 
pre-condidons of correct or incorrect opinions. To paraphrase a remark of Wittgenstein's 
to make it directly applicable to Habermas's view, "the agreement of validations is the 
pre-condition of our language game, it is not affirmed in it". " 
Habermas's fear Is that this seems to abolish argument . 
58 Argument - the ýraisihg, 
criticizing, and redeeming of validity claims - seems to be reduced to matter of fa6t habitual 
practices. But for Wittgenstein, neither actual nor ideal agreement is that by ýirtue of 
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which an application is in accord with a rule. - No agreement is necessary to mediate 
between a rule and the correct application of it, since rule and application are, as Habermas 
recognizes, internally related. Indeed, Habermas recognizes and affimis many of the above 
points in his doctrine of the lifeworld. The following passage, in which Wittgenstein sums 
up the role of agreement in his rule-following considerations, highlights this affinity nicely; 
0 
It is of the greatest importance that a dispute hardly ever arisesýbetween 
people about whether the colour of this object is the same as the colour of 
Ahat, the length of this rod the same as that, etc. This peaceful agreement 
is the characteristic surrounding the use of the word 'same'. 
And one must say something analogous about proceeding according to a rule. 
No dispute breaks out over the question whether a proceeding was according 
to a rule or not. It doesn't come to blows, for example. 
This belongs to the framework, out of which our language works (for 
example, gives a description). " 
iý 
What Wittgenstein refers to here as the 'framework' has just the same role which the 
'lifeworld' has, inter, alia, for Habermas. The question now is whether the primacy'of 
communicative action is compatible with such a lifeworld concept. I will approach the 
nature of thisýtension by considering the' Wittgensteinian' set objections brought against 
Habermas's picture of critical reflection in a recent'article by James Tully. 'O ''' 
Tully's-basic objection is that 'reaching understanding' cannot ground the certainties of 
everyday life, and that it is unreasonable to take the communicative action orientation to 
them. If Habermas were to utter the speech act "I am JUrgen Habermas and I believe that 
the workplace ought to be organized democratically", it would be unreasonable to ask for 
reasons concerning the sincerity of his claim about his name, and reasonable to take it for 
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granted. " The., example is trivial, but it is meant to show that rational action and belief 
often involves taldng things for granted, rather than giving reasons which will ground their 
claim to validity; giving reasons and interpretations for following a rule comes to an end 
at the point where all. one can say is that "This is simply what I do". But this would only 
undermine the rationality of the rule-following if some foundational relation were needed 
between the rule and the application, but the internal relation between rule and application 
offsets this requirement. , The absence of a reason for applying a rule does not reveal an 
irrationality in the nature of rule-following; "to use a word without justification does not 
mean to use it without right", unless a justification or explanation is required by us "to 
prevent a misunderstanding". 62 
But it is only on the condition that this will not always be the case that giving reasons, 
justifications, and validations can get off the ground at all. Giving. reasons requires an 
acknowledgement of a standard for reason giving, just as the practice of measuring Tequires 
a background agreement upon the standards of measurement-To return to Tully's example, 
the sincerity of Habermas's declaration of his name could be questioned, andyalidated by 
the presentation of his birth certificate. This is the standard against which such claims are 
validated. In exceptional conditions, there may be reason, to doubt such standards, but there 
will., come a point at which, the questionableness of them threatens the possibility of 
communication. 
It follows that the use of language oriented towards a "communicatively reached agreeipent" 
which "must be based in the end on reasons" 63cannot be the original use of language. For 
the rationallY motivated agreement of communicative action presupposes a prior agreement 
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about the standards of reason giving. A reason cannot be given for the justification of these 
standards, since they determine what is to count as the justified and unjustified use of words 
at all. To put it in another way, Habermas's view that linguistic interaction oriented to a 
validity conditioned agreement falls foul of Wittgenstein's point that not all propositions can 
be problem-solWng hypotheses, since the very possibility of judgement presupposes 
commonly agreed standards or norms of judgement. If communicative action -were 
originary, then it would be possible that all propositionally differentiated speech acts were 
hypothetical in form. 
On the face of it, Habermas's reply would seem straightforward; these Wittgensteinian 
objections neglect that complementary to the concept of communicative action is the concept 
of the lifeworld. For the lifeworld, according to Habermas, is just that tacitly accepted and 
mutually agreed upon background framework of taken-for-granted assumptions and 
meanings against the horizon of which validity claims are criticizable. The problem 
remains, however, that the agreement to which $reaching understanding' is oriented must 
be of a different order to the ý background agreement in action which constitutes the 
lifeworld. This suggests that the concept of the lifeworld serves more to undermine rather 
than to complement the concept of communicative action, at least insofar as the latter is 
understood as the original mode of language interaction. 
Consider again Wittgenstein's remark that "agreement of ratifications is the pre-condition 
of our language game, it is not affirmed in it". Now the agreement to which 
communicative action is oriented, unlike the lifeworld agreement in action, is precisely such 
an affirmation. Habermas brings together these radically different senses of consensus in 
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his concept -of communicative action, enabling him to shift from the original validity 
conditioning lifeworld agreement to the validity conditioned communicative agreement, and 
then to assert the latter as the originary form of agreement or consensus which all linguistic 
interaction presupposes. Further, the level at which the fundamental agreement operates 
is not one which transcends the internal relationship between the rule and its correct 
application. Such an idealization is thus not necessary to explain intersubjectively identical 
ascriptions of meaning, but it is just upon this presupposition that the primacy of 
communicative action thesis rests. 
But although we can now' say that 'communicative action is not the originary form of 
linguistic interaction, we'are also committed to saying that strategic interaction is not 
fundamental either. Background lifeworld agreement is not a 'giving something to 
understand' nor an inconspicuous harnessing or manipulation of another person's intentions 
for one's own purposes. Both strategic and communicative action as defined by Habermas 
imply a voluntarism which the coherence of lifeworld agreement will not tolerate. We can 
see a way out of this incoherence only by returning to the question initially posed by 
Habermas and taken up by his critics: it asks for an original mode of language use, to 
which comfilunicative and strategic action are proposed as answers. That neither is 
adequate suggests that there may be something misleading in the formulation of the question 
itself. Is the idea of an "original use' of language really intelligible at all? Within 
Habermas's argument, duseg stands in for intentional action, and he considers two different 
kinds of action-orientation as possibly originary. But the concepts about which action is 
oriented cannot themselves be decided upon intentionally, whatever the orientation of the 
action. It therefore makes no sense to talk of an original mode of language use, - if by 
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language 'use' is meant a kind of, intentional action. Both communicative and strategic 
action presuppose the possession of concepts which are prior to any intentional use of 
language. 64 - 
(4.6) Conclusion 
While communicative action may be conceptually prior to strategic action to the extent that 
language is a mechanism for the co-ordination of intentional actions, Habermas has not 
shown that this is something which can be established on the basis of the intelligibility of 
the domain of meaning as such. For Habermas, this domain is opened up by the pragmatic 
presuppositions of communication, by the illocutionary bonding force of the warrant to 
satisfy what I called in chapter two the 'validational imperative' over the whole range of 
propositionally differentiated utterances. By arguing for the originary status of 
communicative action, Habermas has sought to make space for a claim to normativity in the 
form which the pragmatics of communicative competence unavoidably imposes on language 
users. But the space for rational normative critique which is promised by the pragmatic 
presuppositions of language in its originary action-coordinative mode can seem to be 
threatened by the Wittgensteinian objections. For the Wittgensteinian position seems to 
"leave everything where it is"; it appears to give up on the question of the accountability 
of habitual practices. If linguistic practices are self-justifying, if there is no possibility of 
a standpoint which transcends them and from which they can be criticized, are we not left 
with a linguistic positivity of the present? And if this is the case, we seem to be no better- 
off in our pursuit of the self-clarification of the claim to normativity. But as yet, all that 
the Wittgensteinian position entails is that the self-clarification of critical reflection cannot 
decide in advance how meaningful criticism is "to go on" in its various contexts of 
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application. In the next chapter I will consider how Habermas's construal of what it is "to 
go on" in the practice of critical reflection concerning the modem project clashes with the 
model for the need for self-reassurance he derives from Hegel's idea of a 'dirempted' 
et ical totality. 
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CHAPTER 5: CRISIS AND CRITIQUE: TENSIONS IN HABERMAS'S 
CONCEPTION 
(5.0) Introduction 
I have been taking as, fundamental Habermas's contention that a standard of 'intact 
intersubjectivity' offers itself to a critical philosophy which reflects upon the communicative 
mediation of human beings. 'It remains to clarify the measure of this standard, and to assess 
the scope of its . critical powers. I will begin (5.1) by considering how Habermas 
distinguishes between the basic types of phenomena which motivate critical reflection upon 
modernity. These peculiarly modern phenomena, Habermas maintains, are criticizable only 
according to the standard which is appropriate to, their type. UnfortUnately, however, 
Habermas uses the swne terms - 'intact intersubjectivity' and 'ethical totality' - to refer to 
these'different standards when dealing with the problem of self-reasSurance. At this point, 
I identify three different - though closely related - senses of Habermas's concept of an 
'ethical totality', which allows me'to argue subsequently that Habermas trades on this 
ambiguity in order to resolve tensions between the Hegelian concept of crisis "considered in 
chapter three, and the validational concept of critique discussed in chapter four. 
In (5.2), 1 indicate why, in accordance with the different standards available for critical 
reflection, Habermas stresses that the undertaldng of the critical self-reassurance of 
modernity mUst obeY i, strict division of labour in its method. On the one hand, there is 
what Habermas calls the "rational reconstruction" of stages of competence on the other, 
there is what he variously calls "methodically carried out self-critique" 1, "interpretation on 
behalfbf the lifeworld it 2, and "mediation on the part of the lifeworld" 3.1 will then go on 
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to question the, viability of this division of critical labour by arguing, in the core section of 
this chapter (5.3), that it leads to a distorted picture of practical reasoning. By taking the 
moral domain as suitable for rational reconstruction, hence criticizable in virtue of a 
procedural standard of intact intersubjectivity, Habermas understates the scope to be 
coyered by the self-clarification of the claim to normativity. This charge need not worry 
Habermas so long as he can show that adequate 'compensation' can be given to the task of 
the rational reconstruction, of, a narrowly circumscribed moral point of view. Habermas, 
suggests that such compensation can be provided by the 'clinical' intuitions of what he calls 
'therapeutic' reason. After arguing that 'compensation' is an inadequate term for grasping 
the relation between moral judgement and clinical intuition, I suggest that we need 
reconsider the relationship between what Habermas, calls practical and therapeutic 
rationality. This I do in section (5.4), where I trace an insuperable difficulty facing 
Habermas's conceptualization of the rationality of clinical intuitions - of the criteria of 
sickness and health which would provide a substantive standard of intact intersubjectivity - 
back to acultural theoretical commitments which inform the rational reconstruction model 
of critical reflection. I propose that this difficulty could be overcome if Habermas, were to 
abandon some of these commitments, and in the conclusion I consider two reasons 
Haberm4s puts for not rejecting them. These reasons are seen to require further 
substantiadon. 
(5.1) Diremption, Differentiation, and Disharmony 
There are three analytically distinct, though causally related modem phenomena, which 
contour the object-domain of critical reflection for Habermas. Most important, there is the 
'diremption' which Habermas calls the 'uncoupling' and subsequent 'colonization' of the 
145 
lifeworld. The key here, as I explained in (1.2), can be put as follows. Individuals are 
always mediated by the process of socialization. The stability of societies, and therefore 
also of individuals, turns upon the degree to which the identities of individuals (and 
collectives) can be secured in the process of social integration. In pre-modem societies, 
religion provided this integrating force or 'unifying power'. " Identities could be secured 
in an intersubjectively binding way through the conviction of a cosmically-realized ý moral 
order., -Mith the unfolding of modernity, Habermas's thesis runs, the unifying power of 
religion is weakened irredeemably. Increasingly, modem societies come, to, rely upon 
communicative action for the reproduction of their symbolic resources: as societies evolve, 
the unifying or bonding force which integrates them feeds increasingly off the force of the 
better argument. By the lorce of the better argument' is meant the speech act obligations 
. immanent to a rationally motivated agreement, rather than empirically determined, de facto 
accord. I have already considered some of the general conceptual problems attending this 
idea of a rationally motivated agreement, but for the moment we are concerned with the 
costs of, the modernizing process, assuming for the sake of argument that Habermas's 
description of it is accurate. 
First, Habermas, recognizes that as a vehicle for forging social bonds, the - speech-act 
immanent obligations of communicative action are extremely precarious. The modem 
subject, -as mediated by the risky self-formative process of communicative action, is 
constitutively fmgile and vulnerable. 5 But this fmgility can turn to collective pathology 
when ý the communicative mediation of subjects is systematically distorted. Tor alongside 
the rationalization of its socially integrating process - and thus of its mechanism -for 
reproducing symbolic -- resources - modernity develops its powers of material production 
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according to the logic of capitalist systemic growth. Under the material imperative to 
maintain itself as a system steered by money and powqr, modernity's already fragile social 
integration faces a more serious threat. The force of the better argument can give way to 
bureaucratic -and market forces which cannot sustain the identities of individuals and 
collectives. A communicatively mediated lifeworld colonized by a strategically mediated 
system then avenges itself in the crises and social pathologies distinctive of modernity. 
Diremption, refers fundamentally to the crises generated by the splitting-off of areas of the 
communicatively ý integrated lifeworld by the functionally integrated economic and 
firee mediation of subjects bureaucratic system. Crises are generated because such a nonn- 
cannot secure the identities of individuals nor bind them together in solidarity as collectives. 
Habermas - sometimes uses the concepts of the Ilifeworld' and 'ethical totality' 
co-terminously, 6 and I shall call the ethical totality qua lifeworld (the source of normativity 
colonized by the nofin-free steering media of the system) 'ethical totality ". 
The critique of diremption, then, takes as its object the costs of societal rationalization, 
reconstructed according to the Idnd of logic of development outlined above. This' 
phenomenon, Habermas claims, corresponds to what Hegel described as the 'positive'., ý Its 
critique goes by way of reconstructing the unifying potential of communicative rationality. 
But while, considered as a resource, the lifeworld is concrete and historical, the unifying 
force of communicative reason is formal and procedural to the extent that the intersubjective 
bond forged through it is based on a warranty that norm-validation can be provided on 
demand independently of the content of identity-carrying convictions and beliefs. - As we 
saw in the previous chapter, Habermas distinguishes the unifying, socially integrative force 
of communicative rationality from the 'causally induced' bond established by 'empirically 
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motivated' assent. But since all actual agreements are'empirically motivated, Habermas 
refers to this standard for critical reflection or source of normativity as the counterfactual 
or ideal speech situation. As participants in communicative action must presuppose such 
a situation'obtains qua rationally motivated, it can also be considered as Wnrual to all cases 
of communicative action: "sociocultural forms of life stand under the structural restrictions 
of a communicative reason at once claimed and denied". *" These'structural restrictions 
define the formal standard of intact intersubjectivity. Let us call this formal, counterfactual. 
standard of an ideal speech situation or 'ideal communication community' 'ethical totalityý'. 
The critique of 'cultural rationalization, as I introduced it in (I. 1), 'has a"quite different 
object-domain. 'Culture, for Habermas, becomes rationalized as reaso gets differen ated 
into its theoretical, practical, and aesthetic dimensions. Habermas does not take: this 
differentiation - reflected in'the separation of the cultural value spheres of science and 
technology, law and morality, and art, and the relatively autonomous development of 
discourses thematizing validity claims of truth, justice and taste - as in itself 'a source 'of 
discontent. But it does mak6 a modem source of discontent possible, ' since $expert cultures' 
are able to- separate themselves'from the mainstream of everyday life. Questions Of 
scientific 'truth, legality, and aesthetic worth become increasingly subject to ever more 
complex professional assessment. This generates a two-fold problematic. First, within a 
particular rationalized value-sphere there arises the problem of how those aspects of validity 
not thematized within it are to exercise their force. Second, there is the problem of how 
the knowledge which is creamed off by the expert cultures across all the value'spheres is 
to- be allowed to feed back into a culturally impoverished everyday practice'. Both'are 
problems of the mediation of what is necessarily differentiated in the rationalizing process. 
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Habermas takes them to be problems which, are ý independent of the process, of societal 
rationalization; they have no bearing on the structural pathologies generated by diremption. 
It follows that the standard for critique in this domain cannot be the formal standard of an 
intact intersubjectivity. For even where the structures of intersubjectivity are not damaged,, 
the same problems of cultural impoverishment can arise. Habermas makes only a passing 
reference to what standard of critique can be brought to bear in dealing with these problems 
of mediation. He speaks of a "free interplay" between the separated moments of reason 
which have come to a standstill like a, "tangled mobile". ' I will comment briefly on his 
suggestion in section (5.2), and in (5.3) 1 will propose that the 'problem of mediation' both 
within the differentiated and rationalized - value - sphere of morality, and between 'expert 
moral insight and everyday fife, ' runs deeper than Habermas's understanding of 
differenflaflon leads us to suppose. ý- 
Habermas also employs this standard of a 'free interplay' to address a problem of mediation 
which is connected to diremption. For under the pressure of systemic growth, the modem 
lifeworld becomes selectively exploited for its cognitive/instrumental rationality potential. 
That is, it suffers a one-sided rationalization which is ultimately to be explained in terms 
its splitting-off or diremption by the system. Hence the overall object, of critique is 
formulated as the "division [diremption] and usurpation [one-sided rationalization]" of a 
communicatively mediated, procedurally unified lifeworld. So for his standard of intact 
intersubjectivity against which deformations of forms of life as a whole is to be measured; 
Habermas, appeals to a notion of the free interplay of the -three different dimensions of 
communicative rationality: an everyday practice which, is 'open to an uninhibited and 
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bal&wed interpenetration of cognitive interpretations, moral expectations, expressions and 
valuations". 10 Let us call this standard of intact intersubjectivity, 'ethical totality ". 
In reply to the objection that communicative -rationality does not avail itself- of such a 
standard - an objection I will return to from (5.3) to the end of this chapter - Habermas 
suggests that the - pathological symptoms of imbalance can be explained in - terms, of 
systematically distorted communication, formulated in terms of an "inflexibility" when the 
internal links between meaning and validity, meaning and intention, and meaning - and 
accomplished action are interrupted. " By implication, such a standard of an intact 
intersubjectivity would not be a merely formal notion, since it has substantial implications 
for the assessment of -the well being of forms of life as a whole. However, Habemas 
prefers -to leave the criticism of the dishanwny of individualand collective life forms, the 
space, it'leaves for the passage of an "undamaged, correctly spent life", to the "clinical 
intuitions" of the critic. These intuitions give content to a standard 'of 'intact 
intersubjectivity against which the integrity of forms of life as a whole can be judged. 
Habermas insists that this is not to be confused with the formal (or procedural) standard of 
intact intersubjectivity qua the ideal speech situation. The latter, we are warned, does not 
serve as, the "image of a concrete form of life". 12 But in what sense, if any, can such 
clinical intuitions be rationally justified, if rationality is defined procedurally as 
communicative competence? 
If Habermas cannot successfully address this question, the consequence for his contribution 
to the philosophical discourse of modernity is potentially devastating. As he formulates it, 
this discourse addresses the problem of modernity's critical self-reassurance - of how 
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nj emity can not only generate its norms out of itself, but also stabilize itself on this basis. 
But Habermas is also committed to the acultural theoretical requirement of explaining the 
transition to Modernity as process of rationalization. - So the question he has to answer is 
how normativity is generated in the process of the rational, mediation of subjects. He does 
this by appeal to the presuppositions of the distinctively modem vehicle for rationally 
reproducing symbolic resources (communicative action), which he captures in the. fomal 
concept of an ideal speech situation or 'ethical totality ". But as we saw in (3.1) , he also 
explicates Hegel's idea of a diremPted ethical totality which inflicts "suffering due to 
alienation" as a "violation of, the structures of rational life together". " He must therefore 
account for how the disruption of 'ethical. totality " qr be theorized as irrational, In other 
words, he must show, how. 'clinical intuitions' concerning the well being of modernity as 
a whole can be derived from the norm-carrying medium of communicative action - if 
modernity is to have grounds for self-reassurance. ý Alternatively, the normative basis of 
these clinical intuitions could be re-theorized outwith the constraints of an acultural theory 
which would derive their rational core from the culture-neutral mechanisms of symbolic 
reproduction and social integration. My argument Will be that only the latter moye can save 
Habermas's- model , for self-reassurance from the incoherence which this, acultural 
compitment threatens to bring to it. 
(5.2) The Divided Labour of Critical Reflection 
In (1.1), 1 offered a sketch of the acultural theoretical strategy adopted by Habemas in 
order to explain the transition to modernity as a process of rationalization. We saw that the 
explanation. appeals to "internally reconstructible sequences of stages of competence" 
applied to two cultural invariables; the reproduction of symbolic and material. resources. 
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In (1.3), 1 introduced, Habermas's conception of critical reflection in counterpoise to 
Gadamer's 'universality' claim for hermeneutics. The advantage which Habermas claims 
for his conception of reflection over Gadamer's, we saw, lies in its capacity understand, 
explain, and thereby overcome, phenomena of systematically distorted communication. This 
was to be the achievement of a'theory of communicative competence. In (3.2), it was 
shown that this process of understanding, explanation, and overcoming is equivalent to an 
articulation and disenchantment of what Hegel called the 'causality of fate'. For Habermas, 
the causality of fate represents the dynamic of of a 'dirempted ethical totality' which is the 
hallmark of modem crisis-phenomena and the source of its need for'self-reassurance. 'We 
saw how the dynamic of disturbance and reconstitution in the individual's psycho-sexual 
development - and therefore a self-formative process - relies on the moral responsibility 
assumed by the'agent in her act of self-reflection. As Habermas put it in Knowledge and 
Human Interests, the resolution of the identity-crisis into which the agent is plunged through 
systematically distorted communication requires a 'passion for critique'. 
But following upon the objections made to his early outline of the tasks of critical reflection 
in Knowledge and Hwnan Interests, Habermas has been emphatic in distinguishing - within 
a theory 'of communicative competence - between the philosophical tasks of 'rational 
reconstruction' and 'methodically carried out self-critique'. 14 These philosophical tasks, 
according to Habermas, ' best fit a post-metaphysical, non-foundationalist paradigm Of critical 
reflection. Rational reconstructions attempt to articulate in a theoretically convincing 
manner the pre-theoretical know-how implicit in competent speech -and action. ' This 
competence is assessed in terms of the intuitive mastery of rule systems. The command of 
these rule-like procedures is presupposed in the ability to produce such things as correct 
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inferences, good arguments, grammatically correct sentences, successful speech-acts, 
effective' instrumental action, and appropriate moral judgements. 15 Since what is 
reconstructed are formal procedures which condition claims to validity, Habermas construes 
this task as, tantamount to'the production of a general theory of rationality. The 
reconstructive task of Habermas's conception of critical reflection assumes a constructive 
role in providing strong universalistic but fallible knowledge claims, thus heightening the 
self-consciousness of subjects capable'of speech and action. ' It assumes a critical role 
insofar as rational reconstructions explain deviant cases of incompetence. Although their 
domain is that covered by disciplines like epistemology, philosophy of language, and ethics, 
they are essentially strong empirical theories for which philosophy is a 'stand-in'. 
Habermas's underlying thesis is that a standard for the critical self-reassurance of modernity 
can be generated out of distinctively modem forms of interaction. Given these forms of 
interaction, the argument seeks to establish that certain normative constraints - by appeal 
to which critique can proceed and which supply modernity with its normative content - must 
be presupposed by actors- competent in them. As such, the argument is transcendental in 
type: it seeks to disclose the conditions under which a certain kind of practice is possible, 
by way of reconstructing the competences which are presupposed in it. But the claims of 
rational reconstructions are ý transcendental only in a weak sense; as part of a 
'post-metaphysical' paradigm of reflection, they do not have a prioH status. They are 
allegedly open to empirical refutation, and are always proposed with a fallibilist proviso; 
they do not have the epistemic certainty which could qualify them as 'foundational". * 
The lack of a priori' status of rational reconstructions is evident, as Benhabib has'shown, 
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in their failure to'establish'the necessity and uniqueness of what they'conclude as the 
16 implicitly known rules of rational speech and action. Any putative necessity is clearly 
undermined by the fallibility and revisability of their empirical support. But more crucially, 
the uniqueness of the rules which are claimed to be presupposed by a certain kind of action 
does not follow even from an argument which can establish such presuppositions. For there 
may be other presuppositions which are equally consistent with 'the 'given' that they 
condition. Further, these alternative presuppositions may be part of a competing framework 
of explanation. This may well mean that; on the one hand, at most one of the competing 
frameworks can be true - but also on the other hand, that if one is true'that cannot itself be 
17 definitively established by this kind of transcendental argument. This thought suggests that 
the mode of verification of rational reconstructions may not be as dissimilar from the 
evaluation of frameworks of self-interpretation as Habermas supposes. This is a criticism 
I will'e'xplore further in the next section, where Habermas's applicatio fi of rational 
reconstructions to competence in moral judgement is examined. But for the moment, what 
interests us 'is the contrast Habermas draws between the modes of critical reflection 
available to the theonst of com'municative competence. 
While rational reconstruction takes as its object the formal capacitý f6r rational action and 
the logic (ie. bare or formal possibilities) of development of those capacities, methodically 
carried out self-Critique 'employs narrative tools to make sense of the i6nwnkS of 
development of the particular totality of an individual or collective way of life. " By 
m'ethodically carried out self-critique, Habermas implies that it should take the narrative but 
dialogical form for which the model of psychoanalysis is paradigmatic. Indeed, 
psychoanalysis is cited as a model for how rational reconstruction and self-critique can be 
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combined in the same critical project. However, only the former kind of reflection, for 
Habermas, can contribute to a theory of rationality. As we will see in the next section, this 
is because a claim to'unversality is ascribable to the competences reconstructed. 
Habermas contrasts the role of reconstructive science with philosophy's role as interpreter 
on behalf of the lifeworld. . As we have seen, in its latter role philosophy has no formal 
standard against which irrationalities can be gauged. Its task is to gather together or . 
reconci e, at the level of everyday life, the moments of reason which communicative action 
tears asunder. As a reconstructive science, the theory of communicative action articulates 
the differentiation of the three, validity claims and corresponding value spheres which, 
Habermas accords to an evolutionary process of learning. But as Interpreter of, the 
lifeworld, it must show how mediation is possible between these differentiated dimensions. i 
of rationality. For Habermas, as we saw, the problem here lies not with the differentiation 
of the moments of reason as such by competent communicative action, but the way in which 
these moments become stuck like a 'tangled mobile'. In its latter role as interpreter or , 
mediator on the part of the lifeworld, critical reflection must address the question; "How ý 
can a new balance between the separated moments of reason be established in, 
communicative everyday life? ". " To the extent to which a new balance is called for by the 
one-sided rationalization of the lifeworld, which in turn is explained by diremption and 
subsequent colonization, the answer would provide a standard of 'intact intersubjectivity' 
which, in distinction from Habermas's other standards for critique, I earlier designato ý 
ethical totalitye. 
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(5.3) Morality and Ethical Life 
The division of philosophical labour between rational reconstruction and interpretation or 
mediation on behalf of the lifeworld has deep implications for Habermas's understanding 
of ethics. The task of rational reconstruction, as we have seen, is to raise the intuitive 
know-how presupposed in -the varieties of communicative competence to the level of 
theoretical - self-awareness. Communicative competence presupposes the capacity. to 
participate in discourse;,. to raise, and justify when challenged, particular validity claims of 
truth, rightness, -and authenticity. For a claim to count as valid,, participants in discourse 
must presuppose that a rationally motivated consensus concerning it is possible. Habermas 
refers to this counterfactual presupposition of discursive conditions,, in which positions are 
taken up solely on the basis of the rational force of the better argument, as an ideal speech 
situation. Though counterfactual, Habemas, insists that it is an unavoidable presupposition 
of rationally motivated agreement. Since it is unavoidable, it also conditions claims to 
universality., In -maldng explicit the procedural rules which condition claims 
to validity, 
rational reconstructions render intelligible the universal basis of validity claims. The task 
of moral philosophy, -accordingly, is to explicate the conditions which make rationally 
motivated agreement concerning validity cWms to normative rightness possible. " To do 
this is simultaneously to explicate the universality of such claims and to construct a theory 
of practical -reasoning. 
Such is the burden of Habermas's 'discourse ethics'. 21 It seeks to reconstruct the rational 
basis of the strong (because universal) but minimal (because formal) constitution of -the 
4moral point of view'. By the moral point of view is meant the impartial perspective of 
participants engaged in practical discourse. Practical discourse is a formal procedure of 
156 
argumentation, through which participants seek to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus 
over the legitimacy of a norm. The strategy of discourse ethics is to derive the universality 
of the moral point of view from the pragmatic presuppositions of moral argumentation. The 
thread of the Habermas's argument ý is as follows. The point, of engaging in moral 
argumentation would be lost if it were not for the possibility of reaching a valid consensus. 01 
But the condition of reaching a valid (rather than de facto) consensus is that each participant 
has an equal right to raise criticizable validity claims, which is reciprocated amongst all the 
participants. From these procedural normative constraints on participating in practical 
discourse, a moral principle - which is universally binding on communicative actors is 
derivable; namely, "For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side-effects of its general 
observance for the satisfaction of each person's particular- interests must be acceptable to 
22 
all 
Mat norms are valid can only be determined by participants in actual practical discourses. 
But to count as just, their content must pass the test of this, formal principle of 
universalizability which defines the moral point of view. The moral point of view thus has 
a cognitive status; it is not contingent upon the particular cultural traditions or forms of life 
which give content to norms. ' The moral sceptic is defeated, because a non-contingent, 
non-instrumental reason for acting is shown to have theoretical justification. According to 
the basic claim of Habermas's discourse ethics, the normative force of the pragmatic 
presuppositions of argumentation cannot be denied without a performative contradiction. 
Thus, the sceptical, position is something which cannot be argued for, and if it cannot be 
argued for, it is not a 'position' at all. CP 
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This is what discourse ethics qua rational reconstruction attempts to demonstrate. " The 
object of reconstruction is the post-conventional moral consciousness of ideal-typical m ern 
agency. '25 - As Habermas acknowledges, however, - limiting the domain of moral philosophy 
to the refutation of moral scepticism, and the reconstruction of the universality of the moral 
point -of view, has, its price. It can only be achieved if certain phenomena are excluded 
from the moral domain. Rather than pursue Habermas's formal-pragmatic refutation of 
moral scepticism, I want to focus on what is lost to ethical reflection once moral philosophy 
is understood as a stand-in for reconstructive science . 
2' Even if the anti-sceptical conclusion 
could be established, it may be that its own point would be lost unless adequate 
compensation is given by the other critical role Habermas designates for philosophy -'as 
interpreter and. mediator on behalf of the lifeworld. But this is not what I shall be arguing. 
Rather, I will contend that the very issue of 'mediation' becomes distorted once it is 
construed according to Habemas's division of critical reflection. 
Most conspicuously-, Habermas's discourse ethics avowedly eschews consideration of what 
constitutes the good life. This is taken to be an inevitable consequence of a moral domain 
which is determined by a principle of universalizability. This Principle "makes razor-sharp 
cuts between evaluative statements and strictly -normative ones, between the good and the 
just". 21 Further, this separation between the good and the just is what conditions the 
possibility of cognitive advance through the exercise of practical rationality. 'It is just by 
virtue of the "transformation of questions of the good into problems of justice", that an 
21 
autonomous moral domain owes its "gain in rationality". 
One reason Habermas gives for this is that only questions of justice, 'or of the normative 
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validity of norms of action, can be debated with "the prospect of consensus". " Another is 
that evaluativequestions, or questions of what constitutes the good life, "are accessible to 
rational discussion only Mthin the unproblematic horizon of a concrete historical form of 
life or the conduct of an individual' life". " Questions of the good life' Habermas, 9 
continues, "have the advantage of being' answerable within the horizon of lifeworld 
certainties". " Those cultural values which -make up one's conception of the good life can 
only'be "candidates" for legitimate norms. They become objects of practical rationality, 
and potentially legitimate norms of action, as soon as a "hypothetical attitude" is taken 
towards them hy participants in moral argumentation. Upon talcing this attitude, the norms 
and institutions that are'taken for granted appear as "instances of problematic justice". 32 
Particular norms can be tested as hypothetical legitimacy claims under the moralizing gaze 
of the problem-solving participants in practical discourse. And in its universality, this 
moral point of view stands outside the provincialism of the'lifeworld. '! I, 
The guiding intuition of Habermas's thought here is that the concrete institutions of any 
particular ethical'context of life (Sittlichkelt) are criticizable by appeal to an abstract justice 
it does not embody. The'abstractions of the moral point of view "risk all the assets of the 
existing ethical substance". " Thus there arises the problem of how "how to'make up for 
this loss of concrete ethical substance, which is initially accepted because of the cognitive 
advantages attending it". ' The lifeworld must be such as to allow for the application of the 
norms which areibstractly justified, and to motivate action based upon them. " This is the 
problem of mediating morality with ethical life. 
Having briefly summarized Habermas's remarks on the, tasks and presuppositions' Of 
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discourse ethics, I now want to argue that the problem of mediation it leaves us with 
actually runs muc4 deeper than we are led to suppose. I shall do this by highlighting the 
following difficulties which face the programme of discourse ethics as outlined above: (1) 
the reasonableness of the prospect of rational consensus in practical discourse, (2) the 
problematic status and indeterminate rationality of 'evaluative' statements, (3) the 
narrowness of the rational content of the good construed as candidature for the just, (4) the 
problematic identification of the horizon of ethical life with the lifeworld, (5) the tense 
differentiation between the justification and the application of norms, and (6) difficulties 
with Habermas's formulation of the problem of mediation. This will force us to reconsider 
the relation between the reconstructive and hermeneutic moments of critical reflection even 
on Habermas's own terms. 
(1) 7he reasonableness of the prospect of rational consensus in practical discourse. Is it 
reasonable to suppose that participants in discourse about the rightness of norms must hold 
out the prospect of reaching a consensus? If a positive answer to this question is to be 
plausible, the content of the norms under discussion would have to be minimized. That this 
is the, case becomes evident as soon as one considers the Idnd of interests the satisfaction 
of which would be consequent upon a universally consented-to norm. The threat, to 
consensus, it seems, comes not so much from the diversity, as from the incommensurability 
of interests. There is no reason why diversity (or pluralism) in itself should generate 
dispute, unless the realization of one or more of the diverse interests were to be 
incompatible with and to challenge the realization of significant others. So the prospect of 
consensus increases in inverse proportion to the scope for incommensurability. But as the 
scope for incommensurability diminishes, so does the significant content of the norm which 
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is the object of 'practical discourse. ' The problem'he're'is a reminder of Hegel's critique of 
Kaht's principle of- uniVersalizability; that the principle is either empty or inconsistent . 
16 
Although Habermas'sconsequentialist reformulation of the universalizability principle is 
meant toneutralize'this criticism, " the objection I am putting retains some force. For its 
thrust is not that universalizable"norms must be empty, but rather that norms which hold 
out the prospect of universal consensus may be so minimal as not to be worth raising by 
concrete participants in practical discourse. Or,, if discussion over a norm with'such a 
content is undertaken, argumentation over the universalizability of the norm may not merit 
the attribute 'rational'. Consider, for instance, John Rawls's fanciful case of the man whose 
conception of the good life consists ýin counting blades of grass. " One can imagine a norm 
which makes possible this 'good life being taken up for discussion in practical discourse. 
It may well'pass the'procedural test, since the consequences of its general observance for 
the satisfaction of each person's particular interests could be acceptable to all; but only 
because it simply'doesn't matter to them. It could be objected that the example is absurd, 
since there would be no good reason' for'adopting such a norm. But this is just the point; 
that what counts as a good reason for raising a norm for discussion comes prior to the 
procedural test. On the other hand, if the norm is taken up as a constitutive condition of 
tlý6 good life- as requiring all to count grass - it might still be acceptable if the community 
were' to have such'idiosyncratic'desire. - At this juncture, Habermas would have to follow 
Rawls'S-suggestibn that the desire be attributed to a kind of collective neurosis. But in 
making this move, Habermas would be subordinating the task of rational reconstruction to 
the tasý'of methodically carried-out self-critique. I shall return to this issue of the priority 
of the 'two"modes of -critical' reflection enjoined by the theorist of commýnicative 
competence below. 
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To take the basic point I am getting at here further, the content of interests must be of a 
certain recognizable Idnd if we would call participants in discourse about them rational. 
That. is, participation in practical discourse is conditioned by the possession of a 
recognizable conception of acceptable generalizable interests, of what is worth considering 
as just. One might want to go on to say that only beings of a certain kind - with a certain 
identity which discriminates between what is and what is not worth debating - qualify as 
conversational partners, no matter'what the procedure. But this position doesn't follow 
from the objection I am putting. For we can still say that one onlyfinds out what's worth 
discussing through the process of communication with others. This dialogical condition of 
the validity of normative claims, that they be acceptable to all qua participants in practical 
discourse, need not be objectionable so long as such discourse is not analytically bound to 
the reaching of a consensual conclusion'. " Unlike the model drawn by Habermas, this view 
is consistent, with the real possibility that participants in practical discourse can disagree, 
with equallyýgood reason, over the validity of a norm. But more important for our present 
purposes, it is also consistent with the inclusion of conceptions of the good as proper objects 
of rational debate over the content of the moral domain. 
(2) 7he problematic status and indeterminate rationality of evaluative statements. Indeed, 
Habermas's reconstruction of the procedural competences of practical rationality leaves 
statements of what is good - what Habermas, calls 'evaluative' statements - in a curious 
limbo. At, one point, he suggests that evaluations or "value-preferences" cannot be 
rationally debated at all, because they do not hold out the prospect of consensus . 
41 But 
following from my previous point, it is not the prospect for consensus which makes 
conversation about norms rational, and even if it were, it is not clear why the prospect 
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should be any worse for consensus about goods. More typically, however, Habermas 
recognizes that evaluative as well as moral questions are susceptible to a kind of rational 
assessment. He suggests that argument over goods is possible but in a different, less strict 
sense, to practical discourse proper. For the latter, rational consensus is in principle 
reachable, if only argumentation were conducted for long enough. "' But this is not the case 
for ý argument concerning evaluatives. Týhis Icind of argumentation, with its more lenient 
criteria of rationality, is characteristic of what Habermas calls "therapeutic" and "aesthetic" 
discourse. 42 
What status then, do conceptions of the good have? Habermas uncontroversially asserts that 
they "shape the identities of groups and individuals", which within his architectonic means 
that they form an intrinsic part of "culture" and "personality". " Put this way, the good 
would have to be argumentatively criticizable in terms of the validity claims of objective 
truth and subjective authenticity. " But since, following the argument of (2.3), conceptions 
of the good do not apparently fit into either of these categories, to claim this is either to risk 
distortion concerning the meaning of evaluatives, or if they are to be taken as combinations 
of these, claims, it is to say nothing distinctive about them - since every speech-act forms 
a syndrome of the three validity claims. Habermas seems to favour 'therapeutic discourse' 
as that form of argumentation through which conceptions of the good can be rationally 
criticized. But how is this possible if there is no validity claim which is thematized in 
therapeutic,, discourse? A model of non-critefial yet rational critical reflection which 
Habermas requires here is not forthcoming. 
It is required because learning processes in the domain of understandings of the good life 
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cannot be accommodated within Habermas's schema of a logic of development, the rational 
reconstniction'of which is the task of the first of Habermas's two-fold role for philosophical 
reflection. ' - According to that schema, the capacity to differentiate between the validity 
claims of truth, normative rightness, and authenticity makes criticism which thematizes each 
of these claims possible, and thereby conditions cognitive gain - or gains in rationality. But 
Habermas recognizes that this differentiation also problematizes, rational reflection 
concerning evaluatives or conceptions of the good. He suggests that such reflection 
integrates ývhat ha's become differentiated in a harmonious balance . 45 This is the second of 
the two tasks he attributes to critical reflection; methodologically carried out self-critique, 
and interpretation and mediation on the part of the lifeworld. The former, we saw, employs 
narrative tools for the sake - of overcoming particular illusions which block the path to 
self-realization'. But evaluatives, Habermas states, serve'to shape or define particular 
identities. Most recently, Habermas has drawn on Taylor's notion of strong evaluations to 
capture idea of - value-preferences which ar -e "not merely contingent dispositions and 
inclinations", but are rather "inextricably interwoven with each individual's identity". ' 
These evaluations 'Habermas states, "both admit and stand in need of justification". ' This 
justification, he continues, comes'through "hermeneutic self-clarification", whereby one's 
life hisi6ry and process of self-development becomes 'appropriated. Habermas interprets 
this appropriation, Or "striving'foir self-realization", in terms of the "resoluteness of an 
individual who has co'mmitted himself to an authentic life; the capacity for existential 
decisions or'radicil'choice of self always operates within the horizon of a life-history, in 
whose traces the individual can discern who he is and'who he would like to'become 48 
Thus 'clinical advice' aims at justified evaluatives, and is addressed to "the resoluteness of 
the authentic, self-realizing subject". "' 
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cco ing to this new position, the rationality of evaluative statements is discernible by way 
of hermeneutic self-clarification. There are, however, problems in reconciling it with the 
other claims which issue from the method of rational reconstruction. Take the distinction 
between who one is and who one would like to become. Each corresponds to two 
components which are interwoven, according to Habermas, in all evaluatives; - the 
descriptive and the normative. In this case,, they correspond to "the descriptive component 
of the ontogenesis of the ego, and the normative component of the ego-ideal". 'o While 
Habermas now asserts that "hermeneutically generated self-description" (my emphasis) does 
not issue in "value-neutral self-understanding" - and hence that the descriptive and the 
normative components of the evaluation are inseparable - he is also committed to the view, - 
proposed in defence of the method of rational reconstruction, that the descriptive component 
of the ontogenesis of the ego is the prerogative of strong empitical theories, independent 
of the normative context of processes of development. The two methods of critical 
reflection are therefore not supplementary, but incompatible. Moreover, if the description 
of who one is is inseparable from its normative context, then it will admit of a truth-value 
which has an inseparable normative force. At this point, Habermas could be taken to mean 
that the validity-claim raised in the clinical advice is authenticity, not truth. But this cannot 
be correct, since it is what the self is being authentic to which is operative here, something 
which is independent of, or contingent to, the will to realize it. 51 That is precisely why 
resoluteness becomes an issue; the normative force of the description exercises a pull, which 
transcends my matter of fact capacity to live up to it. But if the validity-claim accorded to 
evaluatives is truth, the rationally reconstructed differentiation of the validity-claims of 
truth, normative rightness, and authenticity, must be abandoned. 
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(3) Vie narrowness of the good constnied as candidature for the just. " Jn his earlier 
remarks on discourse ethics - where practical reasoning is taken to be the subject of rational 
reconstruction - Habermas construes conceptions of the good, insofar as they are pertinent 
to the moral domain, as embryonic justice claims. Habermas's idea here is that conceptions 
of justice emerge out of that horizon of concrete historical traditions and institutions which 
he calls at various points the lifeworld and the ethical context of life (Sittlichkelt). This is 
what I earlier designated_-'ethical totality". In this context, it refers to the naively accepted 
background against which communicative actors reach understanding. The claim of these 
conceptions to rationality, however, and therefore their, right to the moral domain, depends 
upon their successful passage through the procedure of practical discourse. Given that this 
procedure is what practical rationality means, and that the moral domain is that covered by 
norms the rationality of which is warranted by virtue of passing the procedural test, 
conceptions of the good can be of moral significance only insofar as they are candidates for 
the just. IýI -- .Iý ýl 
As will be obvious, this leaves the dimension of goods clustered around the self-regarding 
53 
virtues of dignityand integrity completely unaccounted for. This occlusion can only be 
explained as the unfortunate consequence of conceiving morality exclusively on the basis 
I 
of the imperative of social integration through the medium of communicative action. - In the 
terms of the underlying debate which interests us, it is the answer to a question bound to 
arise within the discourse of an acultural theory. Habermas is explicit on the former point; 
, -.,, -all moralities coincide 
in one respect: the same medium, linguistically 
mediated interaction, is both the reason for the vulnerability of socialized 
individuals and the, key resource they possess to compensate, for, that 
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vulnerability. Every morality revolves around equality for respect, 
solidarity, and the common good. Fundamental ideas like these can be 
reduced to the relations of symmetry and. reciprocity presupposed in 
communicative action. In other words, the common core of all kinds of 
morality can be traced back to the reciprocal imputations and shared 
presuppositions actors make when they seek understanding in everyday 
situations. ' 
Linguistically mediated interaction, we have seen, is the culture-neutral mechanism'by 
which societies reprbdu6e their symbolic resources. ' These resources are, reproduced 
rationally when their conviction-carrying power feeds off the illocutionary warrant tojustify 
validity claims when challenged. Habermas gives a plausible account of how the moral' 
intuition of equality for respect can be clarified by way of a reconstruction of the symmetry 
and reciprocity conditions of communicative, illocutionary binding Action-coordination. But 
it is far from evident how intuitions concerning the moral significance of the self-regarding 
virtues can be clarified in this way. Put differently, Habermas faces the difficulty of 
accounting for how conceptions of dignity and integrity are capable of carrying rational 
conWction'. - It is crucial that Habermas have recourse to such an account, for the following 
reason. He argues that the transition to - modernity can be explained as a process of 
rationalization, -and that the normative content of , modernity - self-consciousness, 
self-determination, and self-realization - can be secured on the basis of its mechanism for 
rationally reproducing its symbolic resources. What counts as self-realization therefore 
changes With the transition to modernity. But what counts as self-realization is internally 
- Habermas is therefore committed to the related to conceptions of dignity and integrity. 
claim that transitions in conviction-carrying conceptions of self-regarding virtues are subject 
to rational assessment; even, though the source of such convictions is not reducible to the 
procedural conditions'of communicative action. But this claim is incompatible with the 
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view that the normative content of modernity can be secured on the basis of the mechanism 
for reproducing its rational resources. 
An apparent'way out of this dilemma is to give conceptions of self-regarding virtues the 
status of 'clinical intuitions'. This is the path which Habermas'takes. It is awkward even 
on Habemas's own terms, since it is implausible to assess them ag'ainsta criterial standard 
of sickness and health. The modification in Habermas's view introduced in response to the 
previous objection goes some way to obviate this difficulty concerning'the 'self-regarding 
virtues, since notions of integrity and dignity play a part in 'self-realization', 'and typically 
go hand in hand with the'virtue of resoluteness. But with this modification, Habeimas 
forfeits the'strong claims for rational reconstr6ction: as the meaning Hibermaý, attributýs 
to clinical intuitions is unpacked, " so the relationship'between concrete therapeutic reason 
and formal practical rationality stands in need of reconceptualization. 
(4) 7he problematic identification of the horizon of ethical life with the lifeworld. 
Habermas's case for limiting the moral domain to questions of justice, together with his 
procedural model of practical rationality, turns on the idea that questions about the good can 
only be addressed from within the horizon of the lifeworld. ", However, the lifeworld as a 
whole cannot be put into question, since 'there is no meaningful position to adopt outside 
of it. Particular aspects of it, can, however, be challenged, once made objects of the 
hypothetical attitude-of participants in discourse. Conceptions of the good, concerning as 
they do the value of a life as a whole, cannot foster such challenges. The issue then arises 
of mediating the challenges of practical discourse with the "unquestioningly accepted ideas 
[and institutions] of the'good life" which motivate, give a point to, and concretize action. 
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There are several difficulties with employing the concept of the lifeworld in this way. First, 
as a source of the good and identity formations, it is much more complex and internally 
ambiguous than Habermas's rather homogeneous concept indicates. " Taken as such a 
source, which can, appropriately be called the horizon of ethical life, the lifeworld- is not 
necessarily unproblematic, and not just because as a whole it cannot be treated 
hypothetically. This is mainly because, as several commentators have observed, the 
lifeworld -is itself the site of conflict between groups who find themselves engaged in a 
'struggle for recognition' of the conceptions of the good which give content to their 
identities. " Second, by levelling all conceptions of the good homogeneously under the same 
concept, Habermas is unable to articulate the intuition that, since goods vary in their 
relative preferability and command different degrees of commitment, they must appear as 
forming (in some sense) a hierarchical order. Third, goods can lose their, capacity, to 
motivate action. This is related to the adoption of a hypothetical attitude towards them, and 
it- does generate a problem of mediation. But, I will argue below, it is a more radical 
problem than Habermas presents it as. 
Conversely, the assumption that moral questions can be rationally discussed, and norms 
justified, outside the horizon of ethical life is also in danger of incoherence. If this 
background as whole cannot be challenged, then Habermas's claim that practical discourse 
risks all the assets of the ethical life cannot be sustained. Taken individually, Habermas 
might reply, the particular values can each be put to the problem-solving test. But this 
move is inconsistent with accepting -that the background forms a web-like structure, 
in the 
sense that the value of its 'nodes' are only genuinely assessable when taken together. But 
more important, even the hypothetical attitude towards particular aspects of the lifeworld, 
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rather than being tantamount to a transcendence of it, can equally be taken as peculiar to 
the modem lifeworld. 11, I 
Habermas does'give some consideration to the preceding objections. Although he fails to 
make clear in what sense the goods which shape the horizon of ethical life are not just any 
part of an individual or collective way of life, but rather the means by which particular 
parts fit together into a worthwhile whole, he recognizes that they too; 
transcend de facto behaviour. They congeal into historical and biographical 
syndromes of value orientations through which subjects can distinguish the 
good life from the reproduction of mere life. " 
But this recognition fits extremely uneasily with Habermas's claims about practical 
rationality, and the moral domain. For, if conceptions of-the good are capable-,, of 
transcending de facto behaviour, this means, on Habermas's own terms, that, they are 
capable of motivating rational behaviour. But this makes their exclusion from practical 
discourse arbitrary. -ý Admittedly, Habermas has since defused this objection, by 
distinguishing between what he now calls the pragmatic, ethical, and moral employments 
of practical reason. But the following difficulty remains. If, by means of conceptions of 
the good, subjects can distinguish the good life from the mere reproduction of life, such 
value orientations (the horizon of ethical life) must be distinguished from the 'always 
already' naively accepted lifeworld. Habermas correctly asserts that the value orientations 
towards the good congeal into historical and biographical syndromes, and that the Idnd of 
rationality appropriate for them is not procedural. It was noted above, when considering 
Habermas's amended position on the status of 'strong' evaluatives, that they can bejustified 
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by hermeriiutic self-clarification. But how they can be justified relative to each other, and 
hence what it is by virtue of which they can be ascribed as rational, was left unexplained. 
Habermas claims' that practical rationality can take biographical syndromes as its 
subject-matter, but how justification of transitions between such syndromes - or between 
strong evaluations - is to proceed, remains unaccounted for. 
(5) Difficulties with the distinction between justification and application., Habermas's reply 
to the objection that participants in practical discourse cannot meaningfully transcend the 
historical context of lifeworld traditions is to make a distinction between justification and 
application. Participants in practical discourse abstract the values which emerge on the 
horizon of the lifeworld and put-them to the universalizability test. This is the process of 
justification. But they must then concretize these abstractly justified norms, they must 
recontextualize them as appropriate moral judgements in the here and now of the lifeworld 
- the moment of application. In arguing for the necessity of maldng this hard distinction' 
Habermas correctly * asserts that '"no norm contains within itself the rules for its 
an lication". 59 But this assertion cuts both ways, and in such a wa as to undermine the lp y 
conclusion Habermas claims to reach with it. For on the same account, if no norm contains 
within itself the rules for its application, neither is the application of a rule separable from 
the rules themselves -a point used by Habermas to justify the initial symmetry and 
reciprocity conditions of communicative action. Theproblem is that what a norm means, 
qua a rule for -action, is not separable from what counts as appropriate applications of it. 
It is not just that "moral justifications are pointless unless the decontextualization of the 
general'norms used in justification is compensated for in the process of application", but 
at a more' fundamental level, its not clear how they could be meaningful if this could not 
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be done. The effor, this objection goes, lies in thinking that the application of a meaningful 
rule is somehow a second step made after its justification. Habermas's reply would be to 
insist that the possibility of identical ascriptions of meaning presupposes the idealizations 
of pure communicative action, but this move faces the difficulties I outlined in the previous 
chapter. 60 
A different kind of objection which Habemas considers is the charge of 'rigorism' made 
by Hegel of the Kantian approach to ethics. By focussing exclusively on the 'abstract 
universalism of morally justified judgement', this approach neglects the affective dimension 
of moral competence and maturity. Habermas's reply is to acknowledge the constitutive 
role of emotional dispositions and attitudes in the characterization of moral maturity, but 
only when integrated -with the universalizing cognitive operation of the participants in 
practical discourse. -, Any adequate description of "the highest stage of morality", he writes, 
must integrate an ethics of love with an ethics of law and justice. The charge of moral 
rigorism is only applicable in the absence of such maturity conceptualized as integration, 
its object is "an impairment of the faculty of judgement". " 
But it is not clear how this highest stage of morality can be articulated through the model 
of communicative action. Benhabib has argued forcefully that action motivated out of an 
ethics of love may be oriented about the particular rather than the general neediness of an 
other. 62 The other may appear in need of sympathy, encouragement, affection, support. 
But this could well be in conflict with the requirements of communicative action. Not only 
may the raising and redeeming of the validity claims of truth, justice, and sincerity be 
simply irrelevant to the other who appears in such a way, but more radically, such an 
172 
appearance requires an orientation which on Habermas's terms can only be conceived as 
constitutive for strategic action. Only by generalizing the other can communicative ethics 
lay claim to grounding morality. Only such a concept of the other is consistent with a 
concept of an ideal communication community which transcends the lifeworld as a formal 
or virtual totality. "' 
(6) Difficulties with Habermas's formulation of the problem of mediation. The impairment 
of the faculty of judgement is related to the problem of mediation between a universal 
morality and a particular ethical life. This is, of course, a distinctively modem 
predicament. It is only possible given the differentiation of the three validity claims and 
their corresponding value-spheres. The cognitive gain achieved by taldng norms as 
hypothetical universals under the single validity aspect of justice needs to be compensated 
for in the recognition-carrying institutions and character-foming processes - in brief, the 
socializing medium - of everyday practice. The problem must. be seen as part of 
modernity's need for self-reassurance. As the stringent demands of morality and the facts 
of ethical life become separated, as the normative content of the pragmatic presuppositions 
of communicative action are refused embodiment in a rationalized but colonized lifeworld, 
communicative actors become increasingly disposed towards motivational crises, and 
societies become increasingly vulnerable to legitimation crises. The problems of mediating 
between morality and ethical life, as Habermas puts it, "centre around the idea of a 
non-reified everyday communicative practice, a form of life with structures of an 
undistorted intersubjectivity". " 
One difficulty which this interpretation of the problem of mediation immediately raises is 
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that the problem would seem to remain even without reification'as Habermas theorizes it. 
It is part of the meaning of lifeworld rationalization' that the validity claims and 
value-spheres separate out. One might thus argue that the faculty of judgement, by virtue 
of which they are reintegrated in the moment of practical application, is bound to be 
impaired under these conditions. Further, if the exercise of this faculty is to have the force 
of rationality, and this exercise is impaired under conditions of communicative 
rationalization, one must also assess this process not as a gain, but as a loss of rationality. 
For, following from the previous objection, it only makes sense to talk of the rationality of 
applied judgements. 
Another difficulty emerges from the conceptualization of motivation and legitimation crises. 
In line with his deontological approach to the moral domain, Habermas resists making any 
reference to the good here. As we have seen, Habermas recognizes that issues of the good 
life "invariably deal with the totality of a particular form of life or the totality ý of an 
individual life history" ". He contrasts the foregoing crises with crises in this dimension 
as follows: 
A person who questions the forms of life in which his identity has been 
shaped questions his very existence. The distancing produced by life crises 
of that Idnd is of another sort than the distance of a norm-testing participant 
in discourse from the facticity of existing institutions. " 
But the two kinds of distance are far from being unrelated to each other. As I noted in my 
discussion of Gellner, the hypothetical attitude itself indireCtlY undemines the 
conviction-carrying identities which provide the agent with non-instrumental reasons for 
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acting. More important, however, is Habermas's reliance on the kind of crisis described 
in the passage just cited when dealing with the problem of self-reassurance. The distance 
produced by the life-crises of which Habermas speaks isforced on practical agents; it has 
an existential 'unbearability' which impels change. In my introduction to chapter four, I 
noted that Habermas appeals to this model of life crises to refute value-scepticism. The 
'ought' which is available to critical reflection upon the communicative mediation of human 
beings, and which does the work of critical self-reassurance, therefore has a 'clinical' 
meaning. But this is now revealed as an 'ethical' not a 'moral' ought, and it is scepticism 
about the distinction between the reproduction of good life and the mere reproduction of life 
which is challenged. Habermas asserts that the moralizing gaze can directly undermine any 
particular Sittlichkeit insofar as the latter fails to live up to universal standards of justice. 
As we have seen, the possibility of successful hypothetical problem-solving through 
communicative action is that the lifeworld stands as an unproblematic background. But this 
condition is precisely not met in the scenario which generates the need for self-reassurance. 
Furthermore, this scenario is difficult to sustain by means of rational reconstruction. For 
the moment of transition, by which the agent caught up in the causality of fate regains 
identity, requires the practical appropriation of Habermas's theoretical perspective on the 
lifeworld. 1 Habermas employs the tool of rational reconstruction to ground the rationality 
of justice claims. He then posits the ideal communication community as the virtual ethical 
totality through which the abstract participants in practical discourse - wherein "the 
autonomous will becomes completely determined by reason "69 _ nourish a universal 
solidarity. But this is just the "notional republic" which, on Hegel's account, misleadingly 
gives the claims of justice a logical priority over other 4precincts of virtue'. This is why 
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Hegel introduces the concept of an ethical totality. Habemas takes on, this idea to explain 
the inseparability between the individual and the common good - between autonomy and 
solidarity., It cannot be explained by rational reconstruction, however, since conceptions 
of the good, as Habermas acknowledges, do not follow a pre7hermeneutically accessible 
sequence of stages of competence. This is a fundamental, tension between the model of 
crisis Habermas derives from Hegel, and the validational, model for. critique which has its 
basis in the rational reconstructive method of critical reflection. 
I have argued in this section that critical reflection in the form of rational reconstruction not 
only needs to be compensated by hermeutical self-critique, but that the two forms are. in 
tension with each other. Habermas claims that the latter is guided by clinical intuitions, 
which are subject, in a sense, to rational assessment. Clinical intuitions inform reflection 
on 'ethical life', which are distinguished from valid practical judgements in virtue of their 
lack of universalizability. The Kantian concepdon of pi-4cdcal reason as 'uncondidoned' 
is at once claimed and denied; conceptions of the good can motivate rational behaviour, and 
evaluatives are recognized as having normative assertoric force, while communicative 
competence differentiates between truth-value and norm-value, and opposes rationally 
motivated agreement from empirically motivated assent. It seems as if a rethiný is required 
of the division between rational reconstruction and interpretative, mediation, , 
and 
correspondingly of the roles that therapeutic and practical reasoning play in thinIdng about 
the problem of self-reassurance. 
(5.4) Therapeutic and Practical Reason Reconsidered 
In the terms Habermas's critical project sets for itself, the_ problem of modernity's 
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self-reassurance falls under two aspects. First, there is the problem of how modernity can 
generate its noms out of itself. The task here is of reconstructing the normative content 
of modernity out of the presuppositions of the vehicle for reproducing its symbolic resources 
- communicative action. The critical standard is a formal notion of intact intersubjectivity; 
the procedure of rational will-formation for participants in an ideal communication 
community. Modernity's normative content - self-consciousness, self-determination and 
self-realization - owes its claim to rationality to the unavoidability of the idealizing 
presuppositions of communicative action. By the same token, this rationality can only claim 
to be procedural. So, for instance, the space for self-detemination which structures a form 
of life can be criticized according to the ideal standard of the universal norms generated 
through ý the procedure of practical reason. The lifeworld is simultaneously the 
transcendental site at which ideally rationally motivated speakers and hearers meet, and the 
historically contingent context and resource of actual communicative actors. Second, there 
is the problem of a lifeworld which is one-sidedly rationalized. But the lifeworld can only 
be one-sidedly rationalized as a whole. There is no validity claim by virtue of which 
critique is possible here. The standard of intact intersubjectivity can only come from the 
clinical intuitions (about 'sickness' and 'health') of the critic. This division of Critical 
labour thus corresponds to the ambiguity in the standard of intact intersubjectivity I 
identified in (5.1). Insofar as it stands for the dialogue situation of pure communicative 
action, it does not cover the problems of mediation which remain to threaten modernity's 
self-reassurance. These problems can only be tackled by appeal to the standard of a 
balanced lifeworld, which cannot be derived from rational reconstructions or the exercise 
of practical (as distinguished from therapeutic) rationality. Even worse for Habermas is the 
prospect of conflict between the standards appealed to by participants in practical and 
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therapeutic discourse. For although he considers the modem lifeworld to be one-sidedly 
rationalized in its cognitive/instrumental aspect, it is equally possible that there'may also 
be a one-sided development of its moral/legal dimension. Given Habermas's model, suCh 
a situation 'would still satisfy the requirements of practical reason. This is another reason 
for thinking thatpractical and therapeutic reason are not only divided, but potentially in 
6onflict. 
The relationship between practical and therapeutic reason, and correspondingly the status 
of clinical intuitions, thus calls for reconsideration. In' fact, Habermas has repeatedlY 
acknowledged the difficulties which the notion of clinical intuitions brings. Wýen'asked 
about the appropriateness of a standard of sickness and health for critique, Habemas replies 
revealingly that for intuitions concerning the value of a form of life as a whole'; 
we apply yardsticks which are valid in the first instance in the context of our 
culture or plausible in the context of our tradition... So far I have no idea of 
how the universal core of those merely clinical intuitions - if indeed they 
have one at all - can be theoretically grasped. " 
The point is descisive; if there is one unresolvable problem which threatens Habermas's 
project for critique with exhaustion, this is probably it. The problem arises from the 
following theoretical commitments. First, Habermas is committed to the view that 
normative universality is only graspable from a position of impartiality. Second, he claims 
that impartiality requires a transcendence of the culture in the context of which validity is 
provided in the first instance. He thus needs to show how the universal core. of clinical 
intuitions can be theoretically grasped independent of particular cultural 'yardsticks'. But 
this is an impossible task, since clinical intuitions can never have application outside of 
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particular cultural contexts. Habermas seeks a criterion of sickness of health which is 
universal in virtue of its impartiality between cultures, in the same way as the criterion of 
justice is. - But sickness and health (in the present context), Habermas also claims, are 
inseparable from need-interpretation, and not reducible to medical or biological invariables. 
That Habermas requires a yardstick which has a universal core in virtue of being culture 
neutral betrays his commitment to an acultural theory,, yet the conceptual -resources of his 
acultural theory are unable to yield just what needs to be theoretically grasped. 
In order to be theoretically graspable, the claim to universality of clinical intuitions would 
need to be conceptualized non-criterially; their validity would have to be construed in a way 
which is bound to particular cultural contents, but not merely in thefirst instance. - As we 
have seen, in -his most recent writings Habermas turns to the appropriative understanding 
of hermeneutically generated self-clarification for a model for how changes in clinical 
intuitions are rationally justifiable., Insofar as they are rationally justfiable, they have some 
claim to universality. But there is really little new in this position, as a reminder of 
Habermas's model of self-critique implicit in his reading of Freud, relieved of the ýurden 
of representationalist assumptions exposed by Bernstein's anti-naturalistic objections, might 
serve to make clear. 
As we saw in chapter three, the central themes of that reading were: that a psychoanalysis 
takes the form of an emancipatory narrative; that the'undertaking of the narrative involves 
taking moral responsibility for the sickness; and that the emancipatory movement (the cure) 
follows the dynamic of the Hegelian causality of ý fate. As we saw, the task of analysis is 
to reconstruct a disturbed self-formative process. The meaning of symptoms, in the here 
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and now, is incomprehensible to the subject. 'They must be rendered intelligible by a 
depth-hermeneutics, an interpretation which reflects back upon the original scene of 
disturbance. But since this interpretative reconstruction covers a necessarily temporal 
process of self-formation, it must have a narrative form. Only in this way can the meaning 
of repressed past events be recovered as'interruptions in the self-f6rmative process. But in 
therapY, the self-narration in virtue of which'the self-formative process is understood, ' 
changes the narrating self. But what is it for this change to take place in the therapy? 'It 
involves the adoption of a new framework of self-understanding', one within which different 
affectively charged attitudes can be taken towards oneself. ' But this is only possible if the 
analysand has a will to change herself - what Habermas calls a -passion for critique. 
Thereby moral responsibility is acknowledged for the feelings and actions which are the 
source of her misery. But to adopt moral responsibility here is to recognize oneself for who 
one really- is, as revealed retrospectively in the act of self-narration. Who the self is is 
internally related to this moral responsibility, and so to the passion for critique. It is 
something which must interpret and is capable of reinterpreting its needs, according to 
narratives which can retrospectively distinguish between a more or less fulfilled life. ' To 
act'on the former,, to continue an'interrupted self-formative process, is to continue a life 
which could retrospectively be seen as better as a whole. And this is just what it means to 
take moral responsibility for the self-formative life process. "I 
The passion for critique, then, requires a framework within which diS'Cei-nments can be 
made about the worth of competing self-formations or life-narratives. 'Only with 
conceptions of the good internalized into identity are such-discernments possible, 'in that 
they provide the motivating power for resolving crises of identity. Therapeutic success 
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returns this power by enabling self-repossession through a framework of self-understanding. 
But there is no presupposition of an ideal (in the Kandan sense) self to, be aimed at. 
'Clinical' judgements of what counts, as a distortion, in this case, are only available 
retrospectively within an interpretive framework through which the subject narrates itself. 
It is not available to the,, logic of development, which the idea of a pure communicative 
mediation of subjects represents. - Not only does therapeutic critique not need it to be 
possible to transcend such frameworks to a virtual totality of communicative action, but 
successful therapy is inconsistent with the transcendence which is required of the critic of 
systematically, distorted communication. Since the success of therapeutic critique is 
presupposed by Habermas's project of critical self-reassurance, the latter is inconsistent on 
its own terms. '' I. I- I 
During the same interview in which Habermas acknowledged the ungraspable rational core 
of therapeutic discourse, he makes what is tantamount to a resigned acceptance of the 
irresistible conclusion that clinical intuitions are theoretically acceptable only as 
premonitions of the good life. In reply to objections that the psychoanalytical. model of 
critique presumes a privileged epistemic and evaluative standard on the part of the theorist, 
Habermas states that the emancipatory psychoanalytical naffative does not define how the 
life of the individual must continue, only that it return the subject to the dignity of homo 
saniens . 70 -, But of course, what is meant by human dignity is empty outside of an evaluative 9- 
framework which articulates conceptions of what makes for a good human life. Habermas's 
theory of crisis and his conception of critique carry force given a modem evaluative 
framework. Taken together, the preceding arguments thus suggest that the critique of forms 
of life as a whole is misconstrued as therapeutic discourse for the same reason that practical 
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discourse is misconstrued as a procedure. These misconstruals, I have proposed, can be 
corrected only upon recognition of the irreducibly substantive nature of practical rationality. 
Once, recognized,. the excessively immodest burden carried by clinical intuitions, and the 
excessively ý modest burden carried by procedural practical rationality, can be. relieved. 
Critique oversteps itself when set against a standard of sickness and health, it cuts itself 
short when set against the standard of procedural unity: the standard of intact 
intersubjectivity is either too strong or too weak., 
(5.5) Conclusion 
Habermas, acknowledges that the rational reconstruction of the moral point of view along 
Kantian lines is not without unhappy consequence. By separating the right from the good, 
and by construing the former as the basic moral phenomenon, it abstracts the agent from 
the requisite motivations to act morally. By privileging the moral competence which 
manifests itself at the level of the justification of maxims of action by reference, to a 
principle of universalizability,, it abstracts the agent from the particular lived situations in 
which norms are applied ý and. competence tested. And by according priority to general 
principles of morality over particular contexts of ethical life, it lends itself to atomistic and 
contractarian conceptions of the person and society.,,. But he insists that there can be no 
simple cancelling out of the dilemma between form and content. "The neo-Aristotelian way 
out of this dilemma", he writes, -, - 
is to argue that practical reason should foreswear its universalistic intent in 
favour of a more contextual faculty of judgement. Since judgement always 
moves within the ambit of a more or less accepted form of life, it finds 
support in an evaluative context that engenders continuity among questions 
of motivation, empirical issues, evaluative issues, and normative issues. 71 
182 
Against this, discourse ethics refuses to go back prior to Kandan thought, insisting that the 
idea of impartial application is preferable to the idea of prudential judgement as a 
conception of practical reasoning. Habermas gives a two-fold reason for its preferability. 
First, the neo-Aristotelian approach is said to be encumbered with "metaphysical premises" 
incompatible with the evolution of the learning process thought to characterize the transition 
to modernity. 1 Second, once this metaphysical basis for critique is renounced, Habermas 
supposes that neo-Aristotelianism. assumes a relativistic and thereby essentially conservative 
character; it seems,, to offerý no rationally forceful protection against prejudice and 
parochialism. " 
The metaphysical premise of the neo-Aristotelian approach, it seems, lies in its presumption 
of continuity between motivational, empirical, and normative issues. For the 
neo-Aristotelian, how the objective world is (an empirical, quasi-motivational issue) sets the 
standard for how to act (a normative, quasi-motivational issue), and this provides the basis 
of the objectivity of a moral order. As a neo-Kantian, Habermas insists that an objective 
moral order can be grounded only on the basis of universalizable norms of action 
discontinuous with 'empirical issues', since the empirical issue of how the objective world 
is can offer no reason for moral action. Only the latter position is, consistent with the 
evolution of learning processes in modernity; the learnt capacity to differentiate and 
thematize truth-, right-, and authenticity-aspects of validity claims. But recall now the 
status of clinical intuitions. The coherence of Habermas's concept of clinical intuitions, I 
argued, depends upon them being construed firstly as premonitions of the good life, and 
secondly as truth-evaluable in their action-orienting aspect. 74 , But this is just the 
I 
'metaphysical premise' of the neo-Aristotelian. So far as therapeutic reason goes, then, 
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Habermas is already one step down the neo-Aristotelian path, since the presuppositions of 
therapeutic reason are no less metaphysical than those proposed by the neo-Aristotelian, thus 
far defined. 
This conclusion is coffoborated by an objection Habermas puts to Bernard Williams, whom 
he places in the-neo-Aristotelian camp. "How truthfulness to an existing self or society is 
to be combined with reflection, self-understanding, and criticism", Habermas cites Williams 
as asserting, "has to be answered through reflective living". " He then objects that 
"Williams is compelled to attribute to practical reason a form of rationality which goes 
beyond sheer common sense but whose difference from scientific rationality remains to be 
determined". " But here again, I driven by the need to defend his neo-Kantian rational 
reconitructions, Habermas neglects the third path which he himself has opened up in his 
conception of tfieoi -mediated, autobiographically informed reflective living, which has a ry 
claim to rationality neither reducible to common sense nor to scientific rationality; namely, 
the claim to -therapeutic 'rationality of justified clinical intuitions. 
If Habermas already has one foot on the 'neo-Aristotelian' path, - perhaps the reason he does 
not take it lies in the second of his objections; that neo-Aristotelianism displays* a bias 
towards conservatism, and thus provides an -inappropriate, philosophical basis for critical 
reflection. "In modem societies", he writes, 
we encounter a pluralism of individual life-styles and collective forms of life 
and a corresponding multiplicity of ideas of the good life. As a consequence 
we must give up one of two things: the claim of classical philosophy to be 
able to place competing ways of life in a hierarchy and establish at its acme 
one privileged way of life over against all others; or the modem principle' of' 
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tolerance according to which one view of life is as good as any other, or at 
least has equal right to exist and be recognized. ' 
s 
And he continues; 
if we wish to remain faithful to the Aristotelian conviction that moral 
judgement is bound to the ethos of a particular place, we must be prepared 
to renounce the emancipatory potential of moral universalism and deny so 
much as the, possibility of subjecting the violence inherent in social 
conditions characterized by latent exploitation and repression to an unstinting 
moral critique. For only the posttraditional level of moral judgement 
liberates us from the structural constraints of familiar discourses and 
established practices. " 
Certainly, if the neo-Aristotelian position entails that competing ways of life be dogmatically 
placed in a hierarchy with one particular way of life unassailably imposed at its highest 
point, if it -really does rule out the very possibility an unstinting moral critique of latent 
exploitation -and repression, it is unfit as a philosophical basis for critical reflection. But 
the alternatives -presented in these passages do not exhaust the possibilities for critical 
reflection, even on Habermas's own terms. In the previous section, we saw how Habermas 
appeals to clinical intuitions in order to return the subject to the 'dignity' of homo sapiens, 
a claim which implies the privileging of at least one way of life over others precisely insofar 
as they compete with each other. Furthermore, the critique of "the violence inherent in 
social conditions characterized by latent exploitation and repression", is not 'moral' strictly 
spealdng, but depth hermeneutic. And the conditions of acceptability of such critique, as 
well as the emancipation it issues, we have seen, are those suitable to clinical intuitions. 
Once again, in order to defend his neo-Kantianism, Habermas ushers from view the very 
theoretical resources which he otherwise makes available for critical reflection. Bewitched 
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by' thie' idea o, f 'critique as requiring an id I eal standard, practical reasoning can be 
misconstrued by Habermas as a procedure which can be rationally reconstructed. If 
Habermas were to dispense with this idea, ways of life might be amenable to rational 
comparison, ' not in terms of an evolutionary scale of problem-solving, but through 
competing narrative discourses of 'world-disclosure' concerning the constitution of 
worthwhile ways of life. This would mean that criticism of an alienated or damaged form 
of life -as whole - the Idnd of 
. criticism germane to the problem of modernity's critical 
self-reassurance - could claim to be both practical and rational. 
Taylor attempts'to place this kind of moral critique, which he takes to be suitable to the 
fundamental moral predicaments of modernity, on a philosophically sound basis. Habermas 
acknowledges that Taylor, though a neo-Aristotelian, seeks to open up a space for critique 
which buffers his position from the charge of conservatism. But while not ruling out the 
possibility of unstinting moral critique, Taylor's "universalistic ethics of the good that 
appeals to supreme goods transcending all particular forms of life", Habermas asserts, "are 
grounded incosmologi6al and religious worldviews that are even more difficult to reconcile 
with postmetaphysical. thought than the teleological worldview of Aristotle". 79 In the next 
three chapters, it should become clear that Habermas's criticism betrays quite a radical 
mis , unilerstandifig of Taylor's position. 
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CHAPTER SIX: TAYDDR'S CONCEPTION OF CRISIS 
(6.0) Introduction 
Habermas's model of critical analysis is supposed to be applicable wherever societies must 
reproduce themselves through linguistic interaction. Since this requirement holds for all 
societies, w atever the substantive content of the norms which bind them together, 
Habermas's theory is in a certain sense culturally non-specific. Societies are rational to the 
degree that the norms which bind them together are accountable to the constraints imposed 
by the procedure of communicative action, which is the degree to which these norms 
transcend their culture-specificity, or are universalizable. The rationality of cultures can 
be assessed in terms, of the degree to which they approach, being structured, by, 
communicative action. But the normative constraints imposed by the structure itself are not 
specific to any particular culture. The precise nature of the acultural standpoint of 
Habermas's theory of modernity roughly sketched in (1.1) should now be evident., While 
Taylor correctly identifies Habermas's insistence on the 'immanent logic' of the modem 
differentiation of the three 'validity spheres' as a manifestation of the acultural. leanings of 
his, theory, it is Habermas's focus on the general capacity for linguistically mediated 
interaction which makes it acultural at an even more fundamental level. However, we are 
also now in position to modify our initial characterization. For as I argued in the latter 
sections of the previous chapter, the role which a concept of crisis plays in Habermas's 
conceptipp of critique renders it less acultural than my preliminary oudine made it seem. 
Not only is there a tension between Habermas's (acultural) rational reconstructions and his 
(cultural) model of narratively carried out self-critique, but, I have argued, the latter must 
enjoy priority insofar as his theory addresses the question of modernity's self-reasýurance. 
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But I have not yet considered how the question of modemity's self-reassurance can be 
reformulated, nor have I assessed the prospects for successfully tackling it, once a more 
thoroughgoin'g cultural-theoretic approach to modernity of the kind proposed by Taylor is 
adopted. 'This is the task I shall'undertake in this and the following chapter. 
In this chapter, I will (6.1) offer a clarification of what a cultural theory of modemitY, 'of 
the Idnd advocated by Taylor, is supposed to be about. Here I will outline the core 
concepts around which Taylor's proposed theory of modernity is to be organized. I will 
then be in a position to reformulate the problem of self-reassurance, by means of the 
conceptual resources available to such a theory. The keys to this resource are the internally 
related concepts of 'identity' and 'the good', which Taylor bridges by way of a distinctive 
concept of 'strong evaluations'. ' My aim here is to provide enough of an exposition of these 
basic categories to give us a handle on how the problem of self-reassurance raises itself 
when thought through them. 'I then turn (6.2) to how Taylor does indeed raise it. ' 
Although, as I mentioned in (1.1), Taylor's official view is that his suggested way of 
formulating the problem of self-reassurance represents only one possible' means of 
addressing -it, my claim will be that this is an excessively modest self-presentation on 
Taylor's behalf. For Taylor argues implicitly that the problem as raised by the cultural 
theory is a question which must be fortnulated, and that a cultural theory as Taylor defines 
one is indispensable for a critical self-understanding of modernity. As I have attempted to 
show is the case for the grounding of Habermas's theoretical approach, this is a claim which 
appeals to a particular conception of crisis. I look at this conception, and interpret the 
nature of the claims associated with it, in (6.3). After raising some initial objections to this 
claim - that human agency is necessarily articulable by a framework of strong evaluations 
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(oi ihe'ldnd -of *contrasts, which cultural theories investigate), that doing without strong 
evaluations is impossible for human'beings -I turn in (6.4) to'objections which6an be 
reconstructed in the light of an alternative perspective on the self. Specifically, I do this 
by"considering how well , Taylor . 's view stands up to the challenge of a rival 'praima . tist' 
conception' of the self - one that allegedly does do away with strong evaluations - put 
forward by Richard Rorty. I then raise some problems which, even if Taylor's thesis 
concerning the inescapability of strong evaluations were sound, still face his cultural theory. 
I conclude the chapter (6.5) by drawing some parallelsbetween this and Habermas's theory, 
for the sake of contextualizing the need for Taylor to overcome the aforementioned 
t 
problems. 
(6.1)'Persons, Strong Evaluations, and the Good 
In characterizing 'cultural' theories of modernity by way of their contrastive focUs'on 
modem conceptions of personhood and the good, Taylor is trading on whit he claims are 
internally related concepts ýf 'the person" , 'the self', 'identity', and 'the 
.g- bod'. 1 In - this and 
the following two sections, I shall offer a largely expository account of what I take to be 
the core'of these claims. I will be particularly concerned with clarifying the sense in which 
an unseverable connection between human identity and the good is urged by Taylor, and 
how this sense can be elucidated from the kind of argument which supports it. To show 
ed ap ac t to that the concept of a person is in a sense unintelligible independent of the liv c' iy 
draw stro-ni, qualitative distinctions, and that these distinctions form a framework 'which 
must Orient human agents towards the good, is the burden of his phenomenological account 
of identity cnises. " ' But that account is supported by a cluster of concepts - like 
'personhood', 'strong evaluation', and 'the good' - which organize his favoured 'cultural' 
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theory of modernity, and through which its need for self-reassurance can best be articulated. 
I first want to look at what Taylor thinks we mean by these concepts, and then to how the 
problem of self-reassurance can be formulated in their terms, before turning to his 
phenomenological argument for showing that we must articulate our understanding of them 
in that way. 
If there is a single core idea around which Taylor's theory is organized, itl is that the 
concept of a person is essentially that of a being for whom things matter. ' The distinctive 
themes of Taylor's proposed cultural theory of modernity can, I think, be traced back to this 
basic insight. First, if it is true that a person is a being for whom things matter, it follows 
that things necessarily matter to a person the more or less. Something always matters to 
me rather than something else, and if I could not discriminate between the two, if I could 
not contrast one against the other, I would have no concept of things mattering to me at all. 
Put another way, if everything mattered the same, if anything mattered, nothing would. ' 
What matters makes a difference. " Take, for instance, it mattering to me that I keep faith 
to a principle, or to a person, or to class of persons. It mattering to me is intelligible 
against a background of contrast; what a life would be like which betrayed the principle, 
the person, or the class of persons, in failing to keep faith. Keeping faith matters on the 
understanding I have of what it contrasts with - in this case betrayal, or alternatively not 
caring less either way. Or take it mattering to me that I be a person of generous spirit. 
Again this presupposes that I understand what it is to be mean-spirited, and that I care one 
way or the other about which of the contrasts are true of me. The degree to which I care 
will of course depend on the particular object of it, and there may be more than one 
contrastive term through which I understand that it matters to me. To take the latter point 
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fir I st, it might matter to me that I have an open rather than a closed mind, but the contrast 
to 'open-minded' may also be made by reference to such terms as 'committed', 'resolute', 
or 'critical'. And of course I might change my mind about what matters in the light of 
these altertiative contrasts. But this does not detract from the point that grasping the 
concept of a person involves a grasp on the concept of mattering as articulated by some set 
of contrastive alternatives. 'Toturn to the former point, it might matter to me'thii I 
resolutely keep faith with a principle more than keeping an open my mind to the ambiguities 
or rigidities *o'f principles in general, even though both resoluteness and open-mindedness 
matter to me. And I might change my mind on this too. It is crucial to Taylor's position 
that *these changes of 'mind can stake a claim to rationality, the nature of which will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
The concept of a person to which a cultural theory has recource, then, is that of a being for 
5 
whom things matter, a being which cares about things. What matters to me is by definition 
not something I 'couldn't care less' about, I cannot be indifferent to it. But'once we accept 
that' things 'matter the more or less, Taylor wants to urge, we are committed to 
acknowledginýj that there will be things which matter most. What fundamentally matters 
is signified, so to speak, by 'bottom-line' oppositions between the worthwhile and the 
wor'thleis, the significant and the trivial, the fulfilling and the empty, which define what" 
Taylor calls the 'incomparably higher. The worthwhile, the significant, the fulfilling, 
r 'es'll eally matters; the worthless, the trivial, the empty, either doesn't or only appears to do so. 
And a"pýerson's'being matters to the degree that it is actually or potentially worthwhile, 
significant, or fulfilling. As Taylor conceives it, a person is a being whose agency makes 
sense in virtue of such distinctions. But it is now also clear that distinctions of this kind 
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are also evaluations, and that what matters to human beings is that their lives be oriented 
to the good. At the most general or fundaental level, what makes the life of a person or 
group of persons worthwhile, significant, and fulfilling, is that which defines the good life 
for that individual or group. 
Taylor identifies three different strata to the good life which correspond to three analytically 
cp, n 
separable axioms of moral intuition: that a course of life can either be endowed with or be 
lacIdng of meaning; that it can either succeed or fail to live up to ideals such as dignity; and 
that a form of life can either respect or flout rights to freedom, self-determination, a 
homeland, bodily integrity, basic material well-being, and the like. " In each case, so Taylor 
contends, the good must be defined contrastively, and definitions of goods taken together 
make up a 'framework' which furnishes a person with an orientation for acting for the best, 
or living, to the - full. For -Taylor then, a person as a being for whom things matter is a 
being which exists against a 'background picture' or 'framework' of qualitative evaluative 
contrasts. Human agency requires a 'horizon' which discriminates between ways oflife or 
modes of being which matter the more or less, which are of greater or lesser significance 
for human being. 
The force of this last claim turns on the kind of evaluation which Taylor thinks is at stake 
in making such qualitative contrasts. Taylor makes a distinction between two, different 
kinds of evaluation, which he calls 'strong' and 'weak'. At issue in a weak evaluation is 
the weighing up of defacto preferences. For instance, faced with a decision to haye coffee 
or tea, I weigh up which I fancy most, and go for coffee. There is a sense in. which it 
matters to me that I have coffee rather than the tea, because I just happen to desire it, and 
192 
would rather have that desire satisfied than another I might happen to have. By contrast to 
a weak evaluation, for which it is sufficient that something (in this case the coffee) be de 
facto desired, a strong evaluation involves qualitative distinctions concerning the worth of 
the motivation. Strong evaluations invoke normative judgements concerning the relative 
worth of alternative desires. These stand independently of one's de facto desires, and offer 
standards by which their value can be judged. To keep with our example, there are 
circumstances where I might strongly evaluate between drinking coffee or tea, and this 
would change the sense in which it mattered to me which I were to have. For example. I 
might crave for the taste of the coffee but strongly evaluate in favour of tea because the 
coffee has been produced exploitatively. In this case, I might think that choosing the coffee 
would make me a worse person; a thought which couldn't occur to me if I were merely 
weakly evaluating in favour of the coffee. Or I may hate the taste of coffee but go for it 
because it is an export of an ideologically sound or economically needy country. The point 
here is that in both cases it is my stand which matters, not my de. facto preference for 
coffee or tea. And insofar as I evaluate by appeal to a standard which is not contingent 
upon my de facto desires, I evaluate strongly. In Taylor's terms, this stand would be part 
of my identity. For this reason, only strong evaluations are relevant for what is distinctive 
about human agency, as Taylor is portraying it. ' 
In the example just given, I might well be motivated to take my stand through perception 
of the good of benevolence - through an understanding of benevolence as part of the good 
life. 
I 
Benevolence is thus an example of what Taylor calls 'life goods'. But amongst. these 
life goods, ý there will be some which matter more than others. In other words,, besides 
distinguishing between strong and weak evaluations, we also need to discriminate between 
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the relative strength with which different strong evaluations are individually held or 
institutionally embodied. Those goods which correspond to the top of the hierarchy of 
strong evaluations Taylor calls 'hypergoods'. Hypergoods are "goods which not only are 
incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must 
be weighed, judged and decided about". ' They are 'higher-order' goods, in an analogous 
sense I to which goods are objects of 'second-order' desires or (strong) evaluations. ' To say 
that hypergoods are 'incomparably' mor -e important than other'goods is also to say that any 
one is 'incommensurable' with any other - that they cannot be measured against each other - 
since the measUre of what is important is itself defined by the specific hypergood. 
, 
Hypergoods therefore stand as rivals for the moral allegiance of persons and societies. 
But in order for allegiance to hypergoods to be possible, Taylor thinks, we must suppose 
there to be some reality which stands behind or constitutes -them as good. In distinction to 
life goods then, there are -also what Taylor calls 'constitutive goods'. For a hypergood to 
be'the'object of allegiance there must be something constitutive of it which''motivates that 
allegiance. Taylor defines a constitutive good as "a something the love of which'empoweis 
us to do and be good". 10 It is that by reference and appeal to which one is inspired towards 
that which has a call on me. Because constitutive goods have this empowering quality, they 
function as what'Taylor calls 'moral sources'. A moral source is "something the 
contemplation, respect, or love of which enables us to get closer to what is good". " Taylor 
mentions God, . Plato's Form of the Good, and the power of rational agency articulated by 
Kant, as examples of such sources. " It is contemplation of the Form, love of God, or 
respect for the rational agent which puts the person in contact with what is most important, 
worthwhile, ormost incumbent u. pon persons. And such contemplation, love, or respect, 
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is - the, manner in which the awe and, allegiance which is proper to the constitutive good 
manifests itself. But there is another, even more fundamental way, in which this reality is 
disclosed. 
For something to matter for a person is for it to be invested with significance, and the 
investment of significance is something which is disclosed by language. A person, as a 
being for whom things matter, understands the significance of things by interpreting them 
through'language. Since the particular identity of a person consists ý in what particularly 
matters for that person, and since what matters or is of significance to a person is disclosed 
by interpretation through language, persons must be considered as self-interpreting beings. " 
The, articulation of more or less significance is what, on Taylor's account, 
self-interpretations do. So for a person to have an identity is to relate to an interpreted 
world -which matters the more or less. Although it is perhaps more usual to mean by 
'identity' a set of physical properties which uniquely individuates -an object (rather than a 
source'of interpretation), since the peculiarity of being a person involves interpreting who 
one is, we can usefully talk of different ways of being a person according -to different 
conceptions of 'what it is to be human' available for self-interpretation. To get clear on 
these conceptions is to articulate and find one's place within the 'background picture' or 
'frameworks' within which one finds one's identity. And insofar as historical variations can 
be discerned in the organizing concepts or frameworks of self-interpretation, we can make 
such very general distinctions as between 'modem' and other identities. 
Given that a person is partly constituted by a language of self-interpretations, it is short step 
to the thought that "One is a self only among other selves". 14 What matters to a person, 
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since it is articulated in language, is not just an expression of my being, but of my identity 
as necessarily a participant in a collective practice which is expressed and supported by that 
language. The object of significance, disclosed by language, is meaningful (at least in the 
first instance) for the 'us' of a language community. One is a self only among other selves 
because selfhood only emerges in the medium of 'webs of interlocution'. 11 A person can 
come to self-understanding and self-definition only in relation to other interlocutors, not 
only because the resources for his or her self-interpretations are publicly shared meanings, 
but also because I come to grasp these meanings through relating or interacting with others. 
The need for this interaction in coming to grasp meanings Taylor calls our 'defining 
situation' or 'transcendental condition'. " But this condition can. become problematic. 
When it does, there issues the need for self-reassurance. 
(6.2) The Problem of Self-Reassurance Reformulated 
The problem of modernity's self-reassurance, seen in the light of the conceptual resources 
available to a cultural theory, refers to the sustainability of a historically and culturally 
specific identity. The modem identity includes those conceptions of the good life and 
notions of what it is to be human which are dominant in modem societies, and which are 
expressed and carried in their characteristic languages and institutions. The problem of 
modernity's self-reassurance issues from the 'fateful tendency' of the modem identity to 
undermine itself. Taylor, puts the problem like this; 
We live in a society whose practices embody a certain notion of identity, and 
the human good. This must be ours or we cannot give this society our 
allegiance; we are alienated from it. At the same time, we rely to a great 
extent on these practices to maintain this sense of identity. If these practices 
which supposedly embody the modem identity can be shown to lead in fact 
to some such failure to achieve it ... perhaps our faith in the conception of the 
modem identity is shaken as well. We turn to other models. 17 
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This is Taylor's model for understanding the legitimation crises to which modem societies 
are disposed. ý His *supposition is that legitimation' crises arise when social and political 
institutions fail to embody the frameworks of strong evaluation which legitimate them. T'he 
allegiance of the participants in the modem identity can be lost either because they find they 
can no longer take their stand within the dominant framework of qualitative contrasts, or 
because the institutions which lay claim to carrying this identity fail to do so. They either 
cannot orient themselves within the moral space'defined by the modem horizon of strong 
evaluation, or else they detect such a radical gap between these evaluations and the practices 
which'are supposed to express them that the framework itself loses its hold. Of course on 
Taylor's account, the identity of a practice just means the framework of goods it 
presupposes and reproduces. And as this suggests, Taylor portrays the 'fateful tendency' 
of the modem identity as arising in large measure from a conflict between the hypergoods 
of modernity. It is as partisans of conflicting hypergoods that, according to Taylor's 
theoretical approach, the exponents of 'Enlightenment' against 'Romanficism'and vice versa 
should be understood. - This is bne major source of the problem of self-reassurancet since 
we all, to some extent, live under the pull of these two great "frontiers" of the modem 
identity. 
Although I will not consider either stand' in any detail, I still hope to be able to show in 
summary what, as approached by Taylor's cultural' theory, is at stake in this conflict. But 
this conflict, which issues in the critique of instrumentalism, is not the only -source of 
tension for themodern identity. The 'disengaged' stance, which Taylor claims is espoused 
by defenders of 'Radical' Enlightenment', - although central to the modem identity, 
simultaneously undermines it in other ways. Most crucially, under the guise of the 
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hypergoods of benevolence, ordinary life, and an ethic of cognition, it disavows the 
constitutive goods on which the hypergoods depend. Moral sources are thus lost from its 
purview; constitutive goods are dismissed as illusion. But since moral sources are required 
for motivating persons towards hypergoods, the modem identity, insofar as it is forged 
around an ideal of disengagement, tends to. frustrate its own articulation. ý And this gives 
the edge to Taylor's own conception of philosophical critique as a contribution towards a 
cultural theory of modernity; to articulate in a language of perspicuous contrast the sources 
of our and other identities. But this is a hasty anticipation of how such aý theory might 
answer the problem of self-reassurance. Let us first look, a bit more closely at how the 
theory asks it. 
According to Taylor, the modem identity has in large part been, forged around two 
competing hypergoods, which he identifies as rational disengagement and expressive unity 
with nature. , Taylor describes how for the pre-modem the source of significance 
for human 
life lies in the cosmological order. To find meaning in life, to articulate his or her ideals, - 
and to locate the source of his or her obligations, the pre-modem looks outwards to the 
order of things in which he or she finds his Or her place. Taylor takes Platonism as a 
paradigm articulation of this kind of identity. - One makes contact with the good, - the true, 
the worthwhile, and the just, -by turning one's gaze to the order of the cosmos; the (real) 
world of Forms., By contrast, the horizon of identity for the modem lies 'within'. But this 
turn inward for the'purpose of locating moral sources, through which the modem finds his 
or her 'self', can be made in two quite different and incompatible ways, which correspond 
to the two chief rivals amongst modem hypergoods. 
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On the one hand, I can disengage myself from the thoughts, feelings, and desires which 
happen to constitute me as a natural being. Although this is a point on which Taylor is not 
always consistent, it is not the substance of these inner phenomena which defines my 'self' 
as a modem, but how I find a normative orientation in relation to them. " Talcing a 
disengaged stance is one such way. In adopting a stance of disengagement, I exercise a 
capacity the strong evaluation of which is a distinctive facet of the modem identity. That 
is, it is my ability to stand back from my thoughts and purposes, to resist being fooled by 
the'force of habit and tradition, and to reshape them in a rational order according to some 
neutral methodical procedure, which confirms my dignity as a human being; It is that in 
virtue of which I am the fit object of attitudes of admiration rather than contempt. I merit 
admiration because of my adherence to the ideal of `self-responsible reason' - to 
courageously affirm my responsibility to my own individually, - rationally -thought-out 
convictions, and freedom of belief in the face of, whatever authority. " *The self-mastery 
which my'disengaged, self-disciplined stance makes possible is directed', towards my 
tendency towards prejudice and illusion. This also allows me to endow what is outside me 
(the so-called 'external world') with significance by mastering it., The external world has 
already lost its intrinsic significance through the modem turn inwards (strictly spealdng, it 
only comes into being - as an external world with this turn), but it reappears now, as of 
instnmntal value to the disengaged human subject. Disengagement means the adoption 
of an instrumental stance towards inner and outer nature by means of which it can be of 
controlled with maximum efficiency. The characteristically human, the source of human 
excellence, is in this respect "the capacity to dominate, and not be dominated by things". 20 
Taylor portrays the dominant practices of modernity's technological civil zation ý as 
embodiments of this strong evaluation. 21 ý: I-Iý ýý - 
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On the other hand, and in reaction to the disengaged stance, there are modems who identify 
with those inner feelings and impulses which are unsullied by the distortions and mutilations 
of self-control and the objectification of self which disengaged control requires. According 
to this framework, what is admirable about human existence is the capacity for spontaneity, 
playfulness, and self-exploration, rather than for calculated and efficient instrumental 
thought and action. Genuine human dignity is thought to lie in an openness to the voice of 
nature within. To be heedless to this voice, to be insensitive to it, is to be deaf to what 
really matters in life. And to act on motivations which fail to attune with this inner nature 
is to merit an attitude of either indifference if this is of no consequence, 'or of contempt if 
it results in the manipulation of the inner nature of others or the destruction of the natural 
environment. Either way, on this horizon disengagement represents self-mutilation rather 
than self-fulfilment. According to this facet of the modem identity, the turn inward is of 
no good if disengaged --for nature as it calls us within is not accessible to a rational, 
objectifying gaze. Rather, it requires the exercise of a creative imagination, and in its 
exercise human excellence is made manifest. This stance of self-exploration rules out 
disengagement a pilori. The instrumental stance presupposes a knowledge of the object to 
be 'controlled, precisely what the exploratory stance cannot assume. To resist this 
presumption - to be unprepared to dominate things and to create a language which 
articulates an alternative relation to one of domination - is to be best disposed as a human 
agent. Again, Taylor portrays much of the protest against technological civilization as ý an 
expression of these strong evaluations. ' 
What needs to be emphasized here is that both the Enlightenment horizon of disengagement 
and the Romantic horizon of self-expression are portrayed as internal to the modem 1 entity 
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by Taylor. ý Both share a sense of the self as 'inner', and they rely on each other for the 
sense in which their conception of the self is" to be judged as superior. This last claim is 
crucial, for Taylor insists on avoiding the kind of manichean oppositions which have 
bedevilled both cultural and acultural theories. ' It is not that disengagement and its 
spin-offs are wholly bad and inner exploration in attunement with nature wholly good (as 
some 'Romantic' critics of modernity claim), nor vice versa (as some 'Enlightenment' 
partisans of modernity claim). Modernity's need for self-reassurance arises from the 
inescapability of both horizons. Likewise, the problem of self-reassurance must be dealt 
with in a way which acknowledges the 'all-pervasiveness' of the modem identity. The 
problem would be formulated less misleadingly if it were recognized that though a particular 
hypergood cannot be exclusively pursued without sacrificing others, this does not invalidate 
that pursued good. In the case of disengagement and attunement, sacrifice is indeed 
inevitable, but this in itself does not invalidate the good of either. 
So far I have been discussing the need for self-reassurance arising from rival conceptions 
of human dignity, but the point just made about the disastrous consequences of hypergoods 
also applies to the dimension of moral life which focuses on rights, dudes - obligations, and 9 
benevolence. Besides its inward orientation to the good, Taylor claims that "the affirmation 
of everyday life", is central to the modem identity. By this is meant that ordinary life - the 
life of production and the family - is affirmed by modems as of intrinsic and often 
overriding importance. The realm of ordinary life is not merely the necessary backdrop to 
what is really important, ý for instance being a virtuous citizen or the contemplation of God. 
It is affirmed or strongly valued for its own sake. For Taylor, this hypergood corresponds 
to the importance modems place on the avoidance of suffering, and the recognition we give 
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to persons as worthy of benevolence, as bearers of inalienable rights, and as bound in their 
everyday actions by duties and obligations. But it is also a source of spiritual constraint, 
particularly in the realm of self-exploration. The reasons for this are no doubt complex, 
but suffice it to say that-not only can allegiance to such everyday life-goods engender 
suspicion out those who pursue the life of personal self-creation (or, for that matter, the 
contemplation of God) rather than the life of production and the family, it can also breed 
subtle forms of persecution of them (motivated by what Nietzsche described as 
ressentiment). On the other hand, exclusive dedication to inner exploration, the word of 
God, or the pursuit of perfection in either or any other form, can lead to catastrophic 
consequences in terms of 'life-goods'. This is how Taylor articulates the conflict between 
art and 'morality', now read as a tension between two poles of the modem identity - the 
ethic of affirmative self-expression and of selfless benevolence. Both, Taylor suggests, can 
lead to disaster if uncompromisingly pursued. This much is unquestionable. But it-does 
not follow, he continues, that this undermines the goals of perfection. In my final chapter, 
I will give reasons for thinIcing that this latter proposition is indeed questionable, and for 
reasons which undermine the-value of a cultural theory of modernity as espoused by Taylor 
in general. To anticipate; in order to avoid the errors of procedural accounts of practical 
reason, Taylor focusses on the identity of a person as a product. It therefore gives, undue 
account of the possibility of disturbances in the self-formative process, and therefore of the 
motivational constraints on what is worth pursuing. 
The, affirmation of ý everyday life is a source of tension within the modem identity, for 
another reason. Its very ubiquity makes it seem that ordinary life is simply a given, rather 
than - an affirmation or bearer of strong evaluation. In this sense it encourages the 
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disengaged naturalist view that the whole notion of strong evaluation is a delusion. And 
insofar as the modem identity is informed by the axioms of disengagement, it suffers from 
ano*r source of inner tension; its tendency to frustrate its own articulation as an identity. 
According to the naturalist view, which Taylor convincingly argues exercizes a powerful 
hold on the modem mind, there are no such things as constitutive goods, no 'framework' 
or 'background' picture which refers to them. While Taylor clearly wants to reject this 
view - his whole 'cultural' approach to modernity rests on its falsehood - he observes that 
the experience of being without a framework is a common modem phenomenon which itself 
generates the need for self-reassurance. This it does in the third dimension of the moral 
life; the problem of the meaning of life as a whole. 
It is a peculiar predicament of the modem identity, and hence a distinctive source of its 
need for self-reassurance, that the question of the meaning of an individual life is a problem 
at all. Modems need to lookfor an answer to this question, it is the object of a search (or 
'quest') which might wellfall. The problem is notjust that the modem might not look hard 
enough to find this meaning, but that there just isn't a believable one there to be found. By 
contrast, the problem of leading a full and meaningful life in pre-modem cultures is that of 
IiWng up to the standards defined by the unchallengeable framework. The fear for the 
pre-modem is failing to do this. But for the modem, the fear is of the meaninglessness of 
being without a framework at all. This is a danger which is always potentially there, it 
might happen at any time. When it does, the world loses its "spiritual contour", "nothing 
is worth doing", there is a "terrifying emptiness, a Idnd of vertigo, or even a fracturing of 
our world and body-space". " The modem is dispositionally vulnerable to this Idnd of 
identity crisis, which Taylor suggests is testified by the documented shift in 
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psychopathologies toiýards increasing narcissistic personality disorders centering about 
"ego-loss". 25 
But if to be without a framework has this experiential consequence, then the claim that we 
cannot but lead a human life within one, in some sense of 'cannot but', might seem to be 
vindicated. And this,, indeed, is how Taylor argues. To argue this successfully will bolster 
Taylor's favoured 'cultural' theory of modernity, since if it can be'shown that human agents 
must have conceptions of the good life and have resort to a framework of stro I ng I 
evaluations, any theory which denies or fails to accommodate this point (eg. exclusively 
acultural ones) will at least to this degree be incoherent. ýI now want to turn to'the 
argument by 'which he claims to establish that "doing without ý frameworks is utterly CPI 
impossible for us ... that the horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense 
of them have to include these strong qualitative discriminations ... that living within such 
strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency". " If Taylor can successfully 
establish these claims, he will have gone a long way towards showing that the problem of 
modernity's self-reassurance must be reformulated along the lines we have been considering. 
(6.3) The Transcendental Limit of Human Agency: Identity Crises 
What needs to be noticed about the above claims is that it'is doing without frameworks 
which is alleged to be impossible - that it is IiWng within'horizons of strong evaluation 
which makes for human agency. This is an important point to bear in mind, since'it telli 
us something about the nature of the argument which is supposed to lead to these 
conclusions. According to Martin Lýw-Beer's interpretation, ' Taylor cannot coherently be 
thought to be claiming that the inescapability of frameworks of strong evaluation is either 
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a conceptual or an empirical truth. It is, not a conceptual truth because we can easily 
imagine a person who prescinds from making strong evaluations, or who just "does not give 
a damn about whether some life-forms are higher and others lower". 28 Neither is it an 
empirical truth, because as we just noticed, Taylor recognizes that there are in fact people 
who lack an orientation to the good. The necessity of strong evaluations is neither logical 
nor empirical; the impossibility of doing without frameworks is neither an analytic nor a 
synthetic truth. Rather, Mw-Beer's, interpretation runs, it must be considered as an 
existential impossibility; it would be unbearable to live outside a horizon, of strong 
qualitative distinctions. And to show this, Taylor appeals to the phenomenon of an identity 
crisis - to how the lack of an orientation is lived. While this is indeed part of Taylor's 
argument, I think he wants to make a stronger claim than is admitted in L6w-Beer's 
reconstruction of it. 
Let us first remind ourselves about what Taylor means by an identity. As a person is a 
being for whom things matter, so a particular person's identity is what particularly matters 
for that person - and in both senses of 'particularly'. In the first sense, I am specifically 
this particular person rather than that, according to Taylor's view, because I take this Idnd 
of life to be fulfilling and that kind of life to be empty, or because I interpret this course 
of action as right and that action wrong, or because I find this species of motivation 
admirable but that species contemptible. In the second sense, what I find fulfilling or 
empty, right or wrong, admirable or contemptible, is, no small matter, but is of particular 
orfundwnental significance to me as a person. My particular identity enables me to answer 
the question "who am P". And in answering it, I take "a stand". 29 1 can always be asked 
about what really matters to me, what motivates my actions, what gives them their point, 
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and I can answer by taking a stand in a space which the framework makes available to me. 
These are the frameworks within which one makes sense of questions about what is good, 
worthwhile,. of value. , ''I , 
To'experience radical uncertainty about 'where one stands', to lose this sense of orientation 
within a horizon of strong evaluation, is how Taylor interprets the phenomenon'of an 
'identity crisis'. ' To suffer an identity crisis'is to be incapable of telling why a life should 
be led one way' rather than another; it is to be without any sense of discernment between 
the more or les's worthwhile; 'it is to lose contact with the frameworks within'which some 
life possibilities appear take - on - more significance than others. The 'meaning of such 
. 
30 As a result, in my identity crisis possibilities becomes "unfixed, labile, or undetermined" 
feel a Idnd of vertigo before the question "who am W., I have access to no resource'by 
which to answer it. But this does not make the question go away. The force of the identity 
crisis is just that the question of what is really'of more or less importance, worthwhile, or 
fulfilling demands an answer even if we'are not in a'position to give one. Taylor infers 
from this that frameworks furnish "answers to -questions which inescapably pre-exist for 
us", namely the questions about our identity or the strong evaluationi which define where 
we stand. Only upon'the supposition that the question of our identity arises independently 
of our ability to' answer it, does the -possibility of failing to answer 'it make sense. 
Moreover, this 'failure is experienced both'as a'lack and as an uhbearable' lack. ' - Taylor 
describes the experience as one of an "acute form of disorientation", Ila terrifying 
emptiness", which presupposes the absence of a stand from which to take one's orientation, 
and implicitly a 'fullness' of being or personhood which depends on it. " 
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It follows from this, Taylor thinks, that frameworks are not something we invent on the 
basis of matter of, fact desires or preferences. This conclusion is opposed to the naturalist 
view that strong evaluations are dispensable Ior human beings, that, frameworks; of 
evaluative contrasts are an optional extra for human agency. But it is drawn from two quite 
different arguments which Taylor runs together. First, it follows because the Idnd of life 
of which naturalism offers an account is not the Idnd of life which a human either can lead 
at all, or. can lead without self-mutilation. Naturalism is claimed to be refuted because it 
"defines as normal - or possible a human life which we would find , incomprehensible and 
pathological". 32 Taylor seems, tb. be claiming that a life of permanent identity crisis is 
incomprehensible because we could not recognize, it as a fully human life, and that it is 
pathological because it would be an unbearable life to lead. It thus fails to make sense of 
a human life as we normally live it;, the identity crisis is not comprehensible as a life, only 
as a pathology. This, I take it, is the argument L6w-Beer reads. But there is a second 
argument, according to which it follows because the phenomenon of an identity crisis is G7 
unintelligible on naturalism's own terms. The incoherence of the notion of an identity 
defined by merely de facto preferences follows because the phenomenon of an identity crisis 
presupposes a framework of strong evaluation which is nonnally available. - As Taylor puts 
it; "the condition of there being such a thing as an i4entity crisis is precisely that our 
identities define the space of qualitative distinctions within which we live and choose", 33 
such that these distinctions themselves are not something we can choose on the basis of de 
facto preferences., 
Taylor's phenomenological account of identity crises aims to show that the presence of a 
horizon of strong evaluation is a transcendental condition of human agency. It is a 
207 
transcendental condition because without it the leading of a human life would be 
unintelligible. But our lives are (to a certain extent) intelligible, we do manage to make 
some sense of them. Indeed we must, as self-interpreting animals, be capable of this. The 
transcendental condition is what is presupposed in the making sense of life as it is lived. 
A person in an identity crisis is in crisis as a living person. He or she is a person at the 
limit of personhood. 
Is Taylor's account convincing? I, see two issues, corresponding to the two arguments I 
distinguished, which raise doubts. First, one might object that the phenomenon of an 
identity crisis is not necessarily pathological. Second, one might question whether it must 
be the case that the phenomenon which Taylor describes is only intelligible under the 
presupposition of the lack of a horizon of strong evaluations, as Taylor has defined this 
concept. 
Is the phenomenon of an identity crisis -, as it is described by Taylor - necessarily 
pathological? The main problem here is that Taylor, like Habermas,, conflates the distinct 
phenomena of crisis and pathology. That even Taylor relies on this distinction is clear from 
the contrast between the person who fails to find meaning despite her quest, and the person 
who fails because she doesn't notice she needs one. A crisis can collapse into a pathologyo 
for unlike the latter, the crisis is a state of transition. The prospect of a pemanent identity 
crisis would then be equivalent to a life of permanent transition and self-undermining. Such 
a life may be extremely difficult, or even ultimately unsustainable, but not for this reason 
pathological. That Taylor fails to give due appreciation to this possibility reflects a deep 
ambiguity in his phenomenology of an identity crisis; is it human agency outside the limits 
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of personhood, or is it personhood at its limiff Only on the former interpretation is it the 
account of a pathology. 
A fýrthier objection'might biý put; that a person might find himself bereft Of a horizo4 of 
qualitative contrast, but not'expeilence this , as something "ter'nifying". Taylor assertS"that 
such a person would not just be 'shallow, 'trivial', 'merely 'conventional' or the like, rather 
he would be, as Taylor puts it; "outside our space'of interlocution; he wouldn't have a Stand 
in the space where the rest'of us are. We would see - this as pathological". 3" Clearly, " this 
sense of 'pathological' is different to the sense in which it is attributable to a'person, who 
affirms his or her suffering in the grips of a crisis. Indeed, some might claim that far from 
being pathological, the person in the grips of an identity crisis but who nevertheless 
dyea-says' it is itseif the great challenge of what it- ii to live a' worthwhile life; the 
requirement would be to'tread the tightrope of the crisis without falling I into a pathological 
state. The proper standard of health, 'someone with this view might propose, 'is precisely 
the abandonment of any categories ofmoral oirder which obstruct the spontaneous flow"Of 
de facto desire. According to this view, such natural forces subvert the very purpose of 
stalcing a stand'. If correct, then the propectslOr happiness' or the good life"woUld 
I be 
diminished by thinIcing of the self as essentially spaced in a horizon of strong evaluation. 
This view corresponds to'what in (2.4) 1 called the Nietzschean strategy fdr"recon'ciling' 
cognition and identity by rejecting thý , fibrmativity of order. Taylor recognizes Nietzsche's 
"counter-ideal of the superman and the hypergood of unreserved yea-saying", 35 while 
chastising neo-Nietzscheans who effectively espouse a similar ideal but underhandedly; by 
denying its status "' an ideal, and therefore as a strong evaluation, Taylor claims, they get 
209 
caught -up in a perfomative contradiction. But the 'ideal' espoused here is undertaken 
through the exploration and affimation of precisely limit experiences, ý those which push 
back the bounds of reflective - including hermeneutic - subjectivity. Since these are 
experiences of self-dissolution, the neo-Nietzschean Would retort, they hardly look like good 
candidates for an 'identity' in Taylor's sense. ' The neo-Nietzschean might suggest further 
that Taylor's implicit dismissal of the 'identityless' self as pathological rests unwittingly 
upon a reassertion of the value placed by modems on the affirmation of ordinary life. In 
(8.2), 1 will indeed argue that Taylor wants to have his cake and eat it; that his argument 
for identity as,, a stand in the space of strong eyaluations is incompatible with his 
interpretation of how the 'ideal' of 'non-identity' is articulated in modernist, 'epiphanic' art. - 
Concerning the second issue, -one might want to object against Taylor that our account of 
an identity crisis need not appeal to strong evaluations. It helps Taylor's case against the 
first objection that a crisis, as we saw in (1.2), -is something which is suffered. But then 
what needs accounting for, this next objection runs, is the causal process which explains it 
as a physical phenomenon. Such a physicalist explanation would trace back the cause of 
why I suffer when I am asked the particular, weighty, existential question, "who am I? ". 
But it would also seek to explain why someone else does not suffer when asked this 
question, and also why that person might suffer, even to the point of crisis, when asked 
apparently much more trivial questions. In the next section, I will develop this objection 
by considering a position which combines this naturalist bent of thought with the advocation 
of the kind of self which "yea-says" the undemining of its own identity. 
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(6.4) Pragmatist objections 
Taylor claim's'that for a person to' live outside a framework' of "strong evaluations is 
unintelligibli. To be a person is always to be a more or less of a person, it'is to live'a life 
which can be recognized by the person as satisfying or'* failing by the normative standards 
of the framework which must be supposed to'hold independently of the person's de facto 
desires. This view is proposed in opposition to 'naturalism', which can be defined as the 
doctrine that, rather than being a transcendental condition of human agency, frameworks 
of strong' evaluation are'an optional extra for human beings. Although'Tiylor explicitly 
attacks utilitarian and 'emotivist' conceptions of human agency, " I wint'now to consider as 
an objection to this account an alternative - and I think more challenging-version of 
naturalism-, the pragmatism recently espoused by Richard Rorty. 31 Rorty's position is more 
challenging because while it accepts the hermeneutic 'claim 'that persons exist within 
frameworks of self-interpretation, these self-interpretations are construed not, pace Taylor, 
transcendentally and ontologically, '' but naturalistically and pragmati6fly. Under this 
construal, what Taylor argues is'outside the limits of the human, Rorty offers'ai'in ideal 
character type of a 'postmo&rn' culture. 
As anaturalist, Rorty maintains that there is nothing more to say about the self onceits' de 
facto desires, beliefs, hopes etc., have been -fully accounted for. " There are, however, 
constraints'on what particular desires and beliefs can be ascribed to a'person. Following 
I a cue from Davidson, Rorty holds that to ascribe a particular desire or belief to a person 
is always to ascribe it aspart of an internally coherent and prima facie plausible set'or web 
of desires and beliefs. The particular desires 'and beliefs'which make up, a' person 'are 
intelligible in virtue of fitting with others. But often there ippears to be a Ikk of fit. For 
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a naturalist, this would be the case where the desirability-characterizations which Taylor 
calls strong evaluations stand opposed to one's matter of fact desires. And as I discussed 
in (3.2), it is also the case between 'unconscious' and 'conscious' desires and beliefs. To 
rendq the lack of fit between the unconscious and the conscious self intelligible might 
therefore point the way to a naturalized self which can dispense with,, while account for, 
strong evaluations. This, in effect, is the path followed by Rorty. .ý, ýI 
We know that people are often incoherent in their desires and beliefs, and sometimes 
radically. so. How is this phenomenon intelligible given the supposition that a person is an 
internally coherent cluster or web, of desire and belief, the parts of which are only 
ascribable to a person insofar as they are ascribable to such a coherent whole? Since, Rorty 
supposes, it is an incoherence of agency which is the problem here --that it is a desire or 
belief -of a person which poses the problem of intelligibility .- it. Won't do, to reduce the 
particular incoherence to a person-neutral (eg. neural or endocrinal) mechanism. Rorty's 
move is to posit another self, or what he calls a 'quasi-self'., or Gperson-analogue', as 
constituted by another net of desires and belief of which the prima facie incoherent desire 
or belief is reinterpreted as a coherent part. Again as a naturalist, P-orty, insists that each 
of these quasi-selves "is part of a unified causal network", though this is not the. unity of 
a person. " This causal network, "the machine that each of us is", is the product of the very 
particular and idiosyncratic contingencies of the person's upbringing or natural history. In 
the course of this'history, Rorty argues, we form several internally coherent but mutually 
incompatible nets of desire and belief, only one of which is available to introspection at any 
one time. This much, Rorty proposes, we learn from Freud- But according to Rorty's I 
reading, there is a lesson about moral reflection to be drawn from Freud's conclusion - one 
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which signals a challenge to Taylor's view on the relationship between the self and the 
good. *--, I 
As we have seen, Taylor's concept of identity turns on the idea of qualitative contrasts. His 
thesis is opposed to the naturalist levelling of these contrasts. Now Rorty is also opposed 
to a certain kind of levelling; that which is perpetrated by reductive theories of agency. 
Rorty does not think that the meaning of qualitative contrasts can be reduced to some 
homogeneous operation like ego-utility maximization, 'qualia' association,, evolutionary 
benefit, or the like. For Rorty, this kind of reductive naturalism is rightly criticized by 
Taylor. The levelling proposed by Rorty is of a quite different sort; not the reduction of 
the self to some inarticulate mechanism,, but its decenteting. For Taylor, de facto desires, 
motivations, and actions, await assessment as higher rather than lower, admirable'as 
opposed to base, truly worthwhile against superficial, and one's identity is defined by what 
counts as in the former categories. The stand which one takes in the, light, of these 
characterizations centres the self. From this centre, - judgment can be passed on the 
marginal and the superficial. Now Rorty would claim that his view can accommodate 
generic distinctions of this kind, but rather than hierarchically opposing a true or authentic 
self to a de facto net of desires, he construes the former just as a different self (or network 
of desire and belief). This is not to say that strong evaluations are mere preferences, except 
in the sense in which we can talk of 'mere' persons. Qualitative contrasts or strong 
evaluations should therefore be taken as contrasts between different selves, rather than 
between 'the self', and 'de facto' desire. What Taylor calls the self would then be 
understood not as what stands independently of de facto desire, but rather as another pattern 
or web of desire and belief which stands alongside dispersed sets of desires and beliefs. 
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It only seems, otherwise, Rorty might argue further, because at any moment of reflection 
there is just one 'self open to introspection., Accordingly, what counts as more, or less 
worthwhile will vary between the different nets of desire and belief (or quasi-selves) which 
make up any particular person. And this means that the question, inescapable on Taylor's 
view; '(of what counts as of findamental importance drops out of focus. - -, -, ', 
The question only has a focus, Rorty would argue; where the point of moral reflection is 
to unearth the "essence" of personhood, the "core" self, the "truly" human, the "real" me, 
etc. And this is how Rorty might view the role Taylor's strong evaluations. As answers 
to the question "where do I stand? ", strong evaluations now look disingenuous., For given 
the multiplicity'of quasi-selves which make up the person, 'what "This is where J stand" 
means will, turn on which "I" is asking the question. Further, the question is loaded in 
favour of Taylor's view in virtue of the fact that only a certain kind 'of "I" -will ask the 
question; it will be raised by a reflective self with access to a. certain language Of 
self-interpretatiOn. It'is 'also the self which defines the essence of the human as 
self-interpretation, as addressing the interpretative question "who am IT. Against this, 
Rorty favours the view - which he takes to be encouraged by Freud - that we "see ourselves 
as centerless, -as random assemblages of contingent and idiosyncratic needs rather than as 
more or less adequate exemplifications of a common human essence", even if that essence 
is taken to be self-interpretation. 40 
So far I have been reconstructing Rorty's objections to Taylor as a naturalist, - but this 
thought leads us to the alternative model of the self and moral reflection he offers: - As a 
pragmatist, Rorty- insists that the de facto desires, hopes, and beliefs of a person are never 
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fully accounted for; they are ever open to reinterpretation and redescription. "' One can 
pragmatically adapt to the confingencies ' of selfhood, by self-creation through 
self-redescription. The point of moral reflection would then take a corresponding turn; it 
would shift from the grounding of an identity ('where I stand') to the exploration of the 
different, hidden 'quasi-persons' which make up a self. Rather than searching for one's 
"true centre", moral reflection would be directed towards becoming "acquainted with these 
unfamiliar persons". ' The question "who am V need not then be "where do I stand? ", but 
"who causes me to have my strong evaluations? ". The task would be to reconcile in 
conversation what splits us up 'into incompatible sets of beliefs and desires'. , If we think 
of strong evaluations as analogous to the voice of conscience, discriminations between the 
significant and trivial will be taken as part of "just another story", like Freud shows us that 
the story of the ý superego is on a par with the stories told by the, ego pd the id. In 
abandoning the idea of a single story holding them all together, so the idea of an overriding 
narrative of a life quest loses its hold. The idea of a unifying, self-perfecting quest should 
be dropped in favour of ad hoc narratives tailored to the contingencies of individual lives. 
Such small narratives are "more plausible because they will cover all the actions one 
performs in one's life, even the silly, cruel, and self-destructive actions"; they will be 
without "heroes or heroines". " ý 
To refrain from asIcing Taylor's question of identity requires that a different attitude be 
adopted to the self, and conversely that the self is better thought as something for which a 
different attitude is apt. For the pragmatist, maturity involves substituting recognition of 
chance as "not unworthy of determining our fate" for the aspiration to see things "steadily" 
and "whole". " From a conception of ourselves as "tissues of contingencies" can be derived 
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an, imperative to self-creation. According to Rorty, such a pragmatic attitude would 
encourage us to become more "ironic, ý playful, free, and inventive in our choice of 
self-descriptions". 'Presumably, identity crises would then be open to re-description. If 
there were to be no longing for a centre, if I were to take an ironic attitude toward myself 
before the question "who aml? ", the anxiety of being without an orientation 'Would be 
defused. Indeed, it ought, to be defused, not only because the idea of a centred self is 
deluded, but because it is a hang up from a culture which has lost its use. , In Rorty's 
postmodern culture, the very phenomenon of an identity crisis would be unintelligible. Jt 
would be viewed as a quaint relic from the foundationalist past. The self would have lost 
its tragic dimension. ' I 
Taylor might reply to Rorty's alternative conception of the self by returning the following 
related questions; (1) how pertinent is Rorty's representation of the challenge of Freud? (2) 
Does - Rorty's alternative conception of the self really do without a framework of qualitative 
contrasts? (3), If it does, is it a coherent conception of a livable life? The issues raised by 
these questions overlap, but it will help to deal with them separately. 
(1) We have seen how Freud's splitting of the self might be seen to change the force of the 
distinction between the admirable and the contemptible, the higher and the base'. "How 
seriously does this impinge on Taylor's position? On the one hand, Taylor is very Much 
aware that the disengaged, controlling, disciplining, instrumental stance of the self, which 
according to Rorty is represented by the Freudian ego, is criticizable by appeal to more 
spontaneous, playful action orientations. Insofar as 'unconscious' impulse can be thought 
of as the source of such orientations, then it is not the case that Taylor identifies the 
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generically Ilower"with 'unconscious' motives, and his position seems unthreatened by 
Rorty's Freudian model of the self. On the other hand, however, Taylor's justification for 
the'inescapability of horizons of strong evaluation turns on the conscious state of the person 
in an identity crisis; strongly evaluated motives must be conscious, as must be the 'stand' 
by which,, for Taylor, the self wins back its identity. So it does seem as if there is 
something question-begging in Taylor's argument, since self-interpretative question 'who 
am I? ' presupposes a reflective and consciously situated T for whom the question is 
inescapable. - But while'this objection holds at the transcendental level of justification, it by 
no means follows that on the basis of a naturalistic and pragmatic construal. of strong 
evaluations, Rorty's Freud offers us a superior model of the self or of moral reflection than 
Taylor does. In the remainder of this section, I shall go some way to justifying this claim. 
Take - Rorty's -insistence that Freud enables us to relativize discriminations between the 
significant and the trivial - of the kind which strong evaluations perform - to stories 
constructed, in an ad hoc,, pragmatic manner, to suit the particular contingencies of a 
person's 'self-development. For Rorty, such small narratives' have the advantage'of 
covering all one's actions, even those which are silly and trivial. This view gains its appeal 
from its opposition to practices of 'moralizing' which are insensitive to the particular 
life-histories of agents; to what, as we saw in (3.1), Williams calls the institution of blame. 
But there are'several problems with Rorty's presentation of the source of that opposition. 
First, - - the ý psychoanalytcial narrative uncovers the significance behind what is only 
apparently trivial., But this significance-disclosing transfonnation of the meaning of actions 
requires that it is already accepted that what the general psychoanalytic theory covers is of 
fundamental concern; namely, the roots of psycho-sexual development in early childhood 
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experience. Clearly, insofar as their potential for articulating discriminations regarding the 
worthwhile and the worthless in a life-history goes, stories in this domain are not on a par 
with all others. The new language of self-interpretation may enlarge the scope for 
significance, but it does not undermine the distinction between the significant and the trivial. 
Second, the morally charged distinction between the significant and the trivial is 
presupposed in the conditions of acceptability of the 'small narrative'. One only begins the 
'conversation' with other quasi-selves because these particular feelings do assume a highly 
significant role in the leading of one's life. As we saw in Habermas's interpretation of 
Freud, these are grounded in a 'passion for critique'. But this passion for critique is 
motivated by the need to change for the better, a motivation which would be unintelligible 
in Rorty's scenario, and which is captured in Taylor's concept of strong evaluation. Third, 
Rorty makes it seem as if the shift to new vocabularies of self-enlargement is as contingent 
as the life-histories which they tell. But this either leaves the question of why one particular 
narratiye is' preferable to another unanswerable, or if pragmatic criteria are appealed to, it 
leaves the question unanswered, since the question of what counts as useful - Rorty would 
agree - is internal to the vocabulary of self-interpretation, and is thus begged by appeal to 
pragmatic considerations. 
(2) The crucial point for Taylor - and the decisive advantage of having the conceptual 
resource of strong evaluations - is that one can acquire 'self-enlargement' not only through 
exploration and conversation with one's 'quasi-selves', but also through critical conversation 
with them. They are criticizable, he would maintain, because their contrasting orientations 
are strongly evaluated. For itself to be afflmed as good, 'self-enlargement' must exercise 
its pull in contrast to something less humanly fulfilling; for example, the (typically 
218 
parodied) life of the self-responsible, duty-bound 'Kantian man'. In contrasting the two 
types of moral reflection and character type, Taylor can reply, Rorty is exploiting a 
qualitative contrast. ý- Iýi, 
I- 
Indeed, there are points at which Rorty comes very close to Taylor's view. We have seen 
that Rorty shares with Taylor an acceptance of the importance of self-interpretations to the 
extent that Rorty asserts that a self (a net of desires, hopes and beliefs) becomes "richer and 
fuller" by developing richer and fuller ways of formulating one's hopes and desires. - The 
main technique of self enlargement and development is the "acquisition of new vocabularies 
of moral reflection". "5 By this phrase, Rorty means "a set of terms in which one compares 
oneself to other human beings", for example as "magnanimous", "decent% "cowardly", 
"epicene". These terms feature as answers to questions of identity like ýWhat sort of 
person would I be if I did this? ". Rorty asserts further that the availability of a richer 
language of moral deliberation makes us "more sensitive and sophisticated, t4an t: our 
ancestorslor than, our younger selves". 46 But to acknowledge this relative deficiency in 
4sensitivity', to answer the question of identity as "I would be more sensitive if I did this", 
Taylor could claim, is to cede the point about frameworks of qualitative contrast. ' And the 
point is generalizable to any attribute through which one compares oneself to other human 
beings, real or imaginary. 
These considerations suggest an incoherence in Rorty's naturalistic reinterpretation of strong 
evaluations. His holding operation is to propose that an ironic attitude be adopted to any 
supposed self-improvement which is conditioned by the availability of a new language for 
self-interpretation. The justification for Rorty's lironism' lies in the thesis that the claim 
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that one is really more (or less) sensitive, decent, magananimous, etc. than one's younger 
self, presupposes commitment to an 'essence' of the self - an absolutely non-contingent ideal 
of personhood - which one can fail or succeed to realize. But this desperate reduction of 
alternative positions to 'Raving Platonism"" betrays the weakness of Rorty's own. Taylor's 
construal of qualitative contrasts does not rest on such a notion of an 'ideal' self. All that 
it requires are terms of comparison between two concrete selves or actions. 
(3) If it is the case that the contingency of selfhood, as Rorty describes it, is inconsistent 
with the applicability of the concept of strong evaluations, is it a self which is livable? The 
question will seem bizarre to someone who is convinced by Rorty's view, since his claim 
is not only that such a life is livable, but much more strongly, that one ought to lead it, at 
least insofar as one aspires to the values of a liberal culture. Evidence from 
psychoanalytical. studies suggests, however, that it is precisely the scarcity in resources of 
identity-carrying horizons of significance which, at least in part, makes the leading of life 
unbearable in actually existing -'liberal' culture. " Taylor thus has the option of retorting 
that as far as we know, an individual needs the stability of an identity even to pursue the 
project of self-creation. This kind of argument does not have the 'transcendental' force of 
Taylor's justification for the inescapability of strong evaluations, but it does put the onus 
of argument back on those who deny his claim. ý 
Furthermore, and this is a point to be learned from Habermas's interpretation of Freud, the 
project of self-determination presupposes a condition of mutual recognition. What is 
massively Conspicuous in its absence throughout Rorty's Freud -is the phenomenon of 
resistance and its link with the therapeutic goal of psychoanalysis. " But resistance can be 
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explained, we saw, as an operation which makes bearable an otherwise unbearably traumatic 
mental event which results from the distortion of conditions of mutual recognition. There 
is no space in Rorty's account for the role played by power in the disturbance of contingent 
self-formative processes. I will suggest in (7.3) below, that it is a space which Taylor must 
also make available.,, 
There are other questions which, as yet, remain unanswered in Taylor's defence of Rorty'S 
pragmatist objections. Taylor insists on the importance of dropping an identity when the 
oment is appropriate, but how are we to determine this moment? Or better; how are we 
to rationally justify"the transition from one self to another? The'role of Taylor's 
phenomenology of crisis is to establish the inescapability of frameworks. In the next 
chapter, I'shall consider how the phenomenon of an identity crisis is used to account for 
rational change between frameworks'. How, in other words, can the 'turn towards other 
models' on which I quoted Taylor at the beginning of (6.2) be rational? But before that, 
I want to draw together some parallels between the role played by a concept of crisis in the 
proposals for critical reflection put by Habermas, and Taylor. 
(6.5) Crisis and Critical Reflection 
I have been examining some of the conceptual resources which Taylor wants to make 
available to a cultural theory of modernity. These are offered as an alternative to those 
which equip acultural theories, of which Habemas's is targeted as one. I will leave an 
overall assessment of their the relative merits of their competing conceptions of modernity, 
and especially of their articulation of the problem of self-reassurance generated by the 
tension between cognition and identity, to my final chapter (chapter eight). But from our 
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discussion so far, certain thematic convergences come into focus, to which it is now timely 
to draw attenflon. 
The first theme of'convergence concerns both Habermas's and Taylor's application of a 
reductio ad absurdwn form of argument to the kind of 'norm-free' human conduct which 
is the target of, the critique -of instrumental reason. ý Instrumental reason concerns the 
efficiency of means to non-normatively evaluable ends, and the critique of instrumental 
reason has to demonstrate that there are good reasons for acting upon norms to which 
instrumentally rational actions can be brought to account. For Habermas, this demand is 
equivalent to that of showing that there-are good reasons for-acting 'communicatively', 
rather than 'strategically'. For the strategic actor, other human beings are of significance 
solely to the extent to which they feature as manipulable means to ends which the strategic 
actor has himself decided; they are of value just to the extent to which they are instrumental 
towards the satisfaction of his desires. For Taylor, the demand is equivalent to establishing 
that the matter of fact, naturally 'given' desires upon what Taylor calls the 'weak evaluator' 
acts, are accountable to independent standards - what Taylor calls frameworks of 'strong 
evaluation' - of what is desirable for human beings. Both Habermas and Taylor argue that 
there -is something 'inescapable' about the norms by appeal to which a critique of 
instrumental, society can be undertaken; in the former case, these are norms which are 
presupposed in communicative action, in the latter, they are norms which are presupposed 
in frameworks of strong evaluation. But neither the indispensability of communicative 
action, nor the inescapability of horizons of strong evaluation, are strictly speaking logical, 
requirements. Rather, they are claimed to be the practical demands of a worthwhile 
existence. Both the life of the strategic actor and the life of the weak evaluator are claimed 
222 
to have consequences the recognition of which, if anticipated bythose who advocate them, 
would rendeitheir advocacy absurd. The absurdity here lies not in a logical contradiction, 
but in the espousal of a form of life which generates unsustainable identity-crises; the 
practical undermining of the agency which would choose to lead such a life. ' 
Since for an agent to Suffer an identity-crisis is for the conditions of'his agency to be 
undermined, both Habýrmas and Taylor can appeal to a sense in which strategic action and 
weak evaluation fail to satisfy the transcendental conditions of human agency. Again, such 
,, I conditions are 'transcendental' in a'piactical sense, insofar as failure to satisfy them is 
inconsistent with a normatively secure, worthwhile human existence. ' Habermas's strategy 
is to trace these conditions back to the context of 'intersubjectivity' only within''which 
human identities can emerge in a non-distorted form. This context he calls the 'lifeworld'. 
Accordingly, the crifique'of instrumental reason can take its departure'frorn the norms 
which are presupposed in the'undistorted reproduction of the lifeworld, where the carrier 
of'this repr6duction process is communicative action. His claim is that unless the 
s6lf-formative process of individuals and collectives is mediated communicatively rather 
than strategically, socially induced pathologies of identity which follow a systematic pattern 
ensue. Habermas's central claim about communicative action, then, is that the strategic 
or 'norm-free' mediation of subjects is incompatible with the self-formation of human 
beings in a non-pathological form. For Taylor, on the other hand, the non-availability of 
a framework of qualitative contrasts within which to characterize what is desirable has a 
similar, though even more radically devastating effect on the human subject, since what it 
is to live a'worthwhile human existence is defined within the framework. Habermas's 
lifeworld and'Taylor's frameworks share this fundamental feature; they are the horizon in 
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virtue of which human agency has an orientation, (and therefore the condition for the, 
possibility of human agency at all). 
A second, related theme of convergence, lies in the appeal made by both Habermas and 
Taylor to the phenomenon of an identity-crisis as a reductio against a certain Idnd of value 
scepticism. Habermas's value sceptic holds the view that rationality is exclusively 
instrumental, that there is no good reason for an agent to be constrained in, his ego-utility 
maximization by supposedly intersubjectively valid norms of action. For an agent to 
recognize such restraints, Habermas holds, is for him to acknowledge the validity of the 
moral point of view, where the the moral point of view represents the perspective of the 
impartial participant in practical discourse. This point of view has validity, according to 
Habermas, in. virtue of the pressure towards universalization which is built into the 
procedure for reaching a rational agreement. The moral scepticism targeted by Habermas 
is, in the first instance, the view that this procedure is insufficient for generating valid qua 
universalizable principles of justice. Habermas replies to this that as a rationally justifiable 
claim, it is subject to those very universalizable norms which it simultaneously presumes 
to reject. But to the sceptic who does not claim such warrant - whose assertion is a 
strategic, rather than a communicative act - Habermas rejoins by pointing to the 
unsustainability of a forpi of life in which that were universalized. In the first stage of the 
anti-sceptical argument, the unavoidability of the normatively charged presuppositions of 
communicative action is 'law-like', in the second - and I have argued more fundamental - 
stage, the unavoidability is 'fate-like'. The 'disenchantment' of this fate turns partly on the 
internalization of a theoretical interpretive perspective on self-formative processes which 
provides the agent with non-instrumental reason (and motivation) for acting. Taylor's moral 
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sceptic,, on the other hand, is the 'naturalist'. The naturalist also holds that rationality is 
exclusively instrumental, that there is no good reason to be constrained in the satisfaction 
of my de facto desires by considerations of the intrinsic worth of those desires. Both 
Habermas and Taylor claim to reduce the respective moral sceptic to the absurdity'of 
espousing a course of life the consequences of which are crises of identity. I 
Third, moral scepticism of both the above Idnds, Habermas and Taylor agree, is the product 
of a more general self-misunderstanding of modernity. For Habermas, the source of this 
misunderstanding is the 'philosophy of consciousness' - and its associated paradigm of 
'su ect-centred reason'. -For Taylor, it is a false philosoph cal anthropo ogy o 
'disengagement'. Both'theorists trace the respective confusions back to the Descartes/Kant 
canon of modem philosophy. The main confusion of the philosophy of consciousness is that 
it construes rational thought and action 'monologically', 'on the basis of the reflecting 
subject's transparent relation to itself. This generates the self-misunderstanding thatthe 
growth in 'rationality' which characterizes modernity is itself monological or 'instrumental' 
in form, breeding the sceptical conclusion that in a world of subjects relating to objects, 
there can be no good reason for acting morally. The central confusion of the anthropology 
of disengagement, on the other hand, is the view that the only truths are those available to 
the observer who, by adopting the kind of scientific methodological position to the world, 
neutralizes his engaged stance within the world. This makes it seem as if the only genuine 
form of reasoning is one which follows the rigorous procedures of modem natural science, - 
and that in the modem world genuinely 'neutral' values have been discovered or are aspired 
to. ý But it also generates the sceptical outlook that concerning 'values', nothing can be 
found which affords of the same kind of certainty and interpretive unanimity which 
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characterize 'facts'. 
Fourth, the abstract errors of modem philosophical scepticism reflect on the concrete need 
for, modernity's self-reassurance. For both Habermas and Taylor,, as I am interpretin'g 
them, this need arises from a tension between cognition and identity. Habermas construes 
this tension as resulting from a one-sidedly rationalized lifeworld along its 
'cognitive/instrumental' dimension. The lifeworld is what provides the resources for 
identity-formation, it is the locus of the claim to normativity which give agents reasons for 
acting non-instrumentally. , Individual and collective agents emerge from a lifeworld which 
precedes them, and they reproduce the lifeworld through their actions. However, ý under the 
pressure to maximize the instrumental efficiency of actions coordinated for the purpose of 
reproducing the material resources of modem society, the capacity for controlling nature 
and social systems within the lifeworld becomes excessively exploited. Since science and 
technology - can be harnessed to increase the efficiency of an ever-growing system of 
material reproduction, the 'value-sphere' in which cognitive/instrumental rationality is 
condensed undergoes a corresponding expansion. But this happens at the expense of the 
value-spheres of morality and art, since the forms of rationality appropriate, to them 
obstruct, rather than promote, the expansion of the, capitalist economic system. Ile 
integration of actions in the latter is 'norm-free', and hence in tension with human identity. 
Taylor agrees that value-scepticism, is indeed -a symptom of modernity understood as a 
merely 'instrumental society', where the tendency to become an instrumental, society is 
central to what generates the need for self-reassurance. But for Taylor, the tension between 
cognition and identity arises from a misguided generalization and over-emphasis on the 
goods which accrue from taking a disengaged stance to the world, two of, the -most 
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important being scientific knowledge of nature and its technological control., So although 
for Taylor the tension between cognition and identity can be expressed in terms-of the 
dominance ' of the cultural value spheres which correspond - to Habermas's 
6ognitive/instrumental dimension of the lifeworld, these are theorized as normatively 
significant themselves, rather than as norm-free. 
The fifth thematic convergence I want to highlight, is the affirmation on the part of both 
Habermas and Taylor that recognition of the linguistic constitution of identity, and the 
unseverable embodiment of rationality in language, is the first step along the road to 
thinking clearly about how cognition and identity might be reconciled. Habermas and 
Taylor share the view'that self-understanding'can only be achieved -in the medium of 
language, that language must be understood as a rule-governed. activity, and 
: that the rules 
which govern linguistic meanings are'public. They concur on the view that language cannot 
be 'given a 'foundation by appeal to something to" which it 'coffesponds'; be it the 
self-transparency of 'sense-certainty', or language-transcendent metaphysical 'facts'. ' They 
a gree I that just as language is the medium in which identities are forged, and thus that the 
possession of a language'is the sine qua non of human agency, so is language the medium 
of cognition, and ý thus the possession of a language is' the sine qua non of human 
knowledge. Both a0peal to the fact that the same linguistic vehicle carries both identity and 
cognition as the point 'of 'departure "for thinking how the two might be brought to a 
reconciliation. -- The motto that "all philosophy is a 'critique of language'"50 is apt for both 
their conceptions-of criticýl reflection. 
But after this common starting point, their paths diverge radically. The point of departure, 
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and what essentially separates their respective 'cultural' and 'acultural' frameworks for 
critical reflection on modemity, lies in the different roles each attributes to language. For 
Habermas, language serves a function which all societies must perform; social integration. 
The stability of any society requires that symbolic resources are made available which 
secure both -the individual and collective identities of its people. In modem societies, 
religion is unable to serve this function. This is the byproduct of a learning process through 
which objective scientific knowledge is separated off from moral and aesthetic values.. As 
a learning process, it can be reconstructed as a process of rationalization - or as sequences 
along a logic of the development of communicative competence. This idea lends itself to 
the thought that ideal procedural standards of rationality - standards. which are objective in 
virtue of being unavoidable presuppositions of an unavoidable mechanism for co-ordinating 
actions - can be tapped by the critic. If modernity is to preserve its claim to rationality, 
it can not regress to previous stages; for instance, to norms which are 'substantive' in being 
part of the fabric of the world. The task of critical reflection, then, is to reconstruct the 
norms which are presupposed in language itself; to show that resources are available for the 
integrity. of modernity in-virtue of its mediating mechanism. The burden of Habermas's 
theory, then; is to show that there are rationally binding, non-instrumental norms which are I 
immanent - to language itself. But it is also obvious that there are 'strategic' uses of 
language; forms of linguistic interaction which are instrumentally rational. Therefore 
Habermas takes it upon himself to establish that there is an 'original' use of language which 
is 'communicatively' rational. Further, since language is the source of normativity, he can 
propose that the communicatively distorted mediation of human beings is responsible for 
the crises which generate the need for self-reassurance. 
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For Hibermas, then, the 'critique of language! takes the form of a theory of communicative 
competence, which attempts to reconstruct a logic of development, and which provides 
standards against which systematically distorted communication can be diagnosed as 
crisis-generating. In contrast to this, the critique of language which Taylor undertakes is 
focussed' on the ideals which language makes available for self-interpretation. 
Self-interpretation is theorized as the rendering articulate of a moral ontology which is 
disclosed by language. This difference in philosophical perspective is the source of what 
appears to be the most intractable difference between Habermas, and Taylor; for the latte'r, 
Habermas's commitment to a procedural conception of rationality proves that he' remains 
in the yoke of disengaged anthropology, for the former, Taylor's alternative falls foul of 
the logic of communicative competence, requiring an impossible task of 'unlearning'. In 
chapter eight, -I will assess the applicability of the charge that Habermas's proceduralism 
betrays commitment to a philosophical anthropology of disengagement, and I will introduce 
the radical'sense in which, - for Taylor, under conditions of modernity, ideals for self- 
interpretation can be disclosed only through language in certain form. But in the next 
chapter, I turn to what, for Habermas, are the two major obstacles to Taylor's conception 
of critical reflection: its assumption of 'metaphysical premises' which are incompatible with 
the cognitive or 'learning' achievements of modernity; and its tendency towards 
conservatism in its manner of reflection upon morality and ethical life. 
1, f 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: TAYLOR, LANGUAGE AND CRMQUE I- I- 
(7.0) Introduction 
Even if we accept Taylor's thesis that frameworks of strong evaluation are inescapable for 
human beings, and that the task of a cultural theory of modernity ý is to articulate the 
complex framework which constitutes the modem identity, it remains for us to be shown 
how the modem identity can thereby be reassured about itself. if cultures (and individuals) 
differ in the strong evaluations they carry, and if one's allegiance to a culture is itself the 
expression of a strong evaluation, then what reason is there for being reassured that the 
evaluation through which one identifies oneself is more defensible than others? Won't the 
reason be relative to the particular framework one inhabits - the particular- 'stand' one has 
adopted? --And if this is the case, where does it leave the status of the evaluative claim? 
Does it make sense to understand it as a 'truth-claim'? Or must it be construed as a claim 
whose truth is relative to the particular framework in which it finds expression, and hence 
not strictly speaking a truth claim at all? And if it must be so construed, does this not 
undermine the viability of the cultural theory of modernity itself? 
In this chapter I want to consider how Taylor attempts to disarm the relativist objections 
which appear to beset his cultural theory. In chapter one, it was noted that in calling for 
a debate between cultural and ý acultural theories of modernity, Taylor is aware that the 
claims of the former kind of theory lend themselves to a relativism from which, if they are 
to be acceptable, they must be redeemed. Cultural theorists of modernity, Taylor observes, 
have 
-been unable to 
dispel the appearance of espousing a self-defeating relativism. 
Recognizing that his preferred cultural theory cannot embrace this implication, Taylor needs 
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to establish the sinse in which changes in the framework of self-interpretation can be 
rational without resorting to a culture-neutral criterion of rationality. I consider how Taylor 
atteiýp'ts to' do'this in (7.1). * Practical reason, Taylor proposes, can account for how 
changes in identify can constitute an epistemic gain by taking a narrative form. Narratively 
structured practical reasoning is substantive in virtue of carrying the content of rich 
conceptions of human identity, rather than prescinding from that content in the'manner of 
the procedural Model Of practical reason. But it is also substantive in that its conclusions 
are affirmed as admitting of truth. Taylor thus needs to establish the thesis that concerning 
strong evaluations, th ere is a truth to the matter. I reconstruct this stage of Taylor's 
argument in- (7.2), 'by focussing on the internal relationship claimed between a favoured 
cultural theory and moral realism. The key to this argument, I suggest, lies in the 
explanatory power assumed by identity-expressive, world-disclosive language. Only a 
vocabulary enriched by the kind of concepts through which life is lived is sufficient for 
certain explanatory purposes, Taylor claims, and therefore capable of featurin 1 in the best 9 
accounts of the world. By bringing together the concepts of explanation and practical 
reason within a world-disclosive or identity-expressive model of language, a cultural theory 
can thereby bring to self-clarification its potential for rationally grounded critique. 
But this move is not without its problems. Also in chapter one, I remarked that Taylor's 
case for a cultural theory of modernity can be taken in a strong or a weak sense. The weak 
claim is that the'change in scientific outlook at the onset of modernity can be described in 
acultural terms as openi ng up truths which 'we have come to see'. The strong claim is that 
even this opening up of truths is best described in terms appropriate to a cultural-theoretic 
framework. This ambiguity, I propose, lies in the equivocal status ascribed by Taylor to 
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the 'absolute conception' of reality. The sense in which we can talk about truth and the 
real, Taylor sometimes advocates, needs to be distniguished from the conception of truth 
and reality availability to the disengaged enquirer. Once the cultural theorist does this, 
Taylor claims, the case can be pressed for moral realism. But at the same time, by drawing 
upon the rational form which the resolution of crises within scientific traditions (or 
'paradigms') takes, he advocates an assimilation of the conceptions of truth and reality 
available to any enquirer insofar as truth and reality are what are disclosed in the most 
rational account. After indicating how Taylor's views issue in a tension between scientific 
and moral realism, I turn in (7.3) to some objections to the role played by language within 
the interpretative paradigm of critical relection carried by is cultural theory. In (7.4), 1 
return to Habermas's concern that attempts to bring the claim to normativity to self- 
clarification on the basis of an expressivist, world-disclosive theory of language bear a 
conservative prejudice. This will also allow me to consider how a problem of mediation 
between morality and ethical life arises within a cultural theory. Following up a distinction 
made by Sabina Lovibond between 'empirical' and 'transcendental parochialism', I suggest 
a way of quelling Habermas's worry about the conservative tendencies of the expressivist 
view. - 
(7.1) -The Narrative Form of Practical Reason 
As we have seen, Taylor's preference for a cultural theory of modernity rests on the claim 
that the conceptual resources available to it - the notions of 'identity', 'strong evaluation', 
and 'the good'- are indispensable for making sense of human life as it is lived. Human 
agency, Taylor claims, involves the capacity to take a stand on the question 'who am IT 
or 'what really matters to meT. In other words, it requires having an orientation in moral 
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space, one which is mapped by a framework of qualitative contrasts. Against this thesis, 
I raised two Idnds of ob ection. First, that the question of identity is only inescapable for j 
a certain Idnd of self; that of a reflective sub ect whose self-interpretation is of fundamental j 
concern. Second, I suggested that the 'stand' defining one's identity may be entirely 
provisional, forever open to further unmasIdng and change. To counter this objection, 
Taylor, can reply by appealing to another conceptual resource available to his cultural 
theory, one which I have not yet considered. For in addition to talcing a stand in moral 
space, Taylor asserts, a human being cannot but move in moral time. This moral or human 
time is that which is articulated in narratives. Taylor then exploits the rationality of 
narratively articulated changes in identity for dealing with the problem of the relative merit 
of modem and other identities. By appeal 
-to 
a phenomenology of those changes in a life 
which constitute moral growth, Taylor extracts a model for comprehending what makes the 
rational critique of modem and other cultures possible. But if Taylor is able to do this 
convincingly, then he will have effectively disarmed Habermas's worries about the 
rationally toothless critical powers of a cultural theory of modernity. I will return to this 
point in a moment. But first, a few words on why it is thought that a human life must be 
understood narratively. 
Taylor thinks this follows from the necessity of our orientation towards the good. The 
inescapablility of the question 'who am W (or 'where do I stand? '), is also the 
inescapability of a question which can be raised at different times. It is thus bound to the 
further question of 'who am I becoming? ' (or 'where am I going? '). At any moment, the 
orientation which defines my identity is something at which I have arrived, and grasping 
the significance of it requires an understanding of how I got there. But this is the kind of 
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uýders"tanding, Taylor insists, which can only be grasped by placing one's life in a story. 
Such a life story will always be open to revision, and its revisability in the light offuture 
changes and becomings alters the meaning of how they were arrived at. To understand my 
life in a story, then, requires that it is a story of a whole life. This is also something which 
my orientation to the good'requires; "We want our lives to have meaning, or weight, or 
substance, or to grow towards some fulness ... But this means our whole lives". 
' And a 
whole life is only comprehensible in narrative form. 
In virtue of 'it's'' temporal constitution then, human agency is conditioned not only by an 
orientation towards the good, but also by the possibility of moral growth. We have already 
seen that for Taylor, one's fundamental orientation to the good is determinable by reference 
to the particular hypergood to which one gives one's allegiance. The question then arises 
of how the hypergoods which define an identity are to be deliberated over. This is the 
question which, according to Taylor, a theory of practical reason must answer. It must 
make sense of the possibility of a rational transition from one identity to another; it must 
give an account of the Idnd of move which constitutes moral growth. In chapter five, we 
saw that Habermas too wants to open up a space for rational deliberation concerning 
questions of the good life, though only in the domain of what he calls therapeutic discourse. 
However, it was noted that clinical intuitions, in not admitting of a universal core which is 
unconditioned by culturally specific horizons of self-interpretation, cannot attain the strict 
claim to rationality of judgements of right or justice. For Habermas, the rationality of 
clinical intuitions is compromised by the absence of a universalizable criterion of the Idnd 
which the idealized symmetry and reciprocity conditions of communicative action afford. 
But by posing the question of rational practical deliberation in terms of the transition 
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between action-guiding orientations, the absence of such universalizable criteria need not 
look. so compromising. Furthermore, by posing the problem of practical reasoning in this 
way, the motivational deficit of agents whose obligations derive from the idealizations of 
the, moral point of view is covered, without thereby forfeiting the rational force of the 
practical insight. Of course, the question of what is right or just to do remains a subject 
of practical reasoning, insofar as actions (or norms) are an expression of a particular 
identity which it is better to be (or which merits aflegiance), on account of its respect for 
the obligation to satisfy universalizable needs. But obligations are only worth respecting 
insofar as they orient the agent to the good. The correctness (whether it counts as 'growth' 
or not) of the particular practical deliberation is determined by the comparative superiority 
of the positions on either side of the move, rather than by some absolute criterion or 'basic 
reason" which is applicable to any practical deliberation, independent of context or horizon, 
of self-interpretation. Taylor describes the process of practical reasoning as follows. 
We show one of these comparative claims to be well founded when we show 
that the move from A to B constitutes a gain epistemically. This is 
something we do 
' 
when we show, for instance, that we get from A to B by 
identifying and resolving a contradiction in A or a confusion which A relied 
on, or by acknowledging the importance of some factor which A screened 
out, or something of the sort. The argument fixes on the nature of the 
transition from A to B. The nerve of the rational proof consists in showing 
that this transition is an effor-reducing one. The argument turns on rival 
interpretations of possible transitions from A to B, or B to A. 2 
The logic of practical reasoning thus has a narrative form in the specific sense that it is how 
we account for lived changes in moral outlook, and therefore in one's identity or 'self'. It 
has an ad hominem argumentative structure, in that it is addressed from one particular lived 
identity to another, as that identity is expressed in action . -orientations. ' I might see myself 
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now, in comparison to what I was like before, as less confused about, or as more sensitive 
to, what really' matters or is'worthwhile. Practical argument, according to the 'ad 
hominem' model, proceeds by way of "contesting between interpretations of what I have 
1- .. 4 
been living" , and the argument is trumped by the interpretation ý which, of those available, 
gives the most clairvoyant account of the effor-reduction (or otherwise) of the transition 
lived through. The crucial point for Taylor's model is that what counts as a rationally 
defensible gain is not determinable independently of the actual transition. There is no 
appeal to criteria which are neutral with respect to the content of the moral outlooks lived 
through, and thus no need to invoke an ideal standard which can be brought to bear 
whatever the transition is between. If such a standard were available, - in this case, of the 
good life, or even what is morally obligatory to do - then any move would be j ustiflable in 
its terms. But because any move would therefore be in principle rationally determinable, 
the significance of the rationality of transitions themselves is lost. Failing the availability 
of the neutral criterion, it can then seem as if there is no scope for rational practical 
deliberation. Taylor's non-criterial model for practical reasoning restores such scope, 'by 
limiting it to the passage between rival practical positions. -The error-reduction from A to 
or vice versa does not carry over to other positions; the validity of the transition is not 
transitive in the strictly logical sense. This is simply a'consequence of its ad hominern 
structur I e. And of course,, 'since the validity of the position arrived at depends on its 
comparative superiority to the rival party to the transition, it is always vulnerable to 
succession by other, more perspicuous self-interpretations relative to it. 
From these considerations, it'will appear that the whole business of a cultural theOrY Of 
modernity is an exercise in practical reasoning so conceived. ' The form of this lind of 
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enquiry is to trace the origins of the hypergoods valued in modem culture, as they emerge 
through a transition from others which compete with them for allegiance. The modem 
identity can be reassured if it can defend the move from one hypergood to anot er, in a 
language of perspicuous contrast which is recognizable to both parties of the transition, as 
an error-reducing one. 'The clearest illustration of how the modem identity can, in at least 
one respect, be reassured in this manner, is provided by Taylor in his discussion of the 
superior rationality of modem science in comparison to its pre-modern, Renaissance 
counterpart. We have seen that, even for Habermas, the normative content of modernity 
includes the attainement of 'self-consciousness', -which means, in part, the acquisition of 
valid knowledge about the objective world. Enlightened science removes the obstacles -to 
Val self-consciousness ý entrenched in the pre-modem world view by divesting nature of any 
putative intrinsic moral significance. Habermas theorizes this shift by way of, a rational 
reconstruction of the communicative competence in differentiating the three validity claims, 
but Taylor rejects the idea of a logic of development on which Habermas's model is based., 
So how can Taylor account for the modem achievement of 'self-consciousness' in this 
domain? ' Insofar as an understanding of the physical universe is strongly valued, and 
pre-modem and modem science express rival, incommensurable interpretations of this 
valuation, then the transition from the former to the latter can be shown to represent an 
epistemic gain in the following 'narrative' way. 
According to Taylor's story, the practice of Renaissance science was informed by the 
Platonic hypergood, of wisdom through attunement with the Ideas which make up the 
cosmos. Coming to an understanding of nature required 'participating' in this Ideal order, 
conceived - as the reality behind the changing flux of the apparent material world. 
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Post-Galilean scientific practice, however, dispenses with this conception. It is no longer 
a function of cognizing the physical universe to be attuned to it in this Platonic sense. 
Scientific knowledge becomes rather a function of disengagement. Attunement is 
reinterpreted, as a projection of human qualities onto a morally indifferent material world. 
Apparent flux is explained by a de-divinized or disenchanted underlying order of natural 
laws, according to concepts proper to the intelligibility of nature conceived as the realm of 
law, as opposed to, rather than a part of, the realm of meaning. 
What we have here are two incompatible conceptions of scientific enquiry. They are also 
incommensurable because, týey, incorporate rival norms for the understanding of physical 
reality. One cannot simultaneously aspire towards the attuned wisdom of the Renaissance 
magi and the disengaged objectivity of the modern scientist. ' Each is defined, in contrast 
to the other; the reservoir of concepts and standards of explanation which make the universe, 
intelligible as 
-something 
with which the enquirer can be attuned are just what make them 
irrational according to the conceptual scheme proper to the intelligibility of nature as the 
realm of law. Which, then, is the rationally superior, if the criteria for rational 
understanding differ between the two practices? 
Taylor's answer is that rational superiority shows itself in the practices which the 
disengaged science makes possible. The massive technological spin-offs of modem science 
requires a response from the, pre-modern, and this even if technological control is not 
strongly valued as -a hypergood. Given that both the pre-modem and the modem are 
embodied beings who are active in the world, a move in science which yields "further and 
more far-reaching recipes for action" is, in this respect, bound to constitute an epistemic 
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gain. But this, it seems obvious, is just what increased technological Control achieves. It 
is important for Taylor not to assume that technological control is a neutral criterion of the 
rational superiority of modem science, for this is a standard not recognized by those with 
allegiance to its precursor. But, as Taylor observes, the efficiency of technological 
practices is something'which, once'established, must be accounted for by both rivals. In 
his paper 'Rationality', Taylor suggests that the epistemic gain in the move to the modem 
conception lies in the'simple explanation it has for these technological spin-offs which is 
acceptable to both sides; it is based on a science which advances human knowledge of the 
physical universe. ' But with this formulation, Taylor looks suspiciously close to invoking 
a neutral, universally acceptable criterion of explanation - namely simplicity - which is j uit 
what his non-criterial model of the rationality of transitions is supposed to avoi&, -Matters 
are clearer in the more recent worldng paper, 'Explanation and Practical Reason'. Here 
Taylor more consistently sticks to the point that what lies outside the standards, of the 
pre-modem Science is, the challenge which the success of the mechanistic science posed. 
Admittedly, this challenge is itself only intelligible on the assumption that there is some 
'human constant' common to all enquirers, and therefore something akin to a 'criterion' 
operative im the structure of the argument -: namely "our ability to make our way about and 
effect our purposes". ' The pre-modem Platonist can dismiss the significance of being able 
to make'one's way about by controlling nature and thereby effecting many new purposes, 
but Taylor's point is that the development of new recipes for intramundane action as 
technological spin-offs cannot be explained on the pre-modem's own terms. This is 
something which can only be shown retrospectively - given modern science's technological 
spin-offs -'in the asymmetry of the narratives putatively explaining either the rationality 
(epistemic gain) or irrationality (epistemic loss) of the transition; in the latter case, a 
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plausible, narrative of the kind which is available to the fomer, which would explain the 
transition from Renaissance to post-Galilean science as a loss of understanding of the 
physical universe, is not conceivably forthcoming. 10 
The nerve of the rational proof here is not to invalidate the hypergood of attunement, but 
it does invalidate its association with knowledge of the physical universe, and the methods 
of natural science. Taylor also illustrates how the demise of a morally significant cosmos 
can be brought into play for demonstrating the rationality of transitions in the moral domain 
of a disenchanted universe. Where the cosmos is believed to instantiate a moral order, and 
the order is believed to be miffored in social hierarchies, acts transgressive of the social 
hierarchy can be perceived to merit particularly cruel forms of punishment,, irrespective of 
any moral principle - which is nontheless acknowledged - to minimize pain. 11 But with the 
rational transition to the post-Galilean picture of the cosmos, one factor which contributed 
to the justification of overriding the principle of minimizing suffering loses its hold, and this 
makes a prima facie, case for thinking that the transition to less cruel - practices of 
punishment in the modem world has some claim to rationality. Once again, it is assumed 
here that, there is some human 'constant' at work in the justification - namely, the 
acýnowledgement that minimizing pain is morally desirable. While neither this nor the 
'improved recipes for action' invoked in his narrative explanation of the rational transition 
to post-Galilean science constitute 'criteria' in the sense of being external standards 
applicable independently of any transition, Taylor suggests that normal moral or practical 
reasoning is even further away from the criterial model. In the biographical context, the 
case is simplified by there being only one person living through the transitions. As, was 
noted above, the preferred conclusion of the practical deliberation is shown directly in the 
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perspicuity of the self-interpretation of the transition lived through; there is no need to refer 
"even to the differential performance of the rival vie, %ýs in relation to some [other] decisive 
consideration". 12 
In this section I have summarized Taylor's claims concerning the narrative structure of 
practical reason. His strategy has been to show a common structural core - captured in' the 
idea of narrative - -to the intelligibility of rational transitions in science and practical 
deliberition. But the outcome of the rational transition to post-Galilean science is a divorce 
betw6eh the attainment of valid knowledge of nature and the hypergood of attunement. So 
if the modem identity is to be reassured with respect to 'attunement, the source ý of 
attunement must be articulable by other means. The view that there are no other means, 
that there is no world with which humans can be morally attuned, that any conception of 
a moral reality is deluded - -a mere projection of human attributes onto intrinsically 
meaningless substance - is something Taylor believes can be refuted with just the same 
narrative tools as Platonist science can be. Further, to refute this family of views'would 
be to remove what Taylor claims to be an entrenched source of inarticulacy concerning the 
predicaments facing the modem identity; that the tension between cognition and identity is 
equivalent to a metaphysical gap between facts and values. In the next section, I turn to 
the 'second definitive feature of the substantive model of rationality espoused by Taylor's 
cultural theorY, that the conclusions of practical reasoning admit of truth. 
(7.2) Cultural Theory and Moral Realism 
Among the tensions Taylor claims to be immanent to the modem identity is the tendency, 
strengthened by acultural theories of modernity, to frustrate its own articulation. 13 - Typical 
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of the culture-neutral mechanisms which these theories invoke, as we noted in (1.1), is the 
general capacity to separate pure 'facts' from pure 'values'. The separability of fact and 
value, Taylor suggests, is premissed on a deeply ingrained principle of modem thought; that 
concerning strong evaluations, there is no truth of the matter". "' So deeply ingrained, 
indeed, that even cultural theories are prey to it. And it is adherence to this axiom, Taylor 
argues, which is responsible for cultural theory's supposed affinity with relativism. In this 4P, 
section, Iw 11 examine the version of moral realism which Taylor proposes on the basis of 
the impasse faced by theories of modernity which deny the truth-evaluability of strong 
evaluations. First, I will look at the difficulties Taylor exposes in the 'neutralist' position 
associated with acultural theories. I have already raised objections of this sort against 
Gellner's theory (2.3), so I shall only briefly recapitulate them here. After considering why 
Taylor thinks that relativist versions of cultural theory covertly reproduce the source of 
some of these difficulties, I then turn to his favoured 'realist' version - focussing 
specifically on the sense in which concerning strong evaluations, there is a truth to the 
matter. Taylor's moral realism, we note, relies on the acceptance of what he calls the 'Best 
Account' principle. I then raise some objections to this principle as a resource, to be 
exploited for 'realist' purposes. 
If living within a framework of strong evaluations is not an existential option for human 
beings,,, neither is it a methodological option for the theorist of human agency to utterly 
dispense with the horizon within which human beings understand themselves.. Taylor 
supports this view with the following consideration. Any culture-neutral mechanism which 
is invoked to expWn away or 'finesse' the self-understanding of participants in modem and 
other societies, he argues, prejudices any account of why it is this particular culture which 
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obtains in virtue of the general mechanism. For instance, if one holds that religious beliefs 
are explicable in virtue of some general mechanism for social integration, one will not feel 
(methodologically) impelled to enquire into the content of the identity furnished by such 
beliefs. 'But since any such beliefs could be explained in this manner, this approach is 
unable account, for the specific significance of the particular manifestation of the 
'culture-neutral' phenomenon. It is unable to explain why there obtain these details of a 
form of religious life - or mechanism for social integration - rather than others, since each 
which would fit the theory equally well. But as soon as the theorist inquires into such 
details, he or she encounters the methodological 'imperative of grasping the 
self-understanding of the agent. And this, in general, means "being able to apply correctly 
the desirability characterizations which he applies in the way he applies them". 15 
Now the acultural theorist might accept this, without wanting to endorse the ontological 
commitments implied by the horizon of self-understanding. It is likely that the theorist will 
disagree with some of the beliefs by which the agent understands himself-, so while- these 
beliefs ought to feature in the theorist's explanandum, they ought not to determine the 
preferred explananda of the agent's thought and action. The way the world is, including 
the human world of which the agent is a part, need not be how the agent thinks it is. ' For 
the acultural theorist, according to Taylor, this means that the language of the explananda 
must be culture-neutral. But to be culture-neutral, it must be expunged of the evaluative 
biases which, given the premises of acultural theory, distort its capacity to describe, the 
world felicitously. 'These biases can then be interpreted as non truth-evaluable expressions 
of pro- or con- attitudes. Since they are non truth-evaluable, they have no place in the 
explanatory language of the theory. The acultural theory, if it is to admit of truth, ought 
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to be neutral on such matters. But it can only be evaluatively neutral once it has identified 
the genuinely descriptive claims hidden in the object-language of self-understanding. The 
acultural theory which finds itself in this position is then impelled to transpose the 
o ect-language of self-understanding into one which has purely descriptive criteria of 
correct application; correct, that is, independently of culturally specific evaluative conation. 
Ile problem with this move, Taylor notes, however, is that the criteria for the correct 
application of key descriptive (or classificatory) terms in the language of human 
self-understanding are inewticably evaluative. Following the argument presented in (2.3), 
to strip certain concepts of their evaluative force - far from 'purifying' their descriptive, 
truth-evaluable content, - distorts this content beyond recognition. " This means that the 
transposition of the language of self-understanding into a neutral, value-free vocabulary, 
cannot be achieved without a revision of the original vocabulary of self-understanding. The 
transposed language is a revision because the criteria for the correct application of its 
concepts are not materially equivalent to the criteria for the application of the concepts of 
the original object-language. But a grasp of the original criteria is a condition of the 
methodological requirement, mentioned above, to understand the agent. This requirement 
seems to be flouted by the 'neutralist' position because one cannot understand the agent 
without appeal to the evaluative criteria filtered out in the neutral, purely descriptive 
vocabulary. One is not able to apply correctly the desirability characterizations which the 
agent applies in the way he applies them without the linguistic resources which make such 
application possible. And the canonically transposed language of the acultural theorist is 
no such resource. 
P. . 
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As Taylor describes it, the'acultural neutralist position is motivated by the perceived need 
to defuse the value/ontological commitments of the desirability characterizations which 
define the identities of modern and'pre-modern human beings. But this is exacted at the 
price of misconstruing the meaning of these commitments, and hence of misunderstanding 
the' (self-interpretini) beings it aspires to explain. While cultural theory eschews both 
culture-neutral mechanisms and vocabularies, Taylor suggests that there is nevertheless a 
widely held version of it which also distorts the beings of its subject-matter by defusing the 
value/ontological commitments implicit in the language which expressed them. Rather than 
attempting to 'finesse' the language of self-understanding in the manner of aculturist theory, 
this version of the cultural-theoretic approach effects a similar neutralization 'of the 
value/ontological commitments of the language of self-interpretation by relativizing them 
to*the form of life in which they have a use. Taylor calls this the 'vulgar Wittgensteinian' 
, 17 position. It involves the suspension of judgement on the evaluative force and'the 
ontological commitments accompanying the self-understanding of the agent. Suspension is 
required because the form of life in which the self-understandings (strong evaluations) ai6 
intelligible is not the kind of thing which can either be affirmed nor denied. Since the 
theorist grasps the language of self-understanding of agents when she partakes in the form 
of life which the language expresses, and since "forms of life are incorrigible"' 8, so also, 
according to the Vulgar Wittgensteinian, are the self-understandings of the'agents. -,. 
Taylor is not happy with this conclusion; "It seems to espouse", 'as he puts, it, "an'almost 
mind-numbing relativism". " He suggests that the root of its inadequacy lies, like the 
neutralist position, in its refusal to take seriously the ontological commitments of strong 
6aluations. Both positions falter in adopting the thesis that concerning strong ev uations, 
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there is no truth of the matter. If we are to move beyond the equafly inadequate alternatives 
of interpretative distortion or mind numbing relativism, it seems, we need to be realists 
about strong evaluations. Before moving on to the kind of realism which Taylor proposes 
as the only credible option for a theory of modernity, I need to make a preliminary 
reservations about the strategy followed so far. For even acultural theories which insist on 
a sharp break between fact and value need not make it in the way depicted by Taylor. 
Habermas's theory, for instance, is equally critical of the 'conative' analysis of value. As 
we have seen, his view is that there is indeed a 'world' to which value-judgements are apt. 
This is the world of interpersonal relationships about which normative claims can be correct 
or incorrect. But the criterion of correctness in this domain is not evaluative truth, but 
prescriptive validity or normative rightness. Habermas's position is thus anti-realist with 
respect to evaluatives, but realist with respect to prescriptives. And this means that 
Habermas's view isn't 'neutral' in at least one of the senses in which Taylor uses the term, 
I 
for it intrinsically involves critical engagement with normative validity claims. But the 
separation of validity claims, even if raised simultaneously, generates iis own problems; 
including the distorted representation of the rationality of evaluative claims considered in 
chapter five. 
So fa ,rI have been considering the negative case put by Taylor against not taldng the moral 
realist road. I turn now to positive claims Taylor makes for the realist interpretation of 
strong evaluations. Taylor's version of moral realism turns on what he calls the 'Best 
Account' (BA) principle. Although Taylor doesn't provide us ýith a precise definition of 
this principle, its meaning and realist thrust is most readily discernible in the following 
passage; 
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Ad 
'1- How else to det6 I mine what is real or objective, or part of the furniture of 
things, that by seeing what properties or entities or features our best account, 
of things has to invoke? Our favoured ontology for the micro-constitution of 
the physical universe now includes quarks and several kinds of force ... we have our present array of recognized entities because they are the ones 
invoked 
' 
in 
' 
what we now see as the most believable account of physical 
reality. 
Thirels no'reason to proceed differently in the domain of human affairs, by 
which I mean the domain where we deliberate about our future action, assess 
our own and others' character, feelings, reactions, comportments, and also' 
attempt to, understand and explain these. As a result of our discussions, 
reflections, arguments, challenges, and examinations, we will come to see 
a, certain vocabulary as the most realistic and insightful for the things of this 
domain. ' What these terms pick out will be what is real to us here, and if 
cannot and should not be otherwise. If we cannot deliberate effectively, or 
understand and explain people's actions illuminatingly, without such terms 
4 20 as courage' or 'generosity', then these are real features of the world. 
The real, then, is what is disclosed by the best account of any given domain available to us. 
In this respect, there is continuity between the human and the natural sciences. But as their 
domains 
-1differ, 
so will the kind of vocabulary which features in the best account. The 
crucial point for Taylor's realist thesis is that the best account of how human beings lead 
their lives, cannot but incorporate a language of strong evaluation. In the previous chapter 
we considered Taylor's phenomenological argument for the inescapability of frameworks 
of qualitative contrasts. We are now in a position to consider why such a phenomenological 
account must feature in the best account. Given the BA principle - that the best account 
determines our ontological commitments - we can understand Taylor's moral realism as a 
doctrine of phenomenological ontology. 
4ccording to the orthodox. view, the task of phenomenological ontology is to produce 'ppre 
descriptions', of experience, and hence of the world as it appears from the point of view-of 
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an engaged inquirer. According to the standard objection to it, the exclusive focus on 
description 
-rids 
it of any explanatory power, and hence of any competence to determine 
ontological commitments. Taylor's BA principle is meant to disarm this objection, not by 
denying the relevance of explanations for phenomenological accounts, but by emphasizing 
the explanatory force of the language through which human beings make sense of their 
lives. " We make sense of our lives, Taylor insists, by getting clear on the issues which 
face us in the living of them, and this inevitably involves using a vocabulary of desirability 
characterizations like 'courageous', 'honest, 'cruel', 'generous', etc. If I were deprived 
of this linguistic resource, then I would not understand my life so clairvoyantly, nor 
deliberate so effectively, nor assess the behaviour of others so competently. But this means 
that an explanation of the leading of lives which dispensed with these terms would also miss 
out on the insights they disclose, on the sense actions have, and, hence on something 
fundamental to human agency which needs explaining. The BA principle dictates that the 
best account of human life both explains it and makes the most sense of the living of it, 
"and no epistemological or metaphysical considerations of a more general Idnd" can trump 
it. " Thus Taylor, can claim that there is no good reason why we should not speak of a 
4moral reality', in the sense that "what you can't help having recourse to in life is real, or 
as near to reality as you can get a grasp at present". 23 If phenomenological reflection of the 
Idnd considered earlier shows that one cannot but have recourse to strong evaluations, then 
the, valýes invoked by them are real. 
I. have already - raised doubts about whether phenomenological reflection must, show this. 
But irrespective of those objections, is it correct to think that we are dealing with a uniform 
sense of 'reality' here? The weight Taylor is giving to phenomenological acco4nts of moral 
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experience ý needs to be - seen as a 'counterpoise to the general epistemological and 
metaphysical considerations mentioned above, the kind which issue in the modem construal 
of the fact/value distinction. ' The key consideration Taylor targets is the view that truth 
is the exclusive property of propositions which feature in an "absolute' account of reality; 
one that "prescinds from anthropocentric properties, in particular the meanings that things 
have for us", and which - in virtue of this - "offers the best explanation, -not only of the 
extra-human universe (that much seems now fairly clear), but of human life as well"'. 
Reality, according to this view, is what is disclosed to the third person perspective of the 
disengaged enquirer. - Corresponding to this commitment is the view that, "the terms of 
everyday life, those in which we go about living our lives, are to be relegated to the realm 
of mere appearance "26 , and hence bereft of explanatory force. This is the deep-seated 
premise of what, Taylor calls 'naturalism'. According to the naturalist picture, the only 
account of reality is that articulated in absolute, non-anthropocentric tems. It follows, 
given this premise, that human affairs, like the physical universe, "ought to be maximally 
described in - external non-culture-bound terms". 
11 
But Taylor insists that the absolute 
account does not give us the best account of human affairs, for the reason that the meanings 
things have for us must feature in the understanding and explanation of them. Although the 
reality disclosed by the value terms featuring in our best account is 'dependent on us', it 
is no less real, given human existence, than the reality disclosed in the absolute account of 
physics. " 
If one means by reality what is not conditioned by human existence, then Taylor's position 
on science is realist, - but not on morals. , There is in fact a tension with respect to the 
supposed symmetry and asymmetry between scientific and moral realism. -Taylor is (or 
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aspires to be) both a scientific and a moral -realist' insofar as he holds that there is a truth 
of the matter disclosed in the best account of both domains. Only the former, howeverg, is 
absolute or human-independent. But what right 'do we have to say that the latter is 
'absolute' if it depends on what gives us 'our' best account? It looks as if we can have 
either the best account principle, or the absolute conception of science. If we have the 
latter, reality has nothing to do with us, so we can't be moral realists (in Taylor's sense). 
If we have the former, " there is no absolute reality, which prescinds from the human 
articulation of it, so we can't be scientific realists. The tension can be put in another way. 
'Best accounts' are true in virtue of the reality they disclose by way of a 'perspicuous 
contrast'. The truth of scientific theories, on the other hand, once the absolute conception 
is granted, 'requires no such contrast. All it requires is correspondence. Taylor's equivocal 
use of the term 'reality' corresponds to these different senses of 'truth'., 
The, point I am -trying to make can be put in still another, -and I think decisive way. A 
major difference between best accounts of the moral and physical domain which bears on 
the sense in which they are true is that Taylor's moral realism allows for the possibility of 
incommensurability between moral truthi'. But this can't be the case for scientific truths, 
conceived ý according to the absolute conception, for otherwise either or both of the 
incommensurable truths would not be absolute. The absolute conception of -reality is in 
principle something about which there is (potential) universal consensus. Of course, it has 
been a commonplace since Kuhn to talk of incommensurable scientific theories. Here we 
I 
need to -distinguish two Idnds of incommensurability. First, there -is the Oet's call it 
'first-order') incommensurability of theories within the absolute conception, say between 
Newtonian and, Einsteinian physics. Distinct from this, there is the ('second order') 
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incommensurability between the absolute conception which both Newtonian and Einsteinian 
physics explores, and the conception of 'correspondences' explored by its pre-modem 
counterpart. Taylor would accept that the change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics 
is of a different order to that from Renaissance to modem science. But the best account 
principle doesn't make sense of this difference. And this is partly because within the 
absolute conception, the criteria of best accounts - such as predictive power, simplicity, and 
technological control - are not retrospective. And for this reason, I suggest, Taylor would 
not recognize first-order incommensurability of the kind just mentioned. Why should this 
matter? 
It matters because the Best Account principle is tailored to suit incommensurabilifies. Its 
point is to address cfises within traditions or identities. Following MacIntyre, Taylor 
exploits the retrospective reason of narrativity for the resolution of conflicts arising from 
the unavailability of a common measure. Were there to be a common measure, say for 
instance as there is in what Kuhn calls science in its 'normal', 'puzzle-solving' period, the 
BA principle would, lose, its point. And this is where Habermas wedges his fundamental 
objection, to Taylor's view. For in addition to the 'world-disclosive' or 'expressive' 
dimension of language, there is also the 'problem-solving' capacity of language exploited 
in communicative action. It is in this dimension where the truths of 'perspicuous contrasts' 
are tested against the requirements of intra-mundane practice. 
At the beginning of this section, I considered the objection Taylor makes against the 
validation of exclusively acultural theories; that they are either consistent with a wi e 
variety of cultural practices and beliefs, and therefore non-explanatory of particular onesp 
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or they attempt to explain particular practices at the price of distorting their meaning., I 
then coniidered the Best Account principle as a basis for validation which supposedly 
favours a cultural theory construed along realist lines. In the next section I want to consider 
in more detail the role of practice in this'Idnd of validation, and the interpretative model'of 
language and critical reflection on which it is based. 
(7.3)'Language ind the Lu*xu*ts of Cultuml Ibeory 
I will briefly consider three kinds of objection which might be raised against the role played 
by language in Taylor's cultural theory and the model of critical reflection it recommends. 
First, I bring Wittgensteinian objections, not too dissimilar to those raised against Habermas 
in (4.4), to bear on Taylor's presentation of the role played by language in the philosophical 
foundations of a 'cultural theory' of modernity. I will do this by' focussing on a 
misunderstanding betrayed in the charge Taylor levels at the 'vulgar Wittgensteinian'. 
Second, I return to the issue of systematically distorted communication, 'which Habermas 
takes to be beyond the grasp of hemeneutic reflection, and for that reason a suitable point 
of departure for an alternative conception of critique. Here I take up the objection 
anticipated in (6.2), and to which I will return in the following chapter, that disturbances 
in self-formative processes from outside language may put motivational constraints on what 
is worth pursuing. Third, I re-introduce the case, again to feature later, for a qualified 
acultural theory on the basis of the second objection. 
(1) The charge levelled by Taylor against the vulgar Wittgensteinian position, we saw, is 
that since it proposes that forms of life are incorrigible, it effectively consigns its holders 
to an absurd, mind-numbing relativism. But the mistake implicit in this attribution might 
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be thought to reveal a deeper confusion in the foundations of Taylor's model of critique. 
This model, as we have seen, is based on self-interpretations. For Taylor, human beings 
- beings with the identity of agents - are essentially self-interpreting. This is something we 
unavoidably are as language users. Without a horizon of linguistically articulable strong 
evaluations through which to interpret ourselves, Taylor urges, we would not be 
recognizably human. The task of a cultural theory is to get clear on the self-interpretations 
which constitute the modem identity, by way of the contrasts within it and with foreign 
identities. It seeks an interpretative language of perspicuous contrast: 
This would be a language in which we could formulate both their way of life 
and ours as alternative possibilities in relation to some human constants at 
work in both. It would be a language in which the possible human variations, 
would be so formulated that both our form of life and theirs could be 
perspicuously described as alternative such variations. Such a language of 
contrast might show their language of understanding to be distorted or 
inadequate in some respects, or it might show ours to be so (in whicb case, 
we might find that understanding them leads to an alteration of our 
self-understanding, and hence our form of life ... ); or 
it might show both to 
be so. 10 
We saw in (7.1) how Taylor appeals to the human constant of being able to 'find one's wa ,Y 
about' through 'effective recipes for action' when arguing for the superior rationality of 
modem science over its Renaissance precurser. The language of the latter was shown to 
be inadequate in this respect. Or mI ore precisely, the contrast by which the transition to its 
successor could be articulated was less perspicuous than that available to its rival, for it was 
unable to account for why the latter should be so successful in its capacity to 'effect 
purposes 9 The most general of human constants is the orientation to the good; inwardnesso 
the affirmation of everyday life, and the disengaged or romantic relationship to nature 
represent the modem variations. But at this juncture, the Wittgensteinian can take issue 
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with the view that a 'language of understanding' must be a language of interpretative 
contrast. In (4.4), 1 tried to show that Habermas's thesis that action oriented to reaching 
understanding (the raising and redeeming of validity claims) does not stand up to the 
challenge of Wittgenstein's considerations on rule-following. But those considerations 
generate analogous difficulties to the view that understanding must involve interpretation. 
Just as understanding requires the grasp of something which is not a justification (or a 
validity claim),, so what this grasp is of cannot be an interpretation -on pain of infinite 
regress. For interpretation involves the replacement or substitution of one sign by another, 
but if these signs are not to 'hang in the air', if they are to have a meaning which is the 
object of a possible conflict of interpretation, there must be a way of understanding them 
independent of and logically prior to their interpretation. For Wittgenstein, understanding 
is - in the first instance - "a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which 
is exhibited in what we call obeying a rule and going against it in actual cases"31 
The point is that in presenting foms of life as things which are incorrigible or corrigible, ' 
Taylor implies that they are essentially sources of interpretation. He can -then, argue that 
interpretations are never incorrigible (this is Taylor's realism), and that a fortiori, neither 
are forms of life. If by 'form of life" is, meant'a cluster of self-interpretations - or in 
Taylor's sense, a 'culture' - then the thought that each is incorrigible is 'quite 
'mind-numbing'. Indeed, it is incoherent, given the logic of interpretation. But this cannot 
be what is meant by a form of life, since it includes the idea of an agreement in practice 
which conditions the possibility of interpretative dispute. Tully reminds ýus that 
interpretation is a reflective activity occasioned by a lack of understanding. ", it is, a 
testament to the breakdown in pre-interpretive understanding; to sign usages which, have 
254 
become problematic. But it represents only one way of reflecting critically with established 
meanings and practices, not the only, unavoidable, or essential way. The point is congruent 
with the objection made in the previous chapter that Taylor's depiction of an identity crisis 
represents not the limits of human agency as such, but of a reflective human being whose 
self-interpretation is of fundamental concern. This might lead us to the further conjecture 
that Taylor's -emphasis on interpretation is itself an ý ethnocentric symptom, of an identity 
whose nature has become, in modem conditions, intrinsically problematic. ,ý: i 
(2) Back in - (1.3), we noted that in his dispute with Gadamer, -, Habermas turned, to 
systematically distorted communication as the paradigmatic instance of a linguistic 
phenomenon the grasp of which lies beyond the scope of hermeneutic reflection. Actions 
and utterances which appear incomprehensible both to the subject of them and to the 
ordinary participant in everyday discourse, Habermas argued, are rendered intelligible not 
in virtue of communicative competences which can be assumed in any speaker of a natural 
language, but rather by certain -theoretical assumptions held by the competent observer - in 
this case, the - psychoanalyst.,, Unlike hermeneutic: self-interpretation, the, ý 'scenic 
understanding! mediated by the theorefically informed analyst has explanatory power, in that 
it identifies the causal origins of the incomprehensibility in early disturbances to the agent's 
self-formative process. This synthesis of causal explanation and linguistic understanding 
gives systematically distorted communication an intelligibility it could never have under 
merely hermeneutic premisses. 11 However, according to the argument presented in (3-4), 
it is difficult to see how "scenic understanding' could have the causal significance which 
Habermas claims for it. The claim to equivalence between the original, symptomatic, and 
transference situations on which the explanatory force of the scenic understanding restsP 
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carries an onerous epistemological mortgage from, which this ýversion of 'depth 
hermeneutics' may not recover. We also saw that the controversial epistemological claim 
to equivalence is adventitious to the claim to 'depth' made for, psychoanalytical 
self-reflection, for the self-narration of the analysand can be theoretically informed without 
it requiring insight into singular and determinate causal origins. Furthermore, -in the light 
of Taylor's conception of hermeneutics, self-interpretations can feature in explanations of 
action without subsuming the particular event under a general causal law. It seems, then, 
as if Habermas's appeal to systematically distorted communication doesn't significantly 
challenge the role ascribed to language within Taylor's cultural theory and its hermeneutic 
model of self-reflection. 
But something important has been missed from this representation of the significance which 
systematically distorted communication has for Habermas. We can agree with Taylor's 
hermeneutic insight that the explanatory value of the theoretically informed autobiography 
lies not so much in its correspondence to an original fact of consciousness - something 
which would provide a 'criterion' for the best explanation - but rather in its comparative 
superiority to rival self-interpretations. We can also agree with Bernstein's insistence upon 
the internal relationship between the verification conditions of the general psychoanalytical 
interpretation of self-development and the productive, self-transformative character of the 
particular self-narration. - , But none: of this touches upon Habermas's 
hypothesis that the 
disturbances in self-formative processes which issue in systematically distorted 
communication have their origins in power relations which structure the social context of 
self-formation, quite independently of the capacity of the particular agent to recognize them. 
To be sure, the acceptability of this hypothesis would turn on it being the best account of 
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thoseavailable. But any account which failed to reckon on the socializing process which 
conditions the individual's capacity for linguistic deliberation over identity-carrying strong 
evaluations must stand to it at a disadvantage. What systematically distorted communication 
shows is that- since the initiation into language which conditions hermeneutic deliberation 
through it is subject to disturbance, a model of 'intact' contexts of self-formation is required 
even of hermeneutic theories, even though that context is not itself amenable to hermeneutic 
reflection. And unless such an account of an intact self-formative process which condidýns 
competent -desirability--characterization attribution is forthcoming, then agents engaged in 
practical deliberation over what is most worth pursuing may do so in self-deception -'or 
6ýen worse, they may be lead to radical practical error. The point becomes more pressing 
when directed against the general agenda of Taylor's cultural theory. ' 
(3) The task'of Taylolr's cultural theory of modernity is to bring to self-clarification the 
sources of significance which have historically shaped the modem'idenfity. It deploys a 
genealogical method by tracing these sources back to their pre-modem precursors' and in 
showing how they came to take such a widespread hold on-people's allegiance, it helps to 
explain the transition to modernity. ý But Taylor distances himself from the 'Idealist' claim 
that an account of the kind he offers is sufficient for explanatory purposes. 34 He 
acknowledges that any satisfactory diachronic causal explanation would have to take account 
of how material, economic, social, and psychological forces shaped the conditions for 
cultural allegiances, and he -observes that practices expressing certain aspects of" the 
emerging'modern1dentity were (and remain) "brutally" imposed . 
35 But he insists that the 
causal path between conceptions of the good and material/economic forces is two-way. 
Ideas shape and can'transform the 'realm of necessity', just as the realm of necessity must 
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take aý certain form . in order, for - conceptions of the good to be both, ý convincing and 
sustainable. 
But again, if a theory was avaliable which showed a systematic, non-contingent relationship 
between the realm of necessity and the space for articulating and transmitting conceptions 
of the good life, then Taylor's account would stand at a. disadvantage to it so far as 
explanatory power goes. ý The agenda for such a theory would be set not so much'by the 
conflict between rival conceptions of the good, but by the social space made available for 
practical , rational deliberation concerning them. Most notably, the ý significance Taylor 
attaches to 'ordinary -life' or 'the life of production and of the family' would thereby be 
altered. On the new agenda, -this could be interpreted as a realm within which rational 
practical deliberation is prone to systematic distortion, due to extra-linguistic pressures 
which themselves inflect the linguistic resources available to hermeneutic reflection. But 
this would be a phenomenon which lies beyond the scope of a cultural theory, even though 
it indirectly affects the content of that about which it seeks clarification. Whereas I earlier 
criticized Habermas's conception of the lifeworld for being insufficiently sensitive to the 
substance of normative conflict generated internally to it, it now seems that Taylor's concept 
of a background framework of, strong evaluation is insufficiently sensitive to normative 
conflicts genemted extemally to it. II 
I will briefly return to this issue of how ordinary life features on the agenda of Taylor's 
cultural and Habermas's acultural theory of modernity in the next chapter. But before that, 
I must turn to another source of contention with a non-vulgar Wittgensteinian 'expressivist' 
position. Habermas's proceduralism is motivated on the one hand by scepticism with regard 
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to a 'pre-modem' evaluative realism, and on the other by suspicion of self-re-endorsing, 
anti-Enlightenment prejudices. If a substantive theory of practical reason need not be 
burdened by the insufferable mortgage of 'metaphysical premises', it might still be 
supportive of conservatism in morals, politics, and practices of critical reflection. , 
(7.4) The Expressivist Mediation of Morality and Ethical Life 
We saw in section (5.3) how Habermas's deontological specification of the moral domain 
generated a problem of mediation between morality and ethical life. We also saw that 
Habermas's insistence upon the separation of these domains is motivated by the worrying 
anticipation of conservatism when moral reflection denies itself the possibility of 
transcending the parochialism of the lifeworld. I now want to consider how these issues of 
conservatism and mediation can be addressed from within an expressivist/hermeneutic 
framework for critical reflection. Now although not directly addressed by Taylor, this very 
task has been taken up by a philosopher wholly sympathetic to his, expressive ýrealist 
commitments - Sabina Lovibond in her book Realism and Imagination in Ethics-m Once 
the different senses of conservatism associated with these commitments have' been 
disentangled, Lovibond urges, an expressivism purged of spurious conservative associations 
offers itself as a sound philosophical basis for critical reflection. Although Lovibond's 
representation of the Hegelian distinction between morality and ethical life is idiosyncratic, 
her discussion remains useful since it challenges a strong motivation for Habermas's 
quasi-transcendental standard of critique and procedural conception of rationality. 
Let us first briefly remind ourselves of these 'expressive realist commitments'. Language 
is conceived as the 'expression' of a practice or 'form of life', and it is agreement in this 
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which ultimately conditions the use meaningful signs. Language embodies thought in a 
simi ar way to the sense in which, according to expressivism, social institutions are the 
embodiment of -, a culture. - The family, civil society; ' and the state, for example, are 
considered as the 'objective' expression of the identity of those who participate in them 
('objective spirit', as Hegel called them). Similarly, the objectivity of meaning is thought 
to consist in the publicly shared rule's which determine the correct application of concepts. 
'Moral reality! is'the name given . to the world as disclosed, by particular moral'concepts, 
and access to this world is conditioned by competence in the use of moral concepts. Moral 
concepts are capable of disclosing an 'objective' moral world -a world which'is in some 
sense 'found' - in virtue of rules which put constraints on the purely subjective or merely 
capricious use of them. Moral understanding, or competence in the use of moral concepts, 
requires the acknowledgement of a public or intersubjective authority in the way a moral 
concept can be applied coffectly; that is, in sentences which are 'true'. ': 'Moral objectivity, 
on this view, refers to amI aterial 'pull' which exercises itself on every I participant in the 
moral language game. Only on the basis of an 'agreement in action' does the possibility 
of meaningful, 'and hen-ce'objective, moral discourse arise. -A moral reality can disclose 
itself, therefore, only to human beings who have been initiated into a language, which is 
to say to participants in a form of life which is 'expressed' in its'language and other social 
insfitutions. 
Very broadly spealcing, this conception contrasts with an 'instrumental' understanding of 
language according to which word-meahings are in general determinable prior to their useý, 
for example by mental states which are considered as logically prior to the words which 
name them. Similarly, it is opposed to 'contract' theories, of society, according to which 
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the legitimacy of social institutions is modelled, in the first instance, upon a rational 
agreement between sovereign individuals. The expressivist view takes objection to the 
voluntarism implicit in both these models. It questions the coherence of the 
'instrumentalist' and 'contractarian' transcendence of that embeddedness of individuals in 
language and society which conditions our ability to think and act as concrete individuals. 
Indeed, it is only in virtue of this embeddedness in language and social institutions that one 
counts as a rational agent at all. What counts as rational (and as 'real') is a function of the 
rule-governed institutions which make up the practice in which one is embedded. It is these 
actually existing rules, norms, institutions and customs which express a moral reality, 
participation in which constitutes one as a rational agent, which are called in the expressivist 
tradition the Sittlichkeit. 
Is Habermas's worry is that these expressivist commitments lend themselves to conservatism 
in ethics and politics well founded? It is true, Lovibond submits, that the existence of a 
moral world requires continuity both diachronically and intersubjectively between 
participants in the moral community. It is in virtue of such continuity that ý spirit' is made 
o ective, and thus that we can talk of moral objectivity at all. It is also incoherent to think 
that we can abstract completely from the Sittlichkelt, in the kind of all-at-once overthrow 
of prevailing meanings, pretension to which informs radical scepticism. This much, indeed, 
is accepted by Habermas. But just as radical scepticism is the limiting case of doubt 
concerning moral objectivity, so the unquestioning acceptance of consensual norms - the 
view that any deviation from them is "a sufficient reason to debar the person concerned 
from the shared way of life in which every individual must participate if he is to sustain his 
identity as a rational subject to 37 _ is the limiting case of moral certainty. Between these 
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limits of total conceptual anarchy and conservative submission to the status quo lies the 
space for rational criticism, the expressivist will claim. This space is opened up by the 
relatively loose norms which guide the applicability of most moral (essentially contestable) 
concepts, and by the availability of 'recessive' rationalities which challenge the orthodox 
expression of normativity. Further, there is no way of telling a pilori the extent of moral 
certainty which is sufficient to sustain a person's identity as a rational agent, nor the degree 
of conformity which is sufficient to preserve the identity of a form of life. (It is up to the 
community "to decide when anomie has gone too far"38). 
The fear that expressivism leaves the individual trapped in the parochialism of the lifeworld 
is defused, Lovibond maintains, as soon as we distinguish between (a benign) 
'transcendental' and (a harmful) 'empirical' parochialism. Transcendental parochialism 
refers to the inescapability of the conceptual scheme to which we are transcendentally 
I related as corporeal beings, that is, as beings whose efforts at rational justification rest on 
the natural limit of a sub-linguistic consensus in forms of life. It is the parochialism of 
beings whose reality is mediated by language, but whose language is not grounded in 
rational choice or agreement. This much, that rational subjectivity rests ultimately on a 
shared form of biological life - on something animal - cannot be changed, according to 
expressivism. Transcendental parochialism of this kind, however, is not in any way 
informative about where the limits of rationality are to be drawn with respect to any 
particular belief or action. Its point is the philosophical one of establishing the conditions 
of rational thought and action in general; but this does not allow the expressivist to 
pronounce on the rationality of any (non-philosophical) actual thought or act. - Empirical 
parochialism, on the other hand, turns this expressivist acknowledgement of the immanence 
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of rationality to forms of life as a whole into a policy for conserving the actually existing 
language games, and the institutions which embody them, from change. But this 
conservative policy, Lovibond insists, is wholly adventitious to expressivism per se. , 
She 
attempts to explain the conservative interpretation of expressivism by appeal to a contrast 
between contingent attitudes which may be adopted towards those who do not conform with 
the prevailing Sittlichkelt. She does this by way of a phenomenology of dissent. 
The policy adopted to those who fail to find their identity expressed in the dominant 
communal institutions, and who in turn express their dissent in "unsittlich behaviour"", 
typically depends on whether a 'participant' or an 'observer' attitude is taken towards them, 
Lovibond suggests. In the former case, the challenge of the dissident to the prevailing 
norms of rationality is recognized as a potential act of rational subjectivity, or as worthy 
of consideration as a candidate for Moralit&. Accordingly, the dissident is regarded as 
someone "to be talked to rather than about". But this attitude may be withdrawn, and 
replaced by an 'observer' attitude according to which the dissident's participant status in the 
language game is annulled. The dissident then suffers the fate of an "excommunication"; 
she finds herself banished, by virtue of the anomaly she expresses, from the community of 
rational beings. The agent of unsittlich behaviour, then, is considered not as someone Wth 
whom dialogue is appropriate, but as something to be 'managed', 'cured', or 'trained'. 
"The conservative", Lovibond suggests, "is prone to think that deviation from the main 
channel of the language game is a sufficient ground for the objectification of the deviant". ' 
But this need not be the 'expressivist' response to those whose behaviour or beliefs fall 
outside the accepted criteria of rationality. Faced with a moral anomaly, one has the option 
of taldng the performative or the objectifying stance towards the agent of it: 
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the destruction of the dissident is brought about by the actions of individual 
persons who could, in principle, choose to do something other than what 
they currently do: and this understanding will lead us to anticipate the 
comment that the apparent penchant of dissenters for self-mutilation may be 
no more than a reflection of the violence emanating from within the moral 
organism. " 
This is the violence, Lovibond remarks, of a wholly static moral organism, one in which 
the only recognized moral obligations are those embodied in the moral reality as currently 
constituted. The objectification of the dissident, in other words, is the policy which accords 
with the conception of moral objectivity espoused by 'empirical' parochialism. To take the 
option of adopting a performative attitude, on the other hand, is to acknowledge the 
vulnerability of the moral organism to rational change. But the rationality of this change 
is not initially expressible in an 'objective' form; it must rather be understood in its 
'subjective' aspect, as carried by the 'imagination'. The task then becomes one of 
reintegrating the subjective and the objective perspectives on moral reality, which "must 
i 
result from the consciously willed establishment of an expressive relationship between 
" 42 ourselves and our public institutions . 
Hence a problem of mediation or 'reconciliation, arises for the expressivist. At what point 
can we reasonably claim that the inner, subjective perspective on the moral world (qua 
Moralitilt) carried by the imagination is reconciled or mediated with the outer, objective, 
or public perspective on moral reality (qua Sittlichkeit)? Since the obstacle to this 
reconciliation is the 'empirical' parochialism of the historically given Sittlichkeit, resistance 
to which motivates rational dissent, the problem can be reformulated as how critical 
reflection can be pushed back to the point of purely transcendental parochialism. The 
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possibility of identifying empirical parochialisms, according to Lovibond, rests on the 
availability of concrete conceptions of a less partial or. arbitrary moral world, as expressed 
in the lives of those participating in (or imagining) some other community. , But acceptance 
of this, Lovibond conjectures, presupposes commitment to a limiting point at which the 
ground to be covered in the overcoming of empirical, parochialism runs, out. Such an 
absolute conception of moral reality would-be "one in which the, individual -or 'local 
perspectives of all human beings would find harmonious expression". "' At this 'absolute' 
point, parochialism would -be solely transcendental in Idnd, and the form of life which 
expressed it would be in agreement, as Lovibond puts it, with "universal reason". 44 
From a substantive political point of view, there is much for Habermas to be in agreement 
with here. Lovibond's proposed 'absolute' conception of moralityas, what is embodied in 
a form of life in agreement with 'universal reason' by virtue of the local perspectives of all 
human beings finding harmonious expression, -clearly bears the hallmark of the -utopian 
moment of Habermas's counterfactually presupposed communication community. ,,, And 
Lovibond's attack on the conservative expressivists surreptitious presumption -of, 4 static 
moral organism converges with the space Habermas opens, up for reflexivity and fluidity 
within the lifeworld when reproduced by communicatively rational action. - But, once the 
expressivist has recourse to a distinction between empirical and transcendental parochialism, 
she need not feel imprisoned by the resources of the actually existing ethical customs from 
which, Habermas fears, expressivism as such offers no escape. Given'. this distinction, 
Habermas's worry can be seen as directed towards a policy for excluding participant status 
to the moral anomaly represented by the dissident, but this policy can noW be seen as 
adventitious to the philosophical mainspring of the expressivist conception of language itself. 
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(7-5) Conclusion 
But while the utopian, critical direction of expressivism and Habermas's theory may be 
aligned, there is a reversal at the level of justification. According to Lovibond's view, 
6universal reason' is still a 'parochialism' of sorts - the parochialism of embodied linguistic, 
self-interpreting animals - and is conceived as a limiting point of a process of reflection 
which begins with the content of actual linguistic practices. The gap between this point of 
departure and the limiting conception of a concrete universalism, for Lovibond, is covered 
by the imagination of the critic. But for Habermas, the process of justification begins with 
idealized presuppositions which precede concrete conceptions of their embodiment. 
According to Habermas's conception, we begin by abstracting ourselves into the idealized 
universalism of communicative reason, and then cover the ground backwards to the 
parochialism of the actuality of the Sittlichkeit. But this is an otiose move for the 
expressivist, since the question of what reason there is for recognizing the objective claims 
of moralit& cannot be answered in advance by appeal to necessarily presupposed structures 
of thought or action, since it cannot be decided in advance of the availability of moral 
sources to empower morally motivated action. I have already considered the difficulties of 
mediation to which Habermas's recommended exercise in abstraction leads. But the 
problem of mediation has by no means vanished with the adoption of an expressivist, 
standpoint. For what now needs to be reconciled are the subjective perspective on the 
moral world as carried by the imagination and oriented to moral sources, and the objective 
or publicly instituted ethical life. The question remains open as to how, under conditions 
of modernity, what Lovibond calls an expressive relation can be willed between ourselves 
and our public institutions. For this, in Taylor's terms, would require that moral sources 
assume an objective form in the 'public order of references'. But is it really conceivable 
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that in the' modem world an expressive relation can be established with -an objectively 
articulable moral order? And if not, what are the implications for theform the imagination 
must take if it is to gain access to moral sources? 
I 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE CRITIQUE - OF REASON: INSTRUNWNTAL, 
FUNCTIONAL OR PROCEDURAL? ;I 
(8.0) Introduction 
By reference to the work of Habermas and Taylor, I have been examining two ways in 
which philosophical insight into a tension between cognition and identity can clarify the idea 
that modernity - construed as a horizon of thought and action or as a moqe of being - is 
disposed to crisis. Both Habermas and Taylor undertake to put the intuition that modernity 
suffers from a self-undermining dominance of instrumental reason on a philosophically 
sound basis. Further, they share the view that this basis needs to be recovered from 
conceptual distortions built into the 'subject-centred' paradigm of reason. According to that 
paradigm, rationality is conceived in terms of a cognitive/instrumentat relation, between a 
subject and an, object. The modem distinction between, - subject and object, both authors 
stress, needs to be seen in contrast to the pre-modem fusion of-cognition and identity in 
cosmological world views. Coming to knowledge of the cosmological order, according to 
these views, is co-extensional with finding one's place in the moral order. But with the 
modem turn, an object of cognition becomes defined as something which is extemql to 
human identity. This makes room for an 'instrumental' paradigm of rationality, based upon 
the external, antagonistic, and deeply paradoxical relation of a subject to an object-' Both 
Habermas, and Taylor offer accounts ý of how Post-Enlightenment thought struggles to 
re-establish an internal relation between cognition and identity, without returning to the kind 
of 'substantive' paradigm of reason embodied in the pre-modem conception of cosmological 
orders. But the hold of subject-centred reason is such, both our authors agree,, that even 
the most radical critics of instrumentalism can unwittingly reproduce it. For this reasoni 
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Taylor concurs with Habermas's thesis that the 'total critique of reason' in contemporary 
neo-Nietzscheanism founders precisely in virtue of the hidden subject-centredness which 
anchors it. ' In other words, both claim that this kind of critique commits a performative 
contradiction; it cannot make sense of its own normative presuppositions without appealing 
to those very norms which are, or are entailed by, the object of its critique. 
In (8.1) 1 consider, the extent to which, from Taylor's critical perspective on 
instrumentalism, Habermas's theory is also guilty , of this charge - of 'performative 
contradiction'. For Habermas, we have seen, the critique of instrumental reason is best 
seen as a redemption of the claims of linguistically constituted intersubjectivity ý from 
encroachment by a derivative (and coercive) functional reason. An internal relation between 
cognition and identity is regained, we might interpret Habermas as claiming, in the 
communicative conditions of self-formation. But by maldng this into a claim about the 
procedural nature-of communicative rationality, Habermas is open to the charge that the 
normative presuppositions of communicative action, explored in 'discourse ethics', are 
irrelevant for questions of identity. , For that there are such presuppositions in no way 
informs me why it is good for me not to contradict them, unless I am already committed 
to an identity which has allegiance to the good of consistently following the communicative 
procedure? But whether I should have this commitment -a question of identity - is not 
itself answerable by reference to the procedure. Since the procedural paradigm of Practical 
reason cannot make sense of the norm presupposed in the motivation to follow the 
procedure, it is guilty of performative contradiction. For Taylor, any procedural account 
of rationality reproduces the basic errors and blindnesses of instrumentalism, amongst which 
is the denial of substantive goods (a conception of freedom and dignity) presupposed in that 
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denial. But- if; as I argued in chapter five, Habermas's general critique of instrumental 
reason is not ý procedural - because it is not independent of a substantive conception of 
human dignity - then what remains of the charge that Habermas's model of critique* is 
(implicitly) subject-centred? After rejecting various formulations of this charge as resting 
on, misunderstandings 'of Habermas's position, I turn (8.2) to the claims Taylor ý makes 
concerning artistic modernism. Contrary to Habermas's subjectivist interpretation (as an 
unfettered exploration of human subjectivity), Taylor reads modernist art as striving after 
'epiphanies' which disclose a real, trans-subjective moral order, but one only accessible 
through a language of personal resonance. While these claims might be valid, I go on to 
question their compatibility with the claims about identity and practical reasoning which' 
featured in the transcendental arguments for moral realism considered in the previous two 
chapters., ) 
In (8.3), 1 consider the implications of Taylor's claim that the moral sources disclosed by 
modernist epiphanies can be tapped only by being indexed to a personal subjective vision. 
Taylor's suggestion that moral sources can no longer structure a public order of references 
is, I argue, problematic both in terms of his own account of how legitimation crises emerge 
in modem societies, and 4n terms of how these crises may in principle be resolved. I 
suggest that his'bleak diagnosis results from an arbitrary generalization of the fate of a 
theistic moral source, a fate which again reminds us of the young Hegel's diagnosis of the 
positivity of religion. This puts us in a position to reassess the relevance of the modellof 
an ethical totality which Habermas draws from Hegel. I propose that taken'as a model of 
self-formative processes, the Hegelian view as interpreted by Habermas can at least obviate 
some of the unnecessary difficulties generated by a theistic commitment adventitious to 
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Taylor's basic hermeneutic insights. One of these-insights is not only that artistic 
modernism is sensitive to, the experiential consequences of instrumentalism - an insight 
which, with its focus on intersubjectivity, Habermas's approach elides - but also that it 
engages in a form of critical practice which is the most appropriate response to those 
consequences. - And this gives the cutting edge to Taylor's conception of philosophical 
critique; to recover contact with moral sources beyond the atomized self which are not only 
occluded in modem forms of inarticulacy, but realizable only in virtue of the modem 
creative imagination. In (8.4), 1 compare the responses of Habermas and Taylor to the 
critical capacity of artistic modernism. I suggest that these different responses correspond 
to the roles of what I call the objective and the subjective critic. In my conclusion, I'will 
sketch the different perspectives brought by the two kinds of critic to an issue at the heart 
of the political problem of modernity's self-reassurance; ecology. Using Habermas's 
distinction between the problem-solving and world-disclosive dimensions of language; I state 
a promissory case for both Idnds of criticism, under the condition that the needs to which 
they are addressed are conceptually and practically distinguished. I conclude by proposing 
this as a policy for the critique of instrumentalism in general. 
(8.1) Procedural Reason and Performative Self-Contradiction 
Critics - of , modernity repeatedly identify the dehumanizing'effects, of a form of existence 
rationalized along predominantly 'instrumental' lines. Philosophical critics have located 
these effects in very general structures of thought and action which have been presumed to 
constitute the rationality of the modem ý horizon of self-understanding.,, ý The critique of 
'Instrumental Reason' traces these structures back to the fundamental relationship between 
a subject and an object, and is informed by something like the following picture of modem 
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rationality. As a structure of thought, 'Reason' is the subject's capacity for correctly 
ordering and accurately representing external neutral objects, a capacity which requires the 
minimization -of subjective value or meaning-projections onto the objective world. 
Classical empiricist philosophy can be seen as an articulation of this horizon, and criticism 
of modem instrumentalism often goes by way of an attack on the philosophy which 
reinforces this picture of human beings and their relation to the world. 4 Likewise, classical 
utilitarianism can be seen as drawing upon and perpetuating this picture of human beings 
and their dealings with the world. ' As a, horizon of human agency, objects are still 
intrinsically neutral, but, are invested with value insofar as they are instrumental to the 
purposes of the human subject. But practical reason is incapable of divining what these 
purposes should be, for there is no objective moral ordering of purposes to be divined. 
There is, however, one purpose which, even as an object, the subject must consider in its 
practical deliberations; that of self-preservation. Self-preservation can thus be construed as 
the only end which is rationally determinable - the only point at which practical reasoning 
extends beyond the province of calculating efficient means to subjectively chosen ends. 
Cognition in a disenchanted world is of objects accurately represented by a subject which, 
in its capacity to represent itself, can control and manipulate objects and, itself, for the 
purpose of its self-preservation. But by turning itself into an object, by determining the 
province of practical reasoning as that of the calculable and manipulable, the subject loses 
the aura of its own intrinsic meaningfulness, and hence the point of its practical 
deliberations. The critics of Instrumental Reason further argue that the dominant practices 
and social institutions of modernity - the market, capitalism, and bureaucratic administration 
- are attributable to the overriding hold on western civilization of the imperatives of 
self-preservation; where the notion of self-preservation is modelled on . -the, primordial 
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relation between a subject and an object. Modernity as a whole is diagnosed as being 
geared towards the same kind of unconstrained (and ultimately self-destructive) expansion 
and control as is prefigured in the subject-object relation. " 
While Habermas and Taylor agree that the phenomena identified by the critique of 
Instrumental Reason are real enough, they both resist attributing them to the domination of 
'Reason' as such. That the critique of Reason should take this path betrays the 
presupposition that rationality must be understood either in its Platonic, substantive form, 
or as modelled on a means-ends/representative relation of a subject to an object. The 
critique of Reason, if it is to be capable of articulating that by appeal to which it is critical, 
must show why this opposition is inadequate. Habermas does this by way of proposing an 
alternative paradigm of communicative reason. The subject-object relation can then be 
regarded as parasitic upon a more primordial context of communicative intersubjectivity, 
from which the norms for the critique of instrumental reason, now considered as a critique 
of "an unleashed functionalist reason of systems maintenance", can be derived. ' So the 
crisis which the critique of Instrumental Reason diagnoses as a dialectic of the subject-object 
relation, is diagnosed by the critique of 'Functionalist Reason' as a disfigurement of 
intersubjectivity. For Habermas, the subject-object relation is introduced as an alien 
element "into relationships that by nature follow the structure of mutual understanding 
among subj ects". And this division and usurpation of the rational potential of 
communicative action corresponds to the one-sided rationalization (along the aspect of 
cognitive/instrumental mastery) of the lifeworld promoted by the unfettered, functionally 
self-preserving imperatives of the economic and administrative sub-systems. The critique 
of Functionalist Reason avoids the normative impasse consequent upon the assumption made 
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by the critique of Instrumental Reason that; 
the disenchantment of religious-metaphysical world views robs rationality, 
along with the contents of tradition, of all substantive connotations and 
thereby strips it of its power to have a structure-forming influence on the 
lifeworld beyond the purposive-rational organization of means. As opposed 
to this, I would like to insist that, despite its purely procedural character as 
disburdened of all religious and metaphysical mortgages, communicative 
reason is directly implicated in social life-processes insofar as acts of mutual 
understanding take on the role of a mechanism for coordinating action. ' 
The question I now want to raise is whether Habermas's metacritique of the critique of 
Instrumental Reason - that it cannot make sense of its normative foundations - can itself be 
turned against the critique of Functionalist Reason, insofar as the latter appeals to a 
conception of reason with a "purely procedural character". Taylor gives a critique of 
procedural reason which effectively poses this challenge. Matters will be clearer if we 
distinguish Taylor's general objections against proceduralism from his specific criticisms 
of Habermas's version of it. This is because the nature of the proceduralism attacked 
differs in the two cases. 
There are two quite different contexts in which Taylor examines the nature and 
shortcomings of a procedural conception of reason. In the first place, he associates it with 
the paradigm of rational disengagement inaugurated by Descartes but only fully developed 
in Locke's conception of a 'punctual self'. "Disengagement is always correlative to an 
'objectification'", Taylor writes, where "objectifying a given domain involves depriving it 
of its normative force for us. "" The mechanization of the scientific world picture involved 
such an objectification; it neutralized an order of 'Ideas' or 'correspondences' to a 
norm-free mechanism. While Taylor acknowledges that this transition represents an 
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episternic gain so far as our understanding of the physical universe goes, he -claims that the 
adoption of a disengaged objectifying stance towards the subject of experience itself is more 
a so4rce of bewitchment and error. It is this radicalization of disengaged reason, Taylor 
suggests, which issues in a model of the punctual self. The procedure of disassembling and 
reconstructing items of , experience according to , fixed canons, of, thinking ý -which is 
definitive of rationality for the disengaged inquirer, "- objectifies the pre-disengaged flow 
of experience by depriving it of any normative epistemic content; it is homogenized to the 
level of cognitively innocent and -impersonal inner sensations which have a scientifically 
describable external cause but no genuine object; Taylor points out that much of human 
experience and knowledge is either unintelligible or arbitrarily dismissed along these lines, 
but it is the ethical rather than the epistemological motives behind proceduralism ý which 
really interest him. 12 ý For by adopting an objectifying stance towards the self, the prospect 
opens up for unprecedented control and self-remaldng for which procedural reason is the 
instrument. Such is Locke's 'punctual self', which Taylor defines as the subject who takes 
a radical stance of disengagement to himself-, 
To take this stance is to identify oneself with the power to objectify and 
remake, and by this act to distance oneself from 0 the particular features 
which are objects of potential change. What we are essentially is none of the 
latter, but what finds itself capable of fixing them and working on them . 
13 
Reason is construed as the procedure to be followed in exercising this control. Following 
it is the responsibility of each individual agent, who in taking the radically reflexive 
objectifying stance towards his beliefs, habits and desires - in short, what is pre-given in 
his embodiment - can remould them with the dignity afforded to the autonomous, atomic, 
knowing subject. As Taylor remarks, the validity of the first-person perspective is 
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paradoxically undermined by the very disengaged stance it is a condition of a 
14 
, 
If this is what it means for rationality to be procedural, clearly communicative rationality 
does not have a purely procedural character. On the contrary, the foregoing depiction of 
'procedural reason' is almost identical to the portrayal of the very 'subject-centred reason' 
in opposition to which Habermas offers his communicative model. First, in defining the 
objectification perpetrated by the disengaged self in terms ý of norm-neutralization, and 
associating this with social practices (or technologies of the self) of discipline and control, " 
Taylor is putting just the point expressed in Habermas's critique of the norm-free mediation 
of subjects determined by the functional mechanism of administrative power (the 
objectifications of functional reason). Second, it is just to avoid the paradoxical objectifying 
self-relation of the subject that Habermas, seeks to ground rationality in the linguistic 
medium of intersubjectivity. Nor is the disengaged proceduralism identified by Taylor to 
be conflated with Habermas's rational reconstructions. ,ý The latter, unlike ý the former, 
involve a recapitulation of already existing but pre-theorefical competences, not their 
objectification into a norm-free, wilfully manipulable mechanism. "' As we have seen, it is 
when practical reason is exclusively modelled on a rational, reconstruction that problems 
arise within Habermas's account. Procedural ethics provides us with the second context for 
Taylor's general critique, but so far he has not shown why a procedural conception of 
rationality is necessarily tied to an 'instrumental' conception of it. 
Taylor's general attack on procedural ethics focusses on its refusal to acknowledge 
qualitative contrasts. In typibal fashiop, he responds to this refusal byway of a genealogy 
of what motivates the espousal of - moral proceduralism. First, there is the. family e of 
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epistemological and metaphysical, presuppositions behind the 'naturalist' temper; that the 
human sciences be modelled upon and continuous with the natural sciences. Accordingly, 
like objective states of affairs "human affairs ought to be maximally described in external, 
non culture-bound terms". " But in addition to this, Taylor suggests that the proceduralist 
ethic is bolstered by a cluster of unavowed moral motives. First on this hidden agenda is 
affiliation to the affirmation of everyday life, and a suspicion of any notion of the 'higher'. 
The rejection of qualitative - distinctions can be seen as a liberation from the crushing 
demands of the 'higher', or as a modest antidote to the smug self-satisfaction felt by those 
who claim to meet them. Second, there is an implicit commitment to a modem conception 
of freedom, for example in contract theorists who insist that "normative orders must 
originate in the will". ", Third, there is the emphasis on practical benevolence and an 
associated presumption that intellectual inquiry ought to be directed towards relieving "the 
condition of manldnd". This motive can be compounded with a suspicion that'theorists 
focussing on qualitative distinctions are self-indulgent or socially irresponsible; unconcerned 
about justice, altruism, and the like. Fourth, the proceduralist ethic seeks to -avoid 
"parochial ethical principles", which Taylor attributes to affiliation to the hypergood of 
'purity'. " This affiliation also disposes the proceduralist to make hard distinctions between 
purely moral and other values. 10 
Taylor's point in maldng the above objections is to identify goods which are presupposed 
in the procedural account of practical reason; especially the goods of freedom and 
benevolence as they are supported by the hypergoods of rational disengagement and the 
affirmation of everyday life. And only if one is motivated by these hypergoods, will there 
be any reason to abide by the ethic; to follow obligations determined by the rules of justice., 
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As soon as one accepts these goods, then they must be accounted for, in a conception of 
practical reason. Given the good of freedom, purity, ' and the like, then one can argue about 
procedures. But a theory which dismisses the Idnd of goods which feature in qualitative 
contrasts will be inarticulate about its normative foundation. Any proceduralist ethic cannot 
avoid this performative contradiction, so Taylor argues. . '' I 
How applicable are these general criticisms to Habermas's theory? What first needs to be 
stressed is that one could accept the kind of theory Habermas proposes without denying the 
validity of qualitative distinctions. Habermas recognizes the importance of strong 
evaluations, it is just that he places them outside the domain of morality and pure practical 
reason. I have already argued (5.3), using reasons similar to those invoked by-Taylor, why 
this taxonomy is both unfortunate and misleading. This led me to propose that Habermas's 
theory as a whole - that is, as addressing the problem of modernity's self-reassurance - is 
best interpreted - in 'substantive' rather than 'procedural', terms. The applicability of the 
general -critique against proceduralism -to Habermas's, theory can be made clear by 
considering'Taylor's objection that concerning the 'communicative ethic';, 
The crucial point would not be the presuppositions of communicative action, 
but rather the way in which human identity is formed through dialogue and 
recognition. The argument would turn on the acknowledgement, in other 
words, of a crucial human good, and not simply on the pragmatic 
contradiction involved in the violation of certain norms. " IIIý 
Insofar as the rational reconstructions of discourse ethics goes, this objection holds. -, But 
the wider aim of the theory of communicative action is to establish just this thesis; 'that 
pathologies ensue when individual and social identity is formed otherwise. Where Taylor 
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goes astray - is in identifying the 'procedural' nature of communicative rationality with 
procedural practical reason. If Habermas, were to modify his theory in the way proposed 
in chapter five, it can establish that there are human goods of autonomy and solidarity 
which can only be realized under conditions of undistorted. intersubjectivity. The pragmatic 
contradiction which is relevant to Taylor's point is more the paradox identified by Weber, 
which Habermas theorizes as the violation , of 
lifeworld norms, by the system. 
Communicative reason is precisely not procedural in Taylor's sense because it is internally 
related to the the goods which it conditions as a structure of self-formative processes. 
The crucial difference between Habermas and Taylor lies in what, they take to be most 
structurally significant in the process of self-formation. This is most evident in the role 
they give to 'everyday life'. 'For Taylor, everyday life - the life of production and the 
family -- is of significance in virtue of - the motivational capacity of the strong evaluation 
which -affirms it as a hypergood. This valuation, Taylor suggests, features as a hidden 
support for the procedural ethic. But the significance of everyday life in Habermas's theory 
is quite different. For not only is everyday life the resource of life goods which may be 
affirmed, it is also the context of the self-formative process. This context is not itself a 
strong evaluation, but a condition 'of it. 'On the one hand, the life of production and 
biological reproduction (institutionalized in the family or not) is not something about which 
the social animal homo sapiens has a choice, and therefore is, not something we can 
understand primarily as an affirmation. On the other hand,, the dominant mode, of 
production and biological reproduction clearly structures the self-formative process 
independently of whether the life of production and the family is itself strongly valued, or 
indeed of any strong evaluations. As Habermas insists, the socialization which everyday 
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life structures is also an individuation; the two cannot in principle be separated. 
There is something misleading, then, in construing everyday life as an object of strong 
evaluation. The issue here is not, as Taylor suggests, suspicion of any notion of the 
'higher'. - It is rather that the everyday life of production and biological reproduction is a 
locus of power. ' The suspicion is more that notions of the 'higher' often mask the real 
sources of this power, both material and simultaneously symbolic or 'cultural'. - Taylor 
would ý not deny this obvious point, it is just that his approach to everyday life directs us 
away from putting it. The motive behind Habermas's theory need not be so sinister as to 
makes us suspect cultural theories of the kind adopted by Taylor of social irresponsibility. 
It is better to think of the former as highlighting the political question of power which the 
latter puts out of focus. The fomer approach can focus on the self-fomative process which 
the power relations embodied in modem forms of production and biological reproduction 
disturb, whereas the latter focusses on these phenomena as strongly valued and hence an 
expression of identity. - tl- 
r -' 
Habermas's 'proceduralism% we have seen, boils down to his commitment- that 
setf-formative processes can be explained by rational reconstructions. Discourse ethics is 
but-a species of this genus', and by focussing on the species, Taylor distorts Habermas's 
-intent in ascribing to communicative reason a 'purely procedural character'. Butaswehave 
already seen, - Habermas is also committed to the view that disturbances in the self-formative 
process can be understood by narratively carried out self-critique. And here lies the rub 
of Taylor's -objection that Habermas's communicative ethic cannot make sense of -its 
normative foundation. For in order to motivate action, rational reconstructions remain to 
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be internalized into an identity which only a life narrative can provide. As Habermas is 
aware, rational reconstructions per se cannot empower subjects to continue their disturbed 
self-formative process; they cannot address the motivational problem of 'why changeT. But 
this is a necessary condition of successful critique; there must be a passion to undertake it. 
The communicative ethic, and the critical powers of the theory of communicative action, 
is only coherent given the acknowledgement of this passion. Habermas might be correct 
to insist that the violation of communicative norms by the strategic actor is not an option 
from the point of view of the lifeworld, but it is only not an optional reason for acting for 
the agent who has internalized the theoretical perspective of the lifeworld into a narrative 
perspective on his or her own identity as constituted by an ethical totality which awaits 
acknowledgement. Once acknowledged, Taylor's attack on Habermas the proceduralist no 
longer has a target. 
(8.2) The Epiphanic Mediation of Cognition and Identity 
I have been arguing that, in certain crucial respects, Habermas's theory is not of the 
'proceduralist' kind which is attacked by Taylor, and that consequently there is a danger of 
overstating the differences between their critiques of instrumental reason. Habermas's 
communicative reason is not 'procedural' in at least some of the senses Taylor gives to the 
term, because it is internally related to human constants which can without distortion be 
called 'the good', while the conception of reason which informs Taylor's critique of 
proceduralism is not 'substantive' in Habermas's sense because it does not appeal to a 
Platonic, - cosmological moral order. Both recognize that the tension between cognition and 
identity which is built into subject-centred, reason cannot be overcome by either assimi ating 
identity to cognition (the absolutist or Raving Platonist position) or by assimilating cognition 
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to identity (the relativist, neo-Nietzschean position). But deep differences remain, of which 
the following two are the most significant. First, Taylor takes Habermas's account to be 
cripplingly anthropocentric, since it leaves no room for goods which are not internally 
related to human capacities or needs. Second, Taylor argues that the exploration of such 
goods, while unintelligible on Habermas's account, is in fact central to the phenomenon of 
modernist art. - Since, as Habermas accepts, this phenomenon informs the problem of 
modernity's self-reassurance, Taylor can claim that Habermas's misinterpretation of 
modernism has a distorting effect on his formulation of the self-reassurance problem. In 
short, Taylor takes the view that Habermas is insufficiently radical in his, critique of 
subject-centredness, that this is most evident in his interpretation of artistic modernism', and 
that the correct interpretation points to something which might redeem the modem identity 
from the subject-centredness or instrumentalism which has led it to crisis. The prospect of 
a non-anthropocentric ethic that it opens up I will consider later, for it presupposes the 
validity of claims Taylor makes about artistic modernism. 
Taylor's difference with Habermas on the significance of artistic modernism goes to the 
heart of their conflicting interpretations of the problem of modernity's self-reassurance for 
the following reason. The significance of art in the critique of Enlightenment, -for 
Habermas, lies primarily in its potential as a surrogate for religion as a bonding force 
between socialized individuals. 21 In Taylor's terms, Habermas focusses on the public 
consequences of the decline of religion, that is, on the demise of religion as a medium of 
sociation, and hence on the gap it leaves with respect to the sources of solidarity required 
for social integration. But besides the public consequences of instrumentalism - the 
rectification of which critics of Enlightenment have sought in aesthetically transformed civic 
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religion -, there are also experiential consequences to which artistic modernism must be 
understood as a reaction. 'Both Taylor and Habermas identify the experience of 
objectification; of the reification of subjectivity wrought in instrumental, capitalist, modem 
society. But whereas Habermas discerns the explorations of and experiments in 'pure' or 
'unfettered', subjectivity as the principle of modernist art - and celebrates it as an important 
antidote to the phenomenon of reification - Taylor interprets the subjectivism of modem art 
as a route to something greater, rather than as the destination of the modernist creative 
moment as such. Again, though both Habermas and Taylor want to redeem the claims to 
validity of modernist, works of art from the positivist view that science holds exclusive 
rights on truth, they differ, on what they take to be the nature of this claim., While 
Habermas stresses the claim to authenticity - to genuine expression of subjectivity - in the 
modernist art-work, for Taylor this view represents a massive oversight regarding the task 
of the modernist artist, one which betrays the vestigial grip of subject-centred reason on 
Habermas's theory. , This is because of the' modernist aspiration towards, and exploration 
of an order in which the artist is set as a locus of moral sources. This "search for moral 
sources outside the subject through languages which resonate within him or her, the 
grasping of an order which is inseparably'indexed to a personal vision", 24 issues; in the 
'epiphanic' dimension of modernist- art. The modernist exploration of a moral order 
through a language of personal resonance, Taylor points out, is unintelligible within 
Habermas's' framework of modem understanding; it is a matter neither of, objective 
scientific knowledge, nor procedural practical reasoning, nor unfettered expression of 
subjectivity. The validity of epiphanic art falls between the differentiated claims of 
objective truthý normative rightness, and subjective authenticity. But the epiphanic work 
of art, Taylor insists, is nevertheless criticizable; it can succeed or fail as an epiphany. * 'In 
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this section I will now consider in more detail (1) the nature of the epiphanic claim and (2) 
its intelligibility within Taylor's own realist hermeneutic framework. In the next section, 
I turn to its implications for a possible resolution of the problem of self-reassurance., 
(1) 7he Epiphanic Claim of the Modemist Aesthetic; Taylor's identification of and, -focus 
upon what he calls the epiphanic dimension of modernist art is in the following fundamental 
respect merely a continuation of his expressivist conception of language. To think of a 
work of art as an epiphany is to consider it "the locus of a manifestation which brings us 
into the presence of something which is otherwise inaccessible". ' What the epiphanic 
work manifests "is somehow inseparable from its embodiment", 26 such that one cannot 
understand what it is "qua epiphany by pointing to some independently available object 
described or referent. What the work reveals has to be read in it. "' As we saw in (7.4), 
expressivists take the same relation to hold between language and being generally. They 
take the view that language discloses a world to which there is no non-linguistic accessý'; 
that what language reveals about the world has to be read in language, and not, say, in 
some sensory pre-linguistic touchstone with the world. Similarly, they deny the view that 
thoughts are prior to and logically independent of their linguistic manifestation, and insist 
rather that meanings are constitutively what they are as made manifest or embodied in 
language. ' The meaning of the epiphanic art-work is likewise indissolubly embedded in the 
medium of its manifestation; the visions of the epiphanic poet "give us reality in a medium 
which can't be separaied from them". " 
But whereas the objectivity of meaning requires public rules for the correct application'of 
the language, the meaning of the epiphanic art-work does not admit of such criteria. This 
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is because what the epiphany discloses - namely, moral sources - are, on Taylor's view not 
publicly accessible under modem conditions. "In the Post-Enlightenment world", Taylor 
writes, "the epiphanic power of words cannot be treated as a fact about the order of things 
which holds unmediated by the works of the creative imagination. "" The creative 
imagination, rather than the public order of meanings, becomes the indispensable locus of 
moral sources. Since moral sources are of "the highest moral significance", the artist can 
become accredited with 'paradigmatic' human status. " Although Taylor gives a complex 
genealogy of the modem conception of art as epiphany, with its associated exaltation of the 
artist, and the powers of creative imagination, the underlying idea here, is that - the 
world-disclosive powers of ordinary language can become impoverished. When language 
becomes a mere instrument for everyday, routinized interaction - as it does in the context 
of instrumental society - contact with moral sources becomes problematic. " The creative 
imagination of the poet is then needed not only to reldndle contact with what gives human 
life, its, deeper, more fulfilling meaning, but also to discover new sources of spiritual 
I fulfilment which are defined or completed in the creative revelation of them. ", 11 , 
But contact with moral sources becomes problematic in other ways, evident in how Taylor 
traces the, development of the modernist understanding of epiphany from its Romantic 
precursor. * The Romantics, on Taylor's reading, excelled in 'epiphanies of Being'., The 
aim of -the Romantic epiphany is to show some reality (disclosed in the work) to be an 
expression of something (say, the voice of nature, unsullied inner impulse) which is an 
unambiguously good moral source (contact with which empowered unambiguously good 
action). With the modernist turn, the way in which epiphanies make something -manifest 
moves away from the expressive capacity of the elements of the work, while what is made 
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manifest -a moral source - becomes much more ambiguous. The first shift involves greater 
sensitivity to the indirect nature of the epiphany, and subsequently a need for what Taylor 
calls, 'subtler languages' of articulation. Consequently, the notion of a 'self' - or more 
accurately of a 'source of the self' - which is expressed becomes problematized. The 
second shift', in addition, questions the affirinability of what is disclosed either by 
self-expression or some other form of manifestation. I will briefly consider each of these 
shifts in turn. 
Of modernist forms of epiphany, Taylor distinguishes what he terms the 'framing epiphany', 
the 'intertemporal epiphany', and the 'Post-Schopenhauerian epiphany. Qua epiphanies 
they reveal something which lies beyond the self, but unlike the Romantic epiphanies of 
Being, the epiphanic function is not performed by words or objects with an expressive 
capacity. Framing and intertemporal epiphanies fmme a space between objects, or between 
an event and its recurrence, and it is in virtue of this space between things, rather than of 
the expressive power in them, that the epiphany can work by "bringing something close 
which would otherwise be infinitely remote". ' This move requires a sharper reflexive 
focus on the particularities of language, in order to redeem its disclosive power from. its 
degeneration into an "inert instrument" for dealing "more effectively with things". 35 And 
crucially for our purposes, Taylor acknowledges that the shift involves a 'decentring' of the 
self from its position as a centre either of disengagement or expressive unity. The 
modernist "epiphanic centre of gravity begins to be displaced from the self to the flow of 
"36 experience such that we are taken "beyond the self as usually understood, to a 
fragmentation of experience which calls our ordinary notions of identity into question ... or 
beyond that to a new kind of unity". " While the intertemporal epiphany challenges the 
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basic modes of time consciousness and narrativity associated with both disengaged reason 
and - Romanticism, the modernist critique of the unitary self is most evident in the 
'Post-Schopenhauerian' epiphany. Taylor continues; 
The ideals of disengaged reason and of Romantic fulfilment both rely in 
different ways on a notion of the unitary self. The first requires a tight 
centre of control which dominates experience and is capable of constructing 
the orders of reason by which we can direct thought and life. The second 
sees the originally divided self come to unity in the alignment of sensibility 
and reason ... to the degree that we adopt a post-Schopenhauerian vision of inner nature, the liberation of inner experience can seem to require that we 
step outside the circle of the single, unitary identity, and that we open 
ourselves to the flux which moves beyond the scope of control -or 
integration. " 
In the post-Schopenhauerian (modernist) world "there is no single construal. of experience 
which one can cleave to exclusively without disaster or impoverishment". " Taylor's 
favourite exemplar of this Idnd of epiphany - Thomas Mann's 7he Magic Mountain - 
oppresents two radically incombinable modes of time consciousness, one which approaches 
timelessness and another which is constituted by the calendar of real events". 40 Moreover, 
Mann shows that this "slippage from our normal sense of measured time is the essential 
condition for a deeper experience which opens another dimension of life". " This 
recognition that human life is irreducibly multilevelled "has to be won against the 
presumptions of the unified self, controlling or expressive". 42 And in this recognition we 
are carried "quite outside the modes of narration [common to the disengagement and 
expressivism] which endorse a life of continuity or growth with one biography or across 
generations". 
43 
The manner in which the modernist epiphany renders us close to a moral source beyond the 
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self thus involves a transfiguration of what is disclosed in the disclosure of it as refracted 
through the creative imagination. Now this transfigurative quality of the modernist 
epiphany is crucial for understanding the second rift with Romantic 'epiphanies of Being'; 
that concerning what is disclosed and its affirmability. For what the post-Schopenhauerian 
epiphany seems to make manifest is an enticing, meaning-endowing, but amoral force. 
Contact with it is understood as enhancing the richness of experience, as a necessary feature 
of a -fulfilled life, even though it is not a source of goodness. " This breach between the 
claims t of morality and those of the modernist creative imagination furthers the 
transfigurative imperative of the epiphanic art. The modernist imagination questions the 
goodness of being; it challenges any notion of a pre-established harmony between natural 
spontaneity and the claims of morality, especially benevolence. For those committed to the 
latter, a question of the affirmability of what the modernist imagination discloses arises., 
Faced with such a crisis of affirmation - quite alien to the Romantic epiphanies of Being'' 
a radicalized ý transmutation of what is revealed in its revelation becomes all the more 
imperative., Taylor, suggests that the "recovery may have to take the form ýý of of -a 
transformation of our stance towards the world and the self', such that, "the world's being 
good may now be seen as not entirely independent of our seeing it and showing it as good". 
He concludes that the "key to a recovery from Crisis may thus consist in our being able to 
'see that it is good' ". 
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But such a conception of transfiguration can be developed in different ways, which Taylor 
illustrates by contrasting, the positions of Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche. 1 Whereas 
Dostoyevsky emphasizes the miraculous transfiguration of evil and degradation, into an 
object of love throu . gh the acceptance of (others' and God's) love, Nietzsche advocates a 
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heroic ethic of yea-saying which not only foregoes any reconciliation with morality, but 
bypasses the moral consciousness and the call of its conscience to benevolence. -' Both 
advocate "a transfiguration of the world: a vision which doesn't alter any of its contents 
but the meaning of the whole", " where this new, deeper meaning, - the moral source - is 
brought about in the changed stance towards the self and the world. The transfiguration 
itself can then function as a moral source. For Nietzsche, it is the very human power to 
transfigure which is ultimately affirmed. But Nietzsche's idea, Taylor remarks, -is 
vulnerable to subject-centred misinterpretation. This is the erroneous thought that just 
because the epiphany is indissolubly indexed to a personal vision or subjective stance, it 
follows that the epiphanic is merely the expression of subjectivity. On the contrary, the 
point of an epiphany is "to avoid the merely subjective". Taylor insists that "there are 
forms of subject-centredness which don't consist in talking directly about the self", and that 
overcoming subject-centredness "is a major task, both moral and aesthetic, of our time". 47 
Nietzsche seeks to achieve this by celebrating "the deep recesses beyond or below the 
subject,, or the subject's uncanny powers". "' While acknowledging the power of Nietzsche's 
epiphany, it is clearly Dostoyevsky's vision of a self and world transfigured - good because 
9seen as good' - in the acceptance of the love of God which resonates with Taylor. But 
what sense can be made of a moral order which is so disclosed? 
The significance Taylor gives to epiphanies is partly due to the fact that such a moral order 
is no longer, and cannot conceivably be again, a publicly established one. For the moral 
sources revealed by mode-mist epiphanies to become a publicly established order of moral 
references would require that they be part of 'the tacit background of objects of reliance' 
of the kind described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. These are matters more fundamental 
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than beliefs, because relying upon them conditions the possibility of genuine doubt and 
hence what we normally call belief. . "Virtually nothing in the domain of mythology 
metaphysics, or theology stands in this fashion as publicly available background today", 
Taylor concedes. And this means that the epiphanic disclosure of these domains - for the 
purpose of forging contact with moral sources - must be understood "in default of being a 
move against a firm background"; any such moral order indexed to a personal vision "can 
never become again an involdng of public references, short of an almost unimaginable 
return - some might say 'regression'- to a new age of faith. "" 
Now it. may. be recalled that it just such Wittgensteinian considerations which inform 
Habermas's concept of the lifeworld as that context of ethical life the fragmentation and 
reification of, which motivates the problem of modernity's self-reassurance. We have 
already seen (6.2) how, the problem of reassurance looks when articulated by the basic 
concepts of Taylor's cultural theory of modernity. Before considering the implications of 
Taylor's claims regarding the epiphanic validity of modernist art for tackling that problem, 
I want to examine whether these claims are consistent with those basic concepts of identity, 
practical reasoning, and the good discussed in chapter six. 
(2) -Modernist Epiphany and the Clainu of Taylor's Cultural 7heory; I have quoted 
extensively Taylor's remarks on the epiphanic claim of modernism to emphasize the tension 
of their standing with the foundations of his proposed cultural theory of modernity. The 
striking suspicion is that the expressivist conception of the self undermined by modernism 
appears to be precisely the one exploited by Taylor in his arguments for the inescapability 
of strong evaluations and the narrative form of practical reasoning. The former thesis was 
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supported by the counterfactual claim that a life unintelligible against some framework of 
qualitative contrast would not be recognizably human. The phenomenon of an identity crisis 
allegedly testifies to the inescapability of the question of identity, defined as a stance on 
qualitative contrasts. But the validity of this question is itself put into question by the 
'decentring' movement of modernism. Taylor endorses the modernist attack on expressivist 
notions of identity, but the question of identity is of the force Taylor requires of it only if 
that notion is presupposed. My identity is supposedly expressed in the stance I take, but 
the very adoption of a stance reflects an already accepted notion of what it is to have an 
identity. And it is doubtful whether this notion will be acceptable to 'the 
post-Schopenhauerian. For contact with 'moral sources' is for him or her not a matter of 
self-interpretation, and hence not something for which horizons of strong evaluation are 
relevant. What is relevant, even on Taylor's account, is that reservoir of amoral force 
which is greater than my capacities for self-interpretation. 
This point raises the difficult issue of what it is in virtue of which any epiphanic vision is 
acceptable., Just how difficult it is can be seen by considering the tension between the 
claims about modernism and those about the narrative structure of practical reasoning. As 
we saw in (7.1), the latter turned on a phenomenology of moral growth; determinable only 
in biographical form. But the modernist epiphanies, in Taylor's own words cited above, 
'carry us quite outside the modes of narration which endorse a life of continuity or growth 
with one biography or, across generations'. It seems that the content of the modernist 
epiphany clashes with the claims made about the self as a subject of moral growth. - 
Admittedly, Taylor suggests that we might then be taken to a higher form of, unity, but 
Taylor is unable to clarify what this might mean. " 
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Taylor might reply that lack of clarity should not be seen as an objection here, since we are 
dealing with epiphanies which by their nature are only articulable in a language of 
subjective, personal resonance. While I think this quietist response has its proper place, the 
problem is that if it applies to the 'criteria' of acceptability of epiphanies, it should also 
apply to the 'criteria' for the determination of moral growth. Since Taylor does offer an 
account of the latter, he should in consistency be in a position to defuse the anti-quietist 
o ection about epiphanies. Alternatively, if he retains his quietism about epiphanies, it 
seems that for the same reason, he would have to forfeit a substantively rational account of 
moral growth. But if he takes this second option, he effectively cuts off the branch which 
supports not only his version of the narrative structure of practical reason and much of his 
moral realism, but by implication, also the cognitive status of epiphanies. " "Goods", 
Taylor asserts, "can't be demonstrated to someone who really is impervious to them". 52 
Conversely, argument over goods always has an ad hominem dimension, in that it involves 
a disputed transition "from one's interlocutor's position to one's own via some 
error-reducing moves, such as the clearing up of a confusion, the resolving of a 
contradiction, or the frank acknowledgement of what really does impinge". " Since the 
meaning of modemist'epiphanies is to disclose moral sources, this form of argument should 
also be able to determine the relative superiority of epiphanies. But it is difficult to see how 
the relative truth-disclosure of different kinds of epiphany can be determined in such a 
manner. To be sure, we think some artistic visions to be "deeper, more revealing, truer 
than others", and that just "what these judgements are based on is very hard to say". m' But 
my point is that - in the light of the foregoing account - these judgements will be based on 
different things according to the different kinds of vision. Further, I see no reason why the 
same diversity, and difficulty in the wake of it, should not also apply to judgements of 
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strong evaluations. 
To make aesthetic judgements in the way Taylor prescribes is in fact to do nothing other 
than invoke the Best Account (BA) principle. The best account, as we have seen, is the one 
which issues in a transition of effor-reduction in the manner just described. But here again 
Taylor appears to be inconsistent in his employment of it. In (7.1) we saw how it is used 
to defend those ordinary, pre-scientific conceptions of personal identity and practical 
reasoning from reductionist revision. But now it seems that these common sense notions 
are quite capable of being challenged by the visions of the epiphanic poet; a challenge 
which, to succeed where reductionism fails, must fit into our Best Account. Yet as I have 
just indicated, it is very difficult to see how the BA principle can justify this claim. 
Indeed, Taylor recognizes that ultimately we have to concede that "The epiphanic is 
genuinely mysterious". 55 Besides carrying the implication that the BA principle is itself 
based on a mystery, something which may be true but which fits ill with its role as the 
guiding tool for explaining rational scientific change, this view also implies something very 
awkward for Taylor's notion of human agency. Taylor continues that the epiphanic 
56 "possibly contains the key -or a key - to what it is to be human". But it is difficult to 
reconcile this thought, however laudable, with the concept of the human agent considered 
in chapter six. For there we saw that the lack of a unified, integrated identity is a 
pathological human condition. Yet it is just the aspiration to overcome such an identity 
which Taylor discerns in much modernist epiphanic art. So Taylor seems to be accrediting 
paradigmatic human status to beings who may well be in the very crisis state which he 
earlier consigned to a pathology. " The post-Schopenhauerian who affirms the destruction 
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of a unitary identity without striving for an alternative source of unity or continuity is hence 
paradoxically both a paradigm of the human and outwith the bounds of the recognizably 
human. His or her life is both exemplary and pathological. 
The paradox is easily avoided, as I suggested earlier, by taking crisis states as signifying 
the limit of human agency rather that its collapse into pathology. * ý This construal fits well 
with the recognition of the transfigurative moment Taylor discerns in face of the crisis of 
affirmation. It is in face of the crisis that the transfigurative power of love emerges. But 
this crisis in turn raises a paradox over the supposed nature-of moral sources., Moral 
sources are defined as that the contact with which empowers us to be good. But so defined, 
they clearly cannot generate the crisis of which Taylor speaks. Furthermore, a crisis of 
affirmation of which he does speak well precedes the post-Schopenhauerian turn, since it 
requires only a recognition of the problem of evil; on what basis can being be affirmed if 
it contains so much suffering? " 
There is anotherproblem. If moral sources are as vital for the good life as Taylor claims, 
and the Enlightenment suppression of them is a s6lf-mutilation, isn't their exile from the 
public order of references also devastating for the human identity? The question can be put 
another way. Can moral sources, with all their transfigurative power, escape the fate which 
modernity has meant for theism? 
(8.3) The Causality of Fate Again 
But with this question, we are back at the point in Habermas's reconstruction of the 
philosophical discourse of modernity where Hegel introduces his idea of the dialectic of 
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moral life as a causality of fate. This dialectic, as we saw in (3.1), involves a 
transfigurative 'seeing good' of the context of life which is the common basis of existence 
for self and, other. Contact with moral sources, on Hegel's model, involves the 
acknowledgement and recognition of real networks of dependency; the networks in which 
the self is immersed as part of an ethical totality. This ethical totality avenges itself in the 
ctisis of affinnation of the individual with respect to the actual conditions of self-fulfilment. 
We can then understand the crisis of affirmation as issuing from intersubjective conditions 
of self-formation in which real networks of dependency appear as a hostile fate. Hence the 
need for transfiguration; not as a resigned acknowledgement of the inner goodness of the 
actual, but as an affirmation of an occluded ethical totality in which a reconciliation between 
acknowledged networks of dependency and self-fulfilment becomes possible., 
I want to suggest that such thoughts can help fill a lacuna in Taylor's diagnosis of the crises 
facing the modem identity. Besides the issue of instrumentalism, Taylor identifies two 
other roots of the modem moral predicament. One is that underlying the almost universally 
recognized standards of justice and benevolence, there is profound conflict and uncertainty 
over the constitutive goods behind these norms; that is, over what it is that makes human 
beings worthy of -just or benevolent action. " The other is that living up to the high 
standards of universal justice, self-determination, and benevolence, tends to have a crippling 
effect on the aspiration to expressive fulfilment. "High standards need strong sources", 
Taylor proclaims, and he goes on to suggest that only God can really provide such strength. 
Gone, however, are the days when The Moral Source could be part of a public order of 
references - failing an 'unimaginable' return to an age of faith. The fate of modernity is 
such that, action in accord with the high standards to which modernity aspires, can be 
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empowered only by a subjectively accessible moral source. Cognition and identity are in 
tension because under modem conditions the deepest source of identity has no public or 
objective foundation. The Moral Source is no longer an object of public knowledge; rather 
its foundation lies in the transfigurative moment of the acceptance of God's love, a moment 
which 'makes good' by 'seeing good', as of the kind articulated in the most resonant 
epiphanies of modernism. 
The main weakness with this kind of diagnosis, I suggested, lies in the assumptions it 
carries concerning self-formative processes. On the one hand, one might object - in the 
manner of Rorty - that Taylor's view is insufficiently sensitive to the multifarious and 
mundane accidents of this process. Taylor's realism requires an account of why the 
epiphanic art work bears the capacity to resonate not only with my personally indexed 
vision, but also with that of competent others. Ultimately, Taylor takes the quietist option 
that the epiphanic phenomenon is genuinely mysterious. But it is an open question whether 
the phenomenological considerations invoked by Taylor are just as compatible with the view 
that the epiphanic is but an epiphenomenon of the contingencies of self-formation. On the 
other hand, one could object - more in the manner of Habermas - that Taylor's view is 
insufficiently sensitive to the mundane necessities of self-formation. By limiting himself to 
the 'cultural' sources of the modem identity, traceable by a genealogy of values, --the 
materially constrained socializing processes which make possible the individuation of 
personal visions is all but side-stepped. - The objection here would go that Taylor 
exaggerates the significance of phenomena like artistic modernism in this process. But the 
issue I want to focus on is that art can only take the significance Taylor attributes to it if 
it is embedded in the intersubjective milieu out of which subjectivities emerge. That is, if 
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it is institutionalized in and signiflcantly structures the public order of references. 
Now this implies a potentially devastating objection to Taylor's diagnostic thesis. It is 
crucial to Taylor's argument that societies suffer legitimation crises when their public 
institutions fail to express the identities of their members. Modem instrumental society fits 
this diagnosis not only because its dominant institutions embody values of control, 
discipline, and disengagement alien to and undermining of the values recognized by many 
of its individuals, but also because, under the pressures towards growth and atomization, 
they render 'norm-free' what previously was strongly valued. But how can these public 
consequences of instrumentalism be avoided if not by way of a re-establishment of a public 
order of references which embody constitutive goods? It'would seem to require, given 
Taylor's preference for a theisticly interpreted Moral Source, a civic religion precisely of 
the kind he thinks is now unavailable. This would leave us in just that position of 
6self-mutilation' of which Taylor complains in those who deny the reality of constitutive 
goods, for that something the love of which empowers, good action would then be 
constitutively, absent from the very intersubjective 'context of life' which conditions 
individuated subjectivity. Must we accept it? 
If we think of moral sources theisticly as The Moral Source, then I think we must. There 
are three outstanding reasons for thinking this. First there is modem consciousness of time, 
change, and contingency which generates the problem of self-reassurance. Second, it is 
difficult to imagine that a single public order of references will satisfy the moral needs of 
modems. And third, there is the pressure on the -public order of references to meet needs 
other than moral ones. Besides the world-disclosive function of the public order of 
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references, there is - as Habermas insists - -its requirement for intramundane 
problem-solving. Precisely because of the rapidity of change and growing complexity of 
these problems, the significance of this latter role seems bound to be heightened. Since 
civic religion is otiose in this respect, and incompatible with fundamental moral needs in 
the others, its fate looks sealed. 
But W'doesn't follow from this that a public order as a locus of moral sources beyond the 
atomized self'must, share the same fate. This becomes clear as soon as we take Taylor's 
suggestion that the key to a recovery from the modem crisis of affirmation may lie in our 
capacity to "see that it is good" neither in the spirit of Dostoyevsky nor Nietzsche - but in 
the young Hegel's. " The transfiguration to which Hegel refers is that pertaining to an ethical 
totality, occluded qua ethical insofar as the public order of references fails to function'as, 
a- moral source, actually internalized - into the identity of individuals. But the nature of 
transfiguration is such that it is unable to specify the particular contents of the ethical 
totality (public order of moral references); it is the whole which is seen differentlyt not the 
parts. The working of the causality of fate is such that requires acknowledgement of that 
dependence on others which avenges, itself on the, separation invoked by the abstract 
particularity of the agent of subject-centred reason, 
Hegel's model thus suggests a certain kind of critical practice as the most appropriate 
response to the crisis of affirmation. For Habermas, we have, seen, the causality of fate 
operates as a form of distorted self-formative process, and the transfigurative love which 
disenchants it allows that process to continue. He then attempts to build this insight into 
a, quasi-empirical theory of the, -social pathologies of modernity by way, of rational 
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reconstructions. But because what counts as moral growth or development is determined 
by the substantial picture of maturity, health, or the good which provides its 'terminuS, 61 0 
it is not amenable of neutral, disengaged 'empirical' questioning. In what sense are they 
open to questioning in a manner that expresses Hegel's insight concerning the crisis of 
affimation? 
(8.4) The Objective and the Subjective Critic 
The philosophical critique of instrumentalism - theorized as subject-centred, functional, or 
procedural reason - characteristically' aligns itself with modernist artistic practices. For 
Habermas; the imaginative exploration of 'unfettered subjectivity', the reinterpretation of 
needs in the light of such exploration, and the Tuidification' of rigidified identities, are all 
Onlu . tary correctives to the objectification of the subjective world as it appears from the 
intersubjective horizon of a reffied lifeworld. " The lifeworld is always the focus of interest 
for Habermas's model of critique. The task of the critic is to diagnose identity crises in the 
intersubjective mediation of identity. Habermas recognizes that of the symptoms'which 
accrue from cultural rationalization, the response of much modem art is exemplary. Of 
these symptoms, Habermas focusses on the splitting off of expertcultures from everyday 
life, and the diffeientiation of discourses and value spheres which thematize the different 
validity claims. The interpreter of the lifeworld can learn from artistic efforts to bridge the 
gap between expert culture and everyday life, as well as from works which metaphorically 
intermesh *the validity 'claims. Nevertheless; the philosophical critic must respect the 
cognitive gains which the modem differentiation of the validity claims makes possible. 
Differentiation must be maintained to avoid the 'aestheticizing' of morality and politics of 
which neo-Nietzscheanism falls foul. But an is'not an apt model of criticism for the further 
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reason that it neglects the 'problem-solving', action-coordinative function of language. This 
problem-solving capacity is built into what Habermas takes to be the primary mode of 
language use; action coordination on the basis of a rationally motivated agreement. The 
counterfactual presuppositions of communicative action, for Habermas, condition the 
objectivity of meaning. Jn prioritizing the public or intersubjective conditions of rational 
action, and in seeldng to trace sources of discontent to the distortion of such conditions, 
Habermas's is a form of objective criticism. The world-disclosive capacity of language, on 
the other hand, - is enhanced when the action-coordinative warrant of illocutions is bracketed. 
Taylor's model of philosophical critique aligns itself with modernist art in an even more 
fundamental way., -A cultural theory of modernity, we'have already seen, attempts to 
articulate in a language of most, perspicuous contrast competing, horizons of qualitative 
distinction, which inform conceptions of , the good. --Once one takes the ontological 
commitments of these horizons' seriously (moral realism) - the task can be seen as one of 
exploring the moral order in which we are set with an aim to defining moral sources. ý But 
the contemporary -critic lives in an, age in which a publicly accessible cosmic order of 
meanings is an impossibility. It follows then9ý that the language of philosophical criticism 
- through which the moral order in which the critic is set is made'perspicuous - can exact 
contact -with moral sources only in 'virtue of its ýpersonal resonance, with the critic. 
According to Taylor's conception, philosophical criticism is successful when -it enables us 
to see things more clearly. than we did before, but, in the case of moral sources, this 
perspicuity must be one which realizes contact with the source it explores - it must resonate 
with us., Philosophical criticism of the kind practised and advocated by Taylor thus assumes 
an ineluctably -. subjective character. And for the following reason; this means that the 
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prospect for self-reassurance converges in a peculiar manner with the province of modernist 
art. 
To say that a moral source resonates with us, is to express the thought that morality stands 
in an intemal relationship to our identity. The person in contact with a moral source is an 
agent motivated to act morally. Gone, however, are the days when knowledge of the 
o ective world could attune us to moral sources, and hence motivate moral action. From 
the pre-modem horizon, to know the world objectively is to love it; it is to be motivated 
by that love to moral action which is simultaneously empowered by the knowledge of the 
objective order of cosmic meanings. The philosophical question which haunts modernity 
is that which follows the break between cognition and identity; if there are no objective 
meanings in the world to be known, on what basis can I be reassured about the norms 
which fill out my identity? Three possible responses are rejected by Taylor. First, the 
return to Platonic moral cosmology or strong moral realism; this fails to account for the 
success of disengaged science and technology. Second, the affirmation of moral relativism 
and the powers of unleashed subjectivity; this fails to account for the phenomenological pull 
of values to something beyond human subjectivity. Third, the deontological/liberal 
compromise; this fails to account for the motivation to follow rule-governed constraints. 
The only credible response must be one which is compatible with the cognitive 
achievements of modem science, while sufficiently realistic to deal with the phenomenology 
of moral experience, and sufficiently subjective to account for morally motivated action. 
Such a response is embodied, Taylor suggests, in modernist epiphanic art. The epiphanic 
work puts us in contact with the moral order in which we are set; it empowers us in the 
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same way as the cosmic order once empowered pre-modems. But whereas attunement with 
the latter was constitutive of objective knowledge for which the locus was Reason, 
resonance with the former is now a matter of subjective knowledge for which the locus is 
the creative imagination. To know is still to love - and hence cognition is reconciled with 
identity - but in the case of the epiphanic work, this knowledge is inseparably indexed to 
a personal vision. Philosophical criticism as the exploration of the moral order in which 
we are set now has to -understand itself likewise. Since the question of self-reassurance 
demands'such an exploration, it must be addressed in a manner exemplified by artistic 
modemism. 
The point of philosophical critique would then be to put us (modems) back in touch with 
moral sources. For Taylor, we have already seen, the goal of philosophical criticism is to 
clarify the moral predicaments besetting the modem identity, in a language which makes 
perspicuous the contrast between both sides of the transition between identities. Moreover, 
Taylor contends, this perspicuity empowers me to lead the moral life in virtue of its 
resonance within my particular subjectivity. In what is essentially a recovery job of the 
same kind which is undertaken in modernist art, philosophical critique aims to retrieve 
contact with the moral sources occluded and suppressed in routinized and impoverished 
modem 'instrumentalist' thought and practices, and thereby help to make manifest those 
sources. Philosophical critique so understood is oriented towards transfigured subjectivity, 
and is a consequence of the recognition that a certain kind of moral objectivity is no longer 
defensible. "As our public traditions of family, ecology, even polis are undermined or 
swept away", Taylor writes, "we need new languages of personal resonance to make crucial 
human goods alive for us again". 62 
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Of course, I recognize. that the distinction between subjective and objective criticism I am 
introducing here'stands in need of further clarification and support. I will offer something 
by way of this by considering how the distinction might be applied to one particularly 
pressing problem facing contemporary modernity. It is a problem, I believe, which 
provides a sobering context for assessing the viability of our alternatives to 'subject-centred 
reasons. In my conclusions I will indicate why, -, with respect to ecology, the task of 
self-reassurance is something in- which the, objective and the subjective critic must 
collaborate. 
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CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC PROBLEM-SOLVING AND 
WORLD-DISCLOSURE 
I have been arguing that Habermas's communication-theoretic paradigm for the critique of 
instrumentalism fails to -make available crucial conceptual resources for addressing the 
problem of modernity's self-reassurance. ý As we saw, this is a point which Taylor attempts 
to establish by way of reconstructing an epiphanic dimension in artistic modernism. The 
intersubjective constitution of the subject through language in no way detracts, Taylor 
insists, from the validity of explorations of a moral order to which there is no 
intersubjective access. The critique of instrumentalism as undertaken by modernist art is 
supposed to disclose non-human goods through the personal, human resonance carried in 
their disclosure. The acknowledgement of ý such goods,, Taylor asserts, is a key moral 
challenge of our time. It, is a challenge which can only be ý met by the invention of new 
languages which keep 'non-human goods alive for us' - in the manner in which they are 
acknowledged in-much modernist art. I identified this as the task of the subjective critic. 
But in helping to keep non-human goods alive for us, subjective criticism clearly takes on 
a political character. One implication is that in making non-human goods matter, the 
interpretative language of the subjective critic can help to motivate ecologically attuned 
action: "It would greatly help in staving off ecological disaster", Taylor states, "if we could 
recover a sense of the demand that our natural surrounding and wilderness make on us" - 
demands which can be voiced not in the anthropocentric language of Habermas's theory, 
but rather in that of a subjectively resonant epiphanic poem or philosophical prose. ' 
Anything approaching a proper philosophical analysis 'of,, the claim that the natural 
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environment places moral demands on humans is of course way beyond my present remit. 
But I do feel bound, by way of a conclusion, to suggýst how the two philosophical models 
for 4 critique of instrumentalism I have been exploring might be applied concretely, and I 
shall do this by considering in brief the light they might throw on our understanding of the 
political problem of self-reassurance nurtured by the awareness of environmental devastation 
in the modem world. - The 'environmental crisis' is simultaneously a legitimation and an 
identity crisis for modems. How adequately do our conceptions of philosophical critique 
articulate it? 
At first sight, the prospect for discourse ethics in this respect seems, as Habermas concedes, 
rather bleak. He accepts that the "anthropocentric way of looking at things" built into 
discourse ethics cannot make sense of moral intuitions made manifest in compassion for "the 
2 
pain caused by the destruction of biotypes". His response is to delimit the domain of 
philosophical -ethics; "to clarify the universal core of our moral intuitions and thereby to 
refute value skepticism". "By singling out a procedure of decision making", discourse 
ethics "seeks to make room for those involved, who must then find answers on their own 
to the moral-practical issues that come to them, or are imposed upon them, with objective 
historical force". ' But like most self-limiting manoeuvres, Habermas's looks suspiciously 
ad hoc. Nothing is explained about the specific intuited wrong of biotype destruction by 
maldng it external to the imputed universal core of morality. Similarly, from the point of 
view of an opponent who has that intuition of wrong, Habermas's response might simply 
seem to beg the question of what constitutes the core of what are properly called 'moral' 
intuitions. ' Neither is it self-evident that the intuited wrong of biotype destruction is a 
manifestation of compassion. It at least remains an issue whether the intuited demands that 
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the natural environment might make on us are based on something more than the suffering 
of senfients. ' 
This, is the kind of issue, I want to suggest, about which subjective criticism is pertinent. 
The 6ntent of the moral-practical. issues which come to the participants in the dialogical 
decision-maldng procedure depends partly on what matters to the participants, themselves. 
And what counts as mattering depends upon the moral world which is disclosed to them. 
The task of the subjective critic is to sensitize us to dimensions of an intersubjectively 
non-actualized moral reality. , This activity of sensitization -ý the creative imaginative 
undertakings of the subjective critic - corresponds to what might be called the politics of 
world-disclosure. In the case of ecological politics, it would involve the creation of a new 
language in which the natural 'environment ý is disclosed as a world that mattered 
independently of human interest in it, but which could show itself as such'only in being 
disclosed with subjective resonance in human beings. Subjectively resonant explorations 
of a moral order in which we are set, of the kind achieved in in much modernist art, could 
render "demands from beyond the self more palpable and real for us", Taylor suggests, ' 
instancing those demands that "underlie a more-than-anthropocentric ecological policy". 
The politics of world-disclosure thus borrows-from the form of artistic modernism for the 
purpose of identifying the absence of human resonance from the actual 
(objective/intersubjective) moral world. 
To a certain extent, Habermas seems to concur with this'point when he ascribes -'green' 
protest to sensitivity to those industrial developments which "noticeably affect the organic 
foundations of the life-world and make one drastically aware of standards of livability, of 
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inflexible limits to the deprivation of sensual/aesthetic background needs" .7 Although within 
Habermas's conceptual framework it cannot be construed otherwise, this view need not be 
interpreted in anthropocentric terms. Something can only matter to a human being if, in 
some sense, it satisfies a need. But it doesn't follow from this that the satisfaction of a need 
is why something matters. Individual need satisfaction is a condition of the recognition of 
a good, but not necessarily that in virtue of which it is a: good. The politics of 
world-disclosure concerns just this recognition; the rendering articulate of actually 
unrecognized or muted moral claims. If we understand 'moral' in Taylor's substantive 
sense - rather than the procedural sense given to it by discourse ethics - then it covers the 
claims which are muted in what Habermas calls the attack on the organic foundations of the 
lifeworld. One task of the subjective critic would be to make this attack more visible, to 
make us even more drastically conscious of criteria of livability, where what it is to live a 
fully human life might also cover the acknowledgement of non-sentient claims made vocal 
through the overcoming of aesthetic deprivation. If we think of inflexible limits to the 
deprivation of sensual/aesthetic needs as signifying something about the state of the moral 
world through subjectivity, rather than signifying something about subjectivity through the 
I 
state of the objective world, then the anthropomorphic locus of world-disclosure can be 
combined with intuitions about the non-anthropocentric content of what is disclosed. - 
Political ecology, then, has this world-disclosive character. It seeks, to transform, as we 
might say, the 'mattering' of the world. , To this end it attempts to show the inadequacy of 
discourses which represent the natural environment as relating to humans as a 'standing 
resource'. 
' 
by way of a contrasting language which has a deeper subjective resonance. Only 
given this resonance or sensitivity can green -issues, matter in a non-instrumental way; it 
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must be prior to any decision-making process about human dealings with the environment. 
There is something in this kind of will-formation which Taylor's realist focus on qualitative 
contrasts captures more satisfactorily than Habermas's attempt to ground philosophical 
critique on the idea of unconstrained intersubjectivity or democratic will-formation. 
Once'the decision-making process has begun, however, we move beyond the orbit of 
world-disclosure to the politics-of problem-solving. The critical labour of deconstructing 
the 'world picture', 9 or of disclosing a world of deeper personal resonanm is essentially 9 
a preliminary task; problems might, be redefined, reprioritized, or rediscovered; the 
relationship ., of - the - individual to the whole might be transfigured, but particular 
intramundane problems of action cO-ordination remain. The task of the objective critic is 
to identify those public or intersubjective constraints on what counts as normatively valid 
problem-solving practices. - At this level, Habermas's discourse ethics offers itself as a 
plausible model -for how individuals aspiring to autonomy might have that autonomy 
respected simultaneously to - co-ordinating their actions in a rational manner. For the 
institutionalization of the presuppositions of communicative action, to the degree of 
structuring the public order of references, does not suffer from the difficulties facing the 
conception of nature as a moral source under conditions of modernity. Leaving aside the 
strong claims Habermas makes for discourse ethics - that it articulates the common core to 
all moralities, and reconstructs the essence of strictly 'moral' intuitions - is it so cripplingly 
anthropocentric as to be of no relevance for an understanding of the environmental crisis 
which motivates political ecology? 
Although practical problems have a meaning which is partly determined by the'best 
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available language of self-interpretation, they are also imposed on agents, as Habermas 
reminds us above, by an 'objective historical force'. This is the force'not only - in 
Habermas's vocabulary - of the symbolic a priori of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld, 
but of the material a priori of the state/economic system. To focus exclusively on the 
politics of world disclosure, in the manner of subjective critique, is to open oneself to the 
'Idealist' charge that one is tacitly presupposing that a particular horizon of world 
interpretation is the cause of the environmental crisis. It is to neglect, that is, action 
consequences the meaning of which is graspable not from the point of view of the lifeworld, 
but from the vantage point available to the theorist of the historical forces arising from the 
self-perpetuating mechanism of the modem/capitalist state/economic system. Since it is not 
graspable from the point of view of the lifeworld, the lifeworld itself is a misplaced object 
of critique. The crucial point is that the proper object of critique would be the lack of 
accountability of action-con sequences to decision making procedures circumscribed by the 
normative content of the modem lifeworld, rather than actions which are themselves thought 
to be expression's or manifestations of that lifeworld. This is not necessarily to say that the 
source of accountability for environmentally destructive action consequences is the 
procedure of decision-making - as Habermas is forced into advocating - but it is to give due 
focus on the de facto threat to the environment consequent upon the bypassing of 
communicatively reached solutions to problems of action co-ordination. 
Of course, there can be no guarantees in this domain. It is logically possible that 
communicative problem-solvers will continue that 'rage against Being' wrought by the 
systemic imperatives of profit and control. But it seems hardly unwarranted to claim that 
processes of genuine (non-systemically distorted) democratic will-formation are less likelY 
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to generate self-undermining conditions of environmental devastation. Though not a 
guarantee, three rather obvious considerations can give us confidence that democratic 
problem-solving - theorized along Habermasian lines as action co-ordination governed by 
the rational principles of a communicative ethic - would turn the tide against environmental 
destruction, and hence support the view that discourse ethics is of some relevance for 
grasping the philosophical basis of a normatively secure political ecology. First, and most 
obvious, the control exercised by communicative actors over decision-making processes 
concerning technology is not to be confused with unfettered technological control over 
nature; a point ý which Habermas has struggled to make plain since his earliest writings. 
Second, since only norms which lead to the satisfaction of universalizable interests pass 
through the legitimating communicative procedure, then maxims which when 
institutionalized frustrate the satisfaction of the interest in a healthy environment which 
everyone has will not do so. Here, indeed, the problem of reaching a rational consensus 
over incommensurable interests which in other contexts beleaguers communicative ethics 
does not arise. " Third, the interference of democratic problem-solving processes by the 
profit imperative at the level ofproduction gives an eminently plausible explanation of what 
it is which provokes the need for critique. " And as yet, we do not know what it would be 
like for this critique not to be needed. 
To be sure, even if we acknowledge that the environmental consequences of communicative 
action are less likely to be as destructive as those of actions mediated by money and power, 
this still fails to account for the 'green' intuition, mentioned by Taylor, that mute creatures 
are intnnsically worth preserving; that 'Being' is worth letting be. Two rejoinders can be 
made here. First, no guarantees can be offered by the subjective critic either. The latter 
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can attempt to disclose a believable world in a personally resonant language in which Being 
is an apt object of reverence, but the person so affected cannot escape from the nexus of 
action-coordinative problems that need to be solved under the material constraints of a social 
world which, if genuinely structured by communicative action, would accommodate 
different personally resonant visions of the natural world. There is an in-built indeterminacy 
to both the politics of world-disclosure and of democratic problem-solving. 
Partly because of this indeterminacy, the critique of instrumentalism must tap the resources 
of both objective and subjective criticism. I have referred to the task of the subjective critic 
as that of presenting a horizon of self-interpretation which discloses a believable and 
desirable world with a particular kind of significance. And this leads me to the second 
rejoinder; that the believability and desirability of worlds disclosed through subjectivity is 
partly conditioned by their uncoerced resonance. If this latter point is neglected; the 
awkward question will loom as to what distinguishes the subjective critic from the 
propagandist. Taylor acknowledges the danger of such a slippage. On the task of 
articulating moral sources, he notes that "the whole thing may be counterfeited", and 
confinues: 
This is not to say that words of power themselves may be counterfeit. But 
the act by which their pronouncing releases force can be rhetorically 
imitated, either to feed our self-conceit or for even more sinister purposes, 
such as the defence of a discreditable status quo. Trite formulae may 
combine, with the historical sham to weave a cocoon of moral assurance 
around us which actually insulates us from the energy of true moral sources. 
And there is worse: the release of power can be hideously caricatured to 
enhance the energy of evil, as at Nuremburg. " 
The awkward question is this; how are we to tell the difference between the wholesome act 
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of pronouncement and the rhetorical imitation; between the caricature and the real thing; 
between the counterfeit and the genuine article? Not, of course, simply by the degree of 
subjective resonance - as the powers of the propagandist or charismatic dictator amply 
testify. As a subjective critic, Taylor can only pit the power of his pronouncements against 
those of others. He does not have the critical conceptual resources available to distinguish 
the pragmatics of subjectively resonant philosophy and propaganda. After acknowledging 
the need to make a distinction between genuine and counterfeit contact with moral sources, 
and the dangers of forgetting it, he offers nothing by of justifying such a distinction. 
The objective critic balks at the subjective critic's quietism on this issue. More specifically, 
Habermas can argue for the need to establish intersubjective constraints on the project of 
world-disclosure. The argument would look something like this. The pronouncements of 
the poet exploit the world-disclosive powers which are intrinsic to language in its capacity 
to mediate rationally coordinated action, even though the capacity for world-disclosure is 
enhanced by the bracketing of illocutionary obligations. The speech-act pragmatics of 
propaganda, on the other hand, exploit extra-linguistic coercive forces for the purpose of 
persuading the hearer of the acceptability of what is disclosed in the propaganda. Of 
course, Habermas elaborates an argument of this kind in his construction of the conditions 
of the intelligibility of systematically distorted communication, and thereby of the 
intelligibility of a critique of ideology. This kind of critique thus falls within the province 
of objective criticism. We can agree with Habermas that the non-coercive pragmatics of 
epiphanic poetry or, philosophy implicitly presuppose the symmetrical intersu ective 
structure of communicative action. But this does not commit us to the claim that the 
legitimate task of the subjective critic is limited to the raising and redeeming of validity 
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claims to authenticity. Nor does it commit us to the assertion that the validity of subjective 
criticism is criterially constrained by the possibility of reaching a consensus. As I have 
argued, Habermas's taxonomy of validity claims, as well as his views on the consensual 
orientation of communicative action, must be rejected. But these claims are adventitiously 
related to the model of democratic will-formation represented in the dialogical situation of 
communicative problem-solvers; a situation which it is not unreasonable to suppose can 
structure the public order of references under conditions of modernity. 
Finally, I want to stress that the tasks of objective and subjective criticism as I am 
introducing them here are neither 'objectivist' nor 'subjectivist', insofar as these terms have 
accrued pejorative connotations. The reason for this becomes manifest by considering their 
contribution to defining the critical thrust of political ecology. Subjective criticism as 
perpetrated and advocated by Taylor has a realist core; it is about subjectivity only in the 
sense that the world is disclosed only under certain conditions of intentionality, but in 
articulating these conditions, its critique is directed towards the world. Subjectivity is 
understood as the medium of normative orientations, not their (exclusive) source; it is 
subjective in "manner", not in "matter". 13 To say that the natural environment, as a world 
disclosed in languages with various potentials for personal resonance, must matter to human 
beings, is not necessarily to claim that human beings are the only things that matter. The 
pejorative force of 'subjectivism' is attendant first upon the ontological clairn'that value 
exists in the world just to that extent to which a subject's de facto desires are satisfied, and 
following from this, upon the ethical claim that the best world is one in which all of these 
(compossible) desires are in fact satisfied. Since subjective criticism is neither ontologically 
nor evaluatively subjectivist, it is not a fit object of the pejorative force associated with the 
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term 'subjectivism'. It is, however, semantically subjectivist, but only with respect to a 
restricted domain of discourse. This is the domain in which meaning has an irreducibly 
experiential core, which in turn is an apt object of phenomenological exploration. This is 
the domain of 'private' language only to the extent that, as a matter of fact, the claims 
expressed in it are not recognized in what Taylor calls the public order of references. The 
language of subjective criticism is not private in the empiricist sense - attacked by 
Wittgenstein, - of being meaningful in virtue of referring to a private *ontology of internal 
mental states. I see no reason why this limited semantic-phenomenological subjectivism 
should offend the anti-anthropocentric sensibilities of the radical ecologist. " 
Just as the innocence of subjective criticism from the charge of 'subjectivism' is testified 
by its link with the politics of world-disclosure, so the connection between objective 
criticism and the politics of democratic problem-solving can disarm worries about the 
complicity of such critics with 'objectivism'. The objectivity secured by intersubjective 
agreement under communicative constraint concerns a problem-solving capacity for rational 
action co-ordination. Again, the pejorative force of 'objectivism' is directed towards certain 
ontological, -epistemological, and ethical commitments: that the world is nothing but an 
aggregate of atomic -objects interacting according to mechanistic laws; that knowledge of 
it isexclusively a function of a method of the Idnd which modem physicists are supposed 
(by objectivist philosophers) to follow; and that it is good to follow it - both as an 
expression of human excellence in proper intellectual conduct, and in its utility. But if we 
think of the objective critic, along Habermasian lines, as clarifying the public or 
intersubjective conditions of rational action co-ordination, the objectivist charge has no real 
force. Indeed, -objective criticism comes into play when the intersubjectively binding 
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presuppositions of communicatively rational action co-ordination are violated by the 
pseudo-objectifications of science. " 
How, then, can it come into play in the kind of critique which is relevant to the radical 
ecologist? One suggestion which has been made goes like this; the critical thrust of 
communicative reason can be salvaged from its anthropocentric bias by including the rich 
diversity of life-forms - and even the earth itself - as virtual participants in the dialogue 
situation. 16 But it is extremely difficult to see how this idea could at all be sustained; and 
impossible to see how it could fit with anything remotely resembling communicative 
ethics. 17 A much more plausible idea is hinted at, but not followed through, by Habermas 
himself. As I said, objective criticism comes into play when the intersubjectively binding 
presuppositions of communicative action are violated. But communicative action 
presupposes the integrity of a background lifeworld horizon. Further, as Habermas remarks 
above, the integrity of the organkfoundations of the lifeworld can come, indeed are, under 
threat. The violation of these organic foundations, it follows, is a suitable object for 
objective criticism; their ý breakdown is criticizable (objectively) in virtue of being 
inconsistent with the presuppositions of unconstrained communicative action as a medium 
of will-formation. This doesn't tell us why the environment itself might be intrinsically 
worth preserving, independent of what it makes possible for humans. But then to show that 
is the world-disclosive task of the subjective critic. 
The critical thrust of political ecology can thus be understood as standing at the interface 
of the politics of world-disclosure and problem-solving. This point can be seen to 
correspond to, but is not identical with, Habermas's understanding of green politics as a 
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border conflict between system and lifeworld. According to Habermas, green protest is a 
reaction from the point of view of the lifeworld to an environmental crisis which manifests 
itself as a visible attack upon the organic foundations of the lifeworld. But it also generates 
"a new category of literally invisible risks that can only be grasped from the vantage point 
of the system". " These are risks the responsibility for which is offset by their 
'uncontrollable magnitude'. They are problems which must be tackled with the resources 
of the lifeworld, yet, as Habermas remarks, they go beyond the level of complexity which 
can be experienced within it. So to the liberating risIdness of self-transfiguration which the 
subjective critic celebrates, is now added the constraining risk of responsibility for action- 
consequences of hitherto incomprehensible moral magnitude. 
While the politics of world-disclosure struggles to expand and deepen the resources of the 
lifeworld, the politics of democratic problem-solving pursues means of putting a heightened 
sense of responsibility into effect by way of a particular form of decision-making. " The 
success of the critique of instrumentalism, and the prospects for modernity's 
self-reassurance, turns on the headway made in both these directions. Through the creation 
of new languages of personal resonance, it can disclose matterings in the world, or voice 
previously inarticulate moral claims, which must be capable of motivating collectively 
co-ordinated action constrained by the social and ecological imperative of effective 
democratic problem-solving. 
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Chapter One: Introduction. 
1. In Karl Marx, 'Letter to A. Ruge', September 1843. Cited in Nancy Fraser, 'What's 
Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender', New German Critique, 
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'Continental' tradition - who holds that philosophy has in some sense 'come to an end', 
superseded, for instance, by revolutionary praxis, meditative thinking, or deconstruction. 
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Hegel; David Kolb, A Critique of Pure Modernity; and Robert Pippin, Modernism as a 
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5. This focus is at its clearest in Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration, - Post-structurallst 
7hought and the Claims of Critical 7heory, and in the Foucault chapters of Honneth's 7he 
Critique of Power. 
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Modernity and Modernism in Habermas', Praxis International, 8; January 1989 (special 
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Subject of Modernity; and less antipathetic to Habermas, Martin Jay, 'The Debate over 
Performative Contradiction: Habermas vs. the Post-structuralists', in T. McCarthY et. al. 
(eds. ) Zwischenbetrachtungen Im Prozeft der Aq/Udrung, ppl, 71-189. For wide-ranging 
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71ornas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction In 
Contemporary Critical 7heory; Richard Bernstein, 7he New Constellation: 7he Ethical- 
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and William Rehg, 'Discourse Ethics and the Communitarian Critique of Neo-Kantianism"t 
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Chapter Two: The Modern Tension between Cognition and Identity 
Gellner, 7hought and Change, p 72. Ilis new balance is supposed to be congruent with the 
industrialization of society, where "industry is, essentially, the ecology of a society 
possessed by science", and "science, essentially, is the form of cognition of industrial 
society". Fred Dallmayr complains of Habermas's failure in 7he Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity to comment on the contribution of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of philosophy to 
the entitled discourse (Ile Discourse of Modernity: Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger (and 
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placed in the highest seat. 
Sophia: Easily. Truth is placed above all things ... for if we were to 
conceive of something that was to be ranked higher, it would also 
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9. A thesis which converges closely with Rorty's in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
pp131-9. Here, as on many other points concerning the significance of epistemology, 
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significance of an individual or collective life which can only be grasped, if at all, "from 
within" by those who live it. Second, there is a normative connotation to be drawn from 
'life'. Here, life connotes vitality. In the next chapter we will see that this is explicit in the 
young Hegel's account of an ethical totality subject to a 'causality of fate'. For an individual 
or collective to lose the vitality of 'life' is for it to lose something distinctly human, to fall 
short of an ethical standard of a fully realized humanity. Third, life connotes meaning. This 
connotation is suggested by Wittgenstein in his remark that a sign in itself, as merely a 
written mark or vocalization, appears as "utterly dead" (7he Blue Book, p4). Seeing things 
this way, Wittgenstein suggests, can tempt one into looking for "that which gives the 
sentence life as something in an occult sphere" which co-exists with the signs. (7he Blue 
Book, p5). We can avoid this picture, he suggests, if we take the life (i. e. the meaning) of 
the sign to lie in its "use". But even if in its use the sign is alive, Wittgenstein asks in 
Philosophical Investigations, "Is life breathed into it there? - Or is the use its life? " (#432) 
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Ilose who take an expressivist theory of meaning from Wittgenstein favour the'former 
option, those who take a use theory from him the latter. However interpreted, Wittgenstein 
captures a non-trivial element in our intuitive sense of meaning by indicating how we link 
it to the 'life' of a sign. 
The second and the third connotation are, of course, connected. Reference to a 'dead 
language' betokens a diseased and decadent culture. The moral imperative of preserving 
meaning in language is perhaps put most radically by Karl Krauss, in a remark approvingly 
cited by Anton Webern; "[moral gain] lies in a spiritual discipline which ensures the utmost 
responsibility toward the only thing there is no penalty for injuring - lanugage" (7he Path 
to the New Music, pp9-10). Avant-guarde art is also unthinkable without such a 
commitment, given powerful articulation in Octavio Paz's comment that "When a society 
becomes corrupt, what first grows gangrenous, is language. Social criticism, therefore, 
begins with grammar and the re-restablishment of meanings" (On Poets and Others, pxiii). 
Both Habermas's and Taylor's philosophical conceptions of crisis and critique fall very 
much within this modernist tradition. 
24. Husserl, Crisis in the European Sciences, p130. 
25. As the 'given', the lifeworld was to feature as the point of departure for a resurrected 
transcendental phenomenology. But as Husserl sensed, it is difficult to see how the 
phenomenological method of intuitive reflection aiming at absolute a priori apodeictic truth 
can be reconciled with the intersubjective insights captured in an essentially historicist 
lifeworld concept. Ibis methodological difficulty can be overcome, claims Habermas, only 
by a thoroughgoing shift to intersubjectivity in which the subject-object figure of thought 
itself is made derivative of the prior intepubjectivity of a linguistified lifeworld, and 
'reductions' of consciousness are replaced by structures of linguistic communicative 
competence. 
26. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p147. 
27. Habermas, 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p124. 
28. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, #162.. 
29. Ibid., #94. 
30. Habermas, 7heory of Communicative Action, - vol, 1, p70. 
31. Habermas, 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p 130. 
32. Ibid., p126. 
33. Gellner, Spectacles and Predicaments, introduction. 
34. Habermas, 7he 7heory of Communicative Action; vol. ], plOO; vol. 2, p120. 
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35. The validity claims of truth, rightness, and authenticity are thematized in the discourses of 
the value spheres of science and technology, law and morality, and art and criticism; this 
differentiation and reflexive thematization partly constitute cultural rationalization. The 
lifeworld shares an analogous three-fold formal structure, which Habermas calls 'culture', 
dsociety', and 'personality'. 
36. Habermas, 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p340. 
37. Ibid., plO. 
38. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p3l 1. 
39. Ibid., p315-6. I return to this theme in chapter eight. 
40. "There is a reason why the world the world is made of machines,, and that reason lies not 
in the world but in our practices of explanation", Legitimation of Belief, p. 107. 
41. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 1.93. 
42. Ibid., IV. 48. 
43. Since taken this way; the rule admits of an infinite number of possible interpretations; the 
conclusion reached by #201 of Philosophical Investigations. 
44. The eipstemological significance of primary qualities is, of course, 'that in being measurable 
and quantifiable, the verification procedure for truth-claims in which they feature is 
minimally vulnerable to sceptical objection. 
45. See Taylor, 'Understanding in the Human Sciences, Review of Metaphysics, 1980,34, 
pp25-38; and the subsequent exchange with Rorty (pp47-55). 
46. See John McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', 7he Monist, 62,1979, 'pp331-350 (especially 
p345f. ). 
47. This is the first premiss of an argument which could easily lead to the conclusion that we 
are referr ing'here to an eroding power which is not intellectual, but ideological. 
48. See Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 8. 
49. As is the case, for instance, when anthropologists are confronted with apparently irrational 
primitive societies. Ile problem is discussed by Taylor in his paper 'Rationality', 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences, pp 134-51. 
50. Legitimation Crisis, p120 
51. At least in one of his phases; see Dews, Lo gics of Disintegration, pp203-6- 
52. Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Falsity in an Ultramoral Sense', in 7he Philosophy of Nietzsche 
(ed. ) Geoffrey Clive, p508. 
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53. Habermas quotes Nietzsche remarking in lhe Birth of Tragedy of the "terror which seizes 
man when he suddenly begins to doubt the cognitive form of phenomena, because the 
principle of sufficient reason .. seems to suffer an exception. If we add to this terror the 
blissful ecstacy that wells from the innermost nature of man, indeed of nature, at this 
collapse of theprincipil individuationis, we steal a glimpse into the nature of the Dionysian" 
(Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p93). According to this reading of 
Nietzsche, redemption is possible for an impoverished mythless modernity in the form of 
aesthetic experiences of Dionysian ecstatic self-oblivion. Countering this, Habermas suggests 
that this kind of appeal to the redemptive power of art will not do because the aesthetic 
phenomena of which Nietzsche speaks, far from being of pre-modem mythic origin, are in 
fact only possible given the differentiation of art from cognition and morality which is the 
achievement of modernity. 17hey are the kind of experiences explored by artistic modernism, 
and more specifically, the avant-garde. Habermas's emphasis is slightly different to the one 
I am making here. But I will return to the aesthetic potential for the reconciliation between 
the diremptions of modern life in both Habermas and Taylor in chapter eight. 
54. The way this is interpreted is decisive for the different approaches to the philosophical 
problem of modernity. - We will see that even Taylor agrees with the point, but what reality 
manifests itself through the aesthetic creation of humans is treated very differently. 
55. Nietzsche, 7he Will To Power translated by W. Kauftnann, #552. The idea of truth as 
invention, and the ethic of self-creation which "in itself has no end", but without the will 
to power metaphysics, define exactly the project of Richard Rorty's recent writings. The 
basic thought of the norm of the endless redescription of ourselves which Rorty advocates 
is itself but a redescripion of this Nietzschean theme. 
56. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p296. 
57. Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp98-103. 
Chapter Three: Habermas's Conception of Crisis 
1. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p348. 
2. Ibid., p316. 
3. Ibid., p306. 
4. See Habermas, 7heory and Practice, pp28-9. 
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5. In Hegel, Early 7heological Writings, ppl82-301. As will become clear, Hegel's critique 
of the idea that what might be called "the pull of the ethical" is that of obligation to the 
moral law is largely directed against Kant's views. 
6. Ibid., p226. 
Ibid., p238. 
8. Ibid., p231. The issue is complicated by the role of Kant's 'holy will' which transcends such 
inclinations. Kant seems to be left in the odd position that from the point of view of the 
moral worth of the will, it is actually good fortune to have such potentially immoral natural 
inclinations, since it gives the will all the more opportunity to prove its worth. Hegel's 
underlying point is that the avenging force of the ethical stands outwith the autonomy of the 
isolated rational will - and to the degree to which it is therefore heteronomous, the Kantian 
opposition between the autonomous and the heteronomous breaks down. 
9. Ibid., p232. Ibis reference holds for the remainding quotations in this paragraph. 
10. Ibid., p228. 
11. In Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pp174-196. 
12. Ibid., p193. 
13. Ibis is slightly misleading. The universality of the moral law has its foundation in the 
necessity of practical reasoning, as Williams explains in chapter four of his book. 
14. Ibid., pl9l [my italics]. 
15. Ibid., p195. 
16. Ibid., p193. 
17. Ibid., p196. 
18. Williams gives us reason for thinking that these oppositions need to be reconciled, but offers 
little by way of indicating how they might be. Elsewhere, he acknowledges that an answer 
might lie in a tragic conception of agency (Moral Luck, p30, footnote 2). By conceiving the 
force of the ethical as fate rather than as luck, Hegel is'able to develop such a conception 
systematically. 
19. Ijegel, Early 7heological Writings, pp230-1. The feeling of a life disrupted 4must' become 
a longing for what has been lost if there is to be reconciliation, but the force of this 'must' 
is not categorical; it is not determined by the moral law. 
20. Ibid., p231. 
21. Ibid., p233. - 
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22. As in tragedy, even the innocent gets caught in the nexus of guilt representing the avenging 
force of life (the friendliness of collective life together). 
23. Ibid., p238. 
24. Ibid., p233. 
25. Ibid., p230. 
26. Ibid., p229. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid., p232. Depite his hostility to the christian ethic, even Nietzsche is sometimes tempted 
to take a similar position; "Ilat which is done out of love always takes place beyond good 
and eviI7. (Beyond Good and EWI #153). The problem is that Nietzsche is so obsessed with 
what he sees as christianity's 'slave morality' based on 'revenge' or 'ressentiment' to 
recognize Hegel's point. In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche even seems to suggest that 
it is precisely lack of recognition of other parties which constitutes ressentiment; '"the slave 
morality" says "no" from the very outset to what is "outside itself', and "not itself"; and 
this "no" is its creative deed. Ilis volteface of the valuing standpoint - this inevitable 
gravitation to the objective instead of back to the subjective - is typical of "resentment"'. 
This remark is a very nice illustration of the critique of what Habermas calls 
'subject-centered reason' which unwittingly reproduces that kind of reason. Unlike 
Nietzsche, Hegel avoids the oscillation between the objective and the subjective, since 
subjects and objects only emerge out of a prior context of intersubjectivity. And it is the 
revenge of the distortion of this shared context, so Hegel is arguing, which is the true 
'genealogy' of morals, rather than the revenge of a self-defensive or 'reactive' objectifying 
'herd'., ' 
29. First in 'Labour and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind', in 7heory 
and Practice, ppl. 42-169, especially ppl. 50-6. He later defends his own quasi-Kantian 
'discourse ethics' as innocent of these weaknesses in 'Morality and Ethical Life: Does 
Hegel's Critique of Kant apply to Discourse Ethics?, in Habermas, Moral Consciousness 
0 
and Communicative Action, pp 195-215, a text which I discuss in chapter five. 
30. Habermas, 7heory and Practice, pl. 48. ne same passage is included in Knowledge and 
Hwnan Interests, p56 (under a different translation). 
31. Ibid. 
32. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p324. 
33. Honneth discusses how, in the early chapter of Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas 
incorporates the causality of fate theme within a Marxian framework of the self-formative 
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process I of the species in 7he Critique of Power, pp268-77. But as I go on to indicate, the 
Aind of theory (namely Critical 7heory) which Habermas thinks can best articulate it is most 
thoroughly discussed in the later chapters on Freud. 
34. Ibid., p316. 
35. Especially chapters 10 and 11. My I exposition also draws on Habermas's 'The Hermeneutic 
Claim to Universality', in Bleicher (ed. ) Contemporary Her-meneutics, pp 181-211. 
36. Habermas, Knowledge and Hwnan Interests, p229. 
37. And of course, words can be dangerous. One may not trust one's partner in communication, 
one may not even trust oneself in communicating. 
38. "To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life". (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, #19). 1 am of course only asserting the conclusions here of Wittgenstein's 
arguments, but I will be returning to them in chapter four. 
39. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p226. 
40. Ibid., p227. 
41. The difficulties of this thought are taken up by Donald Davidson, 'Paradoxes of 
Irrationality', in Woolheim and Hopkins (eds. ), Philosophical Essays on Freud, pp289-305. 
Ile very different lesson for moral reflection which Rorty gets from Freud through 
Davidson's paper will be discused in (6.4) below. 
42. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp216-7. 
43. Habermas, 'The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality', pl9l. 
44. Ibid., p194. 
45. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p228. 
46. Ibid., p256. 
47. Ibid., p241. 
48. Ibi&31 p256. 
49 Ibid., p271. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid., p245. 
52. Ibid., p257. 
53. Habermas, 'Ile Hermeneutic Claim to Universality', p193. 
54. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p232. 
55. Ibid., p344-5 footnote 35. 
56. Ibid., p234. 
57. Ibid., pp235-6. 
329 
58. Especially chapters 4,5,6. Keat's book was published in 1981, since when Habermas has 
modified many of the positions attacked by Keat. 
59. Keat, 7he Politics of Social 7heory, p108. 
60. Ibid., pl. 07. 
61. Habermas, Knowledge and Hwnan Interests, p27 1. cited in Keai, p. 107. 
62. Keat, 7he Politics of Social Policy, p108. 
63. Habermas, Knowledge and Hwnan Interests, p220. 
64. Habermas acknowledges that for Freud, this is an inevitable part of human psycho-social 
development. 
65. Keat, 7he Politics of Social 7heory, p179. After making this comment, Keat turns to 
Habermas's attempt to clarify the rational foundation of norms in discourse. Keat fails to 
appreciate that the model of communicative action through which Habermas attempts to do 
this is already central to his interpretation of pschoanalysis. 
66. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p232. 
67. J. M. Bemstein, "S elf-Knowl edge as Praxis: Narrative and Self-Narration in Psychoanalysis', 
in Christopher Nash (ed. ) Narrative in Culture, p6O. 
68. Ibid., p62. 
69. For this reason, ' Bernstein can put the objection to Habermas that he perpetuates the 
"Enlightenment" illusion that "who the self is and its freedom can be analytically 
distinguished" (ibid., p75). 
Chapter Four: Habermas, Language, and Critique 
1. Habermas, 'Reply to my Critics', in John B. Thompson and David Held (eds. ), Haberinas: 
Critical Debates, p227. 
2 Ibid. 
3. As Habermas ýuts it in 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p3 IS: 
both cognitive-instrumental mastery of an objectivated nature (and 
society) and narcissistically overinfalted autonomy (in the sense of 
purposively rational self-assertion) are derivative moments that have 
been rendered independent from the communicative structures of the 
lifeworld, that is, from the intersubjectivity of relationships of- 
mutual understanding and relationships of reciprocal recognition. 
Subject-centred reason is the product of division and usurpation, 
indeed of a social process in the course of which a subordinated 
moment assumes the place of the whole, without having the power 
to asimilate the structure of the whole". 
330 
4. See for example John B. Ibompson, Critical Hermeneutics, pp130-9; Fred Dallmayr, 
'Life-World and Communicative Action, in Polls and Praxis, pp224-54; and Nancy Fraser, 
'What's Critical about Critical 17heory? 7be Case of Habermas and Gender, New German 
Critique, 35, Spring/Summer 1985, pp97-131 (especially pplOO-5) 
5. As Habermas implies in 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p397. 
If we assume that the human species maintains itself through 
socially coordinated activities 
, of 
its members and that this 
coordination has to be established through communicatin_ and in 
central spheres through communication aimed at reaching an 
agreement - then the reproduction of the species also requires 
satisfying the' conditions of a rationality that is inherent in 
communicative action. 
6. Ibid., p286. 
7. More importantly, Habermas proposes that this de-differentiation occurs in the form of 
systematically distorted communication. "Defense mechanism", Habermas writes, 
"undermine the differentiation between action oriented to success and action oriented to 
reaching understanding", by "separating the (unconscious) strategic aspect of action (which 
serves the gratification of unconscious desires) from the manifest intentional action that aims 
at reaching understanding. " Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p188. 
8. Ibid., p133. On the objection that what we would normally call moral (non ego-utility 
maximizing) considerations may also feature in the strategy of the actor, see Stephen K. 
White, 7he Recent Work of Jargen Habermas, pp 10- 11. 
9.7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p286. 
10. Arie Brand illustrates the distinction between strategic and communicative action with an 
imaginative example of this kind in his 7he Force of Reason, ppl4-17. I take up the 
objection that these examples of strategic action are distortingly one-sided below. 
11.7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p30 1. 
12. Ibid., p288. 
13. And as observed in Note 7 above, the unconscious can be understood as playing the role of 
a 4strategic actor occupying "internal foreign teff itory"'. 
14. Stephen K. White, Me Recent Work ofJargen Habemias, p46. I am proposing that at the 
level ofjustification, the category of normativity by which social life can be criticized, and 
which gives content to the idea of undwnaged social life within Habermas's theoretical 
framework, requires that priority be given to one of these two kinds of linguistic interaction. 
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15. Ibid. To uphold a distinction between 'original' and 'parasitic' or 'derivative' modes of 
language use is not necessarily to claim that communicative action is more fundamental to 
social life than purposive action. Since composing 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, 
Habermas has abandoned the latter position (if he ever held it) while retaining the former. 
And it is this former claim about linguistic interaction which, I am proposing, against 
White's interpretation, remains crucial. See Habermas's 'A Reply' in Honneth and Joas 
(eds. ) Communicative Action, p237, and Habermas, Postmetaphysical 7hinking, pp82-4, and 
pp86-7, ý note 33. ' 
16. Rasmussen, Reading Habennas, ch. 2. 
17. See Jonathan Culler, 'Communicative Competence and Normative Force', and Allan Wood 
'Habermas' Defence of Rationalism', both in New German Critique, 35,1985. 
18.7he 7heory of Communicative Action: vol. 1, p288. 
19. Although Habermas does not exploit the following point, I think a distinction of the type he 
is making helps explain a kind of inner conflict concerning the expression of speech acts. 
One might be reluctant, that is, to utter an (intrinsically harmless) illocution for fear of a 
(threatening, quasi-violent) perlocutionary construal of it. Sensitivity to the perlocutionary 
force of my avowal of love, for instance, may be such that it overrides the illocutionary 
value of my uttering it. T'his may result, alas, in the abandonment of the speech act. 
20.7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. ], pp292-3. 
21. Austin's distinction is introduced in How to Do 7hings with Words, pp9g-103. Both Culler 
and Wood identify this problem with Habermas's argument in the articles cited above, from 
which I draw here. Wood calls the proposition that the communicative use of language - 
linguistic interaction oriented towards 'reaching understanding' - is 'originary' the 
versti7ndigungs-thesis ('Habermas's Defence of Rationalism', p154). He cites Habermas's 
early formulation of it as "fundamental to all speech is the type of action aimed at reaching 
understanding" (Communication and the Evolution of Society, p 1), and remarks that the only 
explicit defence of the thesis follows the appeal to Austin in 7he 7heory of Communicative 
Action: v'ol. 1, pp286-295. While I would agree with this remark, I will later reconstruct an 
alternative defence of the verstiIndigungs-thesis which I will argue is implicit in Habermas's 
interpretation of Wittgensein's rule-following considerations. 
22.7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. ], p293. 
23.17his point is elaborated by Wood, Tabermas' Defence of Rationalism', pl. 58. 
24. Chris Martin cited this case to me, I trust with illocutionary force bracketed. 
25.7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. ], p292. 
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26. Culler, 'Communicative Competence and Normative Force', p136. Habermas has replied 
to Culler's objection in Postmetaphysical 7hinking, p86, note 32, and his response does not 
cover the criticism I am putting here. I will return to the political context of illocutionary 
and perlocutionary forces in my conclusion to the thesis, specifically with respect to 
propaganda. 
27. Wood also makes this point, 'Habermas' Defence of Rationalism', p161. 
28. Irreverent and foolhardy perhaps, but I take Culler's article as representative of this position. 
29. My source* for this kind of objection will be Jean-Frangois Lyotard, 7he Postinodern 
Condition. 
30. The objection is not exclusive to deconstruction; Thompson makes it in his essay 'Universal 
Pragmatics', in Thompson and Held (eds. ) Habermas; Critical Debates, ppl25-8. 
31. Culler, 'Communicative Competence and Normative Force', p137. 
32. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p196. 
33. The distinction is made in Ibid., p207. 
34. Ibid., p198. 
35. Ibid., p199. 
36. In other words, by supposing that 'every interpretation, is a misinterpretation' the 
deconstructivist makes it too easy for Habermas to deflect the objection concerning the 
proving of worth' of 'world-disclosive' language. 
37. Lyotard, 7he Postmodern Condition, plO. 
38. Ibid., p57. 
39. Ibid., p16. 
40. Ibid., p17. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid., p65. 
43. Ibid., p16. Lyotard simply dismisses Habermas's distinction as "superficial". The staged 
objections I go onto consider are my own reconstruction of the reason behind this dismissal. 
44. Dews (ed. ), Autonomy and Solidarity, Revised edition, p2l. 
45. Though I should add that this is not a worry which occurs to Lyotard. 
46. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p 198. 
47. The remarks are most concentrated in Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations, #143-242, 
and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Parts I and II. 
48. Habermas, 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p16. 
49. Ibid., p18. 
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50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Ibid., p17. 
54. K. O. Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, p28O. 
55. Rasmussen's phrase, in Reading Habermas, p3 1. 
56. G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wingensteln: Rules, Grammar, and Necessity, p248. 
57. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, p365. -. 
58. "If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as it may sound) in judgements. 17his seems to abolish logic but 
does not do so". Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #242. 
59. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, p323. 
60. Tully, 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy', Political 7heory, 17, May 1989, ppl. 72-204. 
61. Ibid., p179. 
62. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #289 and #87. 
63. Habermas, 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. ], p17. 
64. This thought suggests that of the two readings of Wittgenstein remarked upon in note 23 of 
chapter 2, the 'meaning as expression/world-disclosure' view -may be better than the 
4meaning as use' interpretation. 
Chapter Five: Crisis and Critique; Tensions in Habermas's Conception 
1. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p300. 
2. Habermas, 'Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter, in Baynes et. al. (eds. ) After Philosophy, 
p313. 
3. Habermas, 'Questions and Counterquestions', in R. Bernstein (ed. ) Habennas andModernity, 
pp210-1. 
4. Habermas can therefore be read as a counterpoint to Hobbes. From Habermas's perspective, 
Hobbes"s state of nature represents the self-undermining logic of strategically mediated 
interaction, but only given a lifeworld which has undergone the differentiations peculiar to 
modernity. Insisting on the irrevocability of the latter, Habermas does not allow himself the 
option, taken by Hobbes, of metaphysically grounded laws of nature. For more on the the 
common ground of contention between Habermas and Hobbes, see Rolf Zimmermann, 
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4equality, political order, and ethics: Hobbes and the systematics of democratic rationality, 
in Rasmussen (ed). Universalism vs. Communitarianism, ppIO9-128. 
5. See Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p201. 
6. See, for example, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p29 &p 139. 
7. Ibid., p325. 
8. Habermas, 'Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter', p313. 
9. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p315. 
10. Habermas, 'A Reply', in Honneth and Joas (eds. ) Communicative Action, pp225-6. 
11. Ibid., p226. 
12. Footnote to McCarthy's introduction to Habermas's 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, 
vol. ], p405, note 12. Benhabib also stresses that "formal criteria of rationality should not 
be conflated with the integrity of forms of life". (Critique, Norin and Utopia, p273). But 
there remains a tension between 'intact intersubjectivity' as the criterion of critique used to 
mean either a dialogue situation of pure communicative action, or a harmoniously 
rationalized lifeworld. 
13. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p324 (my emphasis). 
14. For Habermas's early recognition of these problems, see his 'Some Difficulties in the 
Attempt to Link'Ibeory and Praxis', in 7heory and Practice, especially pp22-4. For a lucid 
summary, see R. Bernstein's introduction to Habermas and Modernity, p 12f, and Honneth, 
Me Critique of Power, pp280-5. 
15. See Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p3l; 'Philosophy as 
Stand-In and Interpreter', p300; 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p300. Of 
course, the validity clause does not cover the rationality (efficiency) of instrumental actions. 
16. See Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia, pp263-70. I- 
17. Ile kind of transcendental argument which is appropriate for showing the necessity of some 
framework for self-interpretation will be considered in the following chapter. 
18. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p300. 
19. Habermas, 'Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter', p314. 
20. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p196. Habermas retains this 
view in his more recent writings. For the Kantian, he writes in 'Lawrence Kohlberg and 
Neo-Aristotelianism' (see following footnote), "What one understands by morality becomes 
a matter of how one answers the question concerning the possibility of rationally'resolving 
practical questions in general. " (p5). 
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21. Habermas explicitly develops his thoughts on discourse ethics in the essays collected in 
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. But this conception of ethics is implicit 
throughout 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, most clearly in his discussion of Mead and 
Durkeheirn (vol. 2, pp43-113), and in his discussion of the uncoupling of system and 
lifeworld, ppl74-80. Moreover, the basic intuitions underlying discourse ethics can be 
traced much further back in Habermas's work; to the notion of intact intersubjectivity as the 
dialogue situation. 
On the other hand, there are also notable discontinuities in the development of Habermas's 
position. He now prefers to distinguish between the different uses of practical reason - 
moral, pragmatic, and therapeutic - rather than between (moral) practical reason, and other 
forms of rationality. This new position is outlined in 'On the pragmatic, the ethical, and 
the moral employments of practical reason', and 'Lawrence Kohlberg and 
Neo-Aristoelianism', translated by Ciarin Cronin, in Remarla on Discourse Ethics, 
forthcoming. My citations from these articles are from the unpublished manuscripts. While 
this amendment to Habermas's position deflects some of the criticisms I put in this chapter, 
I will argue that it fits uneasily with the framework of his theory of communicative 
competence. Moreover, to the extent that discourse ethics is understood metatheoretically 
as an exercise in rational reconstruction, my objections hold. Put differently, the changes 
within'Habermas's position in these articles represent a move away from the strong claims 
for rational recontructions proposed in his earlier remarks on discourse ethics. 
22. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p197. 
23. Nor is the moral point of view determined by the empirical will; "the will determined by 
moral grounds does' not remain external to argumentative reason - the autonomous will 
becomes completely internal to reason", 'On the pragmatic, the ethical, and the moral 
employments of practical reason', p13. 
24. In contrast to this, there is the argument against the moral/ethical sceptic which appeals to 
phenomena of crises of identity in bringing the claim to normality to self-clarification. eI am 
proposing that this other (hermeneutic) argument is the more fundamental, andthat it is 
misleading to construe it as of the same rational reconstructive form as 'discourse ethics'. 
25. Post-conventional moral consciousness refers to an abstracted, disengaged, cognitive 
orientation, by which actors put the justification of conventional morality to the test of 
universalizable principles. Habermas appeals to the developmental moral psychology of 
Lawrence Kohlberg as empirical support for the claim that it is the final stage of a learning 
process, typical of the cognitive gains ascribable to modern differentiation and reflexivity. 
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For a representative account of Habermas's views on this matter, see, the title essay of 
Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. For a critique of its 
conception of advanced moral competence, see Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 'what is morality? a 
phenomenological account of the development of ethical expertise', in Rasmussen (ed. ) 
Universalism vs. Communitarianism, pp237-267. 
26. For an excellent discussion of the formal /pragmatic refutation, see Kenneth Baynes, 7he 
Normative Grounds of Social Criticism, ch3. Also useful is White, 7he Recent Work of 
Jargen Habermas, ch. 3. 
27. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p104. 
28. Habermas, 'Questions and Counterquestions, p210. This- is consistent with Habermas' 
general definition of rationality as criticizability; see 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, 
Vol. Ipplo. 
29. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p104. 
30. Ibid., p108. 
31. Ibid., p178. 
32. Ibid., p108. 
33. Ibid., p109. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Habermas, 'Questions and Counterquestions" p209. 
36. For a discussion of this, see Benhabib, 'In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: 
Communicative Ethics - and Current Controversies - in Practical Philosophy', 7he 
Philosophical Forwn, XXI, Fall-Winter 1989-90, especially pp4-13. 
37. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Conununicative Action, p206; 'Lawrence Kohlberg and 
Neo-Aristotelianism', p18. 
38. Rawls, A 7heory ofJustice, pp423-4. With respect to the problem which follows, Rawls's 
option of relective equilibrium isn't available to Habermas. He might refer instead to the 
relevance of norms for social integration, hence dismissing Rawls's fanciful 
counter-example. While undoubtedly of some force, this move generates its own difficulties, 
as I go on to indicate. 
39. See Benhabib, 'In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current 
Controversies in Practical Philosophy", p12. 
40. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p206. 
41. This, for Habermas, is the counterfactual presupposition that participants in argumentation 
must make. 
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42. As this remark suggests, Habermas takes aesthetic and therapeutic discourse to be intimately 
related. The link lies in the 'need interpretative' role of both. Aesthetic discourse is 
conceived as 'world-disclosive', as against the hypothetical or problem-solving procedures 
of practical argumentation. But Habermas also links aesthetic discourse to the thematization 
of the validity claim to authenticity, raising other problems which I go on to discuss. 
43. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p108. I referred to this 
architectonic in (1.1) above. 
44. 'Objective truth' refers here to the validity claim thematized in the discourse of natural 
science, and fits ill, even within Habermas's cognitive map, with the category 'culture'. 
45. See Martin Seel, 'The Two Meanings of Communicative Rationality: Remarks on 
Habermas's Critique of a Plural Concept of Reason', in Honneth and Joas (eds. ), 
Communicative Action, pp36-48. 
46. Habermas, "On the pragmatic, the ethical and the moral employments of practical reason', 
p4. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. t pp9-10. 
49. Ibid., pIO. 
50. Ibid. p4. 
51. For Taylor's contrasting analysis of the ideal of 'authenticity', see his 7he Malaise of 
Modernity, pp. 25-42. 
52. "Cultural values do not appear with a claim to universality, as do norms of action. At most, 
values are candidates for interpretation under which a circle of those affected can, if 
occasion arises, describe and normatively regulate a common interest". Habermas,,, 7he 
7heory of Communicative Action, vol. ], p20. 
53.1 follow Benhabib's terminology here; 'In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: 
Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy', p15. 
54. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p20 I. 
55. Homogeneous, I should add, only in this repect. Habermas's concept in other respects is 
indeed very complex, playing various methodological, epistemological, sociological, and 
normative roles. Again, this complexity creates its own problems; see for instance those 
highlighted by Hans Joas in Ile Unhappy Marriage of Hermeneutics and Functionalism', 
in Honneth and Joas (ed. ) Communicative Action, especially pp 114-8. 
56. See Honneth, 7he Critique of Power, pp300-3; and Fraser, 'What's Critical about Critical 
Tbeory? ', New Gennan Critique, 35, for whom the basic issue is not "whether lifeworld 
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norms will be decisive but, rather, - which norms will" (pl. 27). In defense of Habermas, this 
question is secondary to that of the intelligibility of the claim to normativity which 
Habermas addresses. 
57. A similar criticism is put by Alessandro Ferrara, 'Universalisms: procedural, contextual, and 
prudential', in Rasmussen (ed) Universalism vs. Communitarianism, pp 11-39. It is a point 
which recurs throughout Rasmussen's own book Reading Habermas. 
58. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p108, & p177-8. 
59. Ibid., p206. 
60.11ough I, admit that the extended comment on the relation between justification and 
application in Habermas's "A Reply' in Honneth and Joas (eds. ), Communicative Action, 
makes my objection seem somewhat beside the point. 
61. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p182. 
62. See Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, pp340-3. 
63. For Habermas's reply to Benhabib's objection, see Dews (ed. ), Autonomy and Solidarity,. 
Revised Edition, pp251-2. His thrust is that in real discourses of application, as opposed 
to the idealized context of justification, the other must always be concretized. But this 
response'will only seem convincing if one has already accepted the strong distinction 
between justification and application. 
64. Habermas, 'Questions and Counterquestions', p210. 
65. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p104. 
66. Ibid., ppl. 77-8. 
67. See Habermas, 'Reply to my Critics', pp227-8. 
68. Habermas, 'On the pragmatic, the ethical and the moral employments of practical reason , 
p 13. 
69. In Dews, (ed. ) Autonomy and Solidarity, Revised Edition, ppl. 66-7. 
70. Ibid., p162. 
71. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p206. ' 
72. "neo-Aristotelian approaches ... must demonstrate how an objective moral order can 
be 
grounded without recourse to metaphysical premises". Ibid., p214, n. 15. 
73. For the charge of conservatism, see 'Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianism' pp13 14. In a 
broader political context, Habermas suspects its ideas of deactivating the "explosive force 
of universalistic principles of morality", thereby minimizing "the burden of moral 
justification incumbent upon the political system", 7he New Conservatism, pp41-2- 
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74. This is quite different to the position that the differentiated truth and normative rightness 
validity claims are always raised simultaneously. 
75. Habermas, 'Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianism', p12. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Ibid., ppIO-11. 
78. Ibid., p13. 
79. Ibid. 
Chapter Six: Taylor's Conception of Crisis 
1. For Taylor, some general concept of the person and the good is ineradicable for the 
understanding and explanation of human affairs, even though particular conceptions of them 
are contingent to cultures. I am here drawing on the useful distinction between 'concept' and 
'conception' made by Putnam in Reason, Truth, and History,, p 117. 
2. "We are selves only in that certain issues matter for us": Taylor, Sources of the Setf, p34. 
See also Taylor, 'Ile Concept of a Person', in Human Agency and Language, p98. That 
this is the basic idea upon which Taylor's philosophical position builds is suggested by his 
'Reply to de Sousa' in 7he Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18,1988, p450. f 
This point is thought to hold for meanings generally. See for instance the analogy drawn in 
this respect between the meaning of 'courage' and 'red' in Taylor, 'What is Human 
Agency? ', in Human Agency and Language, p19. 
4. But not vice versa; See Taylor, 7he Malaise of Modernity, pp35-41. 
5. Here, as much elsewhere, Taylor draws upon the insights of Heidegger. For the 
Heideggerian source of this point, see Being and Time, Pt 1, Div. 1, VI; 'Care as the Being 
of Dasein'. 
6. These axioms of moral intuition are discussed in Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp3-25. 
7. This raises the question of how the person whose identity (what matters to him) consists in 
the fulfilment of his de facto desires is to be accounted for as a strong evaluator. It is 
discussed in (6.3) and (6.4) below, but Nietzsche has. given us a snappy answer to the same 
question arising from the inverse phenomenon: "He who despises himself still nonetheless 
respects himself as one who despises". (Beyond Good and Evil, maxim 78, p74) 
8. Taylor, Sources of the Setf, p63. . 11 fý 
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9. For Taylor's thoughts on the distinction between first and second order desires, and how his 
own distinction between strong and weak evaluations relates to it, see Taylor, 'What is 
Human Agency, Human Agency and Language, pp 15-26. 
10. Taylor, Sources of the Sey, p93. 
II Ibid., pp95-6. 
12. They are mentioned, together with a useful summary of the key terms introduced in Sources 
of the Self in 'Comments and Replies', in Inquiry, 34, June 199 1, pp237-54, especially 
p243. 
13. Ibis is an extremely brief summary of arguments set out in 'Self-interpreting Animals', 
Human Agency and Language, pp45-76; and 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences, ppIS-58. 
14. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p35. 
15. Ibid., p36. 
16. Ibid., p38. For a much earlier expression of this idea, see Taylor's Hegel and Modern 
Society, p160. 
17. Taylor, "Legitimation Crisis? ', in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p287. 
18. Compare, for instance, Taylor's remarks in 'What is Human AgencyT, where'he writes; 
"The point of introducing the distinction between. strong and weak evaluations is to contrast 
the different kind of self that each involves". (Human Agency and Language, p23). Ibis 
is confusing, since he also claims that it is virtue of strong evaluations that there is such 
thing as a 'self' at all. 
19. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p322. 
20. Taylor, 'Legitimation Crisis? ', Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p277. 
21. Ibid., pp248ff. 
22. Ibid., especially p278f. 
23. 'Inwardness and the Culture of Modernity, in McCarthy et al. (eds. ) Zwischenbetrachtungen 
Im Proceft der AujUdrung, p622-3. 
24. Taylor, Sources of the Setf, p 18. 
25. Ibid., p19. I will return to this point when considering Rorty's objections to Taylor's 
conception of the self in (6.4), below. 
26. Taylor, Sources of the Setf, p27. 
27. M. L6w-Beer, 'Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility", Inquiry, 34, 
June 1991, pp217-36. 
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28. Ibid, pp224-5. L6w-Beer, however, does not draw attention to the fact that this should be 
the position of the weak evaluator described by Taylor in 'What is Human Agency', Human 
Agency and Language, pp26-35. 
29. Taylor, Sources of the SeIr, p27. 
30. Ibid., p2g. 
31 Ibid., p30. 
32. Ibid., p32. 
33. Ibid., p30. 
34. Ibid., p3l. 
35. Ibid., p102. 
36. As I noted in (1.0), Taylor's most developed discussion of 'neo-Nietzscheanism' is his 
"Foucault on Freedom and Truth', in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, ppl. 52-85. 
37. The 'utiliatarian' conception is attacked in "What is Human Agency', Human Agency and 
Language, ppl7f. The 'emotivist' self is MacIntyres term (see After Virtue, p30), and is 
put to a critique more thorough and subtle than MacIntryre's in Sources of the SeIr ch. 19. 
Taylor criticizes the general view of Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 'Rorty 
in the Epistemological Tradition', in Malachowski (ed. ) Reading Rorty, pp257-75, but 
doesn't deal there with the objections to his own views which can be reconstructed from 
Rorty's later writings. L6w-Beer mentions Rorty's conception of the self in contrast to 
Taylor"s in 'Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility', but he does not take 
up the problems which Rorty's view pose for Taylor's. 
38. My sources for Rorty's views are 'Freud and Moral Reflection', in Smith and Kerrigan, 
(eds. ), Pragmatism's Freud, ppl-27; and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, especially 
ch. 2. 
39. Rorty, 'Freud and Moral Reflection', p5. 
40. Ibid, p12. 
41. This is a point of common ground with Taylor, who agrees that the self is always more that 
the articulations given to it. 
42. Rorty, 'Freud and Moral Reflection', p6. 
43. Ibid., p18. 
44. Ibid., p9; Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p3l. 
45. Ibid., p12. 
46. Ibid. 
47. The phrase is Taylor's, 'Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition', p269. 
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48. Guignon and Hiley cite evidence of this sort in 'Biting the Bullet: Rorty on Private and 
Public Morality', in Reading Rorty, especially p356, with references on p363. Similar 
evidence is provided by Stephen Frosh in Identity Oisis; Modernity, Psychoanalysis and the 
Self, eg. p45. Anthony Giddens incoporates it within a sociological perspective in Modernity 
and Self-Identity, especially ch. 2. 
49. See footnote 10 to 'Freud and Moral Reflection', p22. 
50. Wittgenstein, Ractatus Logico-Philosophicus, #4.003 1. 
Chapter Seven: Taylor, Language, and Critique 
1. Taylor, Sources of the Setf, p50. 
2. Ibid., p72. 
3. Taylor distinguishes between 'ad hominem' and 'apodictic' models of practical reasoning 
in 'Explanation and Practical Reasoning', Wider Working Papers WP72, p2., My citations 
of this article come with the acknowledgement that it is a working paper circulated in a 
provisional form to encourage discussion and comment before publication. 
4. Taylor, Sources of the Setf, p72. 
5. As Taylor puts it, Nietzsche's "genealogy goes to the heart of the logic of practical 
reasoning. A hypergood can only be defended through a reading of its genesis". Sources 
of the Setf, P73. See also P505. 
6. Taylor gives the homely example of the de facto incompatibility of two activities such as 
football and chess, in contrast to the in principle incompatibility or incommensurability of 
soccer and rugby football; "the rules which partly define these games prescribe actions in 
contradiction to each other. Picking up the ball and running with it is against the rules of 
soccer". ' Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p144. A similar relation holds, he suggests, 
between pre- and post-Galilean science. Describing nature in anthropocentric terms is a 
'foul' in the latter. 
7. Taylor, ibid., p149. 
8. 'Explanation and Practical Reasoning', pp7-12. 
9. Ibid., p12. 
10. Ibid., ppll-12. 
11. Taylor instances the cruel punishment of a parricide in the mid-18th century as described 
by Foucault in Discipline and Punish, ibid. 9, p13. 
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12. Ibid., p16. 
13. But articulation only becomes an imperative given the modem moral predicament; see 
Sources of the SeJf, p92f. 
14. 'Understanding and Explanation in the Geisteswissenschaften, in Holtzman and Leich (eds. ), 
Wingenstein: to Follow a Rule, p2OO. 
15. Ibid., p192. 
16. The point that the meaning of virtue terms - or what Taylor calls 'desirability 
characterizations' - such as courage, integrity, and the like, do not withstand division into 
'fact-stating' and 'value-projecting' components, is worth bringing attention to partisans of 
a 'value-free', 'scientific' reading of Marx. Their efforts to purify Marx's concept of 
exploitation from evaluative residue, by translating it into a neutral term like 'extraction', 
spumping out' or whatever, fail to pick out something in the world which is essential to 
what Marx identifies; namely, exploitative practices. 
17. Ibid., p191. Taylor has an unfortunate penchant for critically engaging with the vulgar 
cousins of philosophers, especially the distant ones of Marx (eg. Sources of the Setf, p203). 
18. 'Understanding and Explanation in the Gelsteswissenschaften', p204. 
19. Ibid., p205. 
20. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p69. 
21. The orthodox view thus reinforces the 'naturalist' prejudice that first person accounts, 
articulated in the language of everyday life, are not explanatory. 
22. Taylor, Sources of the Setf, p58. 
23. Ibid., p59. 
24. The epistemological consideration focusses nore on certainty, as against non-conclusive 
validations of strong evaluation interpretation, and 'essentially contestable' value-terms. 
25. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p69. 
26. Ibid., p57. 
27. Ibid., p8l. 
28. Ibid., p59. 
29. Ibid., p67. 
30. 'Understanding and Explanation in the Geisteswissenschaften', pp205-6. 
31. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #20 1. 
32. Tully, 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy', Political 7heory, May 1989, p 195. 
33. See Habermas, 'On Systematically Distorted Communication', p217. 
34. See "A Digression on Historical Explanation', in Sources of the Self, ppl99-210. 
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35. Ibid., p207. 
36. 'Wholly sympathetic' but only qua expressivist. There are important differences, not least 
her rejection of the absolute conception. But I think my attribute is merited, since that 
conception is alien to expressivism. 
37. Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics, p 169. 
38. Ibid., p204. 
39. Ibid., p173. 
40. Ibid., p175. 
41. Ibid., p178. 
42. Ibid., p194. 
43. Ibid., p218. 
44. Ibid., p219. 
Chapter Eight: Ile Critique of Reason: Instrumental, Functional, or Procedural? 
Both Habermas and Taylor express their debt to, and attempt to build upon, the description 
of the paradoxes of the subject-object relation in the final chapter of Foucault's 7he Order 
of 7h! ngs. 
2. Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp99-100. 
3. This is a criticism which has repeatedly been put against Habermas. Taylor makes it in 
'Language and Society', p30. 
4. Taylor does this to great effect in the chapter on Locke in Sources of the Self, 159-74, which 
I refer to below. i 
5. A clear, concise, and convincing case for this claim, relating utiiltarianism specifically to 
the dominance of the market in modernity, is made by Ross Poole in Morality and 
Modernity, pp8-17. 
6. The locus classicus of this view is of course Adomo and Horkeimer's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Similar points about utlitarianism (that it leads to the opposite of happiness 
whether accepted or not) are put less dramatically by Bernard Williams in Morality, 
pp96-112. 
7. Habermas, 7he 7heory of Conununicative Action; vol. 1, pp398-9. 
8. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p29. 
9. Ibid., pp315-6. 
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10. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p160 
11. Ibid., pp156,163,168. 
12. It should by now be clear that, for Taylor, the two. motives are not ultimately separable. 
Like Gellner, he thinks that epistemological issues have their root in an ethic of (disengaged) 
cognition. 
13. Taylor, Sources of the Se? f, p 17 1. 
14. Ibid., p176. 
15. Ibid., p173. 
16. Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p297. 
17. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 81. 
18. Ibid., pp82-3. 
19. Ibid., p85. 
20. Here Taylor draws on Williams's description of the "institution of morality", which I 
discussed in (3.1). 
21. 'Comments and Replies', Inquiry 34,1991 p252. 
22. Though this only comes into focus once Habermas's theory is amended to the satisfaction 
of critics like Fraser and Honneth, whose objections to Habermas's colonization thesis were 
noted in chapter five. 
23. See Habermas, 7he Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,, p 139. 
24. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p5 10. 
25. Ibid., p419. 
26. Ibid., pp374,381,421. 
27. Ibid., p420. 
28. Peter Winch puts this expressivist thought as well as anyone; "Reality is not what gives 
language sense. What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that language has". 
'Understanding a Primitive Society', in his Ethics and Action, p12. 
29. Sources of the Self, p428. 
30. Ibid., p481. 
31. Ibid., pp481-2. 
32. Ibid., p481. 
33. Ibid., pp482,425. 
34. Ibid., p478. 
35. Ibid., p481. 
36. Ibid., p465. 
346 
37. Ibid., p462. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid., p480. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid., p464. 
42. Ibid., p480. 
43. Ibid., p464. 
44. Ibid., p445. 
45. Ibid., p448. 
46. Ibid., p453. 
47. Ibid., p429. 
48. Ibid., p472. 
49. Ibid., p491. 
50. Ibid., p. 462. 
51.1 think this throws some light on Jay Bernstein's insufficiently'justified objection against 
Taylor that by employing "the discourses of modernism directly", he leaves himself open 
to the charge that "epiphanies are just imagined, mere possibilities without cognitive 
purchase on us". (Bernstein, 7he Fate of Art, note 6, pp275-6. ) In avowed opposition to 
Taylor, Bernstein believes that 'it is not the contents of these [modernist/ epiphanic] works 
which is most significant but their forms". ' It is strange that this view should be opposed 
to Taylor's, since the whole point about the concept of epiphany is that form and content 
cannot be separated. A more important issue, however, is that the real difficulty for Taylor 
lies in his reliance on the narrative, substantive model of practical reasoning to deflect the 
objection that epiphanies are a matter of mere subjective imagination. Ibis is why he 
deploys discourses of modernism for the sake of content. Only in this way can Taylor 
address the problem - which to his credit he does not simply wish away - that epiphanies 
have a cognitive purchase. 
52. Ibid., p505. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid., p428. 
55. Ibid., p481. 
56. Ibid. 
57. And therefore would be open to the same charges which, in (6.4), were put to Rorty from 
the viewpoint which Taylor defends. 
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58. A point noted by Michael Rosen, 'Must we Return to Moral Realism? ', Inquiry 34, June 
1991, pp 183-94., 
59. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p515. 
60. Ibid. , 
61. As Bernstein remarks; "psycho-sexual and moral developmental schemes cannot be empirical 
in, this way because they are determined by their terminus, their picture of maturity, 
autonomy, health, virtue, or the good life for men, which are not themselves subject to 
empirical questioning" J. Bernstein, 'Narrative and Self-Narration in Psychoanalysis', p(A. 
62. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p513.. 
Conclusion: The Politics of Democratic Problem-Solving and World-Disclosure 
1. Taylor, Sources of the Setf, p513. 
2. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p2l 1. 
3. Ibid. , 
4. As a philosophical doctrine, discourse ethics seeks to refute skepticism concerning the 
validity of justice claims. But this is done without considering the role which might, be 
played by primafacie moral intuitions of the kind at issue here; they simply don't feature 
in the rational reconstruction of the moral point of view attempted -in discourse ethics. 
5. Ile 'green' intuition that the natural environment and wilderness are bearers of moral claims 
which human beings ought to recognize requires comment. This intuition might be supported 
by the simple thought experiment of imagining two worlds, one where there is no life, and 
another where there is life like there is on earth but without its human form. If we allow that 
the latter is in some sense a better world than the former, (and not just because there is a 
greater chance of humans coming into existence), then the challenge might be put to 
radically rethink the inheritance of anthropocentric grounds of value. While I do not think 
that the validity of moral intuitions can in general be demonstrated or refuted by appeal to 
thought experiments, it might be worth considering if the appeal of this particular thought 
experiment would soon backfire if we were to expand it a little. 
In the year 2100 nuclear war destroys all detectable life on Earth. In the year 2050, 
however, an astronaut had been sent into space in search of life on another planet. After 50 
years of Earth-time, she discovers a planet (which she calls 76ra') which appears to be 
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life-supporting and very similar to Earth as it is thought to have been just prior to the last 
Pleistocene Ice Age (very green and without humans) except that it is bigger. Further, one 
of its moons (which our astronaut calls 'Husk') appears to be as barren - though 'naturally' 
- as the post-holocaust lifeless Earth. Suddenly, a large meteorite is seen approaching the 
planet at a very high and deadly speed. 
What moral intuitions or judgements would we have or make about these respective 
heavenly bodies if we were to be that astronaut? Would we want to say that Tera was better, 
or contained more goodness, than Husk? Would we want to say that Tera was about to 
become worse than the Earth just prior to the Ice-age, but better than the then contemporary 
Earth, since the destruction of life on Earth was the result of a human action? Would we 
want to say anything about the meteorites?, Would we want to say anything of moral 
significance about what caused the Ice-Age? 
Ile sheer obscenity of a radioactively decimated Earth, or even of an Earth depleted of 
many of its I ife forms, provokes the 'Deep Ecological' ethical reorientation toward locating 
value in the life forms themselves, either by pragmatically endowing them with rights which 
demand respect, or - and this is less embarrassingly humanistic - by infusing them with a 
mystical quality (Being) which calls for reverence. But our thought experiment indicates that 
the critique of anthropocentrism may not be quite what it seems. We began by accepting the 
intuition that Earth minus humans would in some sense be better than an Earth minus life. 
It is an intuition which seems to be reinforced if we think of the Earth as being destroyed 
of life by human actions. But if we expand our thinking to consequentially equivalent states 
of worlds (equivalent in terms of the existence of life and the diversity of species), that 
intuition no longer seems so applicable. We must be able to differentiate between the 
impending doom facing the imaginary planet Tera and our imagined fate of the Earth, and 
not only in terms of the extent of life or species loss; a difference intelligible only if we 
distinguish between the actions of human beings, and the happenings of nature. What makes 
a meteorite different to a missile, and the extinction of the brontosaurus different to that of 
the dodo, is of course the human responsibility for these facts. If we focus attention on 
responsibility, then we can preserve our intuition about the immorality of environmental 
destruction, and about the need for a proper sense of our inter-dependence with nature, 
while at the same time recognizing the political need for human autonomy as the condition 
of applying this sensibility. 11is must, in part, be an autonomyftom brute nature - as well 
as from the social 'realm of necessity' - insofar as we are able to bring about happenings 
for which we can be said to be atfault ourselves. It does not follow from this that we must 
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follow Kant in placing the metaphysical locus of this autonomy and responsibility completely 
outside nature, since human beings inhabit a world of linguistically disclosed significance 
which cannot be naturalized to the world inhabited bybrutes without remainder. Further, 
Habermas's approach highlights that the responsibility at stake here is that of a collective 
gus'; an "us' only'in the medium of which we forge our identities and the identities of 
objects with moral claims. One problem with taking solitary aesthetic experience as an 
exemplary source of moral attunement and self-awareness is that there are so many identity 
forming conditions presupposed in such experiences, conditions which can only be 
established on the basis of the shared activities of human beings. On the other hind, the fact 
that human beings do share a linguistically constituted intersubjectivity does not explain the 
peculiar pull of moral claims once disclosed to a particular subject. What is needed is a 
conception of responsibility which synthesizes Habermas's and Taylor's insights, though I 
am not yet in a position to provide it. 
6. Taylor, 7he Malaise of Modernity, p9l. 
7. Habermas, 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p. 394 
8. Heidegger introduces this idea of nature being disclosed as a standing resource (or as the 
translator puts it, 'stand ing-reserve'), in 'The Question Concerning Technology', in 7he 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated and with introduction by 
William Lovitt, p17. 
9.1 mean 'world picture' here in the sense given to it by Heidegger in 'The Age of the World 
Picture', Ibid., pp 115-154. 'Mat essay is not itself, of course, an exercise in deconstruction. 
10. A similar view is shared by John Dryzek, who writes that "the human life-support capacity 
of natural systems is the generalizable interest par excellence". Rational Ecology: 
Environment and Political Economy, p36, cited by Robyn Eckersley, 'Habermas and Green 
Political lbought', Aeory and Society, 19,1990, p757. However, I take issue'with 
Dryzek's view (seemingly shared by Eckersley; see Ibid. 765-6) that this support-system is 
best approached as a "partner in communication" in note 17, below. 
Convincing support for this explanatory hypothesis is given in Timothy W. Luke and 
Stephen K. White, 'Critical Theory, the Informational Revolution, and an Ecological Path 
to Modernity', in J. Forrester (ed. ), Critical Yheory and Public Life, pp22-49. The need for 
a modification to Habermas's theory by way of proposing an institutionalization of 
communicative norms at the level of production is persuasively urged by Tony Smith, 7he 
Role of Ethics in Social 7heory, pp169-71. 
12. Taylor, Sources of the Sey', p. 97. 
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13. Taylor, 7he Malaise of Modernity, pp81-2. 
14. But, for a 'subjectivist' interpretation of Taylor which does leave such sensibilities offended, 
see Stephen R. L. Clark, "Taylor's Waking Dream', Inquiry, 34, June 1991, ppl95-215. 
15. For a defence of science as a project oriented to the cooperative use of problem-solving 
rationality, see Nicholas Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom. Although Maxwell is 
perhaps over ambitious in proposing that "As a result of implementing this Enlighterunent 
programme [qua rational cooperative prolbem-solving], we may well expect to achieve in 
life a degree of progress towards what is, of value in life to us that is comparable to the 
remarkable progress that has been achieved in science (in improving knowledge)" (pp 156-7), 
the point to be stressed is that such a project is not to be confused whith the accumulation 
of objectifying knowledge by subjects. Only the latter conception of science undercuts 
projects of world-disclosure. 
16. This suggestion is made by John S. Dryzek in 'Green Reason: Communicative Ethics and 
the Biosphere, Environmental Ethics, 12, Fall 1990, pp195-210. 
17. Dryzek - -. writes, "intersubjective discourse presupposes some ecological - and not just 
linguistic - standards. Although it is easy to forget, our communications with one another 
can proceed only in and through the media made available by the natural world... if Lovelock 
is right, the atmosphere in which we live, talk, hear, write, read, smell, and touch is 
composed and regulated by the planet's biota acting in concert. 'Mis biota makes possible 
and maintains a physical environment fit for itself - and for us, and our 
communications ... Because any such [communicative] act is made possible by this ecological 
system, it can be called to account in accordance with ecological standards. If indeed nature 
is a silent participant in every conversation, then perhaps it deserves a measure of the 
respect that we accord to human participants. If critical communication theorists argue that' 
only entities capable of entering into communication can be assigned value, then there is a 
sense in which Gaia passes their test. " (Ibid., p205). 
In this passage, Dryzek shifts from the interesting and eminently plausible idea that there 
are 'ecological standards' which are presupposed in intersubjective discourse, to the much 
less plausible suggestion that these presuppositions should be considered ý as unheard 
participants in discourse. The latter view is wholly adventitious to the first, and requires the 
addition of the speculative Gaia hypothesis. The former point can be upheld without relying 
on such speculation, which in any case betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of 
communicative ethics. Critical communication theorists need not claim that only beings 
capable of speech and action are assigned value, but that only such beings, in their capacity 
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for world-disclosure and rational problem-solving, can meaningfully assign it. Since the 
procedural test does not function as a mechanism for selecting candidates for participation, 
it is misleading to propose that Gaia can either pass or fail it. - 
Inhere is another interesting twist to Dryzek's 'extension' of communicative rationality to 
include 'ecological standards'. Of the latter, he cites 'diversity, homeostasis, flexibility', 
which in general are the presuppositions for the maintenance of a 'self-regulating global 
system' (pp204-5). As such, they are precisely the standards of system maintenance which 
Habermas is so concerned to keep distinct from the lifeworld. A major difficulty for radical 
ecology is how to reconcile ascribing value to nature in toto with the requirement of 
acknowledging the moral demands of particulars; a problem Habermas tries to offset by 
refusing to construe the lifeworld as a meta-subject. 
18. Habermas, 7he 7heory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, pp394-5. This point fits peculiarly 
well with the suspicion directed by 'rationalist' radical ecologists, such as Dryzek, against 
those 'Deep Ecologists' who ascribe the environmental crisis to a profane spirituality, or to 
the suppression of intuitions 'naturally' attuned to the environment. Concerning the latter 
view - to which, we have seen, Taylor subscribes - Dryzek comments that "interventions 
in complex systems often have counterintuitive results, as actions ramify throughout these 
systems. As a result, intuitions, good intentions, and sympathetic sensibilities are insufficient 
guides to action" (op. cit. p200). In other words, world-disclosure must be constrained by 
rational problem-solving, even in the case of ecologically attuned action. 
19. Since writing this concluding section, I have discovered that in his book Political 7heory 
and Postmodernism, Stephen K. White organizes the political debate between defenders of 
'modernity' and 'postmodernity' around this distinction between the action-coordinative and 
world-disclosive aspects of language. Corresponding to this distinction, White proposes, 
are conceptions of the 'responsibility to act' and the 'responsibility to otherness; the former 
is prioritized by defenders of modernity, the latter by postmodernists. I am at one with 
White in thinking that the political differences between Habermasians and postmodernists 
can be clarified by appeal to this distinction, and I am in sympathy with his preference for 
Heidegger's conception of language over post-structuralist conceptions. If anything, White 
is insufficiently critical of the latter. For a conception of language which is incompatible 
with the intelligibility of communication, as postmodernism's Derrida arguably is, cannot 
simply be added on to a conception which does account for the possibility of 
communication, just for the sake of its 'world-disclosive' pay-off. Nor is it clear why 
" concerted deployment of new fictions against whatever fictions are socially in force" 
352 
requires Ma deep affirmation of the world-disclosing capacity of language" (ibid., p27). 
What is disclosed by language is the world, not the human power to create fictions. 
Furthermore, it is hardly a sign of "responsibility to otherness" that I respond to the truth- 
claim of an exploited other with "throws of Nietzschean laughter", as White's view seems 
to imply (px). Nor does White consider the "cognitive machinery" of ethical/political self- 
understanding associated with rational action-coordination and world-disclosure in any detail, 
a lacuna which I believe could be filled by linking it to subjective and objective criticism. 
But these objections are a little unfair, since they apply to issues outside the remit of his 
book. I'llis concluding section can'be seen as taking up White's offer (ibid. ' pxii) of 
applying the distinction between rational action-coordination and world-disclosure to a 
political topic other than the issue of justice austice being the topic of his own application 
of the distinction). 
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